The De locis theologicis: Its Nature, History, Aftermath, and Potential Future. An article by Fr. Ambroise Gardeil from the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique.
Translator’s Introduction
As a kind of preparation for a translation of Doronzo’s De locis, I have been also working on the works of Gardeil, who was a pioneer in the recovery of this treatise according to sound methodology. I have thought it best to make the results of this recovery public, for all must learn before working in earnest—even if one must correct an author, even a master, at times. So much of modern theology—by which I mean theology in the wake of the Protestant dissent—is concerned with questions of sources, methodology, etc. The developments in matters of history during the past centuries have accentuated this situation. Thus, the question of positive theology is very important (as is its connection with the assent of faith and mystical knowledge too). Because I believe that discursive theological wisdom of the Thomist type can incorporate all of these concerns, I am trying to do some small part to recover a status quaestionis which is not discussed much nowadays. (How many contemporary Thomists speak of the De locis with in depth and systematically when they speak of the nature and methods of theology? Not many at all. This is problematic.) I will soon be backing away from this particular content on To Be a Thomist, as I have other essays and translations that I wish to bring forth, in relation to other teaching and writing that I am doing. However, I have felt that these articles were important. Several others can be found on the website as well (and several more will be forthcoming).
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Gardeil’s Article
Outline—I. Cano’s work. II. Sources. III. Definition of Theological Loci. IV. The Nomenclature and Classification of Theological Loci. V. The Theologian’s Double Task. VI. Preliminary elaboration of the Theological Loci. VII. Theological questions. VIII. Theological notes. IX. The Use of Theological Loci. X. The Fate of the De Locis after Melchior Cano. XI. Appendix: An attempt to recast Cano’s Treatise on the model of Aristotle’s Topics.
I. Cano’s work.1—The treatise on theological loci is first found in Melchior Cano’s De Locis theologicis libri duodecim (Salamanca, 1563). Of course, there are antecedents for this sort of treatise if we consider the history of theological methodology, but such works are only fragmentary essays (cf. Albert Lang, Die Loci theologici des M. Cano, ch. 1, p. 21–54, especially, p. 62, note 8; р. 63, note 1, p. 64, notes).
The very expression Loci theologici existed at his time, but, as Cano noted, it designated something quite different, namely either the main positions in theology or in a theological system, capita rerum illustrium. For an example of such works, one might consider the Index tertius of Saint Thomas’s Summa theologiae (cf. ed. Nicolaï, 1663) or collections of the common theological loci (Cano, De Locis, bk. 1, c. 3, “Common loci that are usually discussed regarding universal matters”) which can be found in the table of the last three volumes of Hurter's Nomenclator litterarius, or again, the De locis theologicis written by Protestants like Melanchthon, Calvin, etc. (also mentioned here by Cano). See Lang, Die Loci theologici des M. Cano, ch. 2, § 2 (On the use of Loci in theology), p. 62–64 and ibid., § 3, p. 70.
By contrast, Cano’ work presents itself as being a systematic treatise on theological methodology. Cano lays a high claim in authoring this type of work: “I wrote it more willingly because, as far as I know, no theologian has yet taken up the arguments necessary in these matters” (De locis, Proœm; cf. bk. 3, ch. 3; bk. 12, ch. 2, § Nec enim qui quam). History ratifies his testimony (cf. A. Lang, loc. cit.) Granted, Bartolomé de Carranza, in a speech delivered at the Council of Trent and printed in Venice in 1547, sixteen years prior Cano's work, had set out the idea of theological loci and, in part, their division, as Cano would formulate them: “In sacred disciplines, there are many loci from which arguments are drawn: one is from the testimony of the Scriptures, which is the most firm locus for arguments; the next drawn from the Tradition of general and local sacred councils; the third is from positions held by the saints and ancient Fathers of the Church. All of these are properly theological loci…. Finally, to these we also add human reasons, which is not foreign from this discipline as a locus.” Does Cano depend on Carranza, or vice versa? Lang, who contributed this text to the present debate, is reluctant to give an opinion, believing it likely to have a common origin in Francisco Vitoria, who himself would only have taken up the idea put forward by Saint Thomas (ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2, cf. Lang, Die loci th. des M. Cano, p. 71, note 1). Thus would Cano owe the conception of his work to his lifelong adversary? That would be piquant; but, even were it the case, he would still have the unique merit of having produced the work itself, indeed with such full awareness of the detailed requirements of theological methodology, such that he remains its original, unequalled, and undisputed master.
He is no less so in other respects. The excellent Latinity he uses, as a consummate humanist, adds to the value of the content that perfection of form without which no work is truly classical. His documentation is erudite and copious, yet chosen with a sure theological sense. He undoubtedly left some errors to be rectified, some gaps to be filled in, and a number of assertions to be clarified or contradicted—e.g., on the Immaculate Conception, (De Locis, bk. 7, ch. 3, 4th conclusion)—but, on the whole, his facts and texts have retained their positive use. Developments in Catholic doctrine, on the inspiration of Scripture and the infallibility of the Pope in particular, have confirmed Cano’s positions rather than added to them. There is obviously a transitional, though not obsolete, character to his work, which as Dr. Lang insightfully observes, gives his work a kind of contemporaneity (Lang, p. 53), for example in his discussions with Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, the Gallicans, and certain theologians such as Cajetan and Sylvester of Ferrara. There also is the redundancy of Ciceronian locutions and those digressions, episodes, recollections, and personal reflections in the manner of Montaigne, which, however, also give his work a particular charm. But, “because he did not confine himself to the narrow confines of polemics and the narrow horizon of the one-sided questions of the day, because he built, with well-informed theological sense, founded on secular tradition [sic], his work has a lasting value. Like a milestone, it stands upon the path of theological development, at once marking the achievements of the past and marking out the way forward for continued advances” (Lang, op. cit. p. 54). Let us say—if not better, at least without metaphor—that for the conception and implementation of theological methodology, Cano is and remains the master, the classic. Merely by thinking out loud, this thinker teaches those theologians who ponder him to think like theologians themselves. For theological methodology, his work is a type, analogous to what St. Thomas’s Summa Theologiae is for the implementation of the virtualities of the revealed datum.
Considering that, in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, we are indebted to a common and classical doctrine, we will disregard in this article the countless points of view that have emerged since Cano, both regarding details and the overall conception, including our own, which we will however relegate to the “optional” appendix (no. XI). We hope that students of theology, learned laymen, and perhaps some theologians themselves, will be able to discover here the genius of the notion of the theological loci, and realize the scope and significance of the labors to which the De locis responds. So, instead of speaking for ourselves, we’ll take as our textbook the De locis theologicis by Melchior Cano, the authentic and universal founder and doctor of this discipline.
II. Sources.—Absence of precedents does not mean absence of sources. For a work on methodology, sources are of two kinds, some corresponding to its form, others to its subject matter on methodology.
1˚ Regarding its form, Cano draws direct inspiration from Rodolphus Agricola’s De inventione dialectica (Cologne, 1527; Paris, 1529). Chs. 11 and 12 of the De locis theologicis, which is crucial to the formal aspect of his method, is largely borrowed from Agricola’s, De inventione dialectica, bk. 1, ch. 2; bk. 2, chs. 4, 19, 20, 22. Some passages are almost copied word-for-word. Several specimens can be found in Lang (p. 68). Here is the first, from ch. 19 (not 26) of Book 2 of De inventione dialectica:
Agricola, bk. 2, ch. 19: First, let him determine and clearly grasp the number and nature of the loci—that is, what they are, how many there are, and what the force and propert[ies] of each are. Whether this is achieved by his reading of our description or that provided by any other author matters little… Nor would I think that having merely memorized the loci is sufficient; rather, they must be well arranged (paratos) and organized and at hand (exercitos).
Cano, bk. 12, ch. 11: Therefore, let one first learn the number and nature of the loci—what they are, how many there are, what the force of each is, and what its propert[ies are]. Whether these matters are taken from us or from some other source matters little… For it is not enough to have merely held them in memory; they must be well arranged (paratos) and organized and at hand (exercitos).
The notion of locus is identical in both (cf. Agricola, De inventione dialectica,bk. 1, ch. 2 (ed. Paris, 1529, p. 8); Cano, De locis, bk. 1, ch. 3). Cano takes Agricola side in the latter’s quarrel with Aristotle’s dialectic (Agricola, bk. 1, ch. 3, p. 11–14; Cano, bk. 12, ch. 3). If Cano apologizes for not dealing with the use of theological loci in popular discourse (in concione populari), this is no doubt because bk. 3 Agricola’s De inventione dialectica was devoted to this subject.
Cano’s dependence on Agricola clearly proves that, historically speaking, Cano does not immediately base his work on Aristotle’s Topics and these topoi did not furnish the model on which he built his theory of loci (Lang, op. cit. p. 67). But this does not settle the question concerning whether we can establish a parallelism between Aristotle’s Topics and Cano’s theological loci (as we attempted in our article “La notion du lieu théologique”). Lang sets aside this question (op. cit. p. 66), practically speaking, he seems to incline in our direction, quoting our work with favor: “It matters little—to here speak with Gardeil—if the term is contested, as long as we are granted the reality” (Op. cit. p. 72–73, note).2
On the other hand, this same dependence on Agricola suggests Cano’s dependence on Cicero, Agricola’s preferred teacher. This is not to say that Cano knew the Roman orator only through him; to the contrary, he frequented him to the point of owing him the best of his style. Cano thoroughly read Cicero’s Topica, Orator, and De oratore, whose thoughts, and often expressions, merge with his own text, whether he says so or not.
2˚ From the perspective of its subject matter, if by this we mean not documentation but analogous works, Cano, as we have said, has no precedents: his only source, we must believe, is Saint Thomas Aquinas (“St. Thomas was for me the author and master in the composition of this work,” De locis, bk. 12, ch. 3). Cano might not have had the idea of fusing the dialectical premises of Agricola’s De inventione dialectica with the principles of scholastic theology, had he not been prompted to do so by reading the famous text in ST I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2. “There,” he himself declares, “St. Thomas indicated most of the theological loci, with his customary tight and brief style, for he does not expansively set forth his argument, but rather, as though he were making a series of points, he accomplishes what he sets out to do” (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 3).
In this master passage in St. Thomas, we first encounter the term locus, used to designate the sources of theological argumentation. In the article, St. Thomas had just stated that arguments from authority are the hallmark of theology, and he continues: “And this does not lessen the dignity of this teaching for, although the locus from authority founded upon human reason is indeed the weakest, nonetheless the locus from authority founded upon divine revelation is the most efficacious.”
It is not just the word “locus,” understood in the sense of theological “locus”, that occurs in this passage; moreover, there is the analogy between a theological locus and the topical loci of rational logic, which is one of the generative ideas of Cano’s De locis (cf.. bk. 1, ch. 3, §Quemadmodum Aristoteles). And, there is also the theological superiority that arguments from authority have over the argument of reason, another of Cano’s main ideas and the key to the classification of his theological loci (De locis, bk.1, ch. 2 and 3 in fine).
Moreover, this classification is sketched out by Saint Thomas in the rest of the passage in question. Natural reason, referred to as the authority of philosophers, is described as an extrinsic and probable argument. Divine authority, by contrast, is seen as the argument proper to theology, in two of its modalities: canonical Scripture, apt to provide necessitating arguments; the Doctors of the Church, apt to provide a probable argument. This is the fundamental division between Cano’s loci.
Undoubtedly, as Cano himself noted, the question concerning the use of theological loci, which forms the second part of his treatise De locis theologicis (bk. 12 and, still in draft form, bks. 13 and 14) is not addressed by St Thomas, any more than the use of dialectical loci was discussed by Aristotle, at least according to our author, who is here misled by Agricola (Lang, op. cit., p. 59). Cano sees in this oversight a providential allowance that left something new for him to say (“so that earlier authors might leave something for later ones in which… they might be able to usefully exercise not only their powers of memory but also their own particular genius,” De locis, bk. 12, ch. 3). But, again in Cano’s judgment, St. Thomas left us more than a theory of the discovery or use of theological loci; he practiced this use with incomparable mastery, and this fact is highlighted even more brightly if we consider the primitive state of theology as found in the Master of the Sentences and his commentators. (see ibid, §Divum Thomam semper excipio). A model for the use of theological loci is, in its own way, a method, and Cano professes this when he resorts to the great models to show how to proceed in order to relate a theological question to the resolutional loci of that pertain to it: “Truly, so far as discovery is concerned, theologians will benefit more from the examples of the ancients than from precepts—not, I say, just our own, but even those of any other craftsman” (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 11, 2nd precept).
Therefore, Cano himself admits that St. Thomas provided the founder of theological methodology with the main idea for his work, the essential divisions of theological loci, and, in the absence of a theory, the exemplary practice of the methodology to be used for discovering these same loci, i.e. of using them in relation to theological questions.
III. Definition of theological loci.— Cano uses Aristotle’s Topics to define what a theological locus is: “Just as Aristotle, in his Topics, proposed common loci, communes, which are like seats and signposts, sedes et notas, for arguments, from which all arguments may be drawn, for all discussions, so we propose certain specific places, peculiares, which are like the domiciles of all theological arguments, where theologians will find food for all their arguments, either to prove or to refute” (Cano, De locis theol, bk. 1, ch. 3).
However, if we compare (as Cano invites us to do), his definition of loci with the definition of the dialectical locus as it emerges from Aristotle’s Topics and was formulated both in the Rhetoric and by the most authoritative commentators, we notice a marked divergence. For Aristotle, loci are universal propositions which, by virtue of their generality and the fact that they require only general consent to be accepted by the dialectician, can be adapted to the arguments of various sciences and even arts such as rhetoric. This intervention of dialectics in the sciences does not, moreover, concern the sciences that have already been brought to their completion—apart from some of them, such as the physical and moral sciences, as auxiliaries; rather, it occurs in the sciences in the process of being completed, in their phase of discovery, where probability has its place. However, instead of this precise notion of scientific logic, Cano offers us only a vivid and somewhat superficial description of dialectical loci: sedes, notas, domicilia argumentorum.
It's not difficult to restore Cano’s definition to its true author: first and foremost, it is Agricola, whom he transcribes; but, it is also Cicero. Cicero, speaking of oratorical common loci, says: “Indeed, they are so called by Aristotle, as though they were the seats (sedes) on which arguments are set forth. Therefore, we are permitted to define the locus of an argument as a seat (sedem)” (Topicorum, ch. 2). And elsewhere: “Aristotle... thus calls loci, as though it handed down the examined details of arguments (notas argumentorum) of arguments, from which every oration might be draw, on both sides [of the argument] (in utramque partem, traheretur oratio” (Orator, ch. 14) The Aristotelian and Ciceronian definitions do not contradict each other, but only the former expressly pertains to logic proper, whereas the latter, which is broader, is better suited to the practicalities of rhetorical oratory (See San Severino, Philosophia christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata, Logica, pt. 2, a. 9 (Naples: 1866), p. 286–307)).
