Reginald Schultes, The Properties of Dogmatic Progress (a. 11–16)

Aug 1

Brief Translation Introduction

This translation is presented as a relatively stable sketch of this chapter from Reginald Schultes’s Introductio in historiam dogmatum. The text has been edited and reviewed, though it is not in the kind of final form of review that I would do for a published translation. I am posting the text here on To Be a Thomist for those who might be interested in referring to an English draft.

I would like to thank Mr. Mitchell Kengor for his help filling out the details of footnote references.

Section IV: The Properties of Dogmatic Progress

Now that we have considered the essence of dogmatic progress, we must discuss its properties, which we will treat in the following articles:

Dogmatic Formulas (a. 11);
Dogmatic progress in comparison to tradition (a. 12);
Dogmatic progress in comparison to Sacred Scripture (a. 13);
The various states involved in dogmatic progress (a. 14);
The causes of dogmatic development (a. 15);
The analogies used to explain the explication of revealed truths (a. 16).

By discussing these matters, we will thus resolve the most important questions involved with the qualities, conditions, relationships, and laws of dogmatic progress.

Article Eleven: Dogmatic Formulas

Most doctrines, especially those that have been solemnly defined, present some kind of new formulation of revelation beyond the mere proposition and exposition of revelation. Thus, Christ’s divinity is defined through the formula of consubstantiality, the Incarnation through the formula of the Hypostatic Union, and the Eucharistic presence through the notion of substantial conversion. As is clear, formulations of this kind add something over and above the mere proposition of revelation, and this very often constitutes the central point of difficulty involved in the history of dogmatic progress. Thus, it even stands in need of a special explication, especially so that a sufficient response might be given to the objections of Modernists, as well as to both classical and contemporary Protestantism.

I. The term “formula” refers to a determinate word or term and “formulation” to the expression or definition of a reality by means of a determinate term. Thus, the term “dogmatic formula” or “dogmatic formulation” refers to an expression, determination, or definition of a revealed doctrine (or of a reality with which revelation is concerned) by means of specific terms and concepts. However, normally, we do not use the expression “formula” for any sort of term without further qualification but, rather, only for technical and properly scientific ones, such as consubstantiality, person, sacrament, and so forth. This is similar to how in mathematical science we make use of certain formulas so that we might thereby express mathematical teachings briefly, gathered together in their complexity, and with scientific perfection.

Dogmatic formulas of this kind are easily explained in line with the teaching that we already have set forth in earlier articles. For since all dogmatic progress consists in a kind of exposition, declaration, and explication of revealed truths, it makes no difference whether this kind of exposition or determination is performed by means of commonly used terms and concepts or scientific ones. The dogmatic formulation will thus be made in such a way that the terms and concepts which Sacred Scripture or Tradition use to express divine realities and doctrines are, as it were, transformed or translated into scientific terms and concepts: “designating the faith by means of what is characteristic of a new naming, but not with a new meaning.”¹ Now, this presupposes the comparison of commonly used terms and concepts with scientific terms and concepts, as well as the rendering of a judgment concerning their equivalence, from which a new manner of proclamation follows.

Thus, the formula concerning the consubstatantiality of the Word with the Father presupposes, on the one hand, a comparison of the terms Son of God, Word, and the identity of the Father and Son with, on the other, the term consubstantiality. And it likewise presupposes a judgment that these kind of predicates are identical or equivalent. From this follows the proclamation that the Son of God is consubstantial to the Father.

Now, this implies two points of the greatest importance which we must note. First, a dogmatic formulation presupposes both a determinate doctrine of the faith, accepted from revelation, and knowledge of the terms and concepts by which the doctrine of faith is expressed. Second, the truth and perfection of the formula depends both upon the perfection or truth of the presupposed doctrine of faith and upon the truth and exactitude of the terms used as well as the exactitude of the notion expressed by this term. Finally, it also depends upon the truth of the judgment concerning the identity and equivalence of the terms and concepts used. Certainly, dogmatic formulation involves and utterly complex process so that any error, nay even the slightest defect, in conceiving the revealed and handed on doctrine, any confusion concerning the scientific terms being used, or any defect in the judgment that is rendered, any and all of this will necessarly draw an erroneous formulation in its wake, leading either to the rejection of the true formulation or to the acceptance of a false one. And this is all the clearer if we consider the loftiness of revealed realities and the common state of obscurity and imperfection found in our concepts and terms.

And this also provides a sufficient explanation for how nearly all of the Greek controversies were concerned with dogmatic formulations such as those concerning the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, the Hypostatic Union, and the question of whether there was one or two natures in Christ. Therefore, as much as is possible, dogmatic formulation must of necessity be brought to a close by way of the Church’s definitive judgment, through which false formulations are condemned, good ones approved, or better formulations directly proposed, as we can see in nearly all cases of definitions by the Church.

Thus, according to the Catholic teaching, dogmatic formulas scarcely present any proper difficulty, and are commonly considered in light [sub ratione] of the exposition and determination of revealed doctrine, as we find said by St. Vincent of Lerins, Scholastic theologians, and the [First] Vatican Council. However, all the more vigorously are dogmatic formulas fought against by non-Catholic (i.e., Modernists, Protestants, and historical rationalists), though on different bases.

II. Modernists deny the possibility of [definitive] dogmatic formulations. Indeed, according to the agnosticism [that they at least implicitly hold] scientific concepts are only symbols, either of realities, or of religious sentiment, indeed, kinds of subjective schemata and the formal means for expressing and communicating one’s own impressions. Therefore, dogmatic formulations neither explain nor determine religious facts. Clearly, this kind of teaching falls into full agnosticism. By contrast, even before the time of the modernist crisis, the [First] Vatican Council defined: “if reason illumined by faith inquires in an earnest, pious, and sober manner, it attains by God’s grace a certain understanding of the mysteries, which is most fruitful.”² The “understanding” spoken of involves a kind of knowledge of revealed truths by means of human concepts and hence, too, its formulation: “For in as much as we can intellectually know something, we can also name it.”³ You can find the possibility of this knowledge explained by theologians in their treatises concerning the analogy of names and the Divine names,⁴ just as the [First] Vatican Council also expressly indicated that the “analogy” between created realities and [supernatural] mysteries is a kind of source for superior understanding.

III. Classical Protestantism, or even contemporary conservative Protestantism, as well as Jansenists and even no few Catholics reject dogmatic formulations as being useless and extraneous to religion. However, in response to such a claim we must say that dogmatic formulas correspond to man’s natural inclination, are morally necessary and of the greatest used for religion.

First of all, dogmatic formulas correspond to the natural inclination of the human intellect. For just as man in any science, art, and indeed in practical disciplines creates for himself technical, precise, and exact terms for the sake of greater clarity and greater ease, so too in the work of faith he desires the same thing, for grace does not destroy nature but, rather, perfects it. Thus, already from the very beginning of Christianity, indeed already in the very writings of the apostles, we can discover a kind of terminology that quite quickly came to be commonly received. And thereafter, throughout the whole history of the Church, a spontaneous and propulsive tendency for the formulating of the revealed truths manifested itself, a tendency that indeed did vary in different ages and nations. The natural inclination to formulate the realities of faith was stirred up all the more by the fact that revelation is handed on in a metaphorical form making use of images, and indeed in foreign languages, nations, and cultures. For it was entirely natural that a given nation or culture would strive to express the doctrine of the faith by means of its own concepts and in light of its particular strengths.⁵ Certainly, it is no small thing to assert that dogmatic formulas are only the trifles of theologians.⁶

Second, dogmatic formulas are necessary in order to repel heresies and to efficaciously instill the faith. For heresies commonly take their origin from erroneous formulations or indeed properly speaking consist in this. Thus, in order to efficaciously repel heresies it is necessary that the erroneous formula in question be condemned and the true formula be set in opposition to it. Thus, the Arian doctrine was refuted by means of the formulation of the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father; the errors concerning the mode of the incarnation were refuted through the formulas concerned with the hypostatic union; and errors concerning the force and reason for Papal Primacy were efficaciously overcome by the formulas promulgated by the [First] Vatican Council. Indeed, an error will not be sufficiently repelled solely through a negative condemnation of it or solely by opposing it to the terms of revelation, but rather, only can be brought about by the exact determination of the doctrine opposed to it (i.e., through dogmatic formulas that propose the revealed doctrine to the faithful with utter clarity, distinction, and determination). Thus, the Councils did indeed refute heresies, but they simultaneously defined new dogmatic formulas. Thus, “the need to dispute with heretics compelled them to strive to find new terms in which to express the ancient faith.”⁷ Next, the dogmatic formulas were already necessary prior to the existence of heresies, namely in order to avoid or at least diminish the danger of heresy. Indeed, to lack formulation by means of precise and determinate—nay, even scientific—concepts endangers the faith and would open the field to erroneous interpretations, whereas, by contrast, exact formulas of this kind at least diminish such danger. Therefore, since it is better to avoid danger than to condemn the outbreak of it, the Church, as the faithful guardian of the deposit of faith, zealously undertakes the task of proposing with greater clarity and insight the doctrine of faith, which often was proposed in metaphorical or figurative speech, so that she may thereby prevent possible errors.⁸ Hence, it cannot be surprising that the enemies of the true faith fight against dogmatic formulas with as much vigor as possible. Finally, the dignity of revelation itself (or, rather, the honor of God who reveals) wholly demands that the doctrine revealed by God be set forth to man in as perfect a form as possible. For just as God gave us understanding so that it might be perfected by our own labors, so too He gave us revelation so that it might be faithfully set forth—which is most fully brought about by means of dogmatic formulation.

Thus, thirdly, dogmatic formulas are of the greatest utility, on account of: their fixed and determinate terminology; the greater ease they provide for determining and defending the doctrine of faith; and the instruction they provide for the people of God. Thus, dogmatic progress especially and for the most part is perfected through dogmatic formulations, nay it is not wrong to say that dogmatic formulas are the strength and might of dogmas.⁹ Likewise, from history it is clear that new formulas were the beginning and cause of further progress and later explications of the faith. Thus, for example, the formulation of the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father was the condition and reason for the distinction of the divine persons according to origin and relations.¹⁰ Therefore, it is not without reason that the dogmatic formulas that were indeed fought against by heretics are however held in the greatest of honor by the Church. Therefore, the dictum of Vincent of Lerin holds true most especially for the case of dogmatic formulas: “It is quite right that, with the passage of time, those ancient doctrines of heavenly philosophy should be cared for, filed down, and polished… and that they would become more evident, luminous, and distinct.”¹¹ However, St. Thomas, responding to the objection that the term or formula “person” cannot be found in Sacred Scripture, most excellently teaches something that really could be applied generally:

Although the word “person” is not applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nonetheless, what is signified by the word is affirmed of God in many places in Scripture. If we were forced to speak about God solely in the very terms used by Scripture, it would follow that nobody could speak about God in any other language than the original language of the Old or New Testament. However, the need to dispute with heretics compelled them to strive to find new terms in which to express the ancient faith concerning God. Nor is this kind of novelty to be avoided, since it is not profane, for it is not at variance with the sense of Scripture.¹²

IV. The third difficulty against dogmatic formulas is raised by historians. For they object that through such formulation in scientific terms and concepts the teaching of the Gospel came to be mixed together with the teaching of a given era and coalesced into a kind of separate, third body of teaching. Such was the position of the Modernists, led by Alfred Loisy (in his Évangile et Église¹³) and especially, however, Adolf von Harnack. Indeed, the latter held: dogma was born of the conjunction of Greek doctrine with the Gospel… i.e., the concepts by means of which the ancient strove to express or formulate the evangelical doctrine, when they were fused with it and raised to the dignity of dogma.¹⁴

Now in response to this, in view of what is still needed after what we have already said, we must oppose three points. First, it is false to say that all dogmas, especially the principal and primary ones, have a scientific formulation. Indeed, the Apostles’ creed sets forth the doctrine of faith by means of concepts that are entirely drawn from the common usage of men. And the same must be said concerning the doctrine of tradition set forth in the earliest days of the Church. Therefore, Harnack baselessly affirms that scientific formulation pertains to the very essence of dogma.¹⁵ Certainly, the creeds and documents of faith in ancient times express the doctrine of Faith in terms and concepts used by ancient authors. Nonetheless, they do not do so, properly speaking, by means of scientific terms from that period. It was only later that this took place.

Second. Harnack unjustly says that the expression and determination of Christian doctrine in scientific terms and concepts is a kind of fusing of Christian doctrine and Greek philosophy. For, a given doctrine can very well be expressed in various terms or concepts without, from the perspective of the object, something new being affirmed. Harnack indeed objects that one cannot distinguish between a doctrine and its form (Form und inhalt).¹⁶ However, daily experience contradicts such a claim and only has a kind of foundation, though a false one, in the Kantian doctrine concerning a priori and empty forms of knowledge. But if Harnack insists moreover that dogmatic definitions do not involve only a new form, we will concede the point, for they also declare a kind of explication of revelation, as we said, though an objective and true explication. Therefore, the old dogmas that present a kind of formulation do indeed savor of the “Greek spirit”, in as much as they are expressed by means of those concepts in terms that were available for ancient thinkers. However, they do not present quasi-Greek doctrines. On the contrary, it is a historical fact that Christian dogmas concerning the Triune and incarnate God were directly opposed to the polytheism of the ancients and nearly all dogmatic controversies in ancient days were born of Greek philosophy.

Third. Finally, Harnack completely gratuitously and wholly falsely presupposes that the very doctrine of ancient dogmas, including even the Apostles’ Creed, is not contained in the Gospel—neither the existence of God the Creator, nor the divinity of Christ, nor the Trinity of divine persons. And this is noted especially by those Catholics who less cautiously subscribe to Harnack’s opinion.

V. Now, what was just said also holds true concerning syncretistic systems of thought whose proponents hold that Christian doctrines have been drawn or excepted from various pre-existing religions, such as Greek polytheism, Buddhism, and so forth, though modified and given a new spirit. Indeed, the arguments that they offer for this opinion are commonly taken from the likeness that can be found in certain doctrinal formulas, worship, and religious life in these religions, though they utterly neglect to consider the essential differences involved. Nonetheless, nothing stands in the way of Christian life and doctrine from using certain forms that were of use in Pagan or Jewish writings, provided that all danger of idolatry and superstition was avoided.

