“The Integral Object of Theology: According to Saint Thomas and the Scholastics” by Raymond Martin, OP
“The Integral Object of Theology: According to Saint Thomas and the Scholastics” by Raymond Martin, OP
Theology,1 being a true science, necessarily has its own proper object, perfectly distinct from that of other sciences. However, since this science is sui generis, there are also certain particularities on the side of its object that are not found elsewhere and that belong to the integral object of theological science. Hence, we feel the need to discuss this topic in what follows. We propose to determine this object as simply and as clearly as possible.
To this end, we have relied on Saint Thomas Aquinas and his most authoritative commentators. Without claiming to have written something that would new, we nevertheless dearly hope that we might hereby restore to honor certain distinctions which are sometimes overlooked in our days, distinctions which alone allow for a proper delineation and clear emphasis concerning the proper object of sacred science. Too often, the notions of subject and object in theology have been confused. This is why we begin this study with the distinction between these two elements.
* * *
The object of a science is not the same as its subject. Therefore, just as in other sciences, object and subject must be carefully distinguished from one another in theology.2 The subject of a science is that which a science concerns itself with and treats. What is said about it, the truths that are stated regarding it and that relate to this subject, constitute the object of that science.
Both the subject and object are twofold: there is the material and formal subject; and there is the material and formal object.
The material subject is the subject taken in general, such that it may still belong to other sciences, without consideration of the specific ratio under which it is studied in one science rather than another. Thus, the earth is the material subject of both geology and astronomy; each subjects it to its inquiries or calculations.
The formal subject is the subject proper to a given science. At bottom, it is still the same material subject, though now considered under a special aspect that no other science examines. The geologist does not study the earth as the astronomer does; he examines its composition and internal changes, whereas the astronomer considers its form, external movements, and relations with other celestial bodies. The earth, studied from this perspective, falls outside the scope of the geologist but constitutes the formal subject of astronomy.
Another difference between the material and formal subject that absolutely must be noted is that the material subject of a science may consist of multiple and disparate things, whereas the formal subject is a unified whole, perfectly homogeneous in character, precisely because of the unique perspective under which the details composing it are considered.
What we have just said equally applies to the material and formal object. The former is multiple, while the latter is one.
The material object of a science comprises the various propositions that, in one way or another, can be stated about the subject considered by the given science. Let us again take the earth as an example. “The earth is round”: this is a proposition that belongs to the material object of both physicist and astronomy, for both the physicist and the astronomer prove that the earth is a spheroid.3
The formal object of these two sciences gives this conclusion its proper and exclusive character. However, at this point, a further distinction must be made. The formal object is twofold: the objectum formale quo and the objectum formale quod. The objectum formale quo is the specific ratio according to which a given conclusion is reached; this reason is not the same for the physicist and the astronomer. Both will conclude that the earth is round, but the means by which they arrive at this conclusion differ. The astronomer reaches it through mathematical means, for example, by analyzing the figures presented by lunar eclipses; the physicist arrives at it through physical knowledge, such as the laws of equilibrium or gravity. It is evident that this difference in method influences the nature of the conclusion obtained and gives it a particular character. In the first case, it is a conclusion of the science of astronomy; in the second, it is a truth belonging to physics.4 Thus, the objectum formale quo of a science determines its nature and distinguishes it from every other science.
The same can be said of the objectum formale quod, as it is constituted by both the material object and the objectum formale quo. Indeed, a given conclusion, considered in the light of a particular means of demonstration, is the objectum formale quod of a given science.
Now, let us apply these considerations to theology. The material subject of theology is God and the work of God. God: His being, His perfections, the Divine Persons. The work of God: both natural and the supernatural—creation, man, the angels; Redemption, the Church, the sacraments, grace. Indeed, as Saint Thomas observes, “all these things are treated in theology,”5 and there is no manual of theology that does not attest to this fact.
The formal subject of theology is this entire set of things, no longer considered in their proper characteristics but solely in relation to God, under their divine aspect.6 And, in fact, this is how theological science operates. “Everything treated in it is treated in relation to God: either because it is God Himself, or because it expresses a certain order to God, from whom all things proceed as their principle and to whom they return as their end.”7 God, and God alone, is thus the formal and proper subject of theology; everything else enters into the subject of this science only as something of God—aliquid Dei, as Cajetan aptly noted. “Therefore, in true theology, the ultimate point of discussion is nothing other than God. The ‘idea’ of Him is latent beneath all theological assertions and conclusions. And it is this very fact which makes them, in the full sense of the term, theological.”8
What, then, is the object of theology? Let us first determine its material object. It consists of all the conclusions reached by the theologian, each considered in its own proper and particular truth. The objectum formale quo of theology is mediate or virtual revelation.9 Indeed, this is the way, the light, by which the theologian arrives at stating this or that conclusion concerning his subject. It is the unique and specific ratio under which he considers these truths in theology. “Sacred Doctrine,” says Saint Thomas, “considers nothing except under this ratio: that it is revealed by God. Therefore, all truths that are divinely revealable share in the same formal ratio objecti, which will be the formal object of this science.”10 The revelation spoken of here cannot be formal and immediate divine revelation, for truths known in this manner do not constitute conclusions, are not scientific truths, and thus cannot, as such, enter into the object of a science. It is proper to every science, including theological science, to acquire its truths through the rigorous deduction of certain principles with the aid of natural reason.11 When a conclusion has been deduced in this way from a formally and immediately revealed principle, it cannot itself be revealed in the same way—that is, formally and immediately. It can only be revealed virtually, by virtue of the revealed principle that contains it and, thus, only in a mediate manner, that is, through the intermediary of the rational process that shows it to be contained within that principle. This process, which manifests the conclusion, is therefore called virtual or mediate revelation; and it is evident that the term is well-founded, well-chosen, and corresponds to the reality of things. Virtual or mediate revelation is thus the objectum formale quo12 of theological science.