Cano had undoubtedly read Aristotle’s Topics, from he which draws on several occasions. Therefore, his preference for Cicero's definition must be deliberate. Why was this? The extraordinary popularity of Agricola’s De inventione dialectica in his day (cf. Lang, op. cit., p. 61) would not suffice to explain the adherence of such an independent mind. I believe that Cano, having noticed the difference between the principles of theology (which are specific propositions) and the principles of Aristotle’s Topics (which are general propositions) will have given up identifying them. But what a single principle of theology, a particular truth of faith, could not do—namely serve as a point of departure for several arguments—a related set of these same principles, assigned a common and unique distinguishing mark for all the propositions it would contain, could achieve. This distinguishing mark, nota, by virtue of the large number of principles it grouped and whose seat, sedes, it signaled, made the theological locus recover, no doubt in a very material way, the generality that each locus or proposition in [Aristotelian] dialectics possessed in its own right. It was precisely Cicero who clad these distinctive marks and the seats of argument they signaled with the name of locus, and his teaching became a school of thought, not only among rhetoricians like Quintilian, but even among logicians (cf. San Severino, loc. cit. and Lang, loc. cit.). And so it was that Cano was led to use the name loci to refer to the seats or domiciles of related theological arguments, which are called Sacred Scripture, apostolic traditions, the authority of the Church, and so on.
IV. The Nomenclature and Classification of Theological Loci.—Given the very material link that unites the principles of theological arguments under a common sign, under which they have chosen, so to speak, to take up their domicile (tanquam domicilia, as Cano puts it) we cannot expect to find, in the nomenclature of theological loci, the rigor that characterizes Aristotle’s classification of topical loci. Cano counts ten theological places without deluding himself about the value of this number: “But there is no need to delay concerning the form of enumeration, provided that no locus is included superfluously, nor any necessary one omitted” (De locis. bk. 1, ch. 3; cf. Lang, op. cit. p. 87, note 2).
Cano’s ten loci are: 1. Sacred Scripture, as found in the canonical books; 2. the traditions of Christ and the Apostles; 3. the authority of the Catholic Church; 4. the Councils, first and foremost the general councils; 5. the authority of the Roman Church; 6. the authority of the ancient saints, in this case, the Fathers of the Church; 7. the authority of scholastic theologians, to whom are added the canonists; 8. natural reason, and the sciences that apply it; 9. philosophers and jurists; and 10. history, documents and oral traditions (ibid.).
Among these loci, the first seven appeal to authority: they constitute a first class of loci, the loci proper to theology, which rests above all on authority; the other three appeal to reason and are theological subsidiary places, “appropriated, as it were, solicited from another domain” (ibid. and bk. 12, ch. 3).
The first series is divided, in turn, into two groups, each with a different character: the first two loci are to be set aside as containing the whole of revelation, i.e. the very datum of theology; the next five have only the value of preserving the deposit, interpreting the datum, transmitting it (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 3).
These five proper, but secondary, loci are in turn divided. The first three of them, the Church, Councils, and the Pope, are qualified to normally provide absolutely certain principles of argumentation. The other two, the Fathers and Scholastics, as a rule provide probable principles, (cf. Saint Thomas ST I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2; de Schæzler, Introductio ad S. Theologiam, ch. 3, a. 2, nos. 3, 4) but whose probability will reach, according to Cano, the value of an absolute certainty, in the case where their unanimity in a serious question or of faith obliges to consider the judgment of the Fathers or Doctors as being united along with the Church’s own infallibility (cf. De locis bk. 7, ch. 3; bk. 8, ch. 4; also, R. Martin, “Principes de la théologie et lieux théologiques,” Revue thomiste (1912): p. 499–501).
This gives us the following table:
Theological loci:
Proper:
fundamental:
Scripture;
Apostolic traditions.
declarative:
efficacious:
Catholic Church;
Councils;
Papal Magisterium
probable:
Holy Fathers;
Scholastic theologians and canonists.
Annexed loci:
Natural reason;
Philosophers and jurists;
History and human traditions.
Lang (cf. op. cit. p. 88, 89, note 3) admits that St. Thomas’s division of loci into necessary and probable loci is justified, but he holds that it is not clearly indicated in Cano. However, one need only read bk. 1, ch. 1 of the De locis to find it there: “The remaining ten books will... teach what force each of the loci contains, explaining which furnish the foundation for certain arguments and which for merely probable ones.” It would have been more accurate to say that, while maintaining this division of his loci into probable and certain, Cano toned down its rigor by pointing out that, “a firm locus for arguments sometimes emerges as not firm” and vice versa (bk. 12, c. 11, start)
V. The Theologian’s Double Task.—1˚ “Just as the art of the consummate dialectician is perfect only if he knows how to find, and if he knows how to judge, so too the theologian must be versed not only in discovery, but in judgment if his art of theological debate and articulation is fully confected, to the point of confirming his dogmas and refuting contrary errors” (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 11). Here, Cano draws on Cicero (Topica, ch. 2), who himself declares Aristotle to be the master, princeps, with regard to these two fundamental acts of dialectic. Aristotle thus finds himself opposed both to the Stoic dialecticians, who were concerned solely with judgment (Cicero, loc. cit.) and to the academicians, who exclusively cultivated discovery, without bothering to conclude with a firm judgment in favor of one of the alternatives. (Cf. San Severino, Philosophia Christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata, Dialectica, Introductio, (Naples: 1866), pp. 142–144).
In fact, although Aristotle is a master of both operations, he made them into two distinct disciplines. The judicative part of his logic is found in the Analytics, where we learn how to judge with certainty the conclusions resolving the questions posed, by bringing them back by correct reasoning (Prior Analytics) and to their proper, self-evident and necessary principles, (Posterior Analytics). The discovery portion of the same logic constitutes Dialectics, and even, from lower points of view, Rhetoric and Poetics, as Saint Thomas noted, in the so clear and synthetic division of Aristotle’s Logic that he provides in the first lecture of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics. But, adds Saint Thomas, the Aristotelian work of discovery does not exclude judgment, quite the contrary: “For discovery does not always take place with certainty. Thus, concerning those things which are discovered, a judgment is required in order that certainty might be had.” According to Aristotle, the purpose of dialectic is not to agitate questions by simply demonstrating the evidence in favor of each alternative, but, rather, to determine the assent of opinion or faith, which is the preliminary to scientific knowledge.3 In addition to correct argument, this requires the reduction of conclusions to genuinely probable principles and, thus, a judgment both concerning the relationship of the conclusions to the principles from which they are drawn and concerning the true probability of these same principles (Cf. Aristotle’s Topics, bk. 1, ch. 2, § 5 and bk. 8, ch. 12, § 2 [ed. Didot]; San Severino, Op. cit. ch. 2, Introductio (Naples: 1866), p. 160–162.)
This is the full meaning of what Cano, after Cicero, means by the perfect dialectician, the model of the perfect theologian. In theology, there will be no discussion for discussion’s sake, after the manner of the Academicians; but neither will there be simple determination of certain conclusions, without prior research, inventio, as with the Stoics. Determination without research is possible in the sciences,4 because the principles proper to each science are fixed by the analysis of its object. But in theology, as in dialectics, the proof of principles is provided by a common ground, general consent for the former, divine testimony for the latter, and it is necessary to inquire into the degree of approval that this common ground gives to each of the principles, if we are to rightly judge the certainty of the conclusions we draw from them and give them a precise theological grade.
2˚ Cicero, who furnished Cano with the idea of the perfect dialectician, does not seem to have realized this clearly, on his own account, in his works dedicated oratorical methodology. At least, if we look through the Rhetoric to Herennius, De inventione rhetorica, Oratoriae partitiones, De oratore, a the Orator, we find nothing that clearly separates discovery from judgment. The Topica are perhaps an exception, if we look at chs. 1–20 (as describing Invention) and chs. 21–26 (Judgment such as it is understood by rhetoricians attentive only to the form of argumentation).
By contrast, Agricola has furnished for us an idea of the precise task he believes both discovery and judgment must perform. Here is his definition of inventio:
[To articulate] if two things agree with each other or do not (this is the dialectical question), it is necessary that you find some third thing which is certainly consistent with one of these two. That third thing is called the middle term of the argument, because it connects, as it were, the two extremes proposed. Then, because it is joined to the propositions in a probable way (that is, in a way calling for approval) and serves as the means for creating belief concerning them, it is called an argument. Dialecticians call this process of devising either the middle term or the argument “discovery,” bk. 1, ch. 2 (Paris: 1529), p. 7.
This passage is very useful for understanding Cano, in that it determines the meaning of this argumentum, which (for Cano as for Agricola) is the proper objective of discovery. It is, as we said elsewhere, the middle term of a reasoning, which is self-evident in the two propositions it unites, major and minor.5 As Lang puts it (op cit., p. 61), Agricola’s method is “a recipe for quickly finding a middle term,” and consequently, I would add, the two propositions that this middle term connects.
According to Agricola, judgment’s task is to verify the formal side of the argumentation by which the conclusion is reduced to its principles. This is the meaning of the word “judgment” in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics: “Therefore, in order that what we assume into the argument might be certain and clear—that it be one thing not merely in appearance but in reality (i.e., the middle term is taken in the same sense in the major and minor premises)—this part of judgment has been applied to discovery, containing all the precept[s] concerning the modes and figures of syllogisms, as well as every caution against deceptive arguments, which we have called fallacies” (ibid.). Agricola mentions no other use for dialectical judgment than to ensure the formal correctness of argumentation (Cf. De inventione dialectica, bk. 2, ch. 1). As soon as the arguments are drawn from a classified dialectical locus and the form of the argumentation is correct, the conclusion possesses sufficient certainty to obtain the kind of conviction that rhetoricians aim to produce.
3˚ This is not the case for Cano, who wants the theologian to judge— that is, to determine matters and conclude in full knowledge of the facts—like the perfect dialectician, and to do so in such a way as to efficaciously confirm dogmas and refute contrary errors. Therefore, his methodology must include learning not only (1) how to find arguments, but (2) how to judge them and the conclusions they prove.
l. The Method of Theological Discovery.—Cano provided for the Discovery of arguments firstly by elaborating the ten theological loci that he carries out from bks. 1 to 11 of his work, then by determining the different kinds of theological questions (bk. 12, ch. 5), and finally by the precepts he gives for finding appropriate theological arguments in the theological loci (bk. 12, ch. 11, Primum præceptum) and by the three models of argumentation that conclude his work (bk. 12, chs. 12–14).
a) The elaboration of the ten theological loci constitutes a kind of preliminary discovery, in actu primo, of theological arguments, enabling the theologian, faced with a question, to extract from these loci differentiated principles, ready to initiate the specific argumentation that each special question requires. This is the counterpart of the catalogs of proper loci in Aristotle’s Topics or, if you like, in the first book of Agricola’s De inventione (cf. ch. IV)
Therefore, this theoretical and general discovery does not dispense with the practical work of discovery, in actu secundo, of arguments appropriate for each question, which is the real labor of discovery undertaken in the practice of theology. Rather, it prepares him for it by providing him, in place of this amorphous mass constituted by loci, with inventoried, special arguments, good for initiating a specific argumentation: “wholly known and thoroughly examined loci (notos et tractatos locos)” (Cicero, Orator, ch. 33); “loci…that are well-arranged, thoroughly examined, and as it were clearly in view and ready at hand (locos... paratos, exercitos, et velut in conspectu et ad manum positos)” (Agricola, De inventione, bk. 2, ch. 19; “notos et tractatos locos, paratos et exercitos” (Cano, De locis, bk. 12, ch. 11, § Omnium autem).
b) The determination of the types of theological questions is no less useful for discovering arguments. We will demonstrate this in detail in section seven below. However, the point is self-evident. If, as Cano observes, the theologian does not understand the nature of the question, he will not easily see... which loci will serve for furnishing his arguments. For example, if the question is supernatural, it must be projected into those places that rely on divine authority (De locis, bk. 12, c. 15, precept 3).
c) Once both the types of theological questions and the details of the arguments contained in them have been determined, all that remains for the theologian to do is to find the arguments that correspond to a given question and are likely to resolve it. This is the effective and practical discovery of theological arguments, with which theology and its discussions are constructed. To achieve this, Cano lays down his own rules (bk. 12, ch. 11, precept 1), which he illustrates with examples.
For the moment, we are only providing a general overview of the successive moments involved in the methodology applied in the discovery of theological loci, in order to show its overall sequence and to indicate the chapters in which Cano deals with the subject. We will return to this later, after providing an overview of what the theological loci contain for the formation of Judgment.
2. Methodology for forming a theological judgment.—Cano makes no room for a discussion of formal judgment, which is the rhetoricians main concern, when it comes to dialectical judgment. This is general logic. His aim is simply to teach the theologian what criteria he should use to make a sound judgment, both concerning the value of the arguments he uses to resolve a given question, and concerning the certainty of the conclusions these arguments lead to.
a) According to him, the criterion for the value of arguments is to be found in the general elaboration of theological loci (bks. 2–11), the role of which we, with Cano, already pointed out for the process of discovery. Therefore, this inventory has a double scope: to prepare and facilitate the actual discovery of arguments suitable for resolving a given question in the field, and to inform the theologian concerning the value of the arguments he uses for this purpose. As Cano tells us: “Moreover, it seems to me that theologians should have a well founded judgment at hand now that I have expressed the strength and nature of the theological loci. That is, from the ten parts into which I divided the breath and power of the various theological loci, I made clear which of them contains strong argumetns and which weak” (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 11).
Indeed, anyone who has read through the ten books devoted to the development of the ten theological loci will realize that here, as in Aristotle’s Dialectic, we are not reading a mere enumeration but, rather, a set of principles and rules, enabling us to assess, from the perspective of revelation, any argument that postulates its entry into theological argumentation, its nature and its probative force, vim et naturam.
Cano, moreover, gives us a vivid idea of the services rendered to the theologian’s judgment by this preliminary labor of theological criticism. The heretic, he says, finds no fewer arguments in theological loci than does the theologian. His arguments are undoubtedly random, weak, and fallacious. But we must be able to distinguish them from certain, strong, consistent arguments. What’s more, not all arguments in the same theological context are equally strong. If a given locus is intrinsically inferior in effectiveness, nonetheless not all the arguments encountered there are necessarily inferior in this way. For example, from the Holy Scriptures we can draw arguments that are only probable, from the mystical meaning, for example, or from a meaning that is insufficiently defined. (Cf. Ambroise Gardeil, “La réforme de la théologie catholique, Les procédés exégétiques de saint Thomas,” Revue thomiste (1903): 436–441.) By contrast, human history, however weak, however imbecilla, can provide certain arguments. And so, concludes Cano, even if we use the art and precepts by which arguments are drawn from theological loci (discovery), “Still, a judgment is lacking so that they might be sought out. But if one applies no reason for judgment nor discernment, one will indeed have at hand an easy and ready abundance of argumentation—but none of it have any real value, except perhaps to those who habitually judge matters by quantity rather than quality. However, the perfect and accomplished theologian will not merely gather arguments but will also distinguish between those that are consistent and those which are inconsistent, those which are certain and those which are uncertain.” (ibid). And, he adds, this differentiation is what he had undertaken in the books prior to the 12th.
