“The Principles of Theology and Theological Loci,” by Raymond Martin, OP

It¹ was by deliberate intention that, in a previous article,² we discussed the object of theology instead of first and foremost asking ourselves what the principles of sacred science were. We believed that, after clearly and fully detailing this object, it would be easier to ascend from there to the very principles of theology, to distinguish their characteristics, and then to group them into different categories. It is commonly said that the principles of theology are the truths of faith. This assertion is too general and—at least if one takes into account the integral object of theology—too exclusive and consequently incomplete. Therefore, in this study, we shall strive: 1˚ to indicate with greater precision and, as far as possible, in detail, what the principles of theological science are; 2˚ to state the classification that has been made of them or that could be made; and 3˚ to present the relationship between the principles of theology and the Loci theologici.

* * *

As we said in the previous article, the object of theology is what serves our discernment of the principles of this science. Indeed, a tree is known by its fruits and the purity of a spring by the water that flows from it. So too, given that a theological conclusion is, so to speak, the fruit of the two premises from which it derives, it will inform us about the nature and character of those generative elements of all science, namely its principles.

In view of the fact that the integral object of theology comprises three different series of conclusions, we can affirm at once that three groups of principles must be distinguished: 1˚ revealed principles, 2˚ non-revealed principles, and 3˚ mixed principles. Indeed, a De fide conclusion can never be generated except by truths of faith. On the other hand, there is no reason why one should begin from a truth of faith only to arrive at a purely rational conclusion; such a conclusion requires merely purely natural premises. However, a virtually revealed conclusion, having a dual character, participating at once in faith and reason, being deduced from faith with the aid of reason, cannot derive from homogeneous principles. Rather, the principles from which it proceeds will be mixed, that is, one principle of faith and another of reason.

And thus, the principles of theology are complete, in three groups.

Let us bring forth the various elements that compose these three groups.

* * *

The first group consists of revealed principles. The learned Constantin von Schäzler has pointed out that only truths that are immediately and formally revealed can be considered here.³ This is obvious: a truth that is merely virtually revealed is not a principle but, rather, a theological conclusion. However, should all immediately revealed truths be considered theological principles? To this question, the distinguished theologian responded with a distinction. Indeed, one can and must consider immediately revealed truths under a twofold aspect: in themselves and in relation to the believer. Referring to a statement by Cardinal de Lugo, Schäzler recalls that a truth is revealed in relation to us only when its meaning and tenor are sufficiently proposed to us by the divine instrument instituted for this purpose—namely, only those revealed truths that the Holy Church presents to us as the objects of our faith.

Following these considerations, we can conclude with Von Schäzler that the principles of theology are not all the truths formally contained in the revealed deposit, but only those truths that are proposed to us as such by the Holy Church. In other words, only dogmas constitute these theological principles, which we have classified in the first group.

What is the reason for this conclusion? How can it be justified? “It is because,” says Saint Thomas, “the formal object of faith (that is, the means by which we know an object of faith) is the First Truth, as it is manifested in Sacred Scripture and in the Church’s doctrine, which proceeds from the First Truth.”⁴ God speaks to us and reveals the truth through the Church. Outside of proposition by the Church, there is no truth formally revealed for the faithful.

With this point established, we can now examine in greater detail which truths are immediately revealed. The Church proposes for our belief the truths contained in Sacred Scripture and Tradition.⁵ These truths, revealed in themselves, are made accessible to us and are successively proposed, one after another, by the magisterium of the Catholic Church. Through its authentic organs—the teaching authority of the universal Church, ecumenical councils, and the teachings of the Sovereign Pontiff—the magisterium spares us from all personal investigation, which would be highly uncertain, concerning the revealed deposit and places us directly in contact with the assertions of faith. Every good treatise on positive theology recalls these truths. As an example, one might cite a work that is like Turmel’s Histoire de la théologie positive, though perhaps more accurate, for the truths contained in Scripture and Tradition, and the Enchiridion of Denzinger-Bannwart for the teachings of divine faith guaranteed by councils and pontiffs.⁶