Therefore, dogmatic formulas are neither mere symbols of religious sentiment, or transfigurations of religious facts (as the Modernists wished), nor are they arbitrary artifices or useless fabrications by theologians, nor pastisches fashioned by stitching together Christ’s doctrine with the religious teachings of antiquity. Rather, they are kinds of perfect expositions, declarations, and explications of revealed truths. Therefore, formulations are rightly judged to be a kind of glory of a given period of time, the definitions of the first councils for ancient times, the formulas of the councils of the Middle Ages for scholastic theology, and most perfect formulations a more recent days for modern theology. However, particular and great praise is ode to the magisterium of the Church which proscribes false formulas, prepares the way for the truth, and finally, provides final correction for already existing formulas and perfects them.¹⁷

VI. From what we have said, three corollaries follow. The first pertains to the value of theological formulas, the second to the duty of the history of dogmas in relation to them, and thirdly, as regards the duties of dogmatic theology. Since dogmatic formulas are expositions and explications of revealed truths sanctioned by the Church through an infallible judgment, they are without qualification true and immutable. Therefore the [First] Vatican Council condemned Günther’s teaching that the formula sanctioned by the Church are only more apt or more fit are the conditions of science in a given time and therefore our only relatively, not absolutely, true: “that meaning of the sacred dogmas is perpetually to be retained which our Holy Mother Church has once declared, and there must never be a deviation from that meaning on the specious ground and title of a more profound understanding.”¹⁸ And it cannot happen “that, as science progresses, at times a sense is to be given to dogmas proposed by the Church different from the one that the Church has understood and understands.”¹⁹

However, it is not ruled out that revealed truths over the course of time can always be expressed by means of new formulas, not indeed ones that would be contradictory, but rather by means of ones that express the same doctrine according to the same meaning, though in a different manner. Nay, this is most especially what dogmatic progress consists in, namely, that with the passage of time one in the same revealed truth receives, from various perspectives, greater determination, more efficacious defense, fuller explanation, and thus more perfect formulation. For since dogmatic formulation commonly takes place by means of abstract terms, any given formula expresses a revealed reality only from a particular, determinate perspective and does not exhaust the whole revealed truth. Thus, the notion of consubstantiality does not express, at least explicitly, the entire relation of the Son to the Father, nor does the notion of the hypostatic union express the entire truth of the Incarnation. Therefore, both successively and also simultaneously there are various dogmatic formulas concerning one in the same truth. Thus, the [First] Vatican Council determined the primacy of the pope by means of a number of formulas, namely stating that the pope is the prince and visible head of the Church, that he has primacy of jurisdiction, full and supreme power, complete fullness of the supreme power, ordinary and immediate power, and so forth. And, even more do we find various formulas in the midst of the process of explication and in tradition itself, as we will show in the next chapter.

However, note well that dogmatic formulas are infallibly and immutably true according to the sense in which they have been defined by the Church. Indeed, scientific terms, whether considered in themselves or as applied in the expression of revealed realities, are understood in various ways through the course of various times and by various men, as can be seen with terms like οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, φύσις, ἀγένητος, ἀγέννητος, and so forth. Thus, in the process of formulation one in the same doctrine was able to be expressed by means of various, different formulas, until a definitive formula was sanctioned by the Church. Thus, a particular Antiochian Council rejected the term ὁμοούσιος which later on came to be defined by the Council of Nicae.²⁰ The same is true for other doctrines as well,²¹ especially since different formulas—now one, now another—were opposed and accepted by individual teachers of the faith.²² Therefore, rationalistic historians have unjustly inferred from this that there has been kind of a mutation in doctrine over time,

Finally, we must not pass over the different meanings that one and the same term have signified in Greek and Latin. Thus, Latin believers say without qualification that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, whereas the Greeks say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, for the Greek term ἐκπορεύεσθαι not only conveys the notion of origin but, moreover, that of being the primary origin. Therefore, the Greeks say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, who is the principle without principle, and from the Father through the Son, who is a principle from a principle. By contrast, the Latins simply say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, obviously, because the Son is [together with the Father] the principle of the Holy Spirit.²³

VII. Secondly, from what we have said, the duties of the history of dogmas can be determined, namely, to investigate and set forth the facts and causes involved in the process of the formulation of dogmas. For it is necessary that we determine:

What dogmatic formulas have been drawn up over the course of time;
What revealed doctrines (of Tradition or Sacred Tradition) are expressed in given formulas;
The source from which their terms or formal concepts have been drawn;
What modifications have occurred regarding these terms and concepts;
What judgments and controversies preceded definitive formulation;
How a given formula has been set forth following upon its definition;
What kind of influence a given formula, after its definition or rejection, has had over later progress;
And so forth…

The difficulty of such investigations is hidden from nobody, least of all from those who are experts in this art. Nonetheless, the investigation into the successive formulations of revealed truths seems to be the proper duty of Catholic history. For, in this way one most fully shows that dogmatic progress does not involve change, corruption, disfiguration, or transfiguration in the original doctrine in question but only takes place by way of explication or determination by means of equivalent formulas. Only, it must be noted that the judgment concerning the equivalence of given formulas with a presupposed doctrine properly belongs to dogmatic theology and ultimately to the infallible magisterium of the Church. Therefore, it suffices that the historian set forth the history of formulas, in the way we will soon explain below.

VIII. Thirdly, historical knowledge regarding the various ways that Christian doctrine has been formulated, through the course of various eras and in the various writings of particular doctors, theologians, or schools, imposes grave duties upon Dogmatic Theology, especially in our era. For the history of dogmas bears witness to a kind of marvelous multiplicity and diversity of formulations in Christian doctrine, a fact that was less well known or at least less fully considered by earlier theologians. Therefore, the proper office of modern theology will be to show: the equivalence of particular formulas; the continuity and identity of doctrine through its changing formulations; and, especially, how defined formulas are equivalent to the successive formulations found through the course of tradition. Such work will bear the greatest of fruits: theological argumentation will gain from it much greater strength and efficacy; dogmas will be considered from various perspectives; many teachings—whether of the Fathers, the doctors, or of the various schools—which at first sight appear to disagree with each other will be shown to be entirely consonant, or at least more easily able to be reconciled with each other; the various teachings of the schools will present the various (though not opposed) ways of formulating the doctrine of faith, thus paving the way for the resolution of many controversies.

In short, I dare to assert: assiduous and subtle consideration concerning the various ways that doctrines have been formulated is the key for a fruitful investigation of the teaching of Sacred Scripture, the Councils, the Fathers, and theologians.²⁴

Article Twelve: Dogmatic Progress in Comparison with Tradition

I. Up to this point, we have been discussing, in general, the explication of revealed truths, which when taken as a whole are referred to as the “deposit of faith.”²⁵ However, the deposit of faith is contained in two formally and materially distinct places, namely in Sacred Scripture and divine tradition. Therefore, we may more precisely determine the properties of the explication of revealed truths [proprietatem explicationis revelatorum], we will consider it especially in comparison to Sacred Scripture and tradition, reflecting on the latter first because it is prior in origin to Sacred Scripture.

II. Using the term tradition,²⁶ we are here referring to those revealed doctrines that are orally from Christ and handed on by the Apostles of the Church.

Now, the word tradition is understood in multiple ways. In general, it refers to any case of something being excepted from earlier people. Thus, we speak of customs, goods, and teachings that have been handed on [traditis]. Teachings that have been handled on our distinguished into those which are naturally known ([e.g.] philosophical tradition) and those accepted through revelation (divine tradition). Therefore, passive divine, tradition, taken as a whole, includes the entire some of the truths of faith orally handed on by Christ the Lord and the Apostles of the Church. This is distinct from constitutive tradition which only includes those truths that are not found in Scripture, having been orally handed on or communicated. However, in the history of dogmas our consideration is primarily in principally concerned not only with constitutive tradition, but (passive) tradition wholly and completely.²⁷ Finally, in passive tradition itself (that is, the sum total of truths orally handed on) we must distinguish between the very constitution of this tradition and the transmission or later conservation the years that follow. For the sum of revealed truths can be considered both in as much as it was first communicated to the church and inasmuch as it has been conserved and has existed in the church there after with the passage of time. More recent theology has for the most part understood the term tradition as the doctrine that his handed on, inasmuch as it exists under the infallible teaching authority of the Church in the Church, or, as Franzelin states: “the whole doctrine of faith in as much as it is preserved through a continual succession under the assistance of the Holy Spirit in the consent of the guardians of the deposit of faith… and exists in the profession and life of the whole Church.”²⁸

However, for our considerations here, it will be more expedient for us to distinguish between the primitively constituted tradition and its transmission through the passage of time thereafter.²⁹ Thus, we will understand the term tradition here simply as referring to those teachings that were orally communicated to the Church.

III. Tradition is distinguished from Sacred Scripture in two ways:

Formally, in as much as Sacred Scripture contains the Word of God in the form of writings divinely inspired by God, whereas Tradition was orally communicated and primitively fixed in the hearts and minds of the faithful;
Materially as regards the doctrines that it contains, for:
- Divine tradition contains all the truths of faith and morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine and the entire deposit of faith,³⁰ though not all particular facts which only are revealed for the manifestation of what is believed in or are contained in Sacred Scripture;
- And Sacred Scripture, according to the Catholic faith, does not contain all truths that are per se revealed or which pertain to the deposit of faith, though it furnishes many things to be believed into the deposit of faith, considering all the historical facts that are narrated in inspired Scripture.³¹

IV. Christ the Lord orally communicated His teaching, and this teaching which was handed down by Him constitutes the foundation of tradition (=divine tradition). The apostles transmitted this kind of doctrine of Christ first to the Church, along with those revelations that they accepted anew (=divine-apostolic tradition). Therefore, after the death of the last Apostle, there existed in the Church a kind of certain sum of revealed truths which either had been orally communicated to the whole Church or only to part of it, which we signify by the term “tradition.”

V. Regarding this kind of tradition, at least to the degree that the topic pertains to the history of dogmas, the following errors must be noted. The first Protestants denied that tradition contains doctrines that were not simultaneously found in Sacred Scripture. That is, they deny the existence of constitutive tradition, admitting that there is only an explicative or inherent tradition.³² However, they simultaneously affirm that primitive tradition was altered and corrupted in the midst of transmission. Rationalists deny that tradition contains divinely revealed truths. This heresy is the foundation of the history of dogmas and the comparative history of religions that we find in writings by rationalist and modernist thinkers. Among Catholics, Anton Günther proposed a position holding that the tradition of the church is constituted through the interpretation of the deeds of Christ by the apostles so that the apostles not only would state what they saw or heard but for the most part would only teach how to historical deeds [facta] of Christ were understood or had been interpreted. Finally, Modernists hold all of these kinds of errors, mixed together, stating that the doctrine primitively handed on by Christ was a kind of image of Christ’s religious sentiment thereafter disfigured and transfigured over the course of its transmission, according to the conditions of science any change as well as the necessities of consciousness and religious sentiment. Therefore, we must first remark about the very constitution of divine tradition and then secondly about the transmission of tradition once it has been constituted.

VI. Modernists directly attack the possibility of a constituted doctrinal tradition:

By the Modernists, tradition is understood as a communication to others, through preaching by means of the intellectual formula, of an original experience. To this formula, in addition to its representative value, they attribute a species of suggestive efficacy which acts both in the person who believes, to stimulate the religious sentiment should it happen to have grown sluggish and to renew the experience once acquired, and in those who do not yet believe, to awake for the first time the religious sentiment in them and to produce the experience.³³

Therefore, Loisy held that in the Gospels (which for him represented tradition) nothing remained from Christ’s words except a kind of weak and vague echo, a kind of general impression and certain principal statements, though in the manner in which they would have been understood and savored by its hearers, and finally, that religious movement which had Christ as its author.³⁴ Thus, according to the Modernists, no divine tradition exists, constituted by the words and teachings of Christ himself.

Nonetheless, their assertion that a doctrinal tradition is impossible is completely gratuitous. Certainly, nothing a priori prevents doctrines proposed by others from being preserved by its hearers; thus, so many doctrinal traditions exist in history. Nor can it be objected that this could not take place as regards religious doctrines. On the contrary, any and all historical religions sets forth their doctrinal traditions and are principally founded upon them. Finally, the entire reason undergirding Modernist position consists in their presupposition that religion is only a kind of blind movement of religious sentiment.

VII. Similarly, Günther’s opinion was justly rejected by the [First] Vatican Council, that is, his position holding that as it were the apostles only received from Christ certain principal ideas, which thereafter (as was also the case for their knowledge of the facts of Christ’s life) they would have interpreted in their own way. For, as the Apostle John teaches, “What we have heard and seen, we announce to you.” Finally, the opinion held by certain Catholic doctors who place Christ’s teaching authority principally in His action and example and thereby wish to explain the origin of tradition must also be rejected. Certainly, the gospels convey the opposite. If Christ instructed the apostles with the greatest of diligence concerning affairs of minor importance, why should we suppose that he would have provided less instruction concerning the sacraments, the primacy [of Peter], and other things as well?

This one thing against all these must be not so much conceded as affirmed, namely, that Christ did not teach the Apostles exclusively in the form of an abstract doctrine, but especially made use of metaphors, likenesses, examples, and a practical manner of setting forth his instruction. For it is by such means that men are taught.³⁵ Also, we must note that the Gospels narrate in particular those things that Christ did and taught in the midst of His passible life, since the Apostles were not ready to bare all things.

VIII. Therefore, once these kinds of prejudices are set out of question, the constitution of divine and apostolic tradition is easily understood, for since Christ ascended into heaven, he orally communicated his saving teaching to the Apostles; thereafter the Apostles likewise poorly handed on this teaching to the Church (together with new revelations which they received up to that point). Thus, through such preaching divine tradition came to be constituted in the church in accord with the Lord’s command: “Teach all the peoples…Teaching them to preserve everything whatsoever that I have entrusted to you” (Matthew 28:19–20). Even if this oral tradition later on (at least in part) was also communicated to the Church in the form of inspired scripture, the oral tradition itself was not thereby changed.

In this sense, the Council of Trent holds that the Gospel “was promised of old through the prophets in the Sacred Scriptures; our Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, first promulgated it from his own lips; he in turn ordered that it be preached to all creatures” and that “the traditions concerning faith and practice, as coming down from the mouth of Christ or being inspired by the Holy Spirit and preserved in continuous succession in the Catholic Church” are venerated.³⁶ And similarly, the [First] Vatican Council identifies the deposit of faith and “revelation handed on by the Apostles.”³⁷

IX. Similarly, conservation and later transmission of this already-constituted tradition is possible and, indeed, whole and unchanged. Protestants hold that the only medium of this transmission is to be found in Sacred Scripture. Now, certainly, sacred scripture holds a privileged place in the divine tradition to be handed on and preserved, both as scripture, by its stable and easily accessible nature, and especially as divinely inspired scripture, which as the word of God exhibits absolute servitude. Therefore, Catholics also hold that sacred scripture is a privileged medium of the tradition to be preserved. Nonetheless, Sacred Scripture is not the only or absolutely sufficient such medium, neither materially nor formally. It is not materially so because it does not contain the entire deposit of faith, that is every revealed truth. Formally it is not such because sacred scripture itself likewise stands in need of preservation and transmission, and especially interpretation. For a given teaching can be preserved and transmitted properly and formally only through a human mind among men and a written text only play its role as a sign or expression of what is in minds or as an extrinsic aid. Thus, Sacred Scripture is indeed the most illustrious document advance edition in the most efficacious means for its conservation and transmission, but it also presupposes and requires a living, human medium or instrument (organum).