We can now see where we will meet with the criterion by which Cano will ensure the judgment of his theologian, with regard to the value of the arguments that seem to him suitable for resolving a question.
b) To instruct this same judgment as regards the determinations or conclusions that fall within these arguments, Cano institutes the theory of Theological Notes, which can affect both theological questions and conclusions. He sees these notes as “both very certain signs for discerning questions of faith, and very certain arguments for approving the conclusions of theology.” And as a result, he believes that, through his theory of notes (bk.12, ch. 6–10), combined with the critical elaboration undertaken in bks. 2–11, he has sufficiently provided for the formation of theological judgment, both as regards the value of proofs and the value of conclusions: “And since the notes of Catholic truths are the same—both the most certain signs by which Catholic truths of faith are recognized, and also the most certain arguments by which theological conclusions are proven—I believed I should have no other employment in judging (dijucandis) the arguments that prove our dogmas than what I set forth a just now (bk. 12, ch. 6–10) in presenting the notes that distinguish our truths.” (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 11).
4˚ The theologian is now fully equipped, having in hand both the Pars inveniendi and the Pars judicandi, which, as Agricola puts it, make for the consummate dialectician. All that remains is to get down to practical matters and put all his resources to work. Cano, as we have said, will follow him down this path with his methodological rules. “It follows that we must now discuss, as our present task, the means by which we can obtain what we want to draw from the theological loci, namely competence in their use for argumentation” (ibid). Cano devotes the whole of the end of ch. 11 to these precepts, a marvellous exposition, no longer concerning the theory of the method but, rather, concerning its living tactics, where discovery and judgment intersect in action. Judge for yourself by this extract:
Once the relevant loci have been identified and treated, let him cast the question he wishes to examine into the loci of theology (discovery). However, after he has led it through all of them,… through the application of his judgment, he must discern which side of the question is proven by the arguments adduced (judgment). Therefore, once the question has been considered through all the loci (discovery), let him argue both sides, but in the end let him conclude what is true and, conversely, what is false (judgment) (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 11, 2nd precept).
5˚ We are thus led to divide this treatise on theological loci into four sections. The first, Preliminary, Theoretical, and Critical Elaboration of the Theological Loci (Section VI below), serves to form both theological Discovery and Judgment; the second, Theological Questions (Section VII below), aims to guide Discovery; the third, Theological Notes (Section VIII below), serves to form Judgment; and the fourth, Use of the Theological Loci (Section IX below), lays down the precepts for finding in the already developed theological loci the suitable arguments for resolving a theological question whose type is already known, for judging those arguments with full understanding of the facts, and for characterizing the conclusion obtained through them.
VI. Preliminary elaboration of the Theological Loci.—With Cano (bks. 2–11), we will first subject each of the ten theological loci to a critical elaboration, by which I mean a theological critique, designed to enable the theologian to discern both the value of the given locus as a species, as well as the argumentative value of each of its parts, its aspects, and even the value of each of the groups of propositions it contains.
We will here follow the order of Cano’s theological loci.
1˚ First locus theologicus: Sacred Scripture, bk. 2—According to Cano, four questions are of interest for the theologian who intends to use Sacred Scripture as a locus theologicus: the inerrancy of Sacred Scripture, the canonicity of the Sacred Texts, the value to be attributed to various versions and editions of the text, and the extension of the inspiration of the sacred text to its parts, particulas. For each of these questions, Cano puts forward principles or rules that formulate the requirements of faith. The revealed datum of Scripture, elaborated by these principles, will henceforth be presented as a theologically criticized fact,6 apt in all its parts for providing precise arguments, whose value is inventoried and fixed in advance, so as to be able, with full knowledge of the matters being considered, to serve as the starting point for a theological argument. Note that, in order to resolve each of the four questions posed, Cano already uses his own methodology (by which I mean that which is laid out in his De locis): seeking the suitable loci for resolving the question; exposition of the loci from which one could draw a conclusion contrary to the requirements of the faith; positing of those that conclude in favor of faith’s requirements; finally, the conclusion and refutation of objections. This same procedure will hold for all the other loci as well. Consequently, his treatise De locis is, from one end to the other, an anticipatory application of the method he founds therein.
1. Inerrancy of Scripture.—It is heretical to maintain that, through His ordered power, (potentia ordinata, that is, His power as related to His wisdom), God can lie.—It is an error against faith to say that, according to the same power, God can deceive through intermediaries.—Even through His absolute power, God cannot lie, either by Himself or through another.—These principles presuppose that God is the author of Scripture and, hence, that sacred writers could not have altered its truth through their personal cooperation. Therefore, the theologian can use the locus of Scripture as an affirmation of Truth itself (bk. 2, chs. 1–4).
2. Canonicity.—But what do we mean by this word, “Scripture”? In the case of some books, some have either not known that they have been attributed to a God-inspired author or have even disputed this fact. Therefore, what will be the criterion used for judging the canonicity of Sacred Texts? Five principles will guide the theologian: The criterion cannot be Scripture itself.—It cannot be the private judgment of individual Christians.—It is the authority of the Church, the divinely certain rule for receiving or rejecting books that have an authoritative standing for the faith.—This authority resides in Ecumenical Councils [concile générale], whose task it is to define which books are canonical.—And likewise, in the Supreme Pontiff (chs. 5–8) Consequently, these principles indicate that the Bible used by a theologian is inventoried in the canon of Scripture, a catalog authorized and authenticated by the Church containing the books that will serve as the basis for his arguments.—In two additional chapters (chs. 9 and 11), Cano establishes, with his usual wealth of arguments, the solid foundation for the authority of the Deuterocanonical books, which had been subject to controversy.
3. Text.—He presents four “axioms” regarding the text itself: The Vulgate text must be followed in all matters of faith and morals.—Any question of this kind disputed between Catholics must be decided according to the Vulgate.—In matters of faith and morals, there is no need to refer to the original Hebrew or Greek copies for a final determination.—For the same questions, the Vulgate text need not be corrected by the original copies (ch. 12–14).
Note the clause: in his quæ ad fidem et mores pertinent. Theological utilization provides the scope for the provided rules. Cano means that the Vulgate is a good and reliable version of Scripture, to which the theologian can safely turn for his own work, de fide et moribus.
Beyond this, he does not neglect the usefulness of exegesis, making recourse to the originals and their scientific interpretation, is not forgotten. In bk. 2, ch. 15, Cano sets forth, in eight statements, the services that can be rendered by knowledge of original source languages: For discussions with unbelievers or to instruct them.—For discovering certain expressions whose equivalent does not exist in Latin.—To understand those expressions in the original texts that are equivocal and, hence, impossible to translate.—To understand idioms.—To correct the mistakes of Latin copyists.—To understand certain passages that are unclear in the Vulgate.—To avoid the abiguities caused by Latin.—To discover the Greek or Hebrew terms that have passed into the Latin version (ch. 15). Cano’s summary of these uses is illustrated by copious examples, and the progress of scriptural science has revealed others. Cano left the door open to Catholic exegesis. However, the theological rule he laid down remains valid: the integrity of the sacred text and its genuine meaning for questions of fide et moribus are fundamentally guaranteed by the text of the Vulgate for theological use, whatever scientific questions may arise from other perspectives, questions that are subject to limitations by this rule.
4. The extent of divine inspiration to the particular details of the text.—Cano leaves the theory of scriptural inspiration to theology proper. He defines it in the general De fide terms, as explained by the Councils and the Fathers. The sacred texts are written by the dictation and assistance of the Holy Spirit (Spiritu sancto dictante, assistente), and their author is God, not man (non homo sed Deus). See De locis, bk. 2, ch. 2 and ch. 16 and 17. Also see De locis, bk. 5, ch. 5, q. 3 (§ At hæc opinatio).
The only rule that Cano proposes for theological use is the following: All and each of the parts, particulæ, of the canonical books were written with the assistance of the Holy Spirit and therefore are guaranteed for theological use. Three words of this precept need to be explained here in accord with Cano’s own explanations: a) What he means by particulae. This is any member of Scripture in which error or truth can be found, that is to say, any proposition. (“If even one falsehood is found in any sacred book, the certainty of the entire thing perishes.) See Saint Augustine, De consensu Evangelistarum, bk. 2, ch. 12; Cano, De locis, bk. 2, c. 17. The words themselves are reached by inspiration insofar as they are necessary for the meaning of the proposition. Cf. De locis bk. 2, ch. 11 (§In septimo princ. arg.).—b) All and each of the parts: i.e. not only those containing things important for salvation, faith and morals, but also those containing assertions of lesser importance. (Etiamne in minimis rebus? Etiam). See De locis theol, bk. 5, ch. 5, q. 3 (§Alterum autem discrimen).—c) The assistance of the Holy Spirit spoken of by Cano must not be confused with the assistance that the Holy Spirit gives to the ecclesiastical magisterium, which has since appropriated this term, as is clear if we read the other expressions he uses to define it (Spiritu sancto dictante—Spiritum in sacris auctoribus loquentem—auctores sacros non sine divina revelatione loquentes, divino lumine infuso loquentes, ch. 16), all expressions denoting a positive divine influence on the writer’s intellectand will, extending to the very writing of the sacred text. See De locis, bk. 5, ch. 5, q. 3.
These are the main precepts that will enable the theologian to elaborate the propositions drawn from Scripture for theological use. They are not absolutely complete, nor always as precise as they have since become. Nonetheless, Cano’s successors have not changed their general tenor. In any case, taken as a whole, they clearly mark the kind of criticism that the text of Scripture must undergo before entering into theological argumentation, a criticism that is entirely homogeneous with the text, since his rules simply make explicit the requirements of revelation and faith.
Cano had planned to complete (in bk. 13) his account of the locus of scripture, as he had announced (in De locis, bk. 1, ch. 1), and this is the reason he gives for the brevity he observes in bk. 2. (Satis hic fuerit breviter attigisse, bk. 2, ch. 1). Undoubtedly, he had reserved for this 13th book the precepts related to the various meanings of Scripture, the necessity of which he already indicated in bk. 11, ch. 11 and even outlined in bk. 12, ch. 6 (Praeceptiones, 1–5). They are completed by: [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 2 and 3 and canon 4 (Denzinger, nos. 3006–7, 3011, 3029); Leo XIII, Providentissimus Deus; the Responses from the Pontifical Biblical Commission on February 13, 1905 (Denzinger, no. 3372), June 23, 1905 (Denzinger, no. 3373), June 27, 1905 (Denzinger, no. 3394-3397); Holy Office under Pius X, Lamentabile sane exitu (Denzinger. nos. 3401–3461, passim.); Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis. In my own opusculum, La notion du théologique (sect. 4, §2, no. 2), I attempted to provide a list (as complete as possible at the time it was written) of the rules of theological criticism that concern Sacred Scripture.
2° Second theological Locus: Apostolic Traditions.—If we leave aside the interesting discussions with Protestants on apostolic traditions (De locis, bk. 3, chs. 1, 2, and 7), which belong to history, in order to concentrate on what is of eternal value in this theological locus, we find ourselves faced with four main questions.
1. Question concerning existence.—Cano dispatches this question in four propositions, strongly supported by their proofs: The Church predates Scripture and, consequently, the theological locus of its authority extends beyond Scripture.—Not all Christian doctrine is expressed in Scripture.—Many dogmas are found neither clearly nor confusedly in Scripture.—The Apostles delivered part of their teaching orally (De locis. bk. 3, ch. 4).
2. Question concerning the certainty of Apostolic Traditions.—Four precepts: The example of the Apostles, who confirmed the faith and established morals with the help of oral traditions or Church customs, authorizes the theologian to regard unwritten tradition as an effective means of proof.—The greatest authorities of Christian antiquity, e.g. St. Irenaeus, Tertullian, St. Basil, recognize tradition and the institutions of the Church, stemming from the Apostles, as having the same authority as Scripture.—The Fathers of the Church perpetually objected to heretics on the basis of unwritten ecclesiastical tradition.—The Councils of Nicaea and Trent established the authority of Apostolic Tradition as equal to that of Scripture.
3. Question concerning the possibility of recognizing Apostolic Traditions.—Four rules: What has always been held by the universal Church and which, moreover, was not something instituted by councils, must rightly be regarded as having been instituted by the Apostles (Saint Augustine, Contra donatistas, bk. 4, ch. 24).—If the Fathers, from time immemorial, have held in common a given dogma of faith and have refuted its contrary as heretical, even though this dogma is not contained in Scripture, this is an Apostolic Tradition. For example: the perpetual virginity of the Virgin Mary; the number of the Gospels; Christ’s descent into hell.—If anything is approved in the Church by the common consent of the faithful, while no human power has had the right to introduce it, it is necessarily Apostolic Tradition.—If, with one voice, the men of the Church, viri ecclesiastici, attest that we have received a dogma or custom from the Apostles, there can be no doubt that this is a sure thing: the veneration of images in worship, the Apostle’s Creed.
4. Question concerning the different kinds of Apostolic Traditions.—Some traditions were clearly transitory: baptism in the name of Jesus, abstinence from strangled animals and blood. Others, however, have a perpetual character. These come either from Christ Himself, or from the Apostles, inspired by the Holy Spirit. They give rise to three precepts: Traditions received from Christ cannot be modified or abolished by the Church.—Traditions established by the Apostles as pastors may, by contrast, be modified or abolished.—Unwritten truths of faith taught by Christ or the Holy Spirit to the Apostles retain their perpetual dogmatic value.
In modern authors, one can find rules that are more detailed and, above all, distributed in a way to that is better adapted to the demands of theological questions. Those we have just listed contain all the essentials, except perhaps the main rule concerning the discernment of Apostolic Traditions by means of the Church’s own authentic judgment (Cf. Berthier, De locis theologicis, pt. 1, bk. 1, a. 3). However, apart from the fact that this rule is implicit in the preceding ones (cf. the words viri ecclesiastici) Cano, explicitly mentioned it, also, in De locis theol., bk. 6, ch. 7, § Adde quod apostolicarum. Therefore, these precepts provided by Cano suffice for enabling one to understand the proper genius of this locus and the way it should be elaborated for theological use, which is our sole formal intention at present.