The objectum formale quod is none other than the set of theological conclusions, insofar as they are characterized by this virtual and mediate revelation. These conclusions have a proper name: theological conclusions.
The virtually revealed, theological conclusions—this is the true object of theology.
To provide a complete and precise understanding of this object, we still need to define the notion of a theological conclusion.
Until now, we have only spoken of its general notion: a theological conclusion is any truth that is virtually revealed. But which conclusions express a truth that is virtually revealed?
It is clear from what we have just said that this cannot be a conclusion that is immediately revealed. Indeed, there are truths that are revealed in themselves but that also emerge as conclusions from two other revealed principles. Such is the case for the truth stated by Saint Paul in 1 Corinthians 15: “The dead shall rise again,” which he proves by these two other principles: It is as the firstborn from the dead that Christ has risen (1 Cor. 15:20.); now, there is solidarity between the firstborn and his brethren (1 Cor. 15:21–22). The resulting truth—therefore, the dead shall rise—is indeed a conclusion. However, since it is itself immediately revealed, it cannot be a virtually revealed truth, nor, consequently, a theological conclusion.13 Therefore, strictly speaking, 1˚ conclusions that are immediately revealed are not theological conclusions.
Also, according to what has been stated above, the general notion of a theological conclusion moreover implies that it is a truth following from its principles through rigorous deduction, by way of causality.
Thus, the following cannot be considered theological conclusions: 2˚ Truths contained within their revealed premises as a part within a whole, a singular within a universal, or an explicit statement within one that implicitly contains that. For example: Christ died for all men; but I am a man; therefore, Christ died for me. This conclusion follows from the premises, not by way of causality, but by the simple application of what is affirmed of the whole to the part. It is not virtually revealed but formally revealed, for the part is not virtually contained in the whole. Therefore, a conclusion of this kind cannot be a theological conclusion.
However, other cases arise. First, that of a truth not immediately revealed itself but rigorously deduced from two formally revealed premises. Can it be said that such a truth constitutes a true theological conclusion?
Let us draw a distinction: this truth can be considered in two ways: 1˚ As a deduced truth, with its modality and character precisely as deduced,14 it is a theological conclusion. However, it can also be considered in itself, from a specific point of view, as a deduced truth; and in this respect, it is a proposition of faith. This double assertion is proven as follows. Precisely insofar as it is deduced from premises with the aid of natural reason, the certainty of this proposition does not depend on faith; therefore, it cannot be formally revealed but only virtually revealed. However, considered in terms of the truth it expresses, it is necessarily a proposition of faith and formally revealed, for as such, it expresses only a portion of the truth contained in the premises. Since these premises are formally revealed, the conclusion must be so as well.15
The second case is that of a truth rigorously deduced from a revealed premise and a natural principle. Here, there can be no doubt: such a proposition is a properly theological conclusion. It does not matter how one considers it—whether from the perspective of its logical connection to its principles (that is, precisely as a conclusion or deduced truth) or in itself (that is, from the point of view of the truth it contains). Considered precisely as a deduced proposition, it is a theological conclusion, in the same manner as—and with even greater reason than—the proposition in the previous case. On the other hand, as it exists in itself, it did not exist formally in the revealed principle but only virtually, just as every effect exists in its cause. Therefore, it can only be virtually revealed. And as we said, this proposition is a properly theological conclusion because it perfectly fulfills the two conditions required for a theological truth: 1˚ It must be a true scientific conclusion; 2˚ It must be a virtually revealed truth.
We shall relate yet a third and final case: when a proposition is rigorously deduced from two truths that are only virtually revealed. Should it be classified among true theological conclusions? Absolutely, since it fulfills the two conditions enumerated above. It is, indeed, virtually revealed, since it ultimately depends, as on its cause, upon a formally revealed principle. However, because it is only virtually revealed at the second or third degree, it is not a primary theological conclusion but a remote theological conclusion. Does this prevent it from truly being a theological conclusion? Not at all. This case is just like that of the most remote conclusions which are legitimately formulated by the scientist in other sciences: they always remain true scientific conclusions.
In our manuals and other theological works, formally revealed conclusions and improperly theological ones appear in great variety alongside virtually revealed truths. Thanks to this method of delimitation, it becomes easy to recognize the true and strict theological conclusions: they alone constitute the proper and formal object of theology.
Such is the case, at least when considering the question de jure.
When it comes to the question de facto, the proper object of theology extends even further and includes another group of conclusions whose character differs from the previous ones. “Indeed, according to the principles dear to Saint Thomas, one of the offices belonging to theology, this supernatural metaphysics,16 is to defend its principles against their adversaries, either by arguing, on the basis of the principles of faith that they maintain, to make them admit those they revoke in doubt, or, if they grant nothing, by demonstrating the fragility of their objections.”17 However, this is an accidental function of theological science, not an essential one.18 It is imposed upon theology not per se but only due to the ignorance of the faithful or the hostility of heretics and unbelievers. As a science, theology, like any other science, is not required to prove its own principles; it assumes them to be proven elsewhere, that is [in this case], in a higher science [i.e., that of God and of the blessed]. But theology has no human science above itself. What, then, is to be done if it happens that its principles are not admitted or are denied? In such a case, theology must fulfill the same role as metaphysics, which also acknowledges no higher science: namely, to defend its principles. Theology accomplishes this in two ways. If the adversary concedes some revealed principles—as is the case with heretics—then theology will engage in disputation, seeking to prove the truth of the denied article by means of the admitted article. If, however, the adversary denies all articles at once—as is the case with unbelievers—then it is no longer possible to establish the truth of the denied articles through reasoned argument. Nevertheless, it remains possible to refute the sophisms by which adversaries attack the faith.