Modernists claim that this kind of instrument would be the collective religious consciousness. Nonetheless, they’re teaching is completely unacceptable, since they do not admit that there is any kind of divinely revealed teaching, except perhaps in some pantheistic sense. Moreover, it does not explain the reality involved here, for collective consciousness is a kind of fruit or effect, though not a means or instrument of a tradition to be handed on; therefore it presupposes other means. Finally, Modernists proclaim with all their might not the conservation of doctrine, but rather than through the course of history it is disfigured and transfigured.

The absolutely certain reasons for the faithful and integral conservation and transmission [of the revealed message] is the infallible magisterium of to the Church for guarding the deposit of faith, through the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit, Church, and principally the head of the church, the pope. We here presuppose as something already known this teaching concerning such a magisterium, whether in its ordinary or solemn form. We are only undertaking the consideration of one thing, namely, just as infallibility in defining dogmas does not rule out human means, so to infallibility in the divine tradition to be preserved and transmitted does not exclude the possibility that the deposit of faith would be transmitted by human means, in a human manner, and in accord with the conditions of what it means to be human.

X. The human means for preserving and thereafter transmitting the teaching that has been divinely given can be reduced to three general kinds.³⁸ For, a teaching can be preserved and transmitted either through subsequent oral and doctrinal transmission, practical transmission, or written monuments. Moreover, each of these three general kinds likewise admit various modes as well. Thus, oral transmission can take place by way of preaching, religious instruction, definitions by the magisterium of the Church, doctrinal exposition, instruction and exhortation to live the Christian life, in accord with the handed on teaching in question. Practical transmission can take place through the Christian life itself, instituted in accord with examples from those who are older and in line with the norm of the doctrine handed on, through worship as exercise and confession of the doctrine of faith, through administration of the sacraments in accord with the handed-on precepts of faith. The transmission of orally accepted tradition through written monuments is had in creeds and written dogmatic definitions, in the acts of the councils, as well as those of the pope and bishops, in liturgical books, in the acta of the martyrs, in the writings of the Fathers of the Church and those of theologians, in the various documents and monuments of ecclesiastical history, and so forth.

Sacred Scripture must also be numbered among these kinds of means of divine tradition to be handed on. For although precisely as inspired it has force and reason that is independent from tradition, namely as the word of God Himself, He who is the principal author of sacred scripture, nonetheless by reason of its matter (i.e, the doctrine that it sets forth), it refers to and contains the teaching of tradition, at least in part, and is divinely ordered to this kind of teaching, primitively communicated in an oral fashion and there after handed on. Therefore, as regards to things of faith and morals, Sacred Scripture properly is a means for the transmitting of divine tradition. Finally, divine inspiration does not rule out the possibility that the teaching of Sacred Scripture would be drawn from tradition; in fact, quite the opposite is implied quite strongly by Sacred Scripture itself.

Such various and multiple means do not exclude each other, but on the contrary or mutually connected to each other and provide mutual assistance. Thus, one and the same teaching, nay, the entire deposit of faith can be preserved and transmitted orally, through practice, and in writing. For even though doctrines that are properly said to be of faith or speculative by their nature are proximately transmitted through preaching, teaching, and definition (whether orally or in written form), nonetheless together by their nature they are to be carried out in practices. Thus, the doctrine of faith concerning the One in the Triune God, the divinity of Christ, and the constitution of the Church demanded the alteration of the Gentile and Jewish ways of life into the Christian life, the profession of the Christian faith, not only in words but also in deeds, even to the point of martyrdom, the adoration of Christ, Christian worship, the reception of the sacraments, and obedience to Church authorities. And by all of these means, the teaching of the faith was clearly transmitted, certainly with a no less efficacity than through a teaching properly so called. However, moral matters or even more so observed and expressed in the form of practices, although such practices again presuppose or include the teaching, since believers and the Church direct and institute their life in accord with the teaching that has been revealed and handed on.

Thus, the constitution, preservation, and transmission of divine tradition, abstracting from the question concerning the Church’s infallibility, already can be sufficiently explained through human means, in accord with the human condition and in a historical manner.

XI. For the same reasons, already in a quart with human conditions and the historical manner of considering things, change or corruption of tradition can already be ruled out. For, first, tradition should not be simultaneously corrupted in oral, written, and practical transmission. Second, teachings handed on as being divinely revealed—and therefore as truths to be believed concerning what is necessary for salvation—are held in such a way that any kind of alteration would be excluded as something impious. This is the source of all the very bitter quarrels that arise over questions of faith. Third, teachings that directly or indirectly determine the way that one should live cannot be changed without a great controversy and resistance on the part of many. Finally, change cannot take place in the entire Christian community all at once. However, if this were to take place only in one part, another would immediately cry out, as has in fact happened whenever some doctrine has been denied or corrupted by heretics.

Thus, a priori the corruption of tradition cannot be admitted, but rather, is ruled out and certainly must be proven with the greatest of exactitude [when it does happen].

Indeed, we are aware of the history of the transmission of tradition; we are aware of the history of controversies, even the smallest; we are aware of the questions caused by heresies, the teachings of theologians, and through ecclesiastical praxis. And this history shows us the Church successively proposing and explaining, and likewise variously formulating, the teaching that has been given to her, not a process of alteration and corruption. However, history does bear witness to corruption in the various heresies rejected and condemned by the Church. Indeed, Protestants strive with all their might to show the alterations that have taken place [in the deposit of faith through the history of the Church, but nonetheless, they immensely disagreement among themselves, which is a sign of the fact that they present a kind of historical fiction. By contrast, Modernists instead assume that there have been “disfigurations and transfigurations” or at least they drawn them from false presuppositions.

XII. However, adversaries of the Church take refuge in a hypothetical “imperceptible” alteration. Nonetheless, this hypothesis lacks any kind of historical foundation, and in point of fact, in the full light of the history of darkness, heresies, disputations, and theological controversies, is absolutely ridiculous. Indeed, non-Catholic historians strive to prove that there have been many alterations in the doctrine of faith. However, they have not been alterations, and certainly not ones that are imperceptible. No, they have been quite perceptible when they take place, as is shown in the history of dogmas. For the alteration of the doctrine of faith, by its very nature and conditions, as we have shown, cannot be “imperceptible,” but on the contrary, necessarily is accompanied by great controversies.

Thus, the human body or bodily health and indeed undergo some kind of change without men immediately being aware that this has taken place. However, a body or one’s health cannot properly speaking be imperceptibly changed, that is, so that the body that used to be alive, or one’s health, would pass away. For a great illness and, even more so, the death of a man certainly are not “imperceptible” changes. Similarly, alterations can happen regarding a given teaching that has been handed on without this change being immediately perceived. However, once this kind of change begins to turn into the corruption of this doctrine, it will necessarily be perceived. Thus, at first, various heresies were hardly noted; however, when they then led to the denial of the doctrine that had been handed on, they became manifest and were fought against.

Finally, doctrinal alterations that adversaries (whether Protestants, Rationalists, or Modernists) claim have taken place are so fundamental and substantial they could not have taken place imperceptibly (e.g., alteration in teachings concerning the Trinity of divine persons, the divinity of Christ, the hierarchical constitution of the Church, Papal primacy, and so forth).

By contrast, the alterations made through gnostic, Arian, Nestorian, Monophysite, Protestant, and Modernist heresies in relation to the teaching that was revealed and handed on were very “perceptible,” as is well testified in the history of the Church and of dogmas.

Therefore, the change or corruption, disfiguration or transfiguration of tradition, whether perceptible or not, is ruled out by the nature of tradition as well as historical documentation. Although absolute servitude concerning this transmission and preservation integrally and unchanged is had only through the infallibility divinely promised to the Church, nonetheless it does also stand as a historical fact, inasmuch as the church for her part preserves and transmits traditions for human and proportionate means.³⁹ Thus, the preservation and transmission of tradition with complete propriety constitutes a historical fact whose modes, causes, and conditions can and should be determined: which we will strive to do in four conclusions.

XIII. Conclusion I. The transmission of the truths that are handed on is not brought about necessarily nor exclusively by means of those formulas by which those truths were handed on at the start but, rather, those first handed on truths, by kind of moral necessity, were in some way translated [vertuntur] into different formulas, depending upon the conditions and necessities facing particular times. Thus, one and the same truth is always transmitted, though it is formulated in various ways.

Already at the start, the Apostles translated [verterunt] the word of the Gospel not only into the Greek language but also into Greek concepts and formulas. To see this, it suffices that one compare certain chapters from the Lord’s own words to what we find in Saint Paul’s letters. For example, the Gospels represent Christ in the form of the Messiah, the son of man, the vine, the shepherd, and so forth, whereas Saint Paul does so by speaking of him as Lord, Savior, and Head. Likewise, the Gospels describe the incarnation in the form of a mission and the coming of the son of God into the world, whereas Saint Paul describes it as God appearing to the world (see Titus 3:4).

Nay, if we compare the letters of Paul, Peter, John, and James to each other we will find the same teachings again in different forms. Thus, through the Apostles, the teaching of the gospel was handed on and preached integrally, though in new forms, adapted in someway to the capacities and needs of Greeks, translated [traducta] from Christ’s divine style into a human style, from a Semitic form into a Greco-Latin form.

Now, this first communication and transmission of the teaching of the Gospel of Christ was the type and exemplar for the later transmission of the doctrine that have been handed on, for just as the Apostles announced the Gospel in forms that corresponded to the needs of the pagans, so too through the course of time the Church has proposed in new forms the doctrine handed on and received by the Apostles, according to the needs of life, the inclination of men, the dignity of the word of God, and as the perfection of knowledge required it⁴⁰

For just as the intellectual and religious condition of the Greek- and Latin-speaking people differed from that of the Jews to whom the Lord had spoken, so too, thereafter, the condition of the Christian people has differed over the course of the ages. Therefore, likewise during the time that followed, Christian teaching and could not thereafter be simply handed on in a kind of mechanical way. No, through the entire history of the church we find a kind of dogmatic progress, not only as regards the greater explication of her teaching, but even by means of ever-new formulas.

Thus, the doctrine concerning the primacy of Peter was handed on by Saint Ignatius of Antioch by saying that the church of Rome presides over the loving assembly [of the Churches].⁴¹ And St. Irenaeus wrote that this church has greater authority, such that every Church must agree with her.⁴² Saint Cyprian expressed this in a Roman fashion by saying that to be in communion with the pope is to be in communion with the Church of Christ, or that the Roman church is the root and maternal source [matrix] of Catholic unity.⁴³ And so forth to the formulas of the [First] Vatican Council. Likewise, the doctrine concerning the Incarnation or the divinity of Christ are stated in different forms: as the appearing of God, the assumption [of human nature to the Hypostasis of the Word], of mixing [without confusion], of union… upt to the formulation as the Hypostatic Union.

Johann Adam Möhler sets this forth excellently in his Symbolik:

But, after the Divine Word had become human faith, it must be subject to all mere human destinies. It must be constantly received by all the energies of the human mind, and imbibed by the same. The preservation and communication of the Word were, in like manner, attached to a human method. Even with the evangelists, who only wished to recount what Christ had spoken, wrought, and suffered, the Divine Word appears subject to the law here described…

But, the Divine Word became still more subject to this law, when the apostles were fulfilling their mission executing the divine charge, which they had received; for, various questions of dispute arose, the settlement whereof could not be avoided, and on that account claimed human reflection, and required the formation of notions, judgments, and conclusions things which were not possible to be effected, without tasking the reason and the understanding. The application of the energies of the human mind to the subject-matter, received from the Lord, necessarily caused the Divine Word, on one hand, to be analyzed, and, on the other hand, to be reduced to certain leading points ; and the multiplicity of objects to be contemplated in their mutual bearings, and resolved into a higher unity, whereby the human mind obtained, on these matters, greater clearness and definiteness of conception. For, every thing, that the human mind hath received from an external source, and which is destined to become its property, wherein it must find itself perfectly at home, must first be reproduced by the human mind itself. The original doctrine, as the human mind had variously elaborated it, exhibited itself in a much altered form it remained the original, and yet did not; it was the same in the substance, and yet differed as to form. In this process of the development of the Divine Word, during the apostolic age, we may exalt as high, and extend as wide as we please the divine guidance, given to the disciples of Christ; yet certainly, without human co-operation, without the peculiar activity of man, it did not advance of itself. As in the good work of the Christian, free-will and grace pervade each other, and one and the same undivided deed is at once divine and human, so we find this to be the case here.

The same could not fail to hold good, even after the death of the apostles, even after the Gospels and the Epistles were written and whatever else we include in the canon of the New Testament, were already in the hands of the faithful. When, in the manner described, the Church explains and secures the original doctrine of faith against misrepresentations, the apostolic expression is necessarily changed for another, which is the most fitted alike clearly to set forth and reject the particular error of the time. As little as the apostles themselves, in the course of their polemics, could retain the form, wherein the Saviour expounded his divine doctrine; so little was the Church enabled to adhere to the same. If the evangelical doctrine be assailed by a definite theological system, and a terminology peculiar to itself ; the false notions cannot by any means be repelled in a clear, distinct, evident, and intelligible manner, unless the Church have regard to the form of the error, and exhibit its thesis in a shape, qualified by the garb, wherein the adverse doctrine is invested, and thus render itself intelligible to all contemporaries. The origin of the Nicene formula, furnishes the best solution to this question. This form is in itself the human, the temporal, the perishable element, and might be exchanged for a hundred others. Accordingly, tradition often hands down to later generations, the original deposit in another form, because that deposit hath been entrusted to the care of men, whose conduct must be guided by the circumstances wherein they are placed.⁴⁴

XIV. Conclusion II. Not all revealed trues are found in tradition at all times in an explicit form (and, still less, clearly and distinctly) but, rather, some explicitly and others implicitly. —As we have said the transmission of the teaching hand it on does not take place mechanically but, rather, in a spiritual manner, in the faith and teaching of the Church and thus in regard to the form in which the doctrine is expressed, in accord with the conditions and necessities of various times. Therefore, quasi-necessarily at any given time certain doctrines are proposed more explicitly and others less so. At the same time, according to the diversity of formulas by which doctrine is transmitted, certain determinate ideas from revelation are thereby taught in a more determinate manner [than others]; for instance, if the gratuitousness of salvation is emphasized more, the necessity of human cooperation is emphasized less.

Nor is it necessary that the entire teaching handed on by the Apostles stand out at all times in clear and distinct terms, expressing the whole meaning of revelation determinedly, in the Church or in the deposit of faith, since it suffices that it be implicitly contained there. Nor does this seem to be a reason of utility or fittingness. Nay, finally, this could not be the case without an immense miracle. Therefore, through the wise counsel of God, the deposit of faith or tradition contains and furnishes revealed truths partly explicitly and partly implicitly.