3˚ Third Theological Locus: the authority of the Catholic Church.—Cano distinguishes this from the authority of Councils and that of the Pope. Undoubtedly, he says, these three realities are one: “For this is entirely one thing, precisely because these are interconnected and bound together, like the human body and its head” (De locis, bk. 5, q. 5). However, from the perspective of theological loci, and no longer that of [the] reality (res) [from which this particular locus emerges in questions of theological methodology], there are reasons to draw this distinction, as well as to reverse the natural order of their enumeration, which would have them ordered as follows: Popes, Councils, the Church: “Indeed, without the authority of the Apostlic See, any councils will not only waver but founder” (ibid., bk. 6, ch. 2). The same can be said of Councils in relation to the Church.
The reason for setting the Church apart and at the head is that, when it comes to loci, we should follow not the natural order of causes but, rather, the natural order of the mind, which is to proceed from what is most manifest to what is least manifest. Now, the authority of the Councils is better known and better received (notior et acceptior) than the authority of the Pope, (ibid.), implying that the same is true of the Church’s authority vis-à-vis that of the Councils. The present separation is therefore justified on grounds of theological logic.
Now, what does the Church mean here? Cano establishes this through discussions with various heretics. It appears that the Church is first of all the society of baptized Catholics, righteous or sinners, united by the profession of the same faith, and thus forming a new and special republic; then, she is the ecclesiastical leaders in whom the authority of this republic principally resides, according to what Aristotle says, Ethic, bk. 9, ch. 9: a city is most of all that which is principal in it, “to such an extent,” says the Philosopher, “that what the rulers of a city do and esteem, the city is supposed to do and feel.”
Cano holds that the authority of the Church thus defined is so effective that it provides theologians with the firmest principles for argumentation (De locis, bk. 4, ch. 4).
He establishes this in the form of four conclusions which are four rules for the theologian's judgment: The Church cannot fail in faith.—The Church in its faith cannot err.—Not only could the ancient Church not err, but the Church of today and the Church to come, until the consummation of the centuries, cannot and will not err in the faith. Not only does the universal Church (i.e. the gathering of all the faithful) possess this perpetual spirit of truth, but it also belongs to the princes and pastors of the Church, so that, given the impossibility of having recourse to the belief [sentence] of all the faithful, the judgment of the leaders and pastors is the authorized interpreter of the sentiment of the Church (ibid.).
The wealth of proofs and documents amassed in support of these four conclusions, and in response to the objections they raise, completely defies analysis. Thus, we needn’t insist on the last of these, which makes this locus practically coincide “like the human body and its head” with the following ones (cf. Cano, De locis, bk. 5, ch. 5, q. 5).
4˚ Fourth theological Locus: The Councils.—Cano begins with a definition of a council, which excludes the multitudes and reserves the right to participate to those with jurisdiction (bishops and priests) (De locis, bk. 5, ch. 2). He then distinguishes, according to law and history, between different types of councils: general councils, provincial councils, and diocesan synods. History adds further divisions to this initial nomenclature. Some councils were convened by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, while others were not, and some were confirmed by the same authority, while others were not. Some councils convened in this way were not confirmed by this authority. Others that were not convened were subsequently confirmed by the Pope.
To enable the theologian to wend through this maze and make use of the decisions of the Councils, Cano sets forth the following rules: A general Council neither convened nor confirmed by the Roman Pontiff may err in matters of faith.—A general Council merely convened by order of the Roman Pontiff may err in matters of faith.—A General Council merely confirmed by the Roman Pontiff is authoritative in matters of Catholic dogma.—Provincial Councils not confirmed by the Roman Pontiff may err in faith.—However, on the other hand, when such a council is confirmed by the Pope, it cannot err in the faith.—A probable argument can be drawn from provincial councils, even if they lack papal authority.—Mere diocesan synods, if their decrees concerning the faith are confirmed by the Roman Pontiff, provide a certain argument in favor of the truth.—By itself, when judging matters of heresy, a diocesan synod is not certain but probable.—Note: the word “probable” is used here in the ancient sense of probabiliority. See our article “La certitude probable”.
All these rules are illustrated by historical examples, which, by concretizing them, determine in detail the dogmatic value (or lack thereof) of this or that council, always with a view to theological use, the sole aim in the Tractatus de locis theologicis.
However, these principles do not exhaust the subject. Certain more delicate questions—believed to be of the utmost importance—arise, which, for the use of this locus, pit theologians themselves against each other, “nots that even regularly entangle learned men.” And Cano, with admirable erudition, flexibility, and discernment, sets forth these contentious issues in ch. 5: Q. 1. Cano holds, against Cajetan and Torquemada, that a council presided over by the pope’s legates possesses decisive authority, without waiting for the pope’s confirmation, for it is a truly general council and can no more err in matters of faith than can the universal Church, for it possesses all that is necessary to be the normal subject of the Holy Spirit’s inspiration and to be able to say, “It has seemed thus to the Holy Spirit and to us.” Q. 2. Are the Fathers of the Councils advisors or true judges? Cano establishes that they are true judges.—Q. 3. Here, he exposits the distinction between the inspiration of Sacred Scripture (which proceeds immediately from the Holy Spirit and extends to every detail, in minimis rebus) and the [divine] assistance given to Councils (which sanctions the result of deliberations conducted humano modo, and is given only for things necessary for salvation). In passing too, he resolves the question concerning how theological conclusions belong to these necessary things, a question taken up again later (§ Ad postremum).—Q. 4. If the Holy Spirit does not assist the Councils in minimis, how can we discern which decrees are certain from the perspective of faith? Cano answers: a) There are indeed Decretals which are not decrees of faith and, in particular, that part of the Clementine De Summa Trinitate, where the opinion concerning the infusion of the habitus of grace and virtues is chosen as more probable by the Council of Vienna (cf. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 483 [904]).—b) The great sign of certainty is when Councils address the universal Church.—c) There are other notes: the note of heresy inflicted on the contrary opinion, the anathema fulminated, the excommunication ipso jure and pronounced, the declaration that it is an obligation for the faithful to hold such and such a position as a dogma, and so on.—d) All that intervenes in councils, such as explanation, responses to objections, obiter dictum (such as the words corporalium and incorporalium in the chapter Firmiter from Lateran IV, etc., is not De fide, although it would be inconsiderate and rash to deny such things.—Q. 5. Can councils err in questions of morals (de moribus)? In his answer, Cano includes a justification for the inerrancy of the whole Church, the Councils, and popes alike in matters of morals (“But now I am speaking of the authority of the Church which also belongs to general councils and the Supreme Pontiff”). Thus, he provides three conclusions, which furnish three precepts for the discernment of loci governing morals: a) The Church cannot err in doctrines concerning of morals necessary for salvation.—b) The Church, which enacts for all people laws in serious matters of great importance for the formation of Christian morals, cannot command anything contrary to the Gospel or to natural reason. Cano furnishes very interesting supporting developments, restricting the scope of this rule.—c) As regards the morals, not of the whole Church, but of private men or particular Churches, the Church can err, through ignorance, not only in the judgment she passes on accomplished facts but in private laws and precepts. This conclusion is based on the judgment [sentence] of Innocent III (De sent, excom., c. 88): “The Church's judgment sometimes follows opinion... For this reason, it occasionally happens that one who is bound before God is loosed before the Church, and one who is free before God is, by ecclesiastical sentence, bound.” With Cano, let us immediately restrict part of this conclusion. It is not concerned with questioning the authority of these decrees but, rather, of furnishing them with the right note. A possible error is a specific case, relatively rare, and cannot be assumed without very serious presumptions. It is possible; that is all we can say; and that suffices for characterizing the kind of authority the Church has in these particular matters (ibid).
Cano excludes from this possibility of error the decrees of canonization of saints, declaring with Saint Thomas that we must believe in a special Providence that prevents the Church from erring concerning the testimonies by which these decrees are conditioned. Nevertheless, he does not regard the opinion of those who deny the sanctity of a particular canonized saint as heretical, but as rash, imprudent, and irreligious (cf. St. Thomas, Quodlibet 9, a. 16).—He is less strict when it comes to the decrees approving religious orders, especially modern ones. It has to be said that a number of the reasons he gives in support of this reservation are borrowed from the Roman Church itself and that, as Hyacinthe Serry argues in his Prologus galeatus to Cano’s De locis, the refusal of infallibility does not concern what concerns the very substance of religious orders (i.e. Christian perfection and its essential means) where all theologians admit that the Church cannot fall into error (Ecclesiam falli nesciam) but, rather, concerning the circumstances of their institution, the excessive [trop grande] multitude of religious congregations, their necessity, and certain details (see Serry’s prologue, ch. 9; cf. ch. 10, De vellicato nomine: S. J.).
5˚ Fifth theological Locus: the authority of the Roman Church.—For Cano, the infallibility of the papacy in matters of faith and morals is not a matter for doubt; however, as it had not yet been defined, even by the Council of Florence, and was still a matter for dispute by learned and pious men (propter viros quosdam et doctos et pios) at the time when he was writing, he does not dare forestall the Church’s judgment, which he regards as assured: “We do not wish here to preempt the judgment of the Church, but if it is referred to a general council, the mark of heresy would be affixed to that error” (De locis, bk. 6, ch. 7).
Therefore, he insists solely on the existence of pontifical privilege, a path preceded by Cajetan, whose famous opuscula he summarizes (De auctoritate papæ et concilii and De Ecclesiæ romanæ primatu). He neglects to formulate the usual rules that will make this locus usable. However, it so happens that what he is led to say on behalf of his thesis, added to what he had already said concerning the Councils, provides—if we gather together, as we shall, the scattered elements—a position that is completely the same as that declared in the definition declared at the [First] Vatican Council.
1. The fact of papal infallibility. – Cano’s demonstration comprises three main assertions:
a) The Apostle Peter, instituted by Christ as pastor of the universal Church (prop. 1), when he taught the Church and confirmed the faithful in the faith, could not err (prop. 2).—b) Peter’s successor, by divine right, succeeds him in the same powers and authority (prop. 3; Cano, De locis, bk. 6, c. 3).—c) The Roman Pontiff succeeds Peter, by divine right, in the firmness of his faith and in his power to settle religious controversies (prop. 4; Cano, De locis, bk. 6, ch. 4).
The first two propositions are established by the testimony of Scripture, tradition, and the Fathers. The third, above all, by arguments drawn from the social needs of the Church, shedding light on Christ’s intentions, supported by examples from the Old Testament. The fourth (ch. 4), firstly by the assertions of the Popes themselves, without thereby involving any petitio principii, as Cano explains (ch. 5), for their testimony is here invoked as the testimony of the leaders of the Church, whether infallible or not, men of every race and nationality, grave, upright in doctrine, and holy. Moreover, it is confirmed by the testimony of the most ancient Fathers. A second supporting proof is drawn from the councils (ch. 6). Finally, Cano brings into play a rational argument, in this case the argument from prescription: Peter must of necessity have a successor in his Infallible Magisterium (cf. 3rd proposition); no other can be designated (“Clearly he is here or else there is no [such authority]” ch. 7). The Church’s perpetual practice (“there is no sounder interpreter of the Church’s laws”) shows that, in the most serious controversies concerning the faith, the Roman Pontiff has always been the judge of last resort.—All these propositions are set forth with highly vigours reasoning regarding the interpretation of the texts and with a wealth of patristic testimonies or historical facts, which—except on certain points where historical science will find something to take up anew or work over—leave nothing on the whole to be desired.
2. The precepts by which Cano prepares the theological locus of papal authority for theological use.—To highlight these, we can do no better than frame what he says within the master rule that we have from the definition declared by the [First] Vatican Council (cf. Denzinger-Bannwart, no. 1839 [3073ff]).
a) The Roman Pontiff, when speaking ex cathedra, discharging his function as pastor and doctor of all Christians...
Something equivalent to this part of the Vatican [I] definition is given by Cano in the propositions: “Peter the Apostle was appointed by Christ as the shepherd of the universal Church” (De locis, bk. 6, ch. 3, prop. l), with its corollary, “If Peter was established by God as the shepherd of all the faithful, then he was thereby also made the supreme doctor and teacher (magister) of the Church” (Ibid, prop. 2, in fine), in conjunction with prop. 3, “Upon Peter’s death, it follows by divine right that someone must succeed him in the same authority and power.” Other passages may be cited, such as: “Petro dicta in Evangelio a Christo sunt, non ut homini privato, sed ut Ecclesiæ præfecto.”—“ What was spoken to Peter in the Gospel by Christ was not said to him as a private individual but as the head of the Church. But if anything pertains to him as prince and shepherd of the Church, we must, without controversy, consider that it applies to those who succeed him in pontificate over the Church, according to the genuine sense of the text itself” (De locis, bk. 6, ch. 8, resp. ad 10).
b) … by virtue of his apostolic authority, defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals, as to be held by the whole Church... by virtue of his apostolic authority... This clause is represented in Cano by the numerous texts he cites from popes and councils (bk. 6, chs. 4 and 5), which refer serious causes, mainly in matters of faith, to the apostolic authority of the Roman See, heir to the prince of the apostles (cf., c. 7, passim.)—defines a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the whole Church.—To understand this expression, a number of texts are available: a. Regarding Innocent III’s words, “Although some of our predecessors seem to have thought otherwise,” Cano remarks, “they thought thus but did not define it. But neither does Innocent define anything; rather, he explains his opinion, saying: ‘We do not believe,’ etc” (De locis, bk. 6, ch. 7, resp. ad. 2).— Similarly with the word judico, from Alexander III, “The word judico is frequently used to mean the same as sentio or opinor (I perceive or I suppose)” (ibid., ad 3).—[b.] Cano teaches us to distinguish between the intention and conclusion of a pontifical decree and its motives: “In conclusion, the Supreme Pontiffs cannot err if they pronounce on a question of faith from the Apostolic Tribunal. But if the reasoning of the pontiffs are not necessary... there is no need to dwell on this. For we do not fight as if for altars and hearths over the reasons given by the pontiffs. Therefore, Alexander does not define… etc.” (ibid., ad 4).—“For the pontiffs sometimes provide reasons, not ones that compel, but ones that persuade” (ibid., ad 5).—c. He distinguishes between what pontiffs say “in passing and incidentally as a matter of his own opinion,” and what they say, “by pronouncing a judgment through which they intend the faithful to be bound to believe” (ibid., ad 7)—d. Finally, so as not to prolong these quotations too much, Cano distinguishes two possible errors: “One is personal, the other judicial.” If, for example, there are errors in the commentaries on the decretals edited by Innocent IV, “that is, of course, the man’s, not the pontiff’s. But if the same Innocent were to define in a judgment concerning a question of faith something that was in fact false… then it would be judicial” bk. 6, ch. 8, in principio; cf. bk. 5, ch. 5, § Illud item damus and § Nonne igitur, dixerit quis).
c) Possesses the divine assistance promised to him in Blessed Peter.—This assistance is perfectly defined by Cano, as opposed to the inspiration of Sacred Scripture (De locis, bk. 5, ch. 5, q. 3).
d) This infallibility with which the divine Redeemer wished his Church to be endowed in order to define the doctrine concerning faith and morals (fide vel moribus).—In Cano, this clause is derived from the very passages in which he established that Peter, as pastor of all the faithful, could not err, and that the Roman Pontiff succeeded him in this privilege of divine right.
e) And, consequently, such kinds of decisions by the Roman Pontiff are inherently irreformable, and not by the consent of the Church.—This is formally stated in Cano, “For an appeal has never been admitted in matters of faith from the Roman See. Rather, those whom the it has judged to be heretics, the Church also has forever judged to be such [sed hæreticos ab ea judicatos Ecclesia semper hæreticos etiam judicavit]... By this single argument , Gelasius shows that the Apostolic See judges concerning the whole Church, but herself falls under the judgment of no one... Thus, it follows that the judgment of this tribunal on matters of faith is held to be entirely certain” (De locis, bk. 6, ch. 6, §Præterea Ecclesiæ consuetudo).