There surely should be a way to arrange all these elements according to a certain order. In fact, this classification has not been established. At most, there exists only a very general systematization of the principal truths of faith contained in Scripture. Saint Thomas, and after him Melchior Cano, recalled this to theologians. The principle presiding over this classification is the specialis ratio non visi⁷ proper to a truth. According to this principle, the Angelic Doctor first distinguishes, through analogy with the first principles of philosophy, the first truths of faith: the prima credibilia. These are the infinite being of God and divine providence.⁸ Nothing is more hidden, nothing more impenetrable to our minds than the divine essence and His holy providence. These two truths dominate the whole of our faith. Under their hegemony, Saint Thomas—always following the same principle of division—arranged other categories of truths, namely, the articles of the Apostles’ Creed. Indeed, all these articles are connected either to the majesty of the infinite being of God or to the supernatural providence presided over by the Incarnate Word.⁹ The truths of the Creed thus elaborate upon the prima credibilia and manifest their virtuality.

Therefore, within this first group of theological principles, we can likewise distinguish: 1˚ first principles, which Cano calls the dignitates and suppositiones of theology;¹⁰ 2˚ general principles, or the articles of the Creed. And Saint Thomas has shown through examples how this systematization could be further developed and completed.¹¹

A similar classification should be made in the domain of Tradition and the Church’s official teaching.¹² Fr. Gardeil has proposed this as a task for the young. How obvious it is to the eyes of all that this summons be heard!

Thus far, we have considered a certain number of theological principles: truths that are formally and certainly revealed; truths whose certain revelation, contained in Scripture and Tradition, is guaranteed to us by the Church.

However, “not everything is stated by the Church. The theologian knows that, alongside this official magisterium, saints and theologians labor to cultivate the field of the Pater familias.” The result of their work provides us with a body of truths that are not absolutely of faith,¹³ though they are probably so. At the very least, it would be rash to reject a truth relating to matters of faith and taught by the unanimous agreement of the Church Fathers or theologians. The Church herself has recognized the unanimous agreement of the Fathers as an authoritative interpretation of Sacred Scripture: “Thus, there is annexed to the revealed deposit a perpetual commentary which, by the spirit of faith that inspires it, is in some sense homogeneous with it and provides an interpretation that, if not always official, is at least often semi-official.” What does this imply for theological science? Here too it finds another series of principles from which it can draw life and to which it can attach its conclusions.

We will stop there, so let us summarize: in short, we have recognized within the first group of theological principles, formally revealed truths, two kinds of truths: 1˚ truths that are certainly of faith; 2˚ truths that are probably of faith.

* * *

Now, as we have already seen, another group of theological principles comprises truths that are not revealed but are known through natural reason: rational truths. This group is required by the proper yet accidental object of theology: natural-order conclusions.

How should they be classified?

According to the distinction we just employed. That is: according to the degree of certainty or probability.

Indeed, two aspects of natural reason are distinguished. It “can be considered 1˚ in itself and in its abstract value or 2˚ in the authorized testimony of the learned.” In the first case, it can provide us with truths that are absolutely certain within their own order—apodictic truths—which find their criterion of certainty in the very evidence with which they impose themselves upon the mind. These are subdivided into first principles having immediate evidence and mediate principles.¹⁴ “In the second case, if the testimony concerns doctrines, we have the authority of the great philosophers; if it concerns facts, we have the authority of history.”¹⁵ However, neither the authority of philosophers nor that of history guarantees that their teachings are ineluctably certain; the truths they present to us remain more or less probable.

* * *

Nothing particular needs to be added concerning the third group of theological principles. It is not constituted by new principles which would be distinct from those we have already discussed. Rather, the propositions of the preceding groups are linked together within it, mutually supporting one another. By the very fact that a truth of reason is connected and subordinated to a formally revealed proposition, we now have premises of a special kind; they belong neither purely to faith nor simply to reason but, rather, constitute theological reason.