However, by means of a twofold rule we can determine which truths must be explicitly contained in tradition. First, those truths that require explicit faith must be explicitly contained there. Now, this necessity can arise from either the needs of salvation, necessities of the Christian life (whether per se or per accidens), because of the need to preserve the purity of the faith (when a heresy arises that may corrupt the faith), or on account of any other similar need. Second, it is necessary that there be explicitly in the tradition or the deposit of faith all those truths in which all other revealed truths are implicitly contained. We will discuss this in the next conclusion.

Thus, even the Apostles did not hand on all the truths of the faith with equal explicitness, but handed on some implicitly. In the letters of the Apostles, we also have sufficient indication concerning the nature of the truth that they principally insisted upon. For it was entirely natural that the Apostles, writing to pagan converts, would insist more greatly concerning the unity of God than upon the dignity or cult of the Blessed Virgin Mary. By contrast, Saint Peter was able to set forth much more determinately and explicitly the doctrine of the faith to the Jews who believed in Christ than St. Paul was able to do to the Corinthians. This also explains the perfection of the Syriac tradition (Ephrem). And the same holds true for later times as well.

XV. Conclusion III. Every doctrine that is only implicitly contained in tradition presupposes in tradition some determinate and explicit doctrine in which it would be implicitly contained.

This conclusion is relative to the previous one and is of the greatest importance. In fact, for many it suffices to say that dogmas exist in tradition either explicitly or implicitly, though they do not give sufficient consideration to the consequence of this dictum. Indeed, from the notion of that which is implicit it follows that the implicit presupposes the explicit in which it is implicitly contained. Therefore, in order for a given doctrine to really exist implicitly in tradition, it is absolutely required that tradition itself contains some given explicit doctrine in which that other doctrine would really be implicitly contained. Now, the manner for such implication can take on many forms, but nonetheless the doctrine in question must really in some way implicitly be contained in some explicit doctrine in the tradition. Otherwise, there would be nothing other than wordplay involved and the doctrine in question would really not be found implicitly in the tradition.

And this is a kind of middle way between two kinds of errors. For some, erring by way of excess, claim that any given revealed doctrine must always be found explicitly in tradition, whereas others, indeed many, erring by way of deficiency, by contrast place in tradition only certain general ideas in which the dogmas that later would come to be defined would not be implicitly contained properly speaking but, rather, would follow from them by way of a varied and manifold evolution. And thus, they bring forth indeed certain likenesses or analogies, comparing such development to that of a seed or grain (or other such things), although they leave behind—nay, deny—the certain teaching of theology, especially that offered to by scholastic theologians. Now, indeed, we do concede that it is not rare for it to be difficult for the theologian or historian to determine concretely in the doctrines or formulas from earlier tradition that contained those dogmas that later on came to be defined and to explain how they were contained in these earlier forms. However, this sort of difficulty arises from the nature of our knowledge, and this is precisely why we stand in need of authoritative definitions by the Church and her infallible magisterium. Nonetheless, such difficulties commonly arise either from a false or at least deficient understanding of dogma and tradition or from a deficient conception of what is involved in implication.

A well-known example can be taken from the well-known controversy concerning St. Thomas is teaching regarding the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. It can hardly be affirmed that St. Thomas taught this in express words and the same holds true for other scholastics in his own era. On the other hand, one can hardly dare to say that this privilege of the Mother of God was so denied or unknown by the holy doctor and his contemporaries that it would not have been implicitly asserted by them. In fact, St. Thomas assigns the principles in which that prerogative of the Queen of Heaven is implicitly contained. For he argues expressly from the principal that “the purity (namely, from sin) of the Blessed Virgin holds the highest place only after Christ, who, as the universal Savior of all, needed not to be saved.”⁴⁵ Likewise, [citing Augustine,] “Out of the honor due to Christ, it is my wish to absolutely rule out all questions concerning the Blessed Virgin Mary as regards the question of sin.”⁴⁶ Likewise, “The Blessed Virgin Mary received such a great fulness of grace that she was nearest of all to the Author of grace.”⁴⁷ And again, “The Blessed Virgin is said to have been full of Grace… Because she had Grace that was equal to the state to which she had been predestined by God, namely that she may be the mother of His only-begotten.”⁴⁸ Now, in all these principles, the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary is implicitly asserted because it is only by being immaculately conceived that she has her the greatest possible grace after Christ, though such that she would have been saved by Christ, and she who was immaculately conceived was the closest of all humans to Christ, full of grace, with there being no question of sin in her. Thus, in general, we can affirm: if anyone has great knowledge of the documents of tradition he will discover, for all dogmas, the doctrine or formula (though, in various forms according to different eras) in which they are all at least implicitly contained, and it is not necessary that one make recourse to the claim that theological conclusions, properly so called can be defined as dogmas.

XVI. What account of various difficulties, especially historical ones, no few people take refuge in the hypothesis holding that many dogmas, after having been defined, would not have been, properly speaking, implicitly contained in some doctrine but, rather, in the life and action of the faithful. And in this position, we actually find truth and falsity mixed together. Therefore, we have our fourth conclusion:

Conclusion IV. Revealed doctrines and defined dogmas neither primarily nor principally were found implicitly in the life in action of the faithful. Granted, we did above state that the divine doctrine orally communicated to the Church can later be transmitted through either oral, written, or practical transmission. However, we also likewise observed first that these various modes of transmission do not exclude each other but rather or of assistance for each other, and secondly, that transmission through praxis likewise presupposes and includes some teaching. Therefore, simply speaking, it must indeed be admitted that in the praxis of the faithful and the Church certain doctrines of tradition or implicitly contained and taught. However, it must likewise be denied that the doctrines of tradition are contained in praxis and life primarily and principally.

Indeed, the moral and ascetical life of the faithful, as well as the actions of the liturgy and the Church, in no way have the strength or value of tradition except in as much as they are founded upon some doctrine that has been handed on. In the same in fact holds true for any Christian practice which pertains to tradition when a given doctrine is joined to it, such that the given practice would be necessary for salvation or at least would be something that has been handed on. Next, this tradition does not exclusively or principally consist in the life and action of the faithful but, rather, primarily and principally in the action of the teaching and hierarchical Church, which teaches that such an action is necessary and has been handed on, as is particularly clear in the case of the sacraments and the governing of the Church. Therefore, tradition is found primarily and principally in doctrine.

Only, that doctrine itself is not expressed necessarily in a scientific or even properly doctrinal manner, but rather, can be proposed and held in a kind of practical way, namely, inasmuch as a given praxis or mode of life is commanded by the Church and observe by the faithful as something legitimate, obligatory, or even necessary for salvation.

Thus, in fact, many revealed doctrines have existed in the Church’s tradition and exist to this day, for example part of the tradition concerning the sacraments was found in a practical form in the Church, inasmuch as the determinate manner of administrating and receiving the sacraments under the conditions that has been handed on was taught and held to pertain to what is necessary for salvation. The same is true for many things pertaining to the worship and ecclesiastical order which indeed by its very nature must appear in the action and public life of the Church.

Finally, thus, certain defined dogmas, especially concerning the administration of the sacraments, were implicitly taught in the praxis and life of the ancient Church. For first that very practical mode containing a dogma involves a kind of notion of implication: for the doctrinal mode of dogma (and especially its scientific formulation) is related to the practical mode of proposing it as the explicit is related to the implicit. Second, in a concrete and practical action many particular things can be taught which then can come to be part by part and explicitly determined through later dogmas: whether an action that is concretely one comes to be divided into its various parts (essential, physical, potential, and integral), or an action that is concretely one (either physically or morally) comes to be considered and determined from various formal and abstract perspectives. Thus, for example, the dogma concerning Papal Primacy (i.e., the formulas by wish this dogma was defined by the [First] Vatican Council) is implicitly contained “in the ecclesiastical and traditional custom of referring questions of faith to the Roman Pontiff.” Similarly, the dogmas concerning the necessity and character of sacramental confession are implicitly contained in the penitential practices of the ancient Church.⁴⁹

However, if someone really considers the very teaching of tradition (and also of Sacred Scripture), he will be surprised (as Joseph Kleutgen has already noted quite excellently) how full a teaching, properly so called, is already found in tradition (and in Sacred Scripture). Thus, rightly, the Council of Trent asserts that its definitions concerning the necessity and character of sacramental confession were (implicitly) stated by Christ our Lord Himself (John 20:22) and “commended by the great and unanimous consent of the Fathers.”⁵⁰ Thus, in the end, it is only very rarely the case that are given dogma would be stated exclusively in a purely practical manner in sacred tradition.

Now several corollaries follow from this.

XVII. Corollary 1.—Unjustly do Protestant and Modernist authors not infrequently claim that popular devotion of Christians is the origin of dogmas. For, even if we concede that the devotion of the faithful sometimes was the force that impelled toward the defining of a given dogma (e.g, as in a case of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary), nonetheless, first of all, the Church does not define any dogma solely on account of the devotion of the faithful but, rather does so because it is contained in the written or handed on word of God, and secondly, the very devotion of the people is founded upon a given doctrine of tradition and presupposes it, so that, for example, devotion to the Immaculate One presupposes face in the doctrine concerning the divine maternity and perfect holiness of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The devotion of the people (and also certain arguments brought forth by theologians, such as by Duns Scotus regarding the question of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary) only arouse the Church to investigate more attentively, rightly explain, and explicitly propose a given doctrine of tradition.

XVIII. Corollary 2.—Likewise, it is therefore less correctly taught that tradition necessarily must be supplemented by the life in action of the Church. And it is not correctly asserted that “Dogmas are not justifiable by historical science alone (!) nor bye a dialectic that is most ingeniously applied to texts,” or, “a tradition is humanly unintelligible if it is not supplemented by and ascetical tradition and vice-versa.”⁵¹ This would apply all the more if the “tradition” thus “supplemented” by the life and action of the faithful were understood in such a way that certain things would be added to the primitive tradition or that the original tradition then is presumed to have been changed, disfigured, or transfigured.

XIX. Corollary 3.—Although certain revealed truths do undergo (objective) development in the life and praxis of the Church apart from their doctrinal development, nonetheless, it is less correctly taught that revelation, at least as regards its manifestation, is completed by the life and action of the Church.

Fr. Juan Arintero indeed holds that dogmatic development is not only subjective but also in someway objective namely in as much as the same objective truth receives greater explication and development in the life and consciousness of the Church. He explains and proves this as follows. The revelation made to the Apostles was complete only in first act, that is, in its communication, although it neither was, nor could be, complete in its manifestation. Such full and perfect manifestation of revelation he’s had only through the consciousness and life of the Church to whom revelation had been given in a vital manner in addition to a conceptual and doctrinal one. Therefore, not all dogmas are contained “conceptually” in the written deposit of faith but, some are only in the consciousness in life of the Church. Now, such dogmas, which in some way are latent within the life of the Church, over the course of time come to be more fully explained, manifested, and finally defined in the Church’s supernatural life. Therefore, dogmatic progress is in a way objective, namely inasmuch as given dogmas which once upon a time either did not stand forth or were more obscure would come to be manifested in declared through the life of the church. Such was Fr. Arintero’s position.⁵²

As we already have somewhat indicated, it seems that in this kind of position a distinction needs to be drawn. Certainly, in addition to purely doctrinal explication (which Fr. Arintero seems to call subjective progress), a kind of objective progress of revealed doctrine must be posited, namely in as much as given revealed truths, especially certain commands and promises of the Lord are verified in the nature of things, brought into effect, and sensibly appear, at least in part, so that the revealed truth would be placed in some manner before the eyes of men, indeed much more explicitly and determinedly than solely through the terms of revelation. Thus, how true is this for dogmas concerning the Church, her teaching authority, Papal Primacy, the administration of sacraments, the Christian life, and so forth. Surely, the doctrine revealed through the words, “you are Peter in on this rock I will build my church,” over the course of time has been manifested and explicated objectively and it in the life of the Church; the same could be said concerning the parables explaining the nature of the Church, as well as for the other cases as well.

Therefore in this sense, without any doubt, objective progress in the manifestation of revelation not only must be admitted but indeed affirmed. Similarly, it is evident that through this kind of objective progress, a subjective progress (i.e., doctrinal explication) is simultaneously promoted, as we will explain below in article fifteen.

However, he seems less correct when he teaches that through this kind of objective progress revelation, even if only by way of manifestation, is completed, that is, someone as though revelation would thus be given determination and explication so that something would be objectively added to the explanation of it. For that objective progress in fact posits nothing in the nature of things that would not have been stated in revelation itself. For the author wrongly [immerito] supposed that certain dogmas at first exist only in the life of the Church, for as we showed earlier, the praxis or life of the Church presupposes some doctrine, at least in some way. Moreover, the church defines a given doctrine or not because it exists in the life of the church as a fact but rather because it is revealed. For even if the church makes recourse to life or historical facts, such facts are only brought forward as signs of divine revelation, for example, like the fact of the submission of the whole Church under the Roman Pontiff. Therefore, the Church’s life—that is, real and historical facts—are only means for the transmission of tradition and signs of the existing tradition. And we cannot admit a kind of objective progress that would in someway complete revelation as regards its explication, as though it were adding certain dogmas that would not be a doctrinal explication of revelation itself. Therefore, objective progress—i.e., the real development of the Church, her magisterium, primacy, and religious life—are only a kind of condition and cause of doctrinal progress or explication, as we will show below in article 15.

XX. Conclusion.—Certainly, tradition is not “a heap of texts, words, and rites,” but rather a teaching that is expressed by such words, rights, actions, and life, a teaching that we hence know by these means. Certainly, doctrine “does not exist independently from the souls in which it lives,” but nonetheless it lives in the Church as a doctrine and handed on and received, as a divine deposit. Certainly, faith and dogmas arise from tradition not on the strength of historical science or theologians’ dialectical labors but, rather, through the Church’s the successive explication, judgment, and proposition. Thus, Vincent of Lérins rightly stated:

But, the Church of Christ, the attentive and cautious guardian of the doctrines placed in her care, never alters anything in them. She never diminishes nor adds to them; she does not prune away what is necessary, nor does she add something superfluous. She does not lose what is her own, nor does she take what belongs to another. Rather, with great diligence she strives to handle ancient doctrine wisely and faithfully, so that if antiquity has left anything unformed and inchoate she might tend to it and refine it, if something has already been given expressed and elucidated form she might solidify and strengthen it, and if something has already been secure and defined she might guard it.⁵³

Article Thirteen: Dogmatic Progress in Comparison to Sacred Scripture

I. Various positions.—All agree that Sacred Scripture at least in some way is an object of the history of dogmas, though this is explained variously by different authors. The first Protestants strove, first, to determine what doctrines were contained in Sacred Scripture and, then, to judge later doctrines on this basis. Rationalists and Modernists claim to show the human origin of Sacred Scripture. Among Catholics, some first set forth the teaching of Sacred Scripture as the first written documents of the Christian faith; others, by contrast, wish to exclude Sacred Scripture from historical consideration, considering it only as the terminus a quo for later dogmatic progress. Finally, generally speaking, as the inspired word of God, Sacred Scripture seems in no way to pertain to the historical progress of dogmas. Therefore, there are the following conclusions.