6˚ Sixth theological locus: The Authority of the Saints.—This is the term by which St Thomas and scholastic antiquity designate the Fathers of the Church. Their authority is governed by the following precepts: 1. The Fathers, whatever their number, have no other authority in philosophy and the rational sciences than that of the value of their arguments.—2. One or two Fathers, in matters of faith or the exposition of Sacred Scripture, can provide an argument that is probable but not certain; and among the Doctors, a distinction must be drawn between those who have never deviated from the teaching of the Church (e.g., Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, etc.) and others who are less certain and, moreover, not canonized (e.g., Origen, Eusebius, and Rufinus).—3. The authority of a certain number of Fathers, when contradicted by others, does not suffice for furnishing a certain argument in theology.—4. The authority, of the Fathers, even when unanimous, in matters that are free from the perspective of faith, cannot furnish the theologian with a certain argument, even if it has its probability.—5. In the exposition of Sacred Scripture, the common understanding of all the ancient Fathers provides a very certain argument: their meaning is the meaning of the Holy Spirit.—6. All the Fathers, when they are unanimous, cannot err in the dogmas of faith (De locis, bk. 7, ch. 3).
7˚ Seventh lieu locus : The authority of scholastic doctors and canonists.—1 Cano does not intend to defend the “miserable” scholasticism “which, having recoiled from the authority of Sacred Scripture philosophizes about divine realities by means of contorted syllogisms” (De locis, bk. 8, ch. 1). For him, a scholastic doctor is he who, “reasons rightly, prudently, and learnedly about God and divine matters from the Scriptures and sacred institutions” (ibid). He assigns three ends to this true theology: “to gather conclusions from the principles of faith revealed by God; to defend our faith against heretics; to illustrate or confirm the doctrine of Christ and the Church by means of human disciplines.” Considering their authority from the methodological perspective of theological use, he declares the following three precepts: a) The testimony of many scholastic theologians, if contradicted by other truly learned ones, is only as good as the reasons they give and the weight of their authority.—b) It is rash to deviate from the common thought of all scholastic authors concerning important matters.—c) If one contradicts a point of faith or morals on which all scholastic theologians agree, one is guilty of, if not heresy, at least a judgment that is proximate to heresy.
2. As far as canonists are concerned, a) Cano gives them no authority in matters of faith and morals, concerning which, to the contrary, they should seek the advice of theologians.—b) Likewise, when it comes to evangelical morals and natural morality, the authority of jurisconsults is of no use to theologians; by contrast, canonists draw their knowledge concerning the supernatural or natural law from theologians.—c) The ground on which canonists have authority is that of Church’s mores and that of religious institutions, which depend on ecclesiastical laws that define, in particular, the canonical penalties incurred by those who violate them. The agreement of all jurists on these points is of great weight for the theological arguments that must have recourse to these positive laws (ibid. c. 4).
8˚ Eighth and ninth theological loci: The authority, in theology, of natural reason and of philosophers.—Cano himself highlighted the close link between these two theological loci. Firstly, they represent human reason in itself and, then, in the concrete existence of particular doctrines (De locis, bk. 9, c. 9, in fine).
1. Book 9 is one of the most suggestive as regards theological method. It introduces a middle ground between two errors: human reason as the preeminent theological locus, and human reason as a non-existent theological locus. The first error led to the situation that, in the days of the “Germanic” heresies, when superiorly armed theologians were needed, “they had none at all at hand except for long reeds, that is, merely the light-weight weapons used by children.” Such theologians strip theology of all its vigor and weight, bringing forth a theology that has been robbed of its principal argument, namely authority; consequently, such theology not only comes to be held in contempt but, indeed, ceases to be theology anymore (De locis, bk. 9, ch. 1).—From the second error stems the theory of the “holy rusticity” of faith. Cano, arguing that grace does not destroy nature, and that human nature is rational, maintains the indispensable necessity of reasoning in theology, even concerning divine things (ch. 4), although on one condition: “that reason be the handmaid, not the mistress, and the syllogism subservient, not the presiding actor” (ch. 6).
In chapter 5, he lists four precepts governing the use of the locus of natural reason: a) to instruct philosophers; b) to refute sophists; c) to persuade more effectively with a greater number, and more various, arguments; d) to avoid grammatical amphiboles in texts. “But if grammar is once admitted, then why not dialectic? Why not philosophy?” However, the use of natural reason has its dangers. Two rules guard against them: “That we not treat what is unknowns as though it were known or what is uncertain as though it were certain” (ch. 7); and “to recognize that the arguments of nature are sometimes weak, yet at times are strong” (ch. 8). To complete these precepts, and adapt them to the progress of the various sciences a fully updated apparatus can be found in Berthier’s, De locis theologicis, pt. 2, bk. 2, ch. 1, a. 1; ch. 2, a. 1–2 (without prejudice to other authors).
2. Book 10 contains the following precepts regarding the authority of philosophers: The general consent of philosophers is authoritative for philosophical dogmas. Cano shows, by means of examples, that this consent is not chimerical, provided that they are really philosophers, “numbered among those who excelled in great learning and outstanding intellect” (ch. 4).—The isolated testimony of a great philosopher has probable authority in theology, in proportion to his philosophical science, “but a theologian should not so bind himself to any one individual that he thinks he must not deviate from him even by the breadth of a fingernail,” which is said especially in relation to Aristotle, from whom Cano lists six erroneous passages. The opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas on philosophical matters must be taken into great consideration, especially, “even more so” the latter, “But nonetheless in such a way that a kind of moderation is employed” (De locis, bk. 10, ch. 5). These rules, especially the last, have received important confirmation in recent papal documents.
9˚ Tenth theological locus: The authority of human history.—Although excellent for establishing the necessity of this science as a theological locus, Cano’s eleventh book is not very useful from the point of view of its precepts. This is due to a juridical conception of historical testimony, and especially to ideas concerning “proven authorities” which historical science cannot currently accept without the greatest reservations. In place of these precepts, we shall consider the clarification provided by contemporary authors, especially (and without prejudice to other authors) Berthier, De locis theologicis, pt. 2, bk. 2, ch. 3, a. 1-2, whose work is more in harmony with Cano’s overall ideas and plan. Here are some of these rules: History provides theology with an argument that is sometimes certain, sometimes probable (cf. Cano, De locis, bk. 11, c. 4).— Always useful, it is sometimes absolutely necessary for the theologian (cf. Cano, bk. 11, c. 2). In themselves, written documents are a certain, humanly authoritative sign; it is only per accidens that they are uncertain. In this respect, epigraphy sometimes has the highest authority.—Archaeological monuments present certain or probable arguments, depending on their condition and nature.—The history of dogmas and even of non-revealed truths provides theologians with serious points of support.—So does the history of errors.—The certain rules of historical criticism are of the greatest use to the theologian in making use of the locus of human history.—Cf. R.-M. Schultes, Introductio in historiam dogmatum (Paris: Lethielleux, 1923).
This dry enumeration—like the brevity we have needed to observe in listing the precepts concerning the ten theological loci, detaching them from the proofs and discussions that give them so much theological flavor in Cano—must be completed by reading the authors themselves. What we have said here is only to illustrate the kind of work that goes into this preliminary elaboration of the theological loci and the means by which the theologian ensures a datum that is ready to be used theologically.
VII. Theological Questions.—To determine the nature and kinds of Theological Questions, it is essential to start from an exact notion of theology itself. This is why Cano devotes three chapters to this subject, bk. 12, ch. 2–4. There is no need to dwell on this, however tempting it might be, since this question must be dealt with for its own sake in the entry for “Theology” [to be included later in the DTC, written by Yves Congar a number of years later].
1˚ The nature of theological questions.—Cano entitles his ch. 5: “What are the questions or conclusions of theology?” In scholastic theology—the only one in existence at the time— questions and conclusions correspond to each other. Their material content is identical, only the form differs: interrogative for the question, affirmative for the conclusion. Therefore, in theology, only that which is subject to a conclusion is a question, and a theological conclusion is properly “that which arises from the principles of theology, as effects from their causes” (bk. 12, ch. 5). The proper and primary object of a theological question is therefore not to ask whether the principles of theology are revealed, but whether the conclusion we draw from these principles shares in the benefit of revelation, whether it is in some way, mediately or virtually, revealed, appendix fidei (cf. Cano, bk. 12, c. 5, § Maneat igitur and § Fidei porro quæstio). Albert Lang (Die loci theologici des M. Cano, p. 66, note 4), criticizes me for saying that the question concerning the revelation of the principles of theology is a theological question. Let’s be clear about this. The proper object of theology is not the formally revealed, but the revelabile, agreed! (cf. Gardeil, Le Donné révélé et la théologie, pt. 2, sect. 2, p. 224.) However, as Cano notes, since principles are often contested, this contestation gives rise to the admission of questions of principle among theological questions (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 12). Saint Thomas was the first to say so (ST I, q. 1, a. 8), based on theology’s character as a form of wisdom). I agree that many have found it convenient to assign the examination of questions of principle to positive theology, and that even Cano may have been the originator of this innovation (cf. Jacquin, “Melchior Cano et la Théologie moderne,” Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques [1920], pp. 121–141)—provided that positive theology is conceived not as an autonomous discipline but as a potential part, a function, of the one Sapientia, and that it be governed by the same principles and precepts as speculative theology—precisely those that Cano sets out in his De locis theologicis. (cf. Gardeil, Le Donné révélé, pp. 218–223; Antoine Lemonnyer, “Comment s’organise la théologie catholique,” Revue du Clergé français (Oct. 1903), 225–242; M.-B. Schwalm, “Les deux théologies,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques (1908), p.696 ff.)7
2˚ Kinds of theological questions.—We merely mention the division of practical [and] speculative questions (bk. 12, c. 5, § Quæstiones ergo), which are treated by identical arguments: “Questions concerning knowledge and those concerning action must be treated and resolved in almost the same way and from the same loci” (De locis, bk. 12, c. 5). On this, see Garrigou-Lagrange, “Du caractère métaphysique de la théologie morale de saint Thomas,” Revue thomiste, July 1925, p. 341ff.8
The only kinds of theological questions we are interested in are those that can guide the discovery of specific loci. There are three of them:
1. Supernatural and natural questions.—By supernatural, Cano means a question that is defined solely by supernatural (i.e. revealed) principles, for example: Will all of us will rise again?—By natural, he means a question that natural reason is capable of resolving, for example: Is God in all places? Between the two, there are mixed questions, which must appeal to both faith and reason, for example: Does Christ have two intellects? (See De locis, bk. 12, ch. 5, § Et quoniam omnia).
2. Supernatural questions of faith, for which the theologian must lay down his life (in capitis discrimen veniendum) and secondary supernatural questions that one can fail to know without damage to one’s faith (quæ possunt ignorari sine fidei jactura) (see ibid, § Est enim alia divisio).
3. Questions of principles and questions of consequences.—The latter are the only questions that should be asked in theology, since it is a science,9 and does not have to discuss the principles from which it starts, which are the principles of faith. However, in point of fact, there are no principles in theology that have not been subjected to theological investigation, either because of the opponents who attacked them, or because of certain obscurities that affect these principles, and want to be cleared up by explanations. Ibid., c. 5, § Contingit enim aliquando.
3˚ Cano treated the use of the kinds of theological question to guide the search for loci in the following chapter, where he speaks about their practical discovery in the field of argumentation, bk. 12, ch. 6; cf. ch. 11, and “The Method of Theological Discovery” above. We shall return to this subject below in section 9. However, on the other hand, he did not desire to end this chapter devoted to theological questions without providing theologians a series of admirable precepts and advice, in which his marvellous experience rivals the beauty of his language. This moral propaedeutic cannot be analyzed. It infuses a spirit rather than enacts a method, the spirit of the theologian’s own office, officium theology (ch. 610, § Nulla theologicæ, up to Dixerit quispiam).
VIII. Theological notes.—We cannot here provide an in depth investigation of theological notes. It will suffice to define them, list the main ones, briefly show the process by which Cano obtains them, and indicate the role they play in the formation of theological judgment.
1˚ Definition of Notes.—Notes are terms or expressions by which certain propositions are qualified from the perspective of their agreement or disagreement with the Catholic faith. They are sometimes used to refer to theological questions, sometimes to conclusions, and sometimes to propositions that are the major or minor premises in theological reasoning. They are two in kind, depending on whether they indicate agreement or disagreement: in the first case, they are called notes of Catholic truths; in the second, notes of opposing errors. In both cases, they offer a graduated set of qualifications, enabling the theologian to appreciate the right theological value belonging to the propositions he uses or arrives at. Cano deals with positive notes in bk. 12, c. 6, and negative notes in chs. 7, 8 and 10.
2° Overview of the Notes.—According to Cano, the positive notes (ch. 6) are divided into two groups. First, there are those that belong to formally revealed truths, whether primary or secondary (sive primaria sive secundaria). These are the truths of the Catholic faith. They are subdivided according to whether they derive from Scripture or from Apostolic Traditions. Next come those that qualify the truths deduced from the former, in a necessary manner, i.e. in such a way that the concession of the latter entails the concession of the former, while the denial of the conclusions, by contrast, entails the denial of revealed truths. Conclusions are in turn subdivided, according to whether their minor is of faith or of reason. They are of faith, but not absolutely, non simpliciter. On this point, it will be useful to comment on Cano’s thought in light of the recent clarifications offered by Fr. Marin-Sola in his work, L'évolution homogène du dogme catholique (Fribourg, 1924), where one will see that the only theological conclusions that really belong to faith are those with a metaphysical connection.11 Even so, they only come under the scope of faith mediately, as definable, not-yet-defined truths, prior to the Church’s declaration [sentence]. (Cf. Marin-Sola, op. cit. ch. 7, sect. 5, “La vraie pensée de Melchior Cano sur la définibilité de la conclusion théologique,” L'évolution, vol. 2, pp. 444–46912). The negative notes are the note of heresy (chs. 7 and 8) and the notes erroneous, having the savor of heresy, offensive to pious ears, rash, and scandalous (ch. 10). Cano thus abbreviates the catalog of notes given by Torquemada (Summa de ecclesia, bk. 4, pt. 2, ch. 9), which he cites and finds to be too complicated (ibid. ch. 6). We leave it to the specialists to assess Cano’s account of theological notes; what we seek to set forth is his methodology.