In this way, the theologian will arrive at a new group of conclusions: either conclusions of faith, if he proves one article by another, or conclusions of a natural order, if he nullifies the false arguments of the unbeliever. The former constitute, in a new way, the object of theology; the latter are annexed to this object as an external support, demonstrating how this object—whether formally revealed truths or virtually revealed truths—is in perfect accord, not opposition, with reason.
Thus, all these conclusions, which we have successively discussed, constitute the integral object of theology. Under this title, three series of conclusions are included: 1˚ Formally revealed conclusions—the improperly so-called object of theology.19 2˚ Virtually revealed conclusions—the proper, formal, and essential object of theological science. 3˚ Conclusions and truths belonging the natural order—the proper but accidental object of theology, not its formal object, since they do not depend on the objectum formale quo, which is virtual revelation.
Translator’s note: This is a translation of Raymond Martin, “L'objet intégral de la Théologie d'après Saint Thomas et les Scolatiques,” Revue Thomiste 12 N.S. (1912): 12–21. The reader, heeding the footnotes, will detect the fact that I have certain important differences with Fr. Martin. However, there are a number of important points made herein and, also, the article provides context for another piece I am translating for To Be a Thomist. For a sense for my concerns, see my somewhat too verbose article Matthew K. Minerd, “Wisdom be Attentive: The Noetic Structure of Sapiential Knowledge,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition 18, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 1103–1146. I was, however, at the time attempting to rediscover a truth that now is very clear to me. There are some small points that I would change, but the great structural points remain centrally important, I think, to a proper understanding of discursive theology as not merely theological science but as discursive theological wisdom.↩︎
Saint Thomas, ST I, q. 1, a. 7, and, following him, his greatest commentators. Capreolus (In prologum Sententiarum, q. IV, art., Opera, ed. Paban and Pègues, vol. 1, p. 46): “The second conclusion is that the subject of a science is not entirely the same as its object. This is clear. For the proper object of a science is the conclusions that it demonstrates. By contrast, the subject of a science is that which is subjected in the demonstrated conclusions.” However, Capreolus observes that ultimately (ultimatim), the object of a science and its subject coincide in the sense that the totality of truths stated in its conclusions constitutes realities within the subject. This is true. However, it is also the case that no science exhausts the entirety of the reality contained within its subject. Therefore, the object of no science will ever be completely identical to its subject. Regarding theology, which is a sui generis science, it must be added that its conclusions spell out divine reality only according to analogical notions (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 3; De Potentia, q. 7, a. 5). Therefore, it follows that they attain the reality of the subject only according to a certain proportionality. This subject, God, shines dazzlingly far above theological conceptions. For this reason as well, the object and subject of theology cannot be considered identical. Translator’s note: With other Thomists, I would say “superanalogy.” Also see Matthew K. Minerd, “The Superanalogy of Faith,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition 23, no. 2 (2024): 589–614.
Cajetan (In ST I, q. 1, a. 7) explains the meaning of the question as follows: “In the title, note both terms. Subiectum stands for the formal subject, and Deus is taken formally, that is, insofar as God. Therefore, that the sense of the question is: Whether God, insofar as He is God, is the formal subject of this science.” In the course of his commentary on the article (no. 3), following Saint Thomas, he distinguishes between object and subject: “The proposition that, just as the object relates to a power, so the subject relates to a science, does not hold in all respects. However, it suffices for the proposition that it holds in regard to the proportion of the formal ratio. Therefore, just as the formal ratio of the object of a power is that by which all things are referred to it, so the formal ratio of the subject of a science is that by which all things are considered within that science.” At the end of his commentary (no. 13), he speaks of the material subject: “Saint Thomas,” he writes while relating the opinion of certain of the latter’s predecessors, “excusing them, says that they were attending to the material aspect, as if to say that they did not intend to assign the formal subject.” And John of Saint Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, vol. 1, q. 1, disp. 2, a. 11 writes: “In every science, the subject and the object are distinct, and in both, what is formal and what is material can be found. The object of a science is something complex, namely conclusions, as Saint Thomas teaches (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 1)… The subject, however, is that concerning which certain predicates or properties are inferred and proven in the conclusion[s of that science]... The material and formal distinction in object and subject is explained by the fact that the material object is that proposition which is proven and known by inference as a derived truth, whereas the formal object is that ratio under which and through which such a conclusion is illuminated and manifested… The material subject is that thing concerning which something is demonstrated in a given science, whereas the formal subject is that habitudo or ratio according to which those subjects are considered in that science.”
[The proto-nominalist] Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (†1332) likewise made the same distinction (Summa Theologica, Lyon, 1622, In Prologum Sententiarum, q. 5): “Science is the habitus of a demonstrated conclusion. Therefore, the subject of a science is that about which the science is concerned and about which something is demonstrated in known conclusion[s]. Now, the predicate is demonstrated of the subject and not vice versa. Therefore, the subject of a known conclusion is the subject of the science. For this reason, it is more properly the subject than the object—not indeed the subject in which, but about which. Properly speaking, the object is that which is first and principally known. Now, what is first and principally known scientifically is the demonstrated conclusion, which contains both the subject and the property thereof [passionem]. And therefore, the demonstrated conclusion is properly called the object of the science; but the subject of the demonstrated conclusion is the properly called subject of the science, about which other things are known (sciuntur), since other things are demonstrated concerning it. Hence, in this respect, when one says that just as the object relates to a power so too the subject relates to a science, this is not true in every respect. For the object of a power is that which is first and directly known; but the subject of a science is not that which is first and directly known, but that about which demonstrated properties are known.”