II. Conclusion I. Sacred Scripture, as divinely inspired, is not the subject of dogmatic progress and therefore neither is it an object of the history of dogmas but, rather, is the object of the history of revelation and inspiration.—This is because dogmatic progress consists in the success of proposition and explication of revealed truths through the Church. Indeed, the books of Sacred Scripture, “by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit…have God for their author.”⁵⁴ Therefore, according to the Catholic faith, neither as regards their origin nor the teaching that they contain can they be the subject of dogmatic progress or the object of the history of dogmas. However, Sacred Scripture does involve a historical element of a different kind, both on the part of God revealing, who revealed divine truths successively and according to the needs and conditions of men (the history of revelation),⁵⁵ and also on a part of the inspired authors, who by all means when writing the holy books are indeed instruments of God, but not merely mechanical ones, but rather rational instruments, such that the holy books were also the work of the sacred author (in the mode of instrumental causality), with the human author influencing the character of the books through his own rational activity (history of inspiration).⁵⁶ As is clear, the history of both revelation and inspiration are indeed analogous in a way to the history of dogmas; however they are essentially of a different kind, namely inasmuch as God by revealing and inspiring accommodates himself to the conditions of men and the activity of the sacred author. Therefore, the history of revelation and inspiration pertains to the introduction to Sacred Scripture and exegesis, whereas the teaching concerning the successive revelation and inspiration pertains to apologetic and dogmatic theology,⁵⁷ as the writings of theologians demonstrate.⁵⁸

III. Conclusion II. Sacred Scripture has a relation to dogmatic progress, and for this reason properly speaking is a subject of the history of dogmas.—This relationship is threefold, namely in as much as: (a) the doctrine contained in Sacred Scripture has a relationship to doctrine in divine tradition; (b) dogma concerning Sacred Scripture has a history; (c) the doctrines of Sacred Scripture have been successively explicated and proposed for belief.

IV. (a) the relationship between the doctrine contained in Sacred Scripture and in tradition in relation to dogmatic progress. As we already saw above, Sacred Scripture contains part of the doctrine of divine tradition, indeed, enough as to be a large and principal portion thereof.⁵⁹ This sort of fact, in addition to the consigning of revealed doctrine in inspired scripture also indirectly implies dogmatic progress and influences further progress—indeed, in several ways.

First, tradition, at least in part, takes the form of a stable and inspired scripture. Second, again at least in part, the doctrine that is handed on finds itself to be proposed in Scripture by way of new formulas. For the ultimate end of Scripture is not only to enable revealed doctrines to be written down in a quasi-mechanical fashion, but also that they be proposed to the Church in a more perfect manner. Third, in Sacred Scripture, new formulas that were already effective in the Tradition found confirmation through inspiration—principally in the letters of the Apostles. Fourth and finally, the very doctrines contained in Sacred Scripture, in their very mode and propositional formulation, exercise very powerful influence on the later explication and formulation of tradition. Thus, Sacred Scripture is not only an utterly efficacious aid to the perfect transmission of tradition, but likewise is a kind of type and divine exemplar of dogmatic progress. Indeed, it can hardly be estimated how greatly, at least in the time that followed, Sacred Scripture exercised its influence upon the transmission, explication, and formulation of tradition (i.e. upon dogmatic progress).

V. b) The history of the dogma of Sacred Scripture.—Now, concerning Sacred Scripture itself we have a dogma, namely that determinate books were committed to writing under God’s inspiration, such that God himself would be their principal author and witness to their truth. Just like other dogmas, this one has its own history, that is its successive proposition and explication in the Church. For although the sacred books had from the start been proposed as being divinely inspired, nonetheless, this doctrine came to be more fully explicated with the passage of time. In particular, two things must be distinguished: the dogma concerning inspiration itself (i.e., concerning the fact, nature, and extension of inspiration); and the dogma concerning the canon of Scripture (i.e., concerning what books are to be held to be inspired). Each of these parts of the dogma in question has its own history. Thus, Sacred Scripture again, although indirectly, he comes the object of dogmatic progress and the history of dogmas. Moreover, the successive explication of the dogma concerning inspiration and the canon of Sacred Scripture is intimately and mutually connected to the rest of dogmatic progress. For the explication of the dogma concerning inspiration and concerning the canon of Sacred Scripture depended upon (and still depends upon) the general state of the explication of revealed doctrine, especially the state of certain particular doctrines (e.g., the nature of the divine activity upon created realities [natura influxus divini]). And vice versa the entire rest of dogmatic progress is determined through various explications for the inspiration of Sacred Scripture, for how we understand inspiration influences how we interpret Sacred Scripture and the latter determines how we understand inspiration.

All these observations can be confirmed by considering the history of dogmas. It is factually clear that the dogma concerning the inspiration and concerning the canon of Sacred Scripture underwent a successive process of explication. The influence of determinate doctrines of inspiration is clear in the theologies set forth by the Antiochian and Alexandrian schools. General dogmatic progress in the fourth and fifth century and in the writings of scholastic authors before and after the Council of Trent both lead to a more profound understanding of the nature of inspiration; however, the theology of the Fathers and the scholastics was also shaped by [their] concept of inspiration. In general, heresies neither suppose or infer a given conception of inspiration and the specific canon of Sacred Scripture. This is already true in the case of early Gnosticism. And the history of Protestantism and modernism is very closely and intimately connected with the doctrine of Sacred Scripture. Various controversies among Catholic schools of thought concerning how to understand inspiration is founded in the various positions that they hold concerning other points of teaching, and likewise, they drag in their wake other doctrinal differences as well. Finally, the whole contemporary “biblical question”—which certainly is the principal part involved in the development of dogmas—is essentially a question concerning the inspiration of Sacred Scripture, that is, concerning the Catholic dogma regarding Sacred Scripture. Thus, especially in our days it has become clear how mutually connected the development of dogmas and the dogma concerning Sacred Scripture are connected: for if the reality of inspiration is denied, then the history of “dogmas” also entirely ceases to exist.

VI. c) Successive explication of the doctrines of Sacred Scripture.—since Sacred Scripture is the inspired word of God, it can be a terminus a quo for dogmatic progress independent of tradition, namely, yeah as much as the revealed doctrines contained there in come to be explained and explicitly proposed for belief. In this respect, Sacred Scripture becomes the very central object of dogmatic development. Nay, indeed, the history of dogmas for the most part is the history of the explication of Sacred Scripture. In particular, first of all, the meaning of certain texts and Sacred Scripture have been solemnly defined, for example: concerning Papal primacy (Matthew 16:16–18 and John 21:15);⁶⁰ the words of institution for the Eucharist (Matthew 26:26ff; Mark 14:22; Luke 22:19ff; 2 Corinthians 11:23ff);⁶¹ the power to remit sins (John 20:22–23 and Matthew 18:18);⁶² the institution of the priesthood (Luke 22:19 and 1 Corinthians 11:24⁶³); and various texts concerning justification.⁶⁴ Thus, certain doctrines are expressly proposed as being teachings of Sacred Scripture that must be believed. Similarly, many texts from Sacred Scripture have been more or less explicated by the ordinary Magisterium of the Church. Indeed, in general the councils and texts of the popes make use of texts from Sacred Scripture in their argument on behalf of a definition so that they might simultaneously offer a definition concerning the sense of those texts, though that interpretation would have great authority already [given how it is thus used to support the dogmatic definition]. Second, through the Church’s Magisterium, the general sense of Sacred Scripture has been proposed to believers both through the ordinary and solemn magisterium namely in as much as Sacred Scripture is explained in a way that is harmonious with Catholic doctrine.

Third, certain principle and fundamental lines of scriptural doctrine have been determined, especially in response to heresies: the typological and Christological sense of the Old Testament has been proposed in response to Jewish and Judaizing interpretations; the conformity of Sacred Scripture with the Apostolic creed was shown against the Gnostics; Alexandrian and Antiochian theologians took up the debate concerning the allegorical and literal senses of Scripture; the Fathers of the Church and scholastic theologians confirmed the body and system of ecclesiastical doctrine as the doctrine of Sacred Scripture; and the doctrines concerning salvation, the sacraments, and the Church were defended against the Protestants. Indirectly, the meaning of Sacred Scripture was determined by the decree of the Council of Trent that in matters of faith and morals Sacred Scripture must not be interpreted in a way that is contrary to the sense in which it has been, and is, held by Holy Mother Church or also in contrast to the unanimous agreement of the Fathers;⁶⁵ likewise there is the definition set forth by the [First] Vatican Council concerning the infallibility of the pope; and also too, there are the norms and prescriptions concerning the interpretation of Sacred Scripture.⁶⁶ In our days, on a count of the teachings held by rationalist and modernist thinkers, the question concerning the truth and sense of Sacred Scripture has, as it were, become nearly identical with the question concerning the origin and truth of Catholic dogma. Finally, the complete doctrinal explication of Sacred Scripture is set forth in the disciplines of exegesis and dogmatic Theology.

VII. Therefore, although Sacred Scripture of itself is not the object of the history of dogmas, nonetheless, on account of its relations with tradition, the dogma concerning Sacred Scripture, and the various dogmatic interpretations of Sacred Scripture, it finds itself, as it were, right in the middle of dogmatic progress. Thus, it is likewise clear why the history of dogmas thought to begin with Sacred Scripture, namely inasmuch as, at least from our perspective, it manifests to us the form taken on by primitive tradition and bears witness to doctrines that were already explicitly proposed from the start. Only, one must take care not to fall into the Protestant error that no teaching can be admitted as Christian unless it is found in Scripture, nor the error of many historians and exegetes holding that the only sense of Scripture that can be admitted is what can be understood from Scripture itself. For to a great extent, the history of dogmas exists precisely for the sake of the successive explication of Sacred Scripture.

Thus, also, there is no value in their argument that a given doctrine must be rejected solely because it is founded upon an interpretation coming from a later time, for many texts in the Old and New Testament came to be explicitly known and explicated only with the passage of time. Indeed, just as dogmatic progress took place successively so too did the explication of Sacred Scripture.

Therefore, the historian of dogmas, starting from Sacred Scripture, will show: what doctrines later on came to be defined and in what form they are found in Sacred Scripture; what doctrines of Sacred Scripture have been explicated; what kinds of vicissitudes were involved in this process of explication; what kind of influence Sacred Scripture had upon the explication of tradition (and vice versa) and, finally, on dogmatic progress in general.

Article Fourteen: The Various States of Dogmatic Progress

I. The three degrees of dogmatic progress.—In general, dogmatic progress is distinguished into 3 degrees: initial, intermediate, and final. However, the differences between these degrees, as well as their various properties are explained in various ways by different theologians. Thus, Cardinal Billot distinguishes them as follows:

The first (degree) is what we could call simple faith. This refers above all to the letters and confessions of the most ancient bishops and martyrs of the Church… (In the second degree) imperfect explications are joined to simple faith. This can be seen quite clearly in a number of the fathers of the second and third century regarding the dogma of the Trinity… (The third state is) precise explication in which there is clearer understanding of that which was earlier believed more obscurely, and later times enjoy with greater clarity what antiquity previously had venerated without understanding.⁶⁷

Ambroise Gardeil distinguishes between the intuition of faith in general, the mental ferment that follows, and then the integration of theological explication.⁶⁸ Pinard distinguishes between the state of possession, discussion, and definition.⁶⁹ And others take different positions as well.

As is clear, this kind of threefold state or degrees necessarily follows from the nature of dogmatic progress.⁷⁰ However, we believe that three things must be noted here. First, this kind of threefold state must not be understood as though at the beginning they existed no determinate dogma, as modern Protestants hold. For in the preaching of the Apostles, certain Christian truths were immediately and explicitly proposed for belief from the start. For example, quite certainly, the following doctrines were proposed and belief, from the start, as dogmas: the existence of God; [that God is] Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; faith in Christ; salvation in Christ; eternal life; the Church; and so forth. Second: simple faith does not exist without at least some kind of explication. For the assent of faith cannot take place unless the truth believed in is known with some understandable foundation [aliqua saltem ratione], for to believe is “to think with assent”⁷¹ or an assent to a proposed truth; nor “can someone believe unless the truth that he believes in be proposed to him.”⁷² Therefore, already from the start of the Church, even among believers, a kind of determinate understanding of at least some dogmas existed. Indeed, the letters of the Apostles and the first Fathers indirectly testifies to the fact that their understanding was not small but, indeed, was quite broad. There was always a kind of explicit faith and dogmatic progress did not take its origin ex nihilo but rather up on the basis of certain dogmas proposed and believed in a given, determinate sense.⁷³ Third: this threefold state likewise is itself broken up into various subphases. Thus, the state of “simple faith” admits of various degrees; the state of perfect explication has a kind of significant breadth; but, in particular, the intermediate state opens up to a vast field of gradations. Thus, for example, the dogma concerning the divinity or consubstantiality of the Son to the Father had various states at the time of the Apostolic Fathers, than in the apologetic writings of the second century, another under the influence of Origen’s teaching, after the letter of Dionysius the Roman, at the time of Arius, and up to the definition set forth by the Council of Nicaea. Certainly, the history of dogmas finds the greatest utility and importance in determining these kinds of intermediate states in their concrete and historical details.⁷⁴

II. Whether dogmatic progress is continual.—This teaching concerning the threefold state of dogmas presupposes that with the passage of time dogmas would come to be more fully explicated. And this can certainly be understood as meaning that at any given time in the Church there would be a kind of progress in the explication of revealed truths; and we can show that even in less favorable times there was at least some such progress. Nonetheless, we cannot affirm that all dogmas, at whatsoever time, can undergo continual progress. On the contrary, it is clear that certain dogmas in later eras existed less explicitly in the consciousness and teaching of the Church than add an earlier period of time. Thus, the dogma concerning papal primacy was more clearly and explicitly known at the time of Leo the great then it was at the time of the western schism, nay even up to the time of the [First] Vatican council. And Scheeben most excellently explains as follows why this was the case: although the transmission of tradition in the Church does not take place solely by human powers, but with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, nonetheless it does take place by way of acts exercised by men who are not as fully illuminated by the Holy Spirit as were the Apostles. Thus, it happens that divine tradition does not exist in the church at all times with full and ideal perfection either as regards its extension or its explication, but that this kind of perfection changes depending on the cooperation of the Church in particular times. To hold the contrary would stand in clear contradiction to historical facts; nor does it follow from the essential concept of tradition, but rather is actually excluded by it.⁷⁵ The same follows from what we said about tradition above. Thus it can happen that depending upon the intellectual and moral condition of a given period of time, a doctrine of faith of an earlier era might be less known so that formulations already made would be less explicitly known and understood, in particular such that knowledge and formulation would increase less—nay, such that the knowledge of it that was had once upon a time would in a certain manner be obscured and be latent. And this provides a resolution to the problem concerning the obscuring of tradition.