3˚ What procedure does Cano follow in order to obtain his notes?—None other than by recourse to the critical judgments he formulated concerning theological premises, in his elaborations expressed from bk. 2 to bk. 11 (cf. section 6 above). And it is here that we see how the general judgments contained in this part of his work generate judgments concerning the propositions used in argumentation, judgments which, formulated through the notes, will in turn reverberate on the final judgment concerning the theological conclusions and express their theological quality.
Since we cannot here go into all the details, we will choose two examples.—1. A question of qualifying an obscure text of Scripture as a truth of Catholic faith, because “there is no need for a prescription to be made regarding obvious matters” (ch. 6). Here is Cano’s fourth rule: “The unanimous and concordant understanding of all the saints and of the Scriptures is itself the very truth of Catholic faith.” As he immediately notes, this is a summary of his fifth conclusion, from bk. 7, ch. 5.13—2. In his first rule, Cano pushed the influence of his general criticism of the loci right through to the theological conclusion itself: “When the sense of Scripture is obscure, then the Church’s understanding is the same as the genuine meaning of Scripture. From this—though the heretic may cry out—this is a sure mark of Catholic truth, as well as the choice of that reliable argument we seek for proving theological conclusions (ibid., ch. 6, 1st praeceptio). Fundamentally, for Cano, the rules for such qualification are nothing other than an adaptation and, sometimes, a transcription of the critical results of the general discovery of the ten theological loci.
4˚ Cano did not think it necessary to descend from precepts to practice and show us the theologian in the act of qualifying his conclusions and arguments using the rules contained both in his general inventory of loci in bks. 2–11 and in his theory of Notes: “I did not consider it necessary to undertake any further task devoted to the discerning of the arguments that prove our dogmas, other than what was already provided a little earlier (chs. 6–8 and 10) by providing those notes by which our truths are marked out. Therefore, after all that we have said, that aspect of judgment needs no further admonition or precepts, nor does it properly pertain to the treatise on the loci that this book, by its very title, promises” (bk. 12, ch. 11). He believes that the qualification (in actu exercito) of propositions is no longer a matter of methodology but of practice, and that, given the precepts he has already provided, the theologian must handle such matters on his own. The theologian will do so first by putting his arguments in proper logical form, taking care—following Father Marin-Sola’s advice (op. cit., ch. 2, §5)—to use only arguments with a “metaphysico-inclusive” connection, if he wants to arrive at theological science rather than merely systematic conclusions.14 After this, with one last overview of his entire argument and all its elements, each marked by its appropriate note, he has only to determine, with full understanding, the theological truth of his conclusion, that is, to assign it its proper qualification: “Finally, let him conclude what is true and, on the other hand, what is false. But first let him teach what the faith of Christ holds concerning that question, and wholly bring forth, by appropriate and certain testimonies, what it holds; then let him set forth what reason either prescribes or teaches” (bk. 12, ch. 11, 3rd precept). This authorized determination of conclusions—found among the great theologians at the end of lengthy disputationes—is expressed in phrases such as Dico Dico resolutorie, Determinando dico, respondeo dicendum. It represents the culmination, the supreme act of theological labor—its pure act, one might say—in contrast to the judgments that prepare and ground it, which remain in a state of potency until that sublime moment when, in full awareness, the theologian concludes and qualifies his conclusions. This is Cano’s great achievement: the establishment of a method that enables one, with certainty and relative ease, to pronounce judgments of this kind.
Although Cano did not compose a Praxis ad usum theologorum to guide the personal exercise of internal theological judgment, he did sketch out a method for external theological judgments, for use by judges of the faith (cf. bk. 12, ch. 9, “Three rules that must guide external judgments of faith”). This is a collection of practical advice for inquisitors, which is very much marked by its time and can only be of retrospective interest to most theologians. However, its presence shows Cano’s full awareness of all that we have just said, namely that the theological qualification of conclusions is the supreme culmination and ultimate end of theological labor as such, as well as the touchstone of the consummate theologian, perfectus et absolutus theologus, who, in imitation of the perfect dialectician, must be instructed both in discovery and in judgment, tum ad inveniendum tum ad judicandum (bk. 12, ch. 11, beginning).
IX. The Use of Theological Loci.—If Cano, for the reasons we have just presented, refused to provide a practical exemplification of the use of his theological loci in the formation of judgment, he could not do the same for the discovery of arguments. To do so would have been to break with the practices of his masters in dialectics, Cicero and Agricola, and even, whatever he may have said about this, with Aristotle, thus failing to achieve his aim of training the perfect theological dialectician. The part of his twelfth book De locorum usu, which truly concerns the use of theological places, will therefore be devoted solely to discovery.
To this end, Cano first establishes the precepts that guide the theologian in the exercise of discovering arguments on the very terrain of argumentation, in the presence of a question posed and debated. He then gives three examples of the application of these precepts (chs. 12–14), which we will not dwell on at length, since they belong expressly to theology proper.
1° First precept: Possess one’s theological loci and the rules that govern them.—1. When addressing a question, the theologian must have in mind all the precepts listed in the prior critical inventory of theological loci (bks. 2–11), “For it is not enough merely to have them held in reserve in one’s memory. Rather, one must have them ready and at hand… It makes no great difference whether one receives these things from me or from someone else, better prepared and more learned than I, who may come after me to write about them.”—2. But it does not suffice that one know the rules that command the use of loci. One must also thoroughly know the matter they contain and to which these rules apply, “To have reviewed and comprehended the loci themselves.” And Cano, in a passage imitating Cicero (Orator, c. 34) eloquently attacks those who would argue but do not possess their Holy Scriptures, Apostolic Traditions, the teachings of the Church, of the Councils, of the Sovereign Pontiffs, of the Fathers, of the Theologians, philosophy, science, and history. He objects: “But it is impossible to know all these things” (Cf. the words of Lacordaire in his panegyric to Saint Thomas at Saint-Sernin of Toulouse: “The theologian is an impossible man”). He replies: I don't blame him for not knowing all these things; what I blame him for is usurping the name of theologian while not even trying to know them (si non secutus). And he continues this theme with his eloquent vigor, ending, after a magnificent eulogy to Saint Thomas (“How much more abundant and vigorous St. Thomas is…”) with this sarcasm directed at bad theologians: “Wine mixed with water is indeed clearer, but nonetheless is diluted; wine by itself is more difficult to drink, but how much greater is its strength!”
Let us reflect on the two parts of this first precept. Certainly, Cano does not mean that the theologian must begin his task with, on the one hand, the rules governing the use of the loci and, on the other, mere raw knowledge of their matter. Clearly, what he expects is a theological datum already developed through those rules—in other words, not raw data, but a critiqued datum, by which I mean the kind of theological criticism whose principles are laid out in Books 2–11.15 The fact that this criticism is theological does not exclude its scientific character, since philosophy and the sciences, especially historical sciences, themselves serve as theological loci. By accepting the authority of faith, they have not abandoned the rational evidence that constitutes them as sciences but, instead, have placed it at the service of a more certain and higher form of knowledge. In short, this objective and sincere criticism ultimately submits itself to faith, because for Cano, what is critical and what is theological do not exclude each other but, rather, complete each other: “As I have said over and over, Divine and human reason are not dissimilar, nor does one lead in one direction and the other elsewhere. Rather, both look toward the same goal and are directed to the same end.” He adds that our great predecessors abhorred those who separate two things naturally made to be united and that if they had not joined them together in their discussions, they would not have considered themselves theologians (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 11, 3rd precept). Also see Gardeil, Le Donné révélé et la théologie, pp. 212–223.
2˚ Second precept: A reasoned reading of models.—To this fundamental first precept—"which stands at the head of all such instructions”—Cano adds an auxiliary precept aimed at the same goal, namely the general, preliminary preparation of discovery: to have read the great masters of theological science, with the deliberate intention of tracing their doctrinal arguments back to the loci from which they are drawn. By so doing, he says, “you will gather treasure for yourself from the discoveries of others. And once you understand which locus they failed to use, you yourself will seek out those points that were omitted.” Thus, he explains, Saint Thomas, by appealing to the locus of natural reason, supplemented the purely supernatural arguments that Saint Augustine wrote against the Pelagians. However, such supplementary work is only the first and entirely negative benefit of a reasoned study of theologians. Now we come to the positive benefit: “Recognizing the loci of arguments employed by the ancient theologians is extremely helpful, both for understanding their sources of strength and for discerning their various methods of argumentation and because this diligence and practice provide a certain abundance, so that not only will we have at hand the arguments they themselves discovered but, moreover, each time we consult the theological loci, we will find comparable arguments in similar matters.... Indeed, with regard to discovery, the examples of the ancients will be of greater benefit to theologians than will any precepts, whether ours or any other author’s” (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 11, § Argumentationes)
3° Third precept: Connect the question you wish to resolve to its proper theological locus; literally, cast the question into the loci (quæstionem in locos conjicere).
This precept consists of five successive steps.
1. First, one must discern the type of question under consideration: “When the matter for discussion is set before the theologian, he must carefully examine the question and determine, first of all, the class to which it belongs. For unless the theologian grasps the nature of the question, it will not be easy for him to see what sort of arguments he must look for, nor the loci from which he should seek them” (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 11, third precept, §Erit autem hæc formula). This assessment is performed by comparing the question posed with the various categories into which theological questions and their notes are divided (see section 7 above). “When we are seeking to exposit the topic under discussion (questions concerning the principles of faith), our manner of argumentation must differ from that which we deploy in those matters we seek to demonstrate (questions of consequence-inference).16 Likewise, the debate is entirely different depending on whether it involves a natural or supernatural question, and different theological loci must be applied to each” (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 5, § Primum ergo officium.)
2. The theologian’s main concern in this process of characterizing the question is—despite the complexity ordinarily involved in such matters (“although they are all bound up and entangled with one another”)—the most difficult of all things, namely to disentangle whether or not the question belongs to faith (“An præter fidem illa sit an potius ad fidem pertineat,” De locis, bk. 12, ch. 11). For the first type of questions [i.e., those that belong to faith itself], one must fight with full force, “with one’s sails and horses engaged.” For the others, theologians certainly can and at times must contend, but “violent struggle is entirely forbidden in them” (ibid., ch. 5, § Sed cum unius cuiusque). As for open questions that pose no danger to the faith— “where knowledge involves no danger, error likewise involves no fault”—one must observe the greatest moderation (ibid.). This does not mean such questions should be “exterminated” and banished from scholastic thought. They are valuable both for training minds and for theology itself. However, the proper subject of theological debates are supernatural questions. In approaching such supernatural questions, one must be keenly aware of their significance: “Every theologian who is about to dispute a supernatural matter should reflect on what the title ‘theologian’ involves, frequently recall this, and ask himself—not just once but many times—what it demands” (De locis, bk. 12, ch. 5, §Sed cum and §Sed regula).
3. Once the kind of question is properly determined, it is, at last, time to circulate it through all the loci capable of providing arguments for its resolution, “leading it through all the loci,” especially those best suited and most fitting to the question. If it is a supernatural question, one should preferably “cast” it into the loci based on divine authority; if it is natural, one should focus mainly on loci that draw their strength from natural reason; if it is mixed, “it should be lead through them all.” Nonetheless, one should remember that no question fails to benefit from being led through all the loci: Scripture, after all, informs us about natural realities, and reason can set forth or make persuasive arguments concerning matters that are supernatural.
4. Once the question has thus been cast forth and immersed in all the loci, and all possible arguments pro and con have been gathered, the time has now come to engage in dialectical debate—but always with a view to concluding and determining what is true or false. In carrying out this determination, there is an order to be followed: one must first establish what belongs to faith, supporting it with reliable and relevant testimonies; then what reason prescribes or at least suggests must be determined. This is not the order followed by Saint Thomas in Contra gentiles, where he addresses pagans who do not accept [revealed] authority, but it is the order Saint Augustine follows, as it conforms to nature: “[revealed] authority goes before reason.” This is also the order of the Summa theologiae. Cano modestly congratulates himself on having restored this method: “The School… before us, was not so well furnished with arguments based on faith; theological matters were for the most part handled by arguments from reason... But in my lectures, from the very beginning, I always have taught first what faith determines, and then what reason demonstrates.”
5. Cano gives one last piece of advice to those who wish to become adept at using this method: they must practice it frequently. “Our instructions will be of little use unless put into practice, and practice is what confirms the precepts.” Therefore, theologians need to train themselves to dispute a question on both sides, contending together as in a pretend combat, quasi in simulacro. And, since, in all fields, imitating the great masters is the best way to begin, they should choose as models those considered the leading figures in scholastic dispute: Saint Augustine, indisputably so (citra aleam), Saint Thomas, in the judgment of experts (iudicio peritorum), and no doubt… Cano himself. For right after offering this suggestion, he provides three examples of scholastic theses, each perfect in its own kind: the first, on the sacrifice of the Mass, involving a principle of theology; the second, on a theological conclusion (whether the soul of Christ had the beatific vision from the moment it was created); the third, on a mixed question, essentially one of reason yet still bound up with faith: the immortality of the soul. On the specific character of these three examples, see M. Jacquin, “Melchior Cano et la théologie moderne,” Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques (January 1920): 121–141.
X. The Fate of the De Locis after Melchior Cano.— (1) Cano’s De locis theologicis was published (in Salamanca, 1563) only after his death. Hyacynth Serry’s Vindicationes Melchioris Cani opens (in ch. 1) by discussing the favorable reception it received from the most illustrious theologians and scholars, including the Jesuits, a quibus vehementer laudatur, as was expressed by Aloysius Vernerius in Apparatus ad philosophiam et theologiam (Rome, 1751, p. 518). This doesn’t mean that there were not points of opposition, though not concerning the methodology itself: the objections concerned a number of positions taken with regard to given Fathers, St. Thomas himself, particular councils, or even certain theological doctrines stated in passing, etc.