It was only long after Saint Thomas that theologians neglected this distinction and conflated the two terms, subject and object, treating them as though they meant the same thing. Gonet (+1681) bears witness to this as follows in Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, Disputatio Prooemialis, art. 3, §1: “First, it should be noted, following Capreolus (In Prologum Sententiarum, q. 4, art. 1, concl. 2), that in any science, subject and object differ in some way. For the object of a science is the conclusion demonstrated within it, whereas the subject is that which is subjected in the conclusions and of which certain predicates or properties are demonstrated. Nevertheless, according to the common usage of theologians, subiectum and obiectum are generally taken as equivalent, and thus in the title we are asking what the subject or object of theology is.” In the following century, Gotti (+1742), Theologia Scholastica Dogmatica, vol. 1, q. 2, Dubium 6, §1, and Billuart (+1757), Cursus Theologiae, vol. 1, Dissertatio Prooemialis, art. 5, speak only of the object of theology. Modern authors have generally adopted their terminology. Saint Thomas’s principle (ST I. q. 1, a. 7), “The subject of the principles and of the whole science are the same (Idem est subiectum principiorum et totius scientiae),” has simply become, “Idem est obiectum principiorum…” And Saint Thomas, ST I, q. 1, a. 7 is cited scrupulously. However, Fr. Pesch maintained the older distinction (Praelectiones Dogmaticae, vol. 1, (Fribourg: 1909; Prolegomena, nos. 1–7.
Translator’s note: The well known translation by the English Dominican Province makes this same error: “The object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same…”↩︎
Translator’s note: I am allowing the “physicist” vs. “astronomer” example to stand for the purposes of his description (drawn from a classic scholastic example). However, “physicist” here neither quite works for natural philosopher nor even for “physicist”. The demonstrations through equilibrium and gravity are not, in point of fact, natural-philosophical; and, when they are performed according to modern methods, they are physico-mathematical after the manner of ancient astronomy (which was understood to be a scientia media).↩︎
Cf. ST I-II, q. 54, a. 2, ad 2↩︎
ST I, q. 1, a. 7, Utrum Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae.↩︎
Translator’s note: That is, properly divine, from the perspective of the Trinity, the keystone of the mysteries of faith.↩︎
Cf. ST I, q. 1, a. 7.↩︎
Ambroise Gardeil, Le Donné révélé et la Théologie, p. 247. The question concerning the subject of theology was vigorously debated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The article of Saint Thomas cited above clearly implies this, and the manuscript sources of that period attest to the variety of views on the matter. The discussion continued for a long time within the School. See Toletus, In Summam Theologiae S. Thomae Enarratio, vol. 1, q. 1, a. 7.↩︎
Translator’s note: On this topic, however, see Matthew K. Minerd, “Wisdom be Attentive: The Noetic Structure of Sapiential Knowledge,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition 18, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 1103–1146. Also, considering certain misunderstandings by Ambroise Gardeil concerning the “divinely revealable”, see notes 14, 18, and 168 in my translation of Gardeil’s “The Notion of a Theological Locus.”↩︎
ST I, q. 1, art. 3.↩︎
Translator’s note: Because of the importance of these matters, I must again aver to important critical remarks made in the article cited above, “Wisdom be Attentive.”↩︎
Sometimes it is also called the ratio formalis sub qua.↩︎
Cf. A. de Poulpiquet, “Apologétique et Théologie,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 5 (1911): 708–734 (p. 715).↩︎
Translator’s note: Two capital texts deserve cite here, though I have noted them elsewhere in other articles. See John of St Thomas, Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, ed. Beatus Reiser, vol. 1 (Ars logica) (Turin: Marietti, pt. 2, q. 27, a. 1 (823a:15–22): “Scientific knowability [esse scibile] adds over and above mere intelligibility [esse intelligibile] such a mode of knowing, namely that something is understood not merely in a simple manner but, rather, illatively, from causes (or, premises) proceeding to conclusions, for to know scientifically [scire] is to know [cognoscere] the cause on account of which something is, etc.” (my translation); and ibid., vol. 3 (Naturalis philosophia, vol. 2) (Turin: Marietti, 1930), q. 11, a. 3 (esp. 372a7–373b17). He concludes: “And thus, I concede that the third operation has a distinct verbum since it is a distinct operation. However, it is modally, not really, distinct om what is represented in its own propositions. However, when one proceeds from a simple apprehension to a composite representation [i.e., from the first to the second operation of the intellect], a distinct object shines forth in the quiddity or truth to be represented. And thus, discourse according to causality (i.e., according to illation) presupposes discourse according to succession (i.e., according to many succeeding propositions), as St. Thomas says in ST I, q. 14, a. 7. However, it does not make one [concept/verbum] out of many propositions” (translation mine; emphasis added).↩︎
See Salmanticenses, vol. 11, De Fide, Disputatio I, Dubium IV, § III, no. 117; § IV, no. 127ff.
Translator’s note: This point is capitally important. Indeed, Garrigou-Lagrange (who remains opposed to certain aspects of Marín-Sola) admits this view as well. Allow, here, two lengthy citations. The first is from Garrigou himself (who cites this text of the Salmanticenses). The second is from the Salmanticenses cited above. See Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought (taken from https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/reality-a-synthesis-of-thomistic-thought-10148; note that this translation does have some minor but, on occasion, important problems):
6a. Again, theology uses reasoning, not merely explicative, but strictly and objectively illative, to draw from two revealed truths a third truth, revealed elsewhere, often less explicitly, in Scripture and tradition. This kind of illative reasoning, frequent in theology, unites to the articles of the Creed other truths of faith, and thus forms a body of doctrine, with all constituent truths in mutual relation and subordination. This body of doctrine stands higher than all theological systems, higher even than theological science itself. Thus we understand the title: De sacra doctrina, given by St. Thomas to the first question in the Summa theologiae. The first article of that question is entitled, doctrina fidei. In the following articles, the subject is doctrina theologica, sacra theologia, which is declared to be a science, itself superior to systems that have not, properly speaking, attained the status of science. How the various elements of this body of doctrine are grouped around the articles of faith becomes apparent only by that objective illative procedure, of which we are now speaking, which from two revealed truths deduces a third which has also been revealed, even at times explicitly, in Scripture or tradition. To illustrate, let us take these two statements: first, “Jesus is truly God,” second, “Jesus is truly man.” From these two statements there follows, by a strictly illative process, this third statement: Jesus has two minds and two wills. And this third truth is elsewhere explicitly revealed, in the words of Jesus Himself: “Not as I will, but as Thou wilt.”