III. On the obscuring of tradition. Preliminary notes.—“Obscuring” can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it could be understood as referring to the fact that certain revealed truths that had it first existed more explicitly in the church would later on be held less explicitly or implicitly. On the other hand, it could be understood as referring to when revealed truths would be less correctly understood in a given era in the Church and explained in a sense that is foreign to what it had been, such that the doctrine prevailing in the Church would be contrary to revealed truth—that is, the truth of revelation would undergo corruption.

The corruption of revealed doctrine can itself be understood in two ways. On the one hand it would mean that the very faith of the church, the dogmas proposed by her for belief and actually believed by her, would be contrary to revealed truth and, consequently, that faith itself would be false and corrupted. On the other hand, the notion of corruption could be understood as meaning that doctrinal explication would be erroneous and contrary to revealed truth. Therefore, the following conclusions may be drawn.

IV. Conclusion I. Certain revealed truths sometimes exist explicitly in the contemporary teaching of the Church, though later on they might come to be known and admitted less explicitly or implicitly.—Thus, 1˚ the Apostles had full, explicit knowledge of all per se revealed truths, whereas thereafter it was not the case that all revealed truths were explicitly and fully known and proposed in the Church, not only in the first centuries but in those thereafter, indeed, up to the present day. 2˚ It is historically clear that in certain periods (e.g., the ninth and tenth centuries) full and explicit and actual knowledge of the faith as was had in prior centuries (e.g., the fifth and sixth centuries) did not exist in Church. Third, it is historically clear that certain revealed doctrines were at first more perfectly known and admitted then they were later on, as, for example, the primacy of the pope was known and admitted more correctly at the time of Leo the great than it was after the western schism. Fourth and finally this conclusion follows from what we said in no. 2 above.

Based on what we have said about tradition it is clear how far this kind of obscuring would be able to extend. For, at any given time, so many and this or that number of truths must exist explicitly in the tradition, indeed with enough explicit Ness that the whole revealed doctrine might be implicitly contained there in. Here again, Scheeben makes an excellent observation: first of all, all the essential and necessary truths must be witnessed to and transmitted by the church explicitly and actually, at least by the Teaching Church. Second, those truths that either are not yet explicitly known or have later on come to be obscured, which either are not known by all of the members of the church or are not admitted by them all or are even denied by some, and are not proposed and believed by others as being, simply speaking, revealed, must nonetheless exist at least implicitly in the Church’s teaching. Third, all the revealed doctrines must exist at least explicitly or implicitly in the state of a habit [habitualiter], in the ecclesiastical documents of tradition, that is, in Sacred Scripture preserved by the church and proposed as being the word of God, and in the written documents of tradition, so that, either through theologian’s labors or the judgment of the Church they could be drawn and proven therefrom.⁷⁶ Thus, already for this reason was the pseudo-synod of Pistoia’s claim concerning “the general obscuring” of the truths of revelation condemned.⁷⁷ Finally, it must be firmly held that if necessity were to require it either for the preservation of faith or the promoting of Christian life and salvation, the Church would, by the assistance of the Holy Spirit promised to her, explicitly propose the required doctrine.

V. Conclusion 2: when there is obscuring of the faith in the Church herself it cannot happen in the sense that the faith of the church, the dogmas defined by her in proposed for belief, would be contrary to revealed truth, such that the truth of faith would undergo corruption.—This conclusion immediately follows from the dogma concerning the infallibility of the Church, whether that of the Teaching Church in her teaching, or the Believing Church. Therefore, it is heretical to hold and not only the Protestant position that the church’s faith has suffered corruption but also the position held at the pseudo-synod of Pistoia, which “asserts ‘that in these later times there has been spread a general obscuring of the more important truths pertaining to religion, which are the basis of faith and of the moral teachings of Jesus Christ,’” a claim that was condemned by Pope Pius VI.⁷⁸ Therefore, in dogmas that have been solemnly defined in the actual faith of the Church, in the doctrines that the Fathers and theologians hold by way of unanimous consent to be De fide, and in those things that the Church proposes by her ordinary magisterium as being the doctrine of faith, the obscuring of revealed truth is not possible.

However, apart from dogmas themselves, in every age of the church there are teachings that she has not yet approved and which lack unanimous consent from the Fathers and theologians. This gives rise to the famous question concerning whether in these kinds of teachings revealed truths could sometimes be obscured. Thus, properly speaking, this is the question concerning errors in the explaining of revealed truths, which must be dealt with in particular. In this matter, Petavius’s teaching is the position most commonly held, and we too follow him, though with certain additional explanations and specifications.

VI. Petavius’s teaching.—Petavius,⁷⁹ first establishes the historical fact and then determines what its nature is. He briefly states the historical fact as follows: “A number of the ancient authors whom we call authorities and witnesses to our faith have written much that differs from us concerning many dogmas, though especially concerning the Trinity.” And this is certainly quite clear. For the apologists of the second century did indeed profess that Christ is God, the son of God, and the word of God. Nevertheless, they explained the Word of God as though He would proceed from the Father by the freely willed choice by God, by reason of creation, such that the Word would, as it, approach God already constituted and be the minister of God the Father. Origen held a similar teaching, and Tertullian, Novatian, and Hippolytus followed him. Thus was born the doctrine called subordinationism which, when joined with other ideas, leads to the Arian heresy, although also following the Council of Nicaea it caused the question concerning ὁμοούσιοσ and ὁμοιούσιος. The same as clear concerning the dogma of papal primacy and infallibility. For although in the Middle Ages all Catholics acknowledged that the pope was the divinely instituted head of the Church, nonetheless from the time of the Western Schism many held that councils stand above the pope, and this position was followed thereafter by those who held Gallicanism, Richerism, Febronianism, subordinating the power and infallibility of the pope to the universal Church or the body of bishops, until the [First] Vatican Council defined the fullness of supreme power and infallibility of the Pope. However, as we find in the history of dogmas the same kind of affair has taken place concerning many other dogmas. Nay, up to this very day concerning many revealed doctrines various contradicting explanations exist in the Church (for example, regarding grace, predestination and so forth). Therefore, it is a question of explaining a kind of general fact.⁸⁰

Second, Petavius determines the meaning of this fact, writing:

Very few are they who in reality dissent from the common faith, and if we ask sincere and pure Catholics, none at all. For, we have shown that in a manner of speaking some of have varied a bit… However, regarding the most important things and those things that pertain to the entire mystery taken as a whole, as they agree with each other so too they also agree with us… And holding the substance of the dogmas, they do somewhat deviate from the rule regarding certain consequences thereof… In all things, they agree in reality, and merely their manner of speaking differs… I will say further, even in those monstrous errors by which heretics have corrupted the doctrine of the Trinity and in the writings of those rejected under that name, something still appears by which the truth and consistency of the common faith and tradition are proven.

Thus, Petavius distinguishes between the substance of a dogma and the way of speaking about it or consequences thereof, so that very few or none have erred about the substance, though some have in their way of speaking or about certain consequences, though in such a way that even in such errors the substance of the dogmas still is clear. He considers the unity of God and the numerical [sic]distinction of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit as being the substance of the doctrine of the Trinity (no. 10).

The teaching of Petavius is certainly legitimate. However, the explanation that he proposes does not yet resolve the whole matter or the entire difficulty involved here. Petavius indeed does explain how the unity of God and the distinction of persons have always been believed. He does not, however, explain how the dogma of consubstantiality that was later defined was not obscured or denied in those errors. And the same holds true for other dogmas that are now defined, though they were previously denied. For indeed, we cannot hold that such dogmas had been denied only as regards their consequences or as regards one’s manner of speaking. For consubstantiality was not, properly speaking, admitted by many. St. Thomas and his contemporaries properly speaking seem to have denied the fact of the Immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. And quite certainly, the Jansenists and Gallicans properly and directly rejected the doctrine concerning the Pope’s supreme and full power and infallibility as this was defined by the [First] Vatican Council. And not only have heretics denied dogmas of this kind, but many Catholics have as well, even bishops, as is clear historically concerning dogmas like the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary and papal primacy. And, thus, we still must explain how the substance of revealed doctrine or, more precisely, the substance of dogmas afterwards defined, notwithstanding contrary errors, have been preserved and believed. Now, the response to this problem readily follows from the teaching concerning explicit and implicit faith.

VII. Conclusion 3. The theological errors that are encountered over the course of history are concerned with truths that at that time were not yet explicitly proposed and believed, but rather, were proposed and believed only implicitly. However, the substance of faith (i. e. the doctrine afterwards defined), was saved and held in those that had already been explicitly proposed and believed at that time, and therefore by implicit faith.

VIII. The first part of the conclusion properly explains the historical fact. This is easily proven. For in the case of the errors we are here discussing, they did not deny the doctrine already explicitly proposed for belief, or if they did deny it, they were not yet doctrinal errors but, properly speaking, heresies. Thus, Arius had indeed directly and properly denied the divinity of the Word and of Christ, though from that very time, even before the Council of Nicaea, he was, properly speaking, a heretic, for the divinity of Christ had been explicitly proposed for belief without any doubt, namely by the ordinary magisterium of the Church. And this was even stronger following upon the solemn definition set forth by the Council of Nicaea. Similarly, the Photinians and Sabellians were immediately condemned as heretics, since the divinity of Christ and the real distinction of the divine persons were already matters of faith. By contrast, before Nicaea, the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father was not explicitly proposed for belief, and therefore those who denied it were not heretics. Similarly, the Hypostatic Union, precisely understood as such, was not explicitly defined prior to Ephesus and Chalcedon. Therefore, although Diodorus of Tarsus and Theodorus of Mopsuestia denied it, they were considered orthodox during their lifetime. And the same is clear in the case of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. And, yes, the same must be held regarding the Gallicans. Indeed, it had been explicitly proposed for belief that that the Pope as the successor of Peter, was the head of the Church, which the Gallicans did not deny. However, the meaning of his primacy with fullness of supreme power, and therefore, the Gallicans were not heretics. Thus, in general, the theological errors [strictly so called] that exist in the Church do not deny any teaching explicitly proposed for belief.

Nevertheless, the doctrine to be afterwards defined, and in the meanwhile denied by some, had been implicitly proposed for belief—either, in general, in faith in divine revelation, or in faith in the teaching of the Church and the Sacred Scriptures, or, in particular, in some particular dogma explicitly believed in. Thus, the consubstantiality of the Word was implicitly held through faith in His divinity and the Pope’s fullness of power was acknowledged in the fact that he is the head of the Church or in the related texts of Sacred Scripture. Therefore, properly speaking, theological errors are concerned with the explicitation of implicit doctrine.

In this kind of doctrinal explanation of Implicit doctrine errors took place quite easily, indeed with a kind of necessity. For when theologians explain the doctrine of faith, they do not enjoy the infallibility that the Pope has in declaring definitions ex cathedra. Moreover, various errors are more than sufficiently explained by the objective difficulty and loftiness of the mysteries as well as by the imperfect subjective preparation of teachers. Nor is the time of antiquity to be excluded from this universal law. On the contrary, in the first explanation of the mysteries, indeed even that concerning the greatest (such as the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation) much more easily and necessarily did errors occur. Hence, it is no wonder that the first interpreters of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation did not immediately or always explain these mysteries correctly. And the same can be found through the course of the ages as regards all doctrines. For up to our own day, how numerous have been the disputes that have arisen concerning many dogmas!

Finally, three things must be noted concerning such erroneous explanations. First, they were doctrinal explanations, not infrequently less so simply statements of doctrine than attempts at explanation or hypotheses. Second, they were not, properly speaking, the doctrines of the Church, but, rather, were determinate teachings of particular teachers or of a particular school or in a particular region. Thus, the contemporary teachings disputed among the schools cannot, properly speaking, be called the doctrines of the Church. Nor were such teachings common to all; rather, one thinker explained the matter in one way, and another in another. Indeed, it was regularly the case that such teachings found themselves to be in opposition against each other. Thirdly, there was certainly no approval on the part of the teaching Church, which, to the contrary, soon would challenge the erroneous explanation.

Thus, in conclusion, a given obscuring of faith or errors concerning revealed truths may occur in the Church, even to the point of the denial of the revealed truth or of dogma that would be defined thereafter.⁸¹ Therefore, Franzelin excellently expresses the point thus: “Certain revealed truths may at times be obscured, but never in such a way that an opposing and negative consensus would prevail against them,”⁸² which is easily seen by considering the history of dogmas.

IX. The other part of the conclusion is also easily proven, or rather explained, namely that, as to its substance, the truth of faith was preserved and held in those things that were explicitly believed. For although some might explain given revealed doctrines less correctly (nay, even, properly speaking deny them), nonetheless they held and believed them implicitly, namely in those that they believed explicitly.

This can take place in two ways. First, generally they would be held in one’s general faith in God who reveals and in the Church’s doctrine. For a believer has explicit faith in the revealing God, or in the truth of the whole revelation. In the same way, every Catholic explicitly believes that the Church’s faith is true. And in such explicit faith, generally speaking, albeit implicitly, he believes all revealed truth, the Church’s entire faith, and in particular, all that the Church has defined, whether in the past or the future. Thus, all Catholics who err concerning a given doctrine nonetheless implicitly believe it and thence are saved. Second, as regards particular doctrines themselves [particulariter], erring Catholics moreover implicitly believed the revealed doctrine in another given dogma that they explicitly believe, one that implicitly contains the doctrine that they erroneously deny. Thus, Catholics who deny the consubstantiality of the Word implicitly believed in this dogma through their explicit faith in the divinity of the Word. When St. Thomas denied the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, he believed it through his faith in her divine motherhood or in his faith in her supreme holiness; and by believing that the Roman Pontiff was the divinely appointed head of the entire Church, the Gallicans implicitly believed that he was above the authority of councils, even though they explicitly denied it!

For those erroneous doctrines were put forward in order to explicate and determine certain dogmas of faith which were explicitly held. In this explicit faith one also held an implicit doctrine to be defined later on in the future. If the proposed explication was less appropriate or correct, one always remained intent on holding the dogma itself and not departing from its true meaning, even if perhaps the proposed explication de facto denied the dogma itself. But if some persistently held to a false explication of dogma to the point of denying the presupposed dogma (e.g., as the Arians did, even to the point of denying Christ’s divinity), then such persons by that very fact became heretics and were thus condemned.⁸³ But, as for others, there we find something that is often observed in human life, when a person may very well hold to a certain principle, even if he holds a false explication or consequences contrary to that principle.