(2) The success of the new methodology led to the emergence of a whole body of literature, whose ever-growing output fills several centuries. The first imitator of Cano seems to have been Seraphino Razzi, O.P., whose work, De locis theologicis prælectiones (published in Perugia, 1603) is merely a summary of Cano, with some criticisms on points of detail. Gravina, O. P., in his Catholicæ praescriptiones (Naples 1632) follows him by developing him from the perspective of erudition and apologetics, especially against ancient and modern heretics. Dominic of the Holy Trinity, O. C., devotes a large place to the De locis in his Bibliotheca theologica (Rome, 1665, vol 1, ch. 2, and vol. 3). Jan Opstraet’s De locis theologicis dissertationes (Lille, 1737) is considered the best work written by this theologian. Du Plessis d'Argentré's Elementa theologica (Paris, 1702) develops, instead, the methodological side of things, clarifying and freeing it from Cano’s entanglements, without changing anything essential. And we must also cite: Zambaldi, O. S., De locis theologicis (Padua, 1722); Mazzinelli, Totius theologiæ dogmaticae scolasticæ, t. 1; Egger, O. M., De praecipuis locis theol (Augsburg, 1762); and, finally, Vincenzo Gotti, O. P., who opens his masterwork Theologia scolastica dogmatica, (Bologna, 1727, vol. 1) with a De locis. All these authors are scholastics, who hold that the De locis is an introduction to scholastic theology.
We should also mention the work of [St.] Robert Bellarmine, De controversiis, (Lyon, 1602, vol. 1), who, without having theological methodology in mind, practiced it and firmly established against the Protestants the foundations of the most important theological loci, namely, Scripture, tradition, and the papal magisterium.
(3) Annat’s Apparatus ad positivam theologiam methodicus (Paris, 1700) bears witness to another tendency, namely for the De locis to slide towards positive theology. This phenomenon has been perfectly captured and summarized in an article by Jacquin, “Melchior Cano et la théologie moderne,” Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques (January 1920): 121–141. He shows that, if we wish to uncover the earliest origins of positive theology, we must not stop with Dénis Petau and Louis Thomassin but, instead, must go all the way back to Cano. Referring to the three questions treated by way of example at the end of bk.12, he states: “The general outlook of this work is quite different from that of the works of St. Thomas or other Scholastic masters. Whereas reasoning dominates in the latter, erudition does so in the former. And, by this very fact, Melchior Cano’s constructions are naturally at the forefront of modern theology. Hasn’t modern theology been more or less universally modeled on this type of methodology, and looking in textbooks of theology, do we not in general see an organization by way of theological theses, with the three series of proofs: from Scripture, tradition, and reason, with the first two taking precedence?” (Jacquin, p. 136). Jacquin then goes on to show how, over the course of time, such predominance given to arguments from authority gave rise to unavoidable specializations, devoted to justifying, through scholarship and history (particularly in response to Protestants and humanists), the revealed data used by the scholastic theologian. Thus, we have positive theology.
On his own account, moreover, Cano remains, in principle, a scholastic: “Cano maintains, in fact, the traditional definition of theology and, theoretically at least, assigns it a threefold purpose that corresponds exactly to the notion of scholastic thought” (ibid., p. 135). And, in fact, even out of the three typical questions he presents as examples, two are scholastic deductions and, whatever their general appearance might be, are established, in the central part of the proof, with the aid of theological reasoning, one entirely (“Where a conclusion of theology is brought into question”) and the other in part (“Where there is a doubt concerning a question that does pertain to faith even though it is, itself, a natural question, 4th conclusio). The first question, moreover (“Where a principle of theology is brought into question,” bk. 12, ch. 12) was already regarded by St. Thomas as a matter belonging to speculative theology (ST I, q. 1, a. 8c). Therefore, Cano is a traditional thinker, and it is only by occasion, per accidens, that his work gave rise to positive theology.
(4) The era of theological manuals De locis, which are still being written today, began with Fr. Kranz, O.S.A., De locis theologicis sex tractatus ad usum Augustinianæ juventutis (1770) and should be compared also to Chr. Claess, O. S., Principia theologiæ dogmaticæ ad usum fratrum (Munster, 1781), to which should be added: Antoine Mayr, S. J., De locis theologicis et vera religione et Ecclesia (Augsburg, 1781); S. Schaaf, O. S. B., De locis theologicis (Frankfurt, 1774); and Gerbert, O. S. B., Principia theologiae exegeticæ (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1757). These manuals adapt Cano’s work to the needs of elementary theological education, though without losing its overall sense and methodical scope.
Collaterally, we must point out the appearance of several works De locis which distort the principles of theological method in order to erect a fundamentis a more or less secure theology: B. Stattler, S. J., De locis theologicis, Eustadt (1781, indexed in 1797); Chrismann, O.S.F., Regula fidei catholicae et Collectio dogmatum credendorum, new edition, Wurzhourg, 1854, placed on the Index for having been too restrictive regarding papal infallibility and the number of truths to be believed, cf. Migne, Theologiæ cursus completus, t. 6, col. 877–1070: and especially volume 1, on the Index, of Tamburini's De fontibus theologiæ, Pavia, 1789.
(5) Especially during the 19th century, a new approach to the subject matter of the De locis developed, characterized by little room being devoted to strictly methodological questions and, in their place, the development of an ontology concerning the realities serving as the foundation for the principles of theology. Thus, positive theology invaded De locis. The forerunner of this discipline is undoubtedly [St.] Robert Bellarmine, in his De Controversiis (Lyon, 1602), in which he examines and defends the foundations—as Cano would say, the causas—of the three principal loci, namely Scripture, Tradition and the Roman Pontiff. Among those whom we could number as members of his school would include Giovanni Perrone, S. J., Praelectiones theologicæ, ed. Migne in 2 vols (Paris, 1842); [Camillo] Mazzella, S. J., [Praelectiones scholastico-dogmaticae: De religione et Ecclesia];17 Johann Baptist Franzelin, S. J., De divina traditione et scriptura (Rome, 1883); Jean-Vincent Bainvel, S. J., De Scriptura Sacra (Paris, 1910) and De magisterio vivo et traditione (Paris, 1905). Here, the erudite, theological, and apologetic side of Cano’s work comes to the foreground.
6˚ By contrast, concern for theological method is found as the exclusive concern in Schæzler’s Introductio ad S. Theologiam (Regensburg: 1882), a work that is a difficult read compositionally speaking, though written by a truly thoughtful mind and full of sound doctrine drawn from the best sources. This same concern is evident in Scheeben’s Dogmatik, vol. 1, bk. 1, chs. 2–6. It is also predominant in the work of J. Didiot, another thoughtful writer, in his Logique surnaturelle subjective (Paris, 1894), théorèmes 26–45. And it also features prominently in the Summa apologetica de Ecclesia catholica by P. de Groot, O. P., (Regensburg, 1906). However, the modern scholastic work that most clearly emphasized the methodological aspect of the De locis as its exclusive concern is the De locis theologicis by Joachim Berthier, O. P. (Turin, 1900), who adapted Cano’s work for contemporary educational use, supplementing and modernizing Cano’s work with often highly original contributions.
(7) These works provide only a glimpse of the modern literary production dedicated to the De locis theologicis. We have not cited the first volumes in nearly all the various theology textbooks in publication, nor the various Propædeuticae ad S. Theologiam, such as part three of of Christian Pesch S. J.’s Institutiones propaedeuticae ad sacram theologiam, whose abundant bibliography can be used to complete our own. Nor should we fail to mention one of the latest De locis published as a textbook by J. Mucunill, S. J. (Barcelona, 1916), nor the very suggestive work by L. Choupin, S. J., Valeur des décisions doctrinales et disciplinaires du Saint-Siège. Several recent works, of mixed importance and character, should also be mentioned. The first is by Fr. D’Herbigny, S.J.’s Théologie du Révélé (Paris, 1921), a small booklet aiming to introduce people to questions of theological method, written in a lively and original style, which makes the data of a mature and serious science pleasant to read (cf. Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 1922, p. 689). The second is Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P.’s Évolution homogène du dogme catholique (Spanish edition, Madrid, 1923; French edition, 2 vols, Fribourg-en-Suisse / Paris, Gabalda, 1924), which, while dealing with the question of the development of dogma, provides very interesting information on the form of theological reasoning in particular. The same can be said for Fr. Reginald Schultes, O.P.’s Introductio in historiam dogmatum, (Paris, 1923), conceived in a somewhat different spirit, though equally erudite and most useful from the perspective of the methodology proper to historical theology.
But the work that is currently destined to have the greatest impact on the progress of theological methodology is undoubtedly Albert Lang’s Die Loci theologici des M. Cano und die Methode des dogmatischen Beweises, a contribution to theological methodology and its history, in the Münchener Studien zur historischen Theologie. This work, the occasion for which (as the author writes) was my own articles on “La notion du lieu théologique,” is written in the same spirit, in that it concludes that one must return to Cano as to the Master in these matters. As far as we can judge from its first 96 pages, its character is above all historical and documentary. As we have seen from the extracts quoted above, his discoveries in this field are of the utmost interest.
XI. Appendix: An attempt to recast Cano’s Treatise on the model of Aristotle’s Topics.—As we said in section three above, Cano draws only very freely upon Aristotle’s Topics, which he reads through the eyes of Cicero.—His main divergence concerns the notion of locus, which, for Aristotle, is a general proposition, whereas for Cano it refers to a set of related arguments, provided with a special record card of sorts.—Another difference concerns the role of discovery. For Aristotle, discovery is part of the theoretical topic. It consists in discovering, by means of dialectical instruments, the particular loci that abound in the four universal questions (genus, definition, property, and accident). Like the rhetoricians, Cano locates discovery in the practical part of theological dialectic. Such discovery seeks, among the particular loci, supposedly already determined, notos and tractatos, the loci suitable for resolving a theological question under discussion. (Cf. San-Severino, Philosophia christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata, pt. 2, ch. 2, a. 11 with Cano, De locis theol. bk. 12, ch. 11.)
This gave rise to the idea of attempting to establish a closer parallelism between Aristotle’s loci and theological loci, with the aim of giving the latter the benefit of the authority of Aristotle’s Topics, from the point of view of the logical rigor of its method. This idea took shape in three articles on “The Notion of a Theological Locus.”
1˚ In the first section, “Topics and Theology,” while noting the difference between dialectics (which precedes the sciences) and theology, which is a particular science, we showed the close analogy that exists, from the perspective of their logical structure, between theological science and the Topics: 1. in their principles, which are held by a common and extrinsic means of proof, common adherence for the Topics, faith in divine revelation for the principles of theology; 2. in the kind of question they resolve, which is the question of the predicate and not the question of the an sit, the quid et, the propter quid sit, which are scientific questions. Indeed, the only dialectical question is: is such and such a predicate, accident, genus, proper, definition appropriate to such and such a subject? The only fundamental question of theology is this: Is such and such a proposition revealed, either formally (questions of principle) or virtually, (questions of consequence)?18 In his note in the Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique (May 1910) p. 240ff, M. Hourcade contradicted these two assimilations. For my answer to the first point, see Gardeil, “Probable Certainty” and “Topicality.” Also see Albert Lang (Die Loci theologici des M. Cano, p. 66, note 4) who admits that our reply was effective. On the second point, it will suffice to reply that Hourcade (p. 242), does not distinguish between revelatum and revelabile, and that his notion of philosophical argumentation in theology, working freely for the benefit of a philosophical acquisition, and not under the guidance of faith with the aim of manifesting the latter (p. 241–242) is not admissible in theology. (See our discussion of this in our “The Notion of a Theological Locus,” note 60 in translation,19 and Gardeil, Le Donné révélé et la Théologie (p. 232).)
2˚ The second section describes the structure of Aristotle’s Topics. This is dominated, as though by its final cause, by the enumeration of the four dialectical questions that divide up the universal question of the predicate, depending on whether the predicate exceeds the essence of the subject (the question of genus), equals it (the question of definition), cannot be attributed to another subject, even though it is extrinsic to it (the question of property), or finally, is extrinsic to the subject and adventitious (the question of accident).—Each of these general questions finds its counterpart in its universal locus of resolution, which is a general proposition. For example, at the heart of the answer to all problems of definition lies the maxim, “The defined and definition are equal to each other.” To find more specialized resolutional “loci” that address the details of each general question—taking, for example, the sub-problems of definition—Aristotle uses “dialectical instruments.” Chief among these is the gathering of propositions, multiple in number, thereby developing the universal locus of each question, for instance, the proposition: “What does not belong to the definition of the subject does not belong to the subject itself.” Such gathering could not be even remotely complete without employing the other three instruments: distinguishing of ambiguities, gathering differences, and examining resemblances.—In this way, we can establish, for each aspect of the four major dialectical problems, an interconnected set of propositions capable of resolving each of the particular questions that arise within these general problems. These propositions or loci sometimes govern from above, sua potestate, the answer to the particular question posed, without materially entering into the argumentation that resolves it, for which they are nevertheless the strength and nerve: they are common loci. At other times, by contrast, when they are less universal, they enter into the argumentation itself as major premise. In this way, for every aspect of one of the four great questions concerning the predicate, there corresponds a proposition that can resolve it, a special connection for that aspect, not forgetting the general common loci that dominate the resolutions as a whole and underpin their topical value.
3˚ The last three sections are devoted to establishing the parallelism: 1. between theological questions and topical questions; 2. between their instruments of resolution and 3. between their loci.
1. The Questions.—In the third section we take up the issue of theological questions. Their general formula is: Does the predicate revealed belong, at least virtually, to this or that statement? Such belonging can be expressed as necessary or probable. Moreover, theological questions are either supernatural, able to be resolved by divine authority alone, or natural, able to be resolved by theological reason (i.e. by reason governed by revelation). Therefore, there are four major theological questions that parallel the four major dialectical questions: supernatural scientifically demonstrable questions; supernatural probable questions; natural scientifically demonstrable questions; natural probable questions. And to resolve these four questions, there will be four universal common loci, analogous to the universal common loci of dialectics, for instance, for scientifically solvable supernatural questions, this one: What is certainly part of the revealed deposit offers supernatural theological questions a necessary principle of resolution (see the text starting “* 261” in the article linked above.)
These universal loci form the basis for answering all the specific questions that arise in connection with each of the groups of general theological questions. However, in order to topically initiate the direct answer to these particular questions, they must, as in dialectics, be elaborated and made fruitful by the instruments of theological discovery.
2. Instruments.—We then take up the “Instruments for Discovering Theological Loci.” Cano, at the beginning of his precepts for discovery, wrote: “Whoever desires to discover arguments from the theological loci should adhere to the general [communes] precepts that the dialecticians have handed down concerning the discovery of arguments. For indeed,… theologians use precepts which are nearly the same as those by which arguments are drawn from the dialectical loci” (De locis, bk.12, ch. 10). And indeed, the precepts he subsequently gives for discovery are not lacking in analogy with Aristotle’s instruments for discovery, especially the first: the choice of propositions. This section is devoted to exploring this analogy. It shows, for example, how, with the aid of such instruments, the general common locus for the resolution of supernatural scientific questions, reported above, is fleshed out with less universal derived common loci: Sacred Scripture is an effective and necessary principle for the resolution for these questions; so is tradition; so is the Church, and so on. Then, we show how these derived common loci, in turn, abound, under the action of instruments, in even less universal ones. For example, thanks to the second instrument (the distinction of ambiguities) the locus of Sacred Scripture will be enriched with loci like these: the propositions of Canonical Scripture whose literal meaning is explicit are able, on their own and without any declaration by the Church, to provide very certain and very effective theological loci; the propositions of Scripture whose literal meaning has been defined by the Church constitute, when understood in this sense, infallible theological loci which have complete certainty.