Now a conclusion of this kind, a conclusion revealed elsewhere, can evidently be defined by the Church as a dogma of faith. Does it follow, then, as is sometimes said, that in such cases theological reasoning is useless? Not at all. Reasoning in such cases gives us understanding of a truth which before we accepted only by faith. The characteristic of demonstration is not necessarily to discover a new truth, but to make the truth known in its source, its cause. In this kind of reasoning we realize the full force of the classic definition of theology: faith seeking self-understanding. This realization is very important.
6b. Theology uses reasoning, illative in the proper sense, to deduce from two revealed truths a third truth not revealed elsewhere, that is, not revealed in itself, but only in the other two truths of which it is the fruit. Thomists generally admit that such a conclusion, derived from two truths of faith, is substantially revealed, and hence can be defined as dogma. Reasoning enters here only to bring together two truths which of themselves suffice to make the third truth known. The knowledge of the third truth depends on the reasoning, not as cause, but only as condition.
6c. Lastly, from one truth of faith and one of reason, theology, by a process strictly illative, deduces a third truth. Such a truth, since it is not revealed simply and properly speaking (simpliciter): is revealed only virtually, that is, in its cause. A truth of this kind, strictly deduced, lies in the domain, not of faith, but of theological science.
A subdivision enters here. In every reasoning process the major proposition, being more universal, is more important than the minor. Now, in the present kind of argument the truth of faith may be either the major or the minor. If the major is of faith, the conclusion is nearer to revelation than is a conclusion where the truth of faith forms the minor.
Many theologians, in particular many Thomists, maintain that a conclusion of this kind, where either premise is a truth of reason, cannot be defined as a dogma of faith. They argue thus: Such a conclusion has, simply speaking, not been revealed. It has been revealed only in an improper sense (secundum quid): only virtually, in its cause. It is, properly speaking, a deduction from revelation. It is true, the Church can condemn the contradictory of such a conclusion, but if she does, she condemns it, not as heretical, that is, as contrary to the faith, but as erroneous, that is, contrary to an accepted theological conclusion.
Exemplifications of the six theological procedures we have now outlined appear throughout the Summa, particularly in the first question, and in the structure of all the theological treatises of St. Thomas.
The reason is now clear, we think, why we cannot admit the two contrary opinions we spoke of at the beginning of this section. Not all theological conclusions can be defined as dogmas of faith. In particular, we cannot admit that the Church can define as dogma, as simply revealed by God, a truth which is not revealed simpliciter, but only virtually, secundum quid, in causa.
On the other hand, theology can very well reach certitude in such a conclusion which lies in its own proper domain, which is more than a conclusion of metaphysics placed at the service of theology. Further, the most important task of theology is evidently not the drawing of these conclusions, but rather the explanation of the truths of faith themselves, penetration into their deeper meaning, into their mutual relation and subordination. In this task theology has, as aids, the gifts of knowledge and wisdom, by which theological labor becomes more penetrating and savorous. Conclusions are thus sought, not for their own sake, but as a road to more perfect understanding of the truths of faith. Such labor, manifesting the deep inner power of faith, is proportioned to the scope so beautifully expressed by the Council of the Vatican: to attain, God granting, some understanding of the mysteries, an understanding in every way most fruitful.
And here is a draft translation of the selection from the Salmanticenses cited above. The whole section (partly skipped) deserves consideration in view of the debates connected to Fr. Marín-Sola. At this stage, I’m not completely sure what to make of the position, though it is a good stimulant for thinking through an important case. (Fr. Doronzo would aver to this position as ultimately leaning in the direction of vindicating Fr. Marín-Sola. I think, however, that the point of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, making room for this kind of objectively illative deduction, perhaps splits the difference, and it seems to be also the position of the Salmanticenses. Part of the issue, however, is how to understand the case of a “premise of reason,” which is never a purely heterogenous natural premise of reason laminated on to objectively supernatural discourse. But, all of this deserves further consideration aside. I merely note these points in order to ensure that readers know—as I sometimes joke with my students—that there are “beasts,” that is great difficulties and open questions, in the waters here.)