And so Petavius rightly observes that even in the very opinions of the heretics something of the common faith appeared, as when the Arians admitted that Christ was the Incarnate Son or Word of God, the Savior, and so forth, or when the Gallicans admitted that the Pope was the head of the Church, and so on in other cases too. For the main error of Protestant, rationalist, and modernist historians (and even others as well), is that they do not pay attention to the fact that various doctrines are regularly proposed to explain determinate, presupposed doctrines of faith. According to them, the development of dogmas arose almost ex nihilo, with new ideas rushing in from all sides and coming to be raised to the dignity of dogmas. However, according to the historical truth, particular doctrines are explanations of the common, presupposed faith [of the Church].⁸⁴

X. From this, it is likewise clear in what sense the substance of faith was preserved in the errors themselves. For it was not only a certain general principle held, in which the dogma to be defined afterwards was in some way contained (namely, as it were, only needing to be derived from it by development and deduction), but at the same time some determinate doctrine was explicitly held, in which the denied truth or future dogma was implicitly contained and believed. Hence, the very doctrine that was denied by the error in question was held by implicit faith, and the substance of faith which is asserted to be saved is the very dogma defined afterwards— only, it was held implicitly, not explicitly.

XI. Conclusion. Therefore, the Catholic teaching concerning the obscuring of revealed truths represents a kind of middle path between two extremes. Indeed, it does not admit that the revealed doctrine has been changed or corrupted through such evolution, as is held by Protestants, Modernists, and those who agree with the claims of the Pseudo-Council of Pistoia [Pistorienses]. However, it likewise does not affirm that the development of the faith always proceeded along a “normal” or straight path, as Bonwetsch attributes to us.⁸⁵ Instead, the Catholic position admits that various errors did take place, though without them ever prevailing in the Church, while the truth of the faith was corrupted in such heresies. This is why the Fathers, theologians of every period, and especially the authority of the Church have so frequently lamented the upsurging of errors and have condemned so many of them. Thus, Pope St. Leo the Great laments, “Many people’s understanding was clouded… concerning the mystery of the Lord’s Incarnation.”⁸⁶ And Gregory of Valencia held that, “With infallible authority the Church has plucked out, as though from the darkness, certain doctrines which at one time, owing to men’s negligence or impudence and perversity of character, had been hidden and perhaps still lay hidden in the Church.”⁸⁷ Juan de Lugo held the same.⁸⁸ And John of St. Thomas holds, as it were, in the name of all, that in more recent times, on the occasion of the uprising of heresy and the refutation thereof, many things have come to be known in particular fashion and explicitly, things that were still hidden from the learned men who came before us.⁸⁹ Would that all the theological errors of our own days soon be eradicated!

Article 15: The Causes of Dogmatic Progress

In light of what we have said, the causes of dogmatic progress can easily be determined (namely, as regards its efficient, final, material, and formal causes).⁹⁰

I. The primary cause of dogmatic progress is the Holy Spirit.—When the Incarnate Word departed from this earth after manifesting the Father, He abandoned neither the Apostles nor the revealed doctrine, but instead, sent the Holy Spirit, as He had foretold: “When that Spirit of truth comes, He will teach you all truth... He will glorify me, because He will receive from me and declare it to you” (John 16: 13–14). Thus, just as in the Old Testament the prophets spoke under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in order to complete and explain revelation, so too in the New Testament, following upon the fullness of revelation, the same Holy Spirit assists the Church in explaining the revealed truths by His illumination and continued urging. For since the revealed truth is a divine reality and property, he communicated the Holy Spirit to men, in order to protect this reality that belongs to him and to make it bear fruit. Thus, the revealed truth, in the same light from which the truth had proceeded, by working in the minds of men, continues on, is explained, and develops, so that end of the revelation be obtained to the fullest. Thus, the illustrious Schäzler correctly notes the fundamental difference between the Catholic and Protestant concepts of the interpretation of revealed truths, namely, that according to Catholic teaching, God Himself explicates revelation through an instrument that He himself has instituted, whereas, according to Protestants, revelation remains a more or less hidden treasure, left to the research of human reason.⁹¹

II. The second and proximate efficient cause is the Teaching Church.—Although God is the first moving cause in dogmatic progress, He nevertheless works through secondary causes, among which the Teaching Church holds the first place. For when dogmas are properly formed through an authoritative statement and definitive explanation by the ecclesiastical magisterium, then neither by new revelation nor by inspiration, but by a judgment properly exercised by the Church, though with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the proximate and proper cause of dogmatic progress is the teaching Church,⁹² namely, the universal Teaching Church, the Councils, and the Pope, to all of whom infallibility has been promised for this purpose. In a special way, the Pope is the cause of dogmatic progress. This is historically obvious.

In fact, all the most important questions were immediately or mediately determined and resolved by the Popes, so that the history of dogmas would, properly speaking, be a history of the Papal magisterium.⁹³ In the questions concerning the Most Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, the councils approved the doctrine of the Popes. The teaching of St. Augustine concerning original sin, grace, and predestination was definitively sanctioned by the Popes. As regards the question of primacy, the part played by the Apostolic See is clear. The same is clear, however, as regards other particular dogmas. For the function of the Roman Pontiff consists not only in attending to the preaching of the Gospel, but even more so to the “holy safe-keeping and faithful exposition” of the revealed truth, and such guarding and exposition by its very nature involves dogmatic progress. Now, that “holy safe-keeping” is included both the continuous, unchanged proposing of the revealed truths, in the same sense and the same judgment, as well as the condemnation of any error opposed to it, as well as the approval and defining of the doctrine of truth. And “faithful interpretation and exposition” expressly designates the explanation of what has been revealed, whether by way of simple clarification, dogmatic approval, or the definition of dogmatic formulas. In this matter, if one pays close attention to the history of dogmas, one will hardly fail to realize that the Popes in general not only approved doctrines that had already been elaborated earlier, but, furthermore, positively and as part of their own office gave (or at least perfected) a definite resolutions of matters and formulations. Indeed, sometimes the Roman See recalls anew a given doctrine that has been, as it were, latently hidden in the Church. Thus, for example, Pius X’s decree concerning daily communion (although this is not a question of dogmatic definition) recalls and declares the decree of the Council of Trent; similarly, the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists applies the doctrine of the [First] Vatican Council. “Now this charism of truth and of never-failing faith was conferred upon Peter and his successors in this (Roman) chair in order that they might perform their supreme office for the salvation of all; that by them the whole flock of Christ might be kept away from the poisonous bait of error and be nourished by the food of heavenly doctrine; that, the occasion of schism being removed, the whole Church might be preserved as one and, resting on her foundation, might stand firm against the gates of hell.”⁹⁴

However, the Church brings about dogmatic progress not only through definitions, condemnations, or declarations by the extraordinary magisterium, but also through the preaching, instruction, explanation, and application of the faith in the exercise of the ordinary magisterium. Moreover, although the power of magisterium properly belongs to the bishops alone, nevertheless, the bishops work through the mediation of other instruments of the Church, especially through theologians, inasmuch as they develop theological doctrine in accord with the Church’s ordering, instruction, and direction. Hence, also, her entire control over theological studies influences dogmatic progress. Finally, the act by which the Church expresses a certain dogma presupposes many preparatory acts, as can be seen in the history of almost all dogmas.⁹⁵

III. The dispositive cause of dogmatic progress is the Church Fathers, Doctors of the Church, theologians, and also enlightened believers. Because the Church is a society, she expresses dogmas by means of a social organism, i. e. through the cooperation of head and members. Such cooperation can be seen with particular clarity in the Fathers, Doctors, and theologians, for the Holy Spirit promised to the Church also enlightens teachers and theologians, and even faithful of good will. However, this influence by the Holy Spirit over the Fathers and theologians is only ministerial, instrumental, and preparatory: ministerial because, as ministers of the Church and for the good of the Church, the Fathers and theologians explain revealed doctrine; instrumental, because they receive doctrine, authority, and enlightenment through the Church’s own mediation Church; preparatory, because the teaching of the Fathers and theologians does not create or establish dogma, except insofar as it involves the approval and definition of the Church. Hence the Fathers and theologians are properly called witnesses of doctrine of the teaching and believing Church. Nonetheless, their work exercises a real and proper causality in dogmatic progress, inasmuch as they prepare the material to be defined, fashion formulas to be defined, and in a way urge the ecclesiastical authority to a definition. Thus, in point of fact, no dogma has been defined unless the Fathers or the theologians have dispositively prepared and determined the doctrine and formula to be defined (thus giving the matter its final previous disposition).⁹⁶

In fact, the history of dogmas shows bears witness to such an effective influence exercised by the Fathers and theologians on the development of dogmas that the history of dogmas seems to be nothing more than the history of the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians. And the main work of historians consists in investigating the doctrine of the Fathers.

However, three facts must be noted.⁹⁷

First, the Fathers and theologians, on occasion of heresies and other errors, provided a greater explanation and judgement concerning a particular doctrine, fashioned new formulas to be set in opposition to false explanations, and thereby prepared for the definitive explication of the fundamental dogmas and authoritative condemnations of heresies. Thus, the Greek Fathers above all explained the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation, as contained in the Apostle’s Creed. On the occasion of the Pelagian heresy, St. Augustine determined and explicated the doctrine of tradition and Sacred Scripture concerning the necessity and gratuity of grace and also concerning original sin. The theologians of the Middle Ages prepared, against the Greeks,⁹⁸ the definition of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son and similarly explicated what would become the dogmas related to transubstantiation, the fact that the soul is the form of the body, and the beatific vision. On the occasion of the heresy of Protestantism, post-Tridentine theologians explicated the doctrines concerning the Church, the Pope, and faith itself. Against Rationalism, they set forth the doctrines of faith and reason, revelation, and the supernatural order. And against Materialism, they explicated the dogmas concerning the existence and knowability of God the Creator, so that the definitions of the [First] Vatican Council might truly be the fruit and approval of the labors exercised by scholastic theologians.

Second, both the Fathers and theologians out of their desire to exposit and determine the doctrine of the faith, lest they should be [solely] aroused to this by heresies, even prepared for the condemnation of future heresies and errors, such as Protestantism, Materialism, Pantheism, Idealism, Rationalism, and even Gallicanism and Febronianism.

Thirdly and additionally, theologians resolved controversial questions raised by Catholics, doing so in such a way that they would become ripe for definition, such as questions concerning: the number of sacraments, the sacramental character, the intention required in the administration of the sacraments, the effect of absolution, the sufficiency of attrition in confession, the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the Pope’s infallibility and fullness of power.

Fourthly, even without intervening controversy theologians have explained certain points of Christian doctrine in such a way that either the definition came later on (such as the teaching of St. Anselm concerning the satisfaction of Christ) or so that everything would be ready at hand for definition, if necessity were to urge it or expediency suggest it, as is clear for a great number of the teachings held by scholastic theologians.

IV. The instrumental cause of dogmatic progress is human reason, enlightened by faith.⁹⁹—The explication of revealed truths takes place by the exercise of men’s intellects (and wills). For the Church, by means of human reason, grasps and determines the sense of revealed doctrines, explains their implicit senses, explains their implicit meanings, and expresses traditional doctrines in new formulas, whether this is done through a kind of direct intuition or through logical operations, especially syllogistic ones, as we set forth earlier in articles 7 and 11.

Thus, the intellectual powers of the Church are the instrumental causes of dogmatic progress. This, however, must be understood as referring to reason that is enlightened by faith,¹⁰⁰ and above all as reason is illuminated by the gifts of the Holy Spirit, is directed by the Church’s magisterium, and works under the command of a truly good will. Hence there will be greater or lesser dogmatic progress in the Church to the degree that human reason is more or less subject to the Church’s magisterium and the inspirations of the Holy Spirit.¹⁰¹ By contrast, among those who have fallen away from the Church through heresy or schism, we see no progress in knowing revealed truths but, rather, there find a darkening and corruption of the faith, as one sees among the Greeks and Protestants.¹⁰² Therefore, dogmatic progress depends both on illumination by God, whose Spirit breathes wherever and whenever He wills, and on the free cooperation of men.

Finally, the causality of human reason is properly speaking instrumental. This is sufficiently clear from what we said concerning the notion of dogma, the explication of revelation, and especially concerning dogmatic formulas. For human reason does not add a new objective doctrine to the deposit of faith but, rather, solely explicates, formulates, and delineates revealed doctrine or even draws conclusions therefrom. Therefore, the doctrines that reason uses to explain and formulate revealed truth, properly speaking, have the character of being a medium or instrument. Nevertheless, this is a true kind of causality. For although human reason is not permitted to add anything to the deposit of faith, it nevertheless truly and effectively exercises an influence upon the explication of the deposit of faith. And thus, human reason is really and truly the instrumental cause of dogmatic progress. The history of dogmatic development is explained, as much as is possible, from this causality.

Indeed, it follows that dogmatic development is determined not only by the general laws of human knowledge but also by the historical conditions of times, nations, and even humanity itself. Therefore, the explication of revealed truths not only takes place successively, but it also is reminiscent of the spirit and intellectual conditions of those whose work it is. Thus, the definitions of the early Councils savor of the Greek spirit, both as regards the matter defined and the way that these truths are formulated; the teaching of St. Augustine no less betrays a Latin mentality; the canons of the Council of Trent are full of scholastic formulas; and, similarly, the [First] Vatican Council manifests the spirit of more recent theology. Nor is the use and influence of reason in dogmatic progress confined to philosophy or theology alone, but in general, whatever has been developed by reason or belongs to its culture can (and in general does) exercise an influence on dogmatic development: for example, popular ideas, the moral condition [of the era], the character of the language (terminology) and even the teachings and worship of other religions. However, as we have said, all of this exercises its influence exclusively as means and instruments of revelation.¹⁰³ This is especially evident in regard to heresies.

V. Heresies are the occasional cause of dogmas.— Among the elaborated works of reason that have had an influence on the development of dogmas, we must, without a doubt, also number hereses (either the heretical doctrines themselves or the whole activity of heretics). Clearly, however, the heresies themselves are not the positive and direct cause of dogmatic progress, for as far as they are concerned, they do not produce new dogmas, nor do they advance the explication of revealed truths. On the contrary, heretics themselves pervert or hinder the explication of revealed truth. Nonetheless, it would be ridiculous to deny heresies all true causality in the development of dogmas, for they are, properly speaking, the occasional causes for most definitions, as Arianism was the cause for the definition of the consubstantiality of the Word, Nestorianism and Monophysitism for the dogma of the Hypostatic Union in the two of natures of Christ, Pelagianism for the dogmas of grace and original sin, Donatism for the dogmas concerning the Church and of the Sacraments, Protestantism for the definitions set forth by the Council of Trent, Rationalism and Liberalism for the dogmas articulated by the [First] Vatican Council, and so forth. St. Augustine provides an excellent description for how this causality is exercised: “So that many (articles of faith) might be defended against (heretics), might be more thoroughly explained and understood greater clarity and preached with greater urgency, and the question raised by adversaries might provide opportunity for learning.”¹⁰⁴

For the heretics arouse and oblige the Church to explicitly propose, defend, and define revealed doctrines, as St. Thomas says: “Because twisted men pervert the Apostolic teaching and other doctrines and scriptures to their own ruin, therefore, the explanation of the faith against the uprising of errors was necessary with the passing of time.”¹⁰⁵ Thus, heresies are, properly speaking, the motive for applying the Church’s dogmatic authority; they determine the material to be defined and likewise the direction of the development of dogmas. However, the active force for bringing forth dogmas and the explication of revealed truths and dogmas stands on the side of the Church.¹⁰⁶ Heretics bring about dogmas just as the persecutors of the Church made martyrs or as in the World War [bello europeo] the declaration of war [by the Central powers] was the cause of the [Allied] victory.