Let us conclude this section by characterizing these different groups of principles in relation to theology. It is sufficient to mention the first two. All the propositions belonging to the first group are proper principles of theology; theology alone employs them, and no other science can claim them. This is what Saint Thomas affirms clearly in these words: “Sacred doctrine uses the propositions of Scripture as its own, and the conclusions it draws from them are absolutely certain; it also employs the truths established by the doctors of the Church as a good proper to itself, but the conclusions it deduces from them are only probable.”¹⁶

The principles of the second group are used by theology in common with other sciences. They properly belong to natural metaphysics and are, strictly speaking, an extraneous source for theology. This is also what Saint Thomas states: “Sacra doctrina makes use of the authorities of the philosophers as arguments that are, so to speak, extraneous, and merely probable.”¹⁷

It should also be noted that, in itself, theology has no need of these principles from natural reason; it does not call upon their assistance as if though proper principles were insufficient or were not the sole source in which the conclusion is contained. Indeed, the conclusion is contained solely in the principle of faith and in no way in the principle of natural reason. But the theologian employs these natural principles in consideration of the weakness of reason, which does not immediately perceive the conclusion within the principle of faith, and also in view of the mode of knowing proper to the human intellect, which more easily ascends to higher and divine truths with the aid of natural truths. This allows us to clearly characterize the role of the principle of reason in theology: its role is in no way equivalent to that of the principle of faith; it is an inferior and subordinate role, like that of a laborer directed by the foreman directing building project. The principle of reason is not a second, new source of theological knowledge; it serves only to enable one to perceive what is virtually contained in the truth of faith, just as the work of the laborer brings to light the full richness of the master’s ideal. This is the whole extent of its function. And here again, we have merely translated the Angelic Doctor.¹⁸

* * *

We now need to examine the relationship between the principles of theology and the loci theologici.

Are the loci theologici the theological principles?

We owe a debt to the Very Reverend Fr. Gardeil for providing us with a precise and clear understanding of the locus theologicus, and thanks to his learned exposition, it will not be difficult to answer the question we have just posed.¹⁹

The solution can already be somewhat anticipated, no doubt. Do not the principles we have successively enumerated above bear the same names as the ten loci theologici?

Let us recall the various notions of the loci theologici.

First of all, there is the general notion of a locus theologicus. It is the locus theologicus considered as a source, as a repository where the elements of proof are still intermingled and in their raw state. In this sense, the loci theologici can be defined as: “Quasi-seats and notes of arguments, from which all argumentation for any disputation might be found.”²⁰

Then, there is the strict notion of a locus theologicus. Here, the element of proof is no longer in its raw, unrefined state like ore awaiting future refinement. Now, it has been extracted, shaped, and is fully prepared to be adapted and serve as a starting point for theological argumentation. This is the locus tractatus, paratus, expeditus spoken of by Cano—a locus theologicus properly so called.

Who does not see that, when the locus theologicus is taken in this latter sense, it coincides entirely with the notion of a theological principle?

This is also what one will conclude from the following passage from Cano: “It is understood that, among the ten loci, the first two contain the proper and legitimate principles of theology, while the last three are external and foreign; for the five intermediate ones either contain the interpretation of the proper principles or the conclusions that arise and develop from them.”²¹

The first seven loci theologici are proper to theology and are based on divine authority.²² Now, theology is a science that argues solely by authority. The last three loci theologici are borrowed sources and are founded on natural reason.

All of this corresponds exactly to what we stated earlier about the various principles of theology. Therefore, the principles of theology are truly one and the same as the immediate and properly so-called loci theologici. And from this it is also evident how the treatise on the loci theologici belongs entirely to the domain of the Introduction to Theology.

* * *

Thus, we can conclude and summarize our thought in the following propositions:

1. The principles of theology, recognized as identical with the immediate loci theologici, are: a) the truths of faith; b) Certain truths of the natural order

Within each of these division, there are loci which are either absolutely certain or more or less probable.

2. The use of these principles in theology are differentiated into three cases, according to the three kinds of conclusions to which theological science leads: Either two truths of faith serve as principles and yield a conclusion; or a principle of faith is united with a principle of reason, and both then beget a theological conclusion properly so called.²³ Or again, theology, taking hold of two purely rational truths, employs them for an accidental but sometimes necessary purpose, the defense of its principles.²⁴

3. However, only the truths of faith are the proper principles of theology. The truths of reason are merely borrowed principles, which theology uses in common with other sciences. Their role is not at all the same as that of revealed principles. It is inferior and subordinate to that of the truths of faith.