Allow, however, one further observation. In these discussions, one has a sense that the distinction between particular and singular quantification in propositions is not heeded well enough (see this variously throughout Maritain’s Outlines of Formal Logic). There are important differences between saying, “Some man is guilty,” and “This man is guilty,” “Jeffrey Dahmer is guilty.” It is a normal example to say that the universal proposition, “All men have (originally) sinned in Adam,” contains as a De fide truth the singular proposition “Abraham (or Matthew Minerd, et alia) has contracted original sin.” This seems quite clear. It is by the theological virtue of faith, with its certainty, the certainty of the revealing God, that I know that I have contracted mortal sin. This singular truth seems to be clearly contained in the universal premise. And yet… On the supposition that one holds that canonizations are definitive, if one holds that this is De fide catholica, then we would have to say that it has been revealed that the sainthood of St. Thérèse of Lisieux is a truth that was revealed (!). Such was the position of Marín-Sola, a claim that caused consternation for Labourdette (in La foi) and causes consternation for me. For those who are willing to hold that such a truth is held on account of the Church’s ability to infallibly declare “secondary objects” of infallibility (De fide ecclesiastica), things are much simpler. Yet, I will admit that nobody will refer to this kind of assent to justify the knowledge we have of our own contraction of original sin. In any event, I am noting these points—which may well seem obvious to the reader, in which case this is merely the rustic, Appalachian ramblings of a Byzantine Thomist—and leaving evidence thereof somewhere, in the hopes of fruitful discussion
In any event, here is the content from the Salmanticenses, vol. 11, De Fide, Disputatio I, Dubium IV, § III, no. 116–117; § IV, no. 127ff:
↩︎116. The latter part of this question asks us to explain whether virtual revelation made to the universal Church also constitutes the ratio formalis sub quo of the theological virtue of faith. This is the same as asking whether propositions that are included in others which are expressly revealed to the whole Church—either as a particular within a universal or as an effect in its cause—are per se the object of Catholic faith, such that we can assent to them by an act of this virtue. For the resolution of this difficulty…
117. It must be said, secondly, that particular propositions included in a universal one formally revealed to the whole Church (in the way that the assertion that Abraham contracted original sin is contained under the general proposition All have sinned in Adam) are de fide and therefore, their virtual or universal revelation sufficiently constitutes the formal ratio sub qua for this virtue. This assertion is common among theologians: Cano, De locis, book 6, last chapter; Vega, In Trident., chapter 39; Vásquez, pt. 1, disputation 5, chapter 3; Suárez, disputation 3, section 11; John of St. Thomas, here, disputation 2, article 2, § Ex dictis; Hurtado, disputation 11, section 11; Lugo, disputation 1, section 3, § 3; Valentia, disputation 1, question 1, point 1; Lorca, disputation 6, no. 14; Zumel, pt. 1, question 1, article 2, little question 2, conclusion 6; Machin, in the same place, disputation 2, section 3; Theodorus, question 1 of the Prologue to the Sentences.
It is proved, first, as follows: for a virtual revelation equivalent to a formal one, or coinciding with it, constitutes a revealed truth in its being as an object of theological faith, as is evident of itself. However, the virtual revelation of a particular proposition included in a universally and expressly revealed one is equivalent to the express and formal revelation of that same particular. Therefore, it constitutes it in its being as an object of faith. The minor is proved, because according to true dialectic, a universal proposition is equivalent (aequivalet) to all the particular ones it includes under itself and in reality coincides with them. For it is the same to say, Every man is living, as to say, This man and that man in particular lives. Therefore, the formal and express revelation of a universal proposition—for example, that every infant duly baptized is in grace—must be equivalent to the formal and express revelations of the particular propositions included under it, namely, that this infant and that infant duly baptized is in grace. Nay, it is nothing other than the formal and express revelation of all those, because God, through that universal proposition, does not affirm that an infant duly baptized, as such, is endowed with grace, but, rather, that all who are duly baptized in particular, whom He then had present and distinctly regarded, are in grace.
This reasoning is confirmed because it is not possible for a universal proposition to be de fide without all the particular propositions included under it also being de fide. Therefore, the revelation of particular truths in some universal proposition sufficiently constitutes them in their being as objects of faith. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proved because it is not possible for a universal proposition to be true without all the particular ones contained under it also being true; therefore, neither is it possible for the universal proposition to be de fide without all the particulars included under it also being de fide. The consequence is clear because, otherwise, two contrary or contradictory propositions could be simultaneously true, which is impossible; namely, that every infant duly baptized is in grace is de fide, and that some truly baptized infant is not in grace is not de fide. These are modal contradictories, since the mode affirmed in the former is denied in the latter.
Secondly, this assertion is proved by first noting that it is one thing for God to reveal some truth formally and expressly, and another for us to distinctly perceive the sense of that revelation. The former is frequently found without the latter, as is evident in many revelations of Sacred Scripture, through which God intends to manifest some truth explicitly to us, yet we do not distinctly perceive it because we are ignorant of the adequate sense of the divine expression. However, we do perceive it explicitly whenever it has been declared by the Church. For when the Church defines something to be expressly believed, she does not establish or propose a new revelation from God, but rather declares the sense of those already contained in the sacred writings…
126. You will say: A proposition that ultimately resolves into the formal ratio sub qua of metaphysics is metaphysical; therefore, a proposition that ultimately resolves into the formal ratio sub qua of theological faith—namely, divine revelation—must be de fide, as is evident by the same reasoning. However, the proposition, Christ is capable of laughter, ultimately resolves into the aforementioned divine revelation, for we know that Christ is capable of laughter because He is man, yet we believe that He is man because God has said so. Therefore, the first proposition is de fide, even though it is only virtually revealed in its cause.
The response is given by denying both consequences. First of all: because the proposition Christ is capable of laughter, along with all other theological propositions, resolves into divine revelation only per accidens, in the same way that a musical conclusion resolves into belief concerning the principles of arithmetic for the persons who lacks that higher science—for, per se, they ultimately resolve into the formal ratio sub qua of the science of God and of the Blessed. Second, and most importantly: although the conclusions of a subalternate science ultimately resolve into the principles of the subalternating science, they do not for that reason belong to the latter but to the former, as we now suppose. It is evident, however, that our Theology is a science per se subalternate to beatific science, but per accidens to faith. Hence, even if its conclusions—such as the proposition Christ is capable of laughter—ultimately resolve into divine revelation, this does not prevent them from not being de fide but rather theological conclusions. By this, the response to the proof contained in the antecedent is also clear; for metaphysical conclusions are not propositions of a subalternate science, as Theology is, and thus there is no parity.