Assuming this work has been completed, and each of the ten general common loci has been fleshed out with similar propositions that make it explicit, all ready to direct the theologian’s work, the discovery of immediate theological loci (i.e. propositions that will lead directly to a given argumentation) is the easiest kind of thing for any expert to do, and nothing will be left to chance (See our discussion of “the rules or precepts that constitute the internal organization of the Instruments for the Discovery of Scriptural Theological Loci”).
3. Immediate Theological loci.—Here, sections 4 and 5 of the article under consideration.—At the end of the process of discovering theological loci, parallel to that of the Topics, each of the four great theological questions is faced with a hierarchical set of theological loci capable of resolving it, not only in terms of its general content, but also in terms of the particular modalities of the specific and even individual questions that arise in relation to it.
For example, if it is a supernatural question that can be necessarily demonstrated, we will have :
a) A universal theological common locus, e.g. the locus cited: What is contained in the very deposit of revelation presents a necessary principle of resolution for this question.
b) A derived common locus, though still very general in nature, for example: What is contained in Sacred Scripture constitutes a necessary principle for the resolution of supernatural theological questions.
c) A common locus derived from the previous one and making it more specific, for example: propositions from canonical Scripture, whose explicit literal meaning is not in doubt, by themselves and without declaration by the Church, are necessary principles for the resolution of supernatural theological questions.(See the text starting “Therefore, let us focus on the second main argument, taken from this text from Saint Luke,” in our article.)
These are theological loci, general propositions, comparable to the hierarchical general propositions that constitute dialectical loci. And, as one can see, the first establishes the truth of the second from above, and the latter of the third, so that when the third comes into play, it is under the virtual influence of the first two—as in the Topics. (See the text starting “But these supreme Loci will in turn be divided, thanks to the Dialectical Instruments, whose role is to multiply the Loci,” in our article.) This is a far cry from Cicero’s sedes et notæ argumentorum.
4˚ Having reached this extreme point, where the division of the universal theological locus has yielded all its results, nothing remains but to subsume the particular principle, from which one hopes that the particular question in view will find an immediate resolution.
As an example for discussion, let us take the first question raised by Cano in De locis (bk. 12, ch. 12): “Whether in the New Law there now exists, truly and properly, a sacrifice?” Let us linger over his second principal argument, drawn from the text of Saint Luke, “Taking the bread in his hands, he gave thanks, broke it, and gave it to His disciples, saying: this is my body, which is given for you, do this in memory of me. And likewise the cup… etc.” Cano sees in this passage an utterly testimony (apertissimum testimonium) in support of the affirmative, and he proves it. Clearly, for Cano, this text is grounded in the locus that deals with the explicit literal sense, which is the third locus mentioned above. Here, in all its detail, is the sequence of steps that Cano’s argument presupposes:
Common locus serving as a major: The propositions of canonical Scripture whose explicit literal meaning is not in doubt are apt, by themselves and without any declaration by the Church, to provide necessary principles of solution for supernatural questions :
Minor: Now the text, “Taking the bread, etc.,” expresses literally and explicitly the institution of a true and proper sacrifice in the New Law;
Conclusion: Therefore, this text, on its own and without any declaration by the Church, is a principle for necessary resolutions to the supernatural question concerning the sacrifice of the Mass. (See the text starting “How to formulate an immediate theological locus,” in the article cited above.)
Therefore, this text, under the pressure of the three major factors that define its probative force, can be called an immediate theological locus, analogous to the immediate dialectical loci that, according to Aristotle, enter into the very body of the arguments by which this or that question is answered.
There is a difference, however. Many of these immediate theological premises are not in themselves general propositions like Aristotle’s topical premises. Nonetheless, there are a number of them, such as this definition, which has the force of a general proposition: “Faith is the substance of things hoped for.” This peculiarity, which affects immediate theological places—for example, most of the propositions drawn from Scripture—represents the allowance that must be made for the analogy between topical loci and theological loci. Analogy is not univocity. (See the text starting “We will make no attempt to conceal this discrepancy,” in the article cited above.)
But the relative freedom of analogy allows us to see the particular propositions of Scripture, Church teaching, etc., as participating in the universal essence of the major loci of theology. It is through the communicated virtue of these major preimises that particular propositions govern theological arguments. As individual expressions of theological common loci, acting under their influence and becoming, as it were, instruments through which the probative virtue of the major loci passes, the texts, decisions, authorities of the Holy Fathers, etc., participate in the universal vigour of the common loci of the revealed deposit, Scripture, tradition, etc. They do not in themselves have the generality of dialectical principles, but they do possess in solidum, the equivalent, through the common cause of conviction that acts in and through them, for providing a foundation for theology. Thus, according to the dialecticians themselves, universal loci penetrate particular loci, by their power but not formally (sua potestate, non formaliter) as Themistius would according to Averroës (see the text starting “This conception is not so new as not to find an explicit foundation in classical dialectics,” in the article cited above). That suffices for the immediate principles of theological argumentation to be considered, by analogy, as loci.
5˚ Conclusion (see the section entitled “On the Idea of a General Systematization of Theological Loci, Properly so Called, or a Universal Theological Characteristic,” in the article cited above).—Consequently, the contents of Cano’s ten theological loci can be listed proposition by proposition, no longer in their raw state, as they exist in Scripture or the Enchiridia dogmatum, but with a kind of index card, mentioning the general loci under which each proposition expresses its conclusion. In this way, analogous to Aristotle’s catalogs of dialectical loci, a material theological Topica could be established. In it, all the principles of theology elaborated according to the rules and precepts that constitute the instruments for discovering immediate theological loci could be brought together, catalogued, and characterized by their precise note of doctrinal approval. The theologian, in the presence of the sources of theology, would no longer be left to his own devices, obliged each time to repeat the task of characterizing the principles he wishes to employ. For the most important of these questions, Justification for example, there would be a pre-classified repertory of the means of resolution existing in the Bible, in the Fathers of the Church, etc., each with its own index card, which would dispense with the need to repeat the inventory of the appropriate loci each time these questions were dealt with.20
Not everyone liked the idea of this Universal Characteristic21 of the sources of theology. (cf. Hourcade, “De Melchior Cano au P. Gardeil,” 244.) I take comfort in Cano’s words: “However, it is scarcely possible to find anything which is so perfectly agreeable and four-square to all minds that no one disagrees with it” (De locis, theol., bk. 12, ch. 11). Given that anyone can personally find the logarithm of any number by means of an easy calculation, would Hourcade consider tables of logarithms to be useless? Obviously, in theology, there would be the danger of suppressing or diminishing personal judgment, of making the theologian’s work mechanical. But this is an illusory danger for true theologians, whose job it is to judge and, if necessary, verify the texts alleged in the most widely accepted Enchiridia dogmatum. On the contrary, it would have the advantage of eliminating forever from the argument a host of texts and authorities which prove nothing in the matters where we force them into service, continuously throwing them at each other in discussions which, with such procedures, show no way of escape. When I hear, for example, Saint Augustine’s text, “But when He has mercy on someone, He calls him in a way He knows is suited to him (scit ei congruere), so that he does not reject the One calling,” taken from De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum, bk. 1, n. 13, as an argument textually proving congruism, despite the fact that the whole context of the book and even of the paragraph protests against this interpretation, I can’t help thinking that “my” Characteristic would be quite useful, if only to eliminate from theology these kinds of ineffective arguments—“long reeds, that is, merely the light-weight weapons used by children” (De locis theolicis bk. 7, ch.10)—which serious scholastic theologians have been wasting their time and oil administering to each other for centuries.
Because of discrepancies in the distribution of chapters, which occur in different editions of Cano’s De Locis, I warn the reader that I am referring, like Dr. Lang and for similar reasons (Die Loci theologici des Melchior Cano, p. 251), to the edition by Serry (Bassano: 1746), which I am using in 1776 reprint from Madrid, entitled Melchioris Cani episcopi Canariensis Opera, in hac primum editio ne clarius divisa.
The essentials of the Bibliography have been indicated, either through the progress of the article, or in section 10. But it is my duty to point out, in closing, the erudite and no doubt exhaustive bibliography on the question of De locis theologicis to be found, both at the bottom of the pages, and in the Index on pp. 246–251, in Dr. Lang’s Die Loci theologici des Melchior Cano (Munich: 1925), of which I have only been able to use the first 90 good pages in this article, and which was published as I was correcting these proofs in December 1925.
Translator’s note: I owe thanks to my research assistant Mr. Mitchell Kengor for helping me pull this file together digitally in order to expedite the process of drafting this translation. (And, as always, too, for very intelligent discussions about questions of theological methodology.)↩︎
Translator’s note: Search for the header “Instruments for discovering dialectical places” in the aforementioned translation.↩︎
Translator’s note: See Gardeil’s work on probable certainty, available here in translation.↩︎
Translator’s note: Sciences in the most strict sense—in which one senses certain mathematicising tendencies in the Aristotelian notion of science if not balanced by the methodological differences that befall each science, due to the nature of the abstraction belonging to that particular science. There is a kind of rationalism that seems to remain a bit here in Gardeil—but, it is at least counterbalanced, even if perhaps imperfectly, elsewhere.↩︎
Translator’s note: Here is what Gardeil says elsewhere (at the paragraph starting “And it’s this reality, for want of a word, that Cano gives us”) which he cites here.↩︎
Translator’s note: This remark (and others like it) should be read in light of further developments that can be found in Labourdette’s “Theology: Faith Seeking Understanding,” in Kirwan and Minerd (ed. and trans.), The Thomistic Response to the Nouvelle Théologie.↩︎
Translator’s note: For a detailed documentation of debates up through the mid-20th century, see Celestine Luke Salm, The Problem of Positive Theology (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1955). This work is only an extract from Salm’s longer doctoral dissertation, which is available in the Christian Brothers archives held at Manhattan College.↩︎
Translator’s note: Available as “Remarks Concerning the Metaphysical Character of St. Thomas’s Moral Theology, in Particular as It Is Related to Prudence and Conscience,” Nova et Vetera 17, no. 1 (Winter, 2019): 245–270.↩︎
Translator’s note: I join Gagnebet, Labourdette, solely on this point Charlier, and others in concerns regarding the limitations to this view of theology. There is a kind of ambiguity here in Gardeil, for he recognizes the question of principle as falling to theology as a form of wisdom. Yet, he does not dig deeply enough into the methodological implications. With Labourdette, I agree that I’m glad that Gardeil’s practice of theology did not always track his expositions of methodology. For some sources and discussion of the sapiential aspect of discursive theology, see Matthew K. Minerd, “Wisdom be Attentive: The Noetic Structure of Sapiential Knowledge,” Nova et Vetera (English Edition) 18, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 1103–1146.↩︎
Translator’s note: In the modern edition, at least, this is in ch. 4.↩︎
Translator’s note: I reserve certain doubts (echoed by Labourdette, Garrigou-Lagrange, Schultes, and Wallace concerning Fr. Marin-Sola’s theses regarding doctrinal development and, especially in Wallace, scientific reasoning.↩︎
Translator’s note: See Francisco Marín-Sola, The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma, trans. Antonio T. Piñon (Manila: Santo Tomas University Press, 1988), 713ff.↩︎
Trans. note: Gardeil here cites col. 723, where he is discussing the locus of Sacred Scripture.↩︎
Translator’s note: In the background, also, are Fr. Gardeil’s own distinction between system and science, discussed in Le donné. I’ve also wondered, too, how much of the use of this distinction by certain authors during the 1940s crisis over methodology comes from a somewhat hasty implementation of Gardeil’s distinction. I say all of this while, however, remaining in doubt regarding all the elements of the notion of demonstrative reasoning proposed by Fr. Marín-Sola.↩︎
Translator’s note: As I noted in my translation of Fr. Gardeil’s personal articles on the De locis, this observation is perhaps a point of contact to bring his thought—despite some of its infelicities regarding the discursive tasks of theology—into contact with important developments registered by Labourdette regarding theological “observation.”↩︎
Translator’s note: Parentheses are Gardeil’s addition. This point, echoing remarks made earlier, is an important observation which helps to rescue Cano and Gardeil from a purely “scientific-conclusion” conception of theology, often decried in the 20th century. Admittedly, as many felt last century, this remains a weak flank for many scholastics of this era. Nonetheless, the “toothing stone” for development should be recognized.↩︎
Translator’s note: Fr. Gardeil wrongly has J.B. Mazzella, De divina traditione et scriptura here, seeming to have skipped a line and duplicated the entry for Franzelin.↩︎
Translator’s note: It is here that I join Labourdette and Gagnebet in their concerns regarding Gardeil’s notion of theology. I have noted this in various footnotes to the other relevant Gardeil texts translated for To Be a Thomist.↩︎
Translator’s note: This is the footnote cited by Gardeil:
↩︎An explanation is in order. Indeed, one might think that these natural questions are theological only when, leaving aside the rational proofs that support them, we seek to resolve them through revelation. This is a mistake. They remain theological questions even though they require reason to resolve them. How can this be so? Here is how: If, according to what we have called the natural order of realities, reason takes a kind of precedence over revelation, the same cannot be said concerning its value as a criterion of truth. Here, revelation, the direct manifestation of divine knowledge and the rule of our own, naturally takes precedence over reason. Therefore, where there is a common object, and one and the same question is subject to the means of proof from both, rational knowledge can only approach its solution by taking into account the superior value of revelation and basing itself on it. In this case, Reason is no longer mere reason, but theological reason, that is, reason governed and, if necessary, corrected by the teachings of Revelation. This is how a primarily philosophical question, such as the existence of God, becomes a truly theological question, even as it awaits its solution from rational arguments. And this is what explains and justifies the presence, in treatises that are purely theological, of questions that are in themselves philosophical, such as that concerning the existence of God treated in ST I, q. 2, a. 3, whose means for resolution, borrowed from Aristotle but dominated and led by the words of Exodus recalled in sed contra, are therefore theological means of resolution.
Translator’s note: Whatever one might think of this proposal, one must in all fairness note that, as he explains elsewhere, he is thinking of something more capacious than Denzinger, with a much more detailed methodological apparatus and organization.↩︎
Translator’s note: As he explains in his own personal articles from RSPT, this is a notion adapted (I would say not-insignificantly) from Leibniz’s dream of instituting a Characteristica universalis for use in the sciences.↩︎