---

1. Translator’s note: I owe thanks to my research assistant Mr. Mitchell Kengor for helping me pull this file together digitally in order to expedite the process of drafting this translation. (And, as always, too, for very intelligent discussions about questions of theological methodology.) This text is a translation of Raymond Martin, O.P., “Principes de la théologie et lieux théologiques,” Revue Thomiste 12, NS (1912): 499–507.↩︎

2. See article here *.↩︎

3. Cf. Schäzler, Introductio in sacram Theologiam, (Regensburg, 1882) p. 5.↩︎

4. See ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3.↩︎

5. Denzinger, no. 1792[3011].↩︎

6. See the opening paragraphs of the section “The passage from the four a priori theological common loci to Melchior Cano’s Ten a posteriori common loci” and the paragraph starting “Everyone is familiar with Denziger’s Enchiridion” in Gardeil, “The Notion of a Theological Locus.”↩︎

7. ST II-II, q. 1, a. 6.↩︎

8. ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7.

   Translator’s note: But, one must take note that as credibilia, these are truths concerning the intrinsically supernatural existence of God and the intrinsically supernatural providence of the economy of salvation. On this, see, for example, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation, vol. 1, trans. Matthew K. Minerd (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2022), 261n22 323n78, 666-7n49.↩︎

9. ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7.↩︎

10. See De Locis, bk. 12, ch. 3.↩︎

11. See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 8, ad 6.↩︎

12. See the closing paragraphs in the section immediately prior to the conclusion to Gardeil, “The Notion of a Theological Locus.”↩︎

13. Translator’s note: I often translate “de foi” as De fide. However, due to the question concerning ecclesiastical faith, I am leaving this matter in some slight indetermination.↩︎

14. Translator’s note: That is, the latter are scientifically mediate in philosophy but serve as truth-principles within theological discourse.↩︎

15. For this citation and the preceding ones, see what Fr. Gardeil has to say in the paragraph starting, “Henceforth, the Theological Dialectician no longer faces any insurmountable obstacle,” and onward in “The Notion of a Theological Locus.”↩︎

16. ST I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.↩︎

17. Ibid.↩︎

18. See ST I, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2: “It must be said that this science can take something from the philosophical disciplines, not because it necessarily needs them but, rather, does so in order to more clearly manifest what is handed down in this science. For this science does not take its principles from other sciences; rather, it takes them immediately from God through revelation. Therefore, it does not receive from other sciences as from superiors but, instead, uses them as inferiors and handmaids, just as the architectural art makes use of the subordinate arts, as civil science does of military science. And the very fact that it thus makes use of them is not due to any defect or insufficiency in itself, but rather to the deficiency of our intellect, which is more easily led from those things known through natural reason—on which other sciences are based—to those things above reason, which are handed down in this science.”↩︎

19. See “How to formulate an immediate theological locus” in Gardeil, “The Notion of a Theological Locus.”↩︎

20. See ending of Cano, De locis theologicis, bk. 1.↩︎

21. Cano, De Locis, bk. 12, ch. 3 (fine). — Also see the end of bk. 1. — Along the same lines, John of St. Thomas establishes: “The loci, or principles, from which the theologian principally derives his proofs are ten” (Cursus Theologicus, vol. 1, q. 1, art. 12).↩︎

22. Translator’s note: With increasing mediacy, however, as is evident if one considers the progression from the Fathers and Theologians (and Canonists).↩︎

23. Translator’s note: This is a very standard way for scholastic theologians to speak in these matters. However, Gardeil (citing Cano himself) notes roles for the consideration of principles of faith within themselves in discursive theological wisdom. Here, Fr. Martin says “proprement dite”. I have come to prefer saying, somewhat following Schultes, “proper theological conclusions” (and even that term is somewhat ambiguous). The point is: such conclusions are proper to this discourse and not to matters of faith. (The informed reader will note, though, that I am thus taking a position on the side of Schultes, Garrigou-Lagrange, Labourdette, and Maritain regarding the question concerning the De fide definability of proper theological conclusions.) Conclusions that are concerned solely with the principles of theology and not scientific conclusions are, in that sense, “non-proper” (which at least is less ambiguous than “improper”). But, they are the most important aspects of theological discursion, which is above all wisdom, not science. For more discussion of this, see Matthew K. Minerd, “Wisdom be Attentive: The Noetic Structure of Sapiential Knowledge.” Nova et Vetera. 18, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 1103–1146.↩︎

24. Translator’s note: This is an apologetic modality of doing theology, whether in the context of the so-called Tractatus de revelatione or within any particular theological question.↩︎