127. Ultimate Conclusion: A proposition immediately deduced through proper discourse from two formally revealed premises, insofar as it follows from them by virtue of consequence and inference (illationis), is a theological conclusion. However, when accepted and considered specifically, it is de fide. And thus we can assent to it both through the habits of faith and that of theology. This assertion, which few have addressed under this distinction, brings to proper concord the disagreement that exists regarding this matter among authors. Some, such as the Thomists, as well as Molina, Valentia, Torres, Lorca, and others, unqualifiedly teach that said proposition is theological; others, however, such as Ockham, Cano, Vega, Vasquez, and others, whom Hurtado cites and follows (Disputation 10, Section 1, §2), unqualifiedly affirm that it is De fide.
These positions can, in fact, be rightly reconciled if the former consider the aforementioned proposition formally—that is, insofar as it has the nature of a conclusion inferred from revealed premises, while the latter consider it specifically, that is, precisely from the perspective of its object. And indeed, whatever may be the interpretation of others, the Thomists speak only of it formally, as a conclusion deduced from revealed premises, as will be evident to anyone who consults them. In this sense, it is true that the aforementioned conclusion is a theological proposition. This does not, however, prevent it from also being de fide, since it is deducible from two formally revealed premises, as we shall immediately prove.
128. Therefore, the first part of this assertion can be persuasively argued by reason, for assent terminating in a proposition deduced through proper reasoning from premises that are formally revealed, and which is generated by virtue of those premises, is not elicited by the habitus of faith but, rather, by our habitus of theology. Therefore, such a proposition, insofar as it has the nature of an object terminating that assent, is not De fide but, rather, a theological conclusion. The consequence is evident.
Now, with regard to its second part, the antecedent is clear based on the first. This, however, is proven first of all by the fact that such assent does not rest immediately upon divine revelation but upon the truth of the premises themselves, as we saw in the preceding number above. But it is certain that the assent of theological faith rests immediately upon divine revelation and not upon the truth of the revealed object itself.
Secondly, because the certainty of the aforementioned assent does not depend solely and intrinsically on divine revelation, but also, and more immediately, on the necessary connection between the premises and the conclusion to which it pertains, as well as on the validity of the inference (illationis) and consequence.
For however expressly true and revealed the premises may be, if it is not certainly established both that they contain the conclusion and that they are necessarily connected to it, and also that there is no defect in the consequence, no one can firmly assent to the said conclusion as a conclusion. This is because the certainty of judgment regarding the conclusion formally rests on the containment and connection of the premises with that conclusion, as well as on the validity of the inference (illationis), as we are taught in logic.
Now, it is evident that certainty derived from the validity of the consequence and the connection of the premises with the conclusion cannot equal the proper certainty of an act of faith. Since these two principles are natural, it is impossible for them to yield a supernatural certainty as firm as the certainty of faith.
First confirmation: The assent of faith is not discursive. However, the assent terminating in a proposition legitimately deduced from two premises of faith, insofar as it has the nature of a conclusion drawn from them, is properly discursive. For it rests upon the logical (dialectico) principle: Whatever things are identical to a third thing are identical to each other, etc. Therefore, it is not an act of faith, but of theology.
Second confirmation: A theological conclusion is said to be that which is inferred through proper reasoning from principles of faith. However, such is a proposition deduced from two premises that are formally revealed. Therefore, it is properly a theological conclusion, rather than one that is inferred from a single premise of faith and another natural premise, which is clearly theological. Let what was stated in the previous number be recalled, for the reasons established there in favor of the assertion also confirm the first part of this argument.
129. The second part of this assertion is briefly proven as follows: A proposition, absolutely speaking, is De fide if it is formally revealed by God, either explicitly or implicitly. But by the very fact that a proposition is legitimately deducible from two premises of faith, it is formally revealed, at least implicitly. Therefore, by that very fact, it is of faith.
Both the major premise and the consequence are evident. The minor premise is persuasively supported by the following two considerations. First of all, every conclusion legitimately deducible from its premises is contained in them in reality, just as the particular is contained within the universal, or as a definition is contained within the defined term, or in a similar manner, for nothing can appear in the conclusion if it was not already posited in the premises. But it is clear that this containment is sufficient such that, if the premises are formally revealed, the conclusion legitimately deduced from them must also be formally revealed.
Secondly, one can consider the following properly discursive syllogism: Every rational being is capable of admiration; all beings capable of laughter are rational; therefore, all beings capable of laughter are capable of admiration. If both premises were formally revealed, then by that very fact, the conclusion would also be formally revealed. This is demonstrated as follows. When God, in the utterance of the major premise, affirmed that all rational beings are capable of admiration, He formally and explicitly revealed that all supposits possessing reason, whatever they may be, are capable of admiration. But any being capable of laughter is a rational supposit, or a being endowed with reason, as is evident both by natural light and by faith, since the minor premise, which states this, is formally revealed, as we are supposing. Therefore, it is certain that in stating the major premise, God was speaking of every subject capable of laughter, and thus revealed that it is capable of admiration. But the proposition that all beings capable of laughter are capable of admiration is the conclusion of the aforementioned syllogism. Therefore, by the very fact that both of its premises are formally revealed, the conclusion must also be formally revealed, at least by a revelation that, from our perspective, is vague (confusa), though from God’s perspective is distinct, as is clear from this example.First confirmation: In God, there is no vague knowledge (cognitio confusa), but rather, distinct knowledge of all things that partake in rationality. Therefore, since on the given hypothesis He uttered the universal statement, All rational beings are capable of admiration, He spoke formally and distinctly, as far as He is concerned, about everything that possesses rationality and formally revealed it to be capable of admiration. But all subjects capable of laughter are rational. Therefore, He was speaking about them in the utterance of that universal statement. Consequently, He formally revealed to us that all rational beings are capable of admiration, which is the conclusion of the aforementioned syllogism.
Hence, since the same reasoning applies to all other cases, it cannot be that both premises are formally revealed without the conclusion, which is immediately and directly drawn from them, also being formally revealed in reality.
Second confirmation: The revelation of particular propositions within a universal proposition sufficiently establishes them as an object that can be believed by faith. Therefore, likewise, the revelation of a conclusion within the premises from which it is immediately deduced according to syllogistic art will establish it as an object attainable by the same virtue.
The consequence is clear, for the same reasoning applies in both cases, especially since the conclusion of a syllogism is particular, as will be clear to anyone who considers what was stated in the preceding section. Otherwise, either the previous statements must be denied—which no one dares to do—or this conclusion must be admitted.
130. Now, you might say: The habitus of first natural principles does not of itself provide assent to the conclusions deduced from them; rather, this is proper to the various scientific habitus. Therefore, since faith is the habitus of first supernatural principles, in no way will it assent to the conclusions that are inferred from them as premises through proper reasoning.
In response, we deny the consequence, and the reason for the disparity is that the habitus of first natural principles elicits assent only to propositions that stand upon the relation of terms, which cannot be the condition of conclusions legitimately inferred from those principles. However, a proposition immediately deducible from two premises of faith can be formally revealed, either within the premises themselves or through another revelation. Therefore, since faith assents to all truths formally revealed by God, nothing prevents it from also assenting to the aforementioned proposition.
131 [And this is what I (Minerd) would insist]. But you will insist: Any conclusion, by the very fact that it is a conclusion, is a formally distinct object from the premises from which it is deduced. Otherwise, the same habitus that assents to the premises could assent to the conclusion, which we do not universally admit. Therefore, from the fact that the premises are explicitly revealed, we ineffectively conclude that the conclusion immediately deduced from them is also formally revealed. Since they are distinct formal objects, it is entirely possible for one to be formally revealed without the other being so.
In response, we say that any conclusion, insofar as it is a conclusion, is indeed distinct in its formal object from the premises from which it is deduced; however, it is actually and implicitly included and signified within them. Thus, although on account this distinction, the habitus that pertains to the premises cannot assent to the conclusion insofar as it is a conclusion (which we freely admit, and this is what this objection at most proves), nevertheless, due to this inclusion, it is necessary that in the explicit revelation of the premises, the said conclusion is formally and implicitly revealed as well. If we admit that this is formally revealed, then by that very fact, when taken specifically, it will have the proper conformity in its formal object with the principles of faith. Therefore, it can be attained through the habitus of this virtue.
132. Nor will you refute our position if you insist: the revelation of the conclusion within the premises, from which said conclusion is legitimately and immediately deduced according to syllogistic art, is merely the revelation of an adequate cause of some truth or proposition. But this does not sufficiently establish that truth as an object that is believed through the habitus of faith, as we established in the third assertion of this doubt. Therefore, neither does the formal revelation of the aforementioned conclusion within its premises.
In response, we deny the major premise, as it is understood concerning a natural cause, whether in being or appearance, which we discussed in our third conclusion. For premises, from which, according to syllogistic art, some conclusion is deduced a priori and immediately, contain its adequate natural cause and moreover signify the truth of said conclusion. The reason is that the natural cause of the given truth is the middle term of the demonstration, from which it is inferred. However, the premises not only include the middle term of the demonstration but also express its union with the extremes, which they cannot express without at least implicitly signifying the union of the extremes themselves, in which the conclusion itself consists. Therefore, he who explicitly reveals the premises from which, according to dialectical rules, some conclusion legitimately and immediately follows, cannot but formally and implicitly reveal the conclusion itself. However, the formal and explicit revelation of the adequate cause of some truth is not the formal revelation of that truth itself, nor even implicit revelation of it.
133. This doctrine can be clarified by means of the following example. Indeed, the adequate natural cause of Christ’s ability to laugh is His discursive power, both proximate and radical; for He is able to laugh precisely because He is also proximately rational or discursive. However, from the fact that it has been explicitly revealed to us that Christ is rational or discursive, we cannot construct a syllogism in which, from two formally revealed premises, we infer that He is able to laugh. This is because, to assert this conclusion, we would need to assume the universal proposition: All discursive beings are able to laugh. However, this universal proposition is not formally revealed, simply because it has been revealed that Christ is discursive. For in that revelation, only the fact that Christ possesses what is otherwise the cause of the ability to laugh is signified. However, the universal premise (all discursive beings are able to laugh) expresses the union between the discursive faculty and able to laugh, signifying that the latter belongs to the former—which is entirely different from the previous statement, as is self-evident. Therefore, there is a difference between 1˚ formal revelation and precise revelation of the adequate cause of some truth, and 2˚ the revelation of premises from which a truth is rightly deduced according to the syllogistic art. Hence, although the former does not pertain to the ratio formalis sub qua of faith, the latter does. This is evident from the same example: for if the proposition, All rational or discursive beings are able to laugh were formally revealed, then it would thereby be De fide that Christ and every true human being is able to laugh.
Translator’s note: One must be very careful with this designation “supernatural metaphysics”. See Labourdette’s critiques of Journet (and Gardeil) in notes 14, 18, and 168 in my translation of Gardeil’s “The Notion of a Theological Locus.”↩︎
See Ambroise Gardeil, “The Notion of a Theological Locus.”—Also, ST I, q. 1, a. 8.↩︎
Translator’s note: I would say, rather (with others): this is an office of theology precisely as a form of wisdom.↩︎
Translator’s note: Because of my strenuous concerns in this regard, I must yet again note my disagreement, for this is a good example of how too many Thomists, alas, leave behind discursive wisdom for mere discursive science. (I sometimes wonder, too, if the methods of Thomist thought really do breathe with non-discursive wisdom and the other mystical gifts. Our intellectual-theological culture as Thomists must always guard against this—I preach to myself as much as to others. But I feel I would be dishonest if I didn’t admit this constant concern.)↩︎