VI. Conclusion: As regards the efficient cause of dogmatic progress, the primary cause is the Holy Spirit, through His motion and assistance; the secondary and proximate cause is the Teaching Church, principally the Pope; the Fathers, Doctors, and theologians are the preparatory or disposing causes, as also, indeed, is the piety of the faithful; the instrumental cause is human reason, enlightened by faith; finally, the heresies are an the occasions stirring up such progress.

VII. The laws of dogmatic progress.—Based on what has been determined concerning the efficient causes of dogmatic progress, its laws follow by way of corollary. The most general law is: Dogmatic progress takes place through the cooperation of God and men.¹⁰⁷ Such a law corresponds to the universal order of salvation, according to which God leads men to acquire supernatural goods by means of human cooperation, so that it is fit both to God and to man: something that should greatly stir up in men the desire to tirelessly devote themselves to the study of theology.¹⁰⁸

According to this most general law, dogmatic progress is subject to the general laws of the order of grace and of human activity. As for the supernatural order, dogmatic progress depends on the general laws of the distribution of grace (illumination, antecedent grace, consequent grace, etc.) and the laws of the causality of grace; and its particular law is found in the Holy Spirit’s promised assistance in preserving, proposing, explaining, and defending the deposit of faith. As far as human activity is concerned, dogmatic progress is subject to the general laws of human knowledge, with the exception of fallibility in preserving and defining the deposit of faith, on account of the Holy Spirit’s assistance. Hence it is not necessary to inquire into special laws for dogmatic progress, but to apply the common laws of human knowledge, obviously, however, as applied to the unique object that is divine revelation. In addition to these laws, properly so called, whether general or particular, we can also establish laws improperly so called of dogmatic development or even historical laws thereof. These kinds of laws must be taken from the history of dogmas, so that dogmatic development sometimes depends on heresies, sometimes is the fruit of controversies among theologians or results from the requirements of the Christian life, and so forth.¹⁰⁹ However, they cannot, properly speaking, be called laws, because instead they express certain general facts of dogmatic progress . However, the laws, properly so-called, follow the nature of the causes and dogmatic progress.

Hence, at the same time, deeper theological explanation of both divine and human causality in dogmatic development varies, depending on different explanations offered concerning how divine causality is exercised upon human the understanding and will, and also depending on the different concepts of first (or even principal) causality and the second (and instrumental) causality. According to St. Thomas’s teaching concerning the perfect subordination of a second cause under the first cause (and likewise of an instrumental cause under the principal cause) the whole effect comes from both causes. Thus, the whole development of dogmas is both from the Church and from God, though from the Church by virtue of the power communicated to her by God. Thus, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, the development of dogmas fully and completely constitutes a human and historical fact, as will be explained in more detail below (a. 17). According to the Molinist system, part of the dogmatic evolution would be the effect of God and part the effect of men.

VIII. Final or motive causes. Generally speaking, there are two motives involved dogmatic progress: the honor of God and the salvation of souls. Thus God Himself intends a greater manifestation of the divine truth, fuller knowledge of God or of the divine mysteries, and the salvation of men. For the sake of the salvation of men, He successively explains revelation, “Just as how a teacher who knows his entire art does not immediately deliver it to the pupil from the start (for the latter could not grasp it yet) but, instead, does so step-by-step, lowering himself to his student’s capacity, so too for this reason have men have advanced in the knowledge of the faith through the passing of the ages.”¹¹⁰ For men would not have been able to bear revelation if from the start it had been proposed in fully explicated form. Similarly, the Church defined the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary “For the honor of the Holy and Indivisible Trinity, for the adornment and ornament of the God-bearing Virgin, for the exaltation of the Catholic faith, and for the increase of the Christian religion,”¹¹¹ and defined Papal infallibility “to the glory of God our Savior, the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and the salvation of the Christian people”¹¹²: this is similarly the case in other definitions. And similar such words can be found in other definitions as well.

In particular, the following motives are noted: a) The preservation of the purity of the faith. For through heresy and unbelief the work of God would be rendered void and ineffective; thus, the Popes in particular defended the purity of the faith with the utmost zeal and constancy in the midst of every danger against the faith, not out of self-love or from a desire to dominate but, rather, in order to satisfy a weighty obligation.¹¹³

b) The perfection of divine worship. Worship is the practical application and execution of what we believe; hence a mutual connection exists between the explication of worship and of faith itself. Sometimes the development of faith precedes the perfection of worship, and sometimes practice precedes the development of faith.—For the perfection of worship either presupposes or bears with itself a kind of explication of doctrine, just as, on the other hand, the development of faith promotes the explication of worship. Since Christian worship is primarily sacramental, the perfection of worship had a particular, though not exclusive, influence on the explication of sacramental doctrine. Thus, there arose questions concerning the baptism by heretics, the pardonability of capital sins, and so forth, up to the decree concerning daily communion. Undoubtedly, the needs of worship were a most effective stimulus for the explicating of faith, both because most things concerning worship were only implicitly revealed and, also, because the needs of worship were practical and subject to sense experience. However, modernists¹¹⁴ and more recent Protestants wrongly claim that the primitive faith was altered or disfigured through forms of worship borrowed from other religions or introduced solely on account of certain subjective needs, for the whole of the dogmatic explication that took place on account of [the Church’s] worship is only the determination of the pre-existing faith.

c) The execution of the duties and power of the Church hierarchy.—Since the Church is divinely instituted to provide for the salvation of souls, it must necessarily exercise its duty and apply the power given to it. And, once again, this cannot be done without her explicating the Church’s doctrine. However, in such explication, practice necessarily had to come first in some way. That is, the Church first had to explain herself in practice, before the doctrine became more definite. For no definite doctrine concerning General Councils could exist before such Councils had taken place. Similarly, the explicit doctrine concerning Papal power and infallibility presupposes the effective exercise of such power and infallible magisterium. And this explains the history of dogmas concerning the Church and especially concerning the Pope. The Popes did not successively exercise their power out of a desire to dominate or to imitate the Roman Empire, but rather, did so in obedience to the command of Christ, fulfilling the duty entrusted to them. By no means did the theological and dogmatic doctrine sanction a purely historical fact as being divinely instituted, but instead, recognized the power and action of the Pope as being the legitimate execution of the divine command, and in the light of the facts, better recognized the divine command itself, the nature of Papal primacy. Nor can it be surprising that, from the early days of the Church to the present day, the explication of the dogma concerning the power of the hierarchy and Papal primacy has aroused so many difficulties and controversies, for ecclesiastical dogma presents difficulties not only to the intellect, but also to the will, since the will does not gladly submit to the governance of others over one’s intimate affairs.

d.) The promotion of Christian holiness.—The proper end of revelation is not only that might come to believe but, moreover, that it might be a path that guides man to salvation; hence the explanation of reveled truths must, in a special way, serve in the promoting of the Christian life, especially since Christian holiness is easily endangered by erroneous doctrines. Therefore, this kind of motivation will promote in particular the development of moral doctrine, such as that concerning religion, duties, virtues and sins, states of life—e. g. concerning marriage—the conditions for receiving the sacraments, and similarly will motivate the resolving of moral questions caused by new economic, political, social conditions or by the practical customs of life. Thus, you have a whole series of declarations by the Church, beginning with decrees of the “council” of Jerusalem up to the recent Papal encyclicals. For although the moral life depends mainly on good will or intention, on zeal and constancy, yet it is no less the case that certain, true, and objective norms are required, the knowledge of which is indispensable, especially for the ecclesiastical community. Even the smallest mistake can introduce the greatest danger to holiness and morality. How such footsteps should frighten us! By contrast, a more perfect explanation of revealed doctrine paves a safer and easier way for holiness, and thus provides for greater tranquility of souls. Indeed, “holy simplicity” is good, but according to the ordinary laws [of human existence] only those who have more perfect knowledge of the ways and means of sanctification will reach a loftier perfection.¹¹⁵ Therefore, by reason and merit of a fuller explication of revealed doctrine, the faithful today are able to carry on the work of salvation and sanctification more easily and more securely—as in fact can be seen in the lives of the saints.¹¹⁶

e. Finally, this very progress in knowledge of revealed truths constitutes an exceptionally important spiritual good, not at all to be neglected by the Church. Indeed, no few people, even among Catholics—nay, even among theologians—abhor the idea of new dogmas. However, they are wrong in this estimation. Indeed, in the nature of dogmatic definitions two things must be considered: 1˚, the obligation of faith imposed; 2˚ the explanation of revelation or the progress of faith and knowledge of revealed truths. Indeed, those who abhor the idea of new definitions seem to consider them only as involving a new obligation. However, the obligation to profess faith is imposed precisely to perfect one’s understanding and to direct and advance man along the way of salvation. If these ends are kept in mind, then dogmas will appear not so much as being heavy burdens as, rather, precious gifts. Just as new scientific doctrines, conclusions, and indeed all such progress is received with the applause of all, so too in matters of faith, that greatest form of progress which is found in dogmatic definitions can hardly be appreciated as much as it deserves. Finally, I do not see why those who have true faith in God and profess the infallibility of the Pope should abhor the idea of new definitions. Nevertheless, the Church, sparing the weakness of the majority, does not define new dogmas without necessity or great benefit.

IX. Conclusion—Therefore, the motives for promoting dogmatic progress are clearly and essentially religious, namely, so that revealed religion might be preserved, perfected, and bear fruit. For the deposit of faith was not entrusted to the Church as a talent to be wrapped up and hidden in a cloth, but rather, as a seed to be sown and a light to be shone, so that all might benefit from it. Therefore Leo XIII rightly teaches: “To reject dogma is simply to deny Christianity.”¹¹⁷ Thus, guided by these reasons, the Church has condemned errors, resolved doubts, promoted explication, and defined dogmas by her own authority. Therefore, the most important concern for the salvation of souls was the cause of most of the definitions, i. e. the faithfulness of the Church in the execution of the divine mandate: “Teach them to observe all that I have commanded you” (Matthew 28:20). And the words of Jeremiah’s Lamentations cannot be applied to the Church: “Little ones ask for bread, and there is no one to break it for them” (Lamentations 4:4).

X. The formal cause of dogmatic development is the authority and the approval of the Church’s infallible magisterium.— The formal cause of dogmatic development is easily known based on the nature of dogmas themselves. For since dogmas are formally constituted by the definitions and propositions set forth by the ecclesiastical magisterium, the very coming-into-being of dogmas also formally depends on the Church’s magisterium, whose ultimate act is that of setting forth dogmatic definitions. Thus, a given doctrine must be considered to have progressed through the course of dogmatic development to the same extent that it has been approved by ecclesiastical authority. Thus, a given doctrine may indeed be very clearly understood in terms of scientific speculation while still being far from the point of definition, and by contrast, another doctrine might be close to a definition without having received sufficiently scientific explanation. Therefore, the historian of dogmas will pay particular attention to the Church’s declarations, since they indicate the various stages in the development of dogma.

XI. The revealed truths themselves are the material cause of dogmatic development.—The material of dogmatic progress is quite clearly those doctrines that can constitute it as explained, formulated, and defined dogmas. All the revealed doctrines, and indeed only them, are what can constitute this body of truths. However, other doctrines that exercise an influence on the development of dogmas are considered, rather, as being in the line of a kind of efficient causality [potius ut agentia quadam considerantur]. Revealed truths have the character of being the matter of such progress insofar as dogmas are potentially contained in these truths, or insofar as dogmas are fashioned from revealed truths.¹¹⁸

XII. Conclusion.—From what has been said, it is clear that dogmatic progress is extremely complex, even as regards its causes. Hence, for the history of dogmas, there evidently follows the duty to consider its individual causes, at least to the degree that this is possible. In our own days, many historians consider mainly, indeed almost exclusively, the influence of ideas that are extraneous to revelation, such as the influence of contemporary philosophy, pagan religions, or even Judaism. Although such matters do involve true objects of the history of dogmas, they are, nonetheless, certainly neither the main nor the only objects thereof, and therefore, such a restricted outlook makes it hardly possible for one to render a definitive and correct judgment concerning dogmatic progress.¹¹⁹

Article Sixteen: Analogies Used to Describe Dogmatic Progress ¹²⁰

I. Dogmatic progress is certainly a sui generis process: Neither in nature nor in history is there some other process that is equivalent or similar in all respects to what takes place in dogmatic progress. Nonetheless, from a variety of perspectives it does bear an analogy to other processes. In other words, it shares something similar to them, inasmuch as something common is found, mutatis mutandis, in dogmatic progress and in other similar processes.¹²¹ Therefore, having determined the specific [propria] nature of dogmatic progress, we must make use of analogies, for such analogies are of great utility, since they further illuminate the nature of dogmatic progress. However, when we use them, we must proceed with caution: 1˚ we must take care to not overemphasize the likeness involved and also must avoid neglecting what makes dogmatic progress specifically distinct (for no few errors concerning the nature dogmatic progress have taken their origin from lack of care on these points); 2˚ analogies of this kind must¹²² be based on the theological and historical concept of the development of dogmas, and be used to illuminate it, not vice versa—for less rightly do many insist, almost exclusively, on bringing to bear such analogies¹²³ and on that basis determine the doctrine of dogmatic development.

II. The best-known analogy for dogmatic development is found in Vincent of Lerins’s first Commonitorium. First, he distinguishes between change and progress, admitting only progress in the knowledge of Christian doctrine:¹²⁴

But perhaps someone will say: “Therefore, there will be no religious progress in Christ’s Church?” Let there be great and abundant progress... But let it take place in such a way that such faith would truly progress, not suffer alteration. For progress requires that each thing be enlarged into itself, whereas alteration involves on thing being transformed into another. Therefore, understanding, knowledge, and wisdom must grow and progress with vigor both individually and in all, both for in particular persons and in the whole Church—through the ages and the centuries—though in its own kind, that is, in the same dogma, in the same meaning, and in the same judgment.¹²⁵

Second, Vincent explains this kind of progress by means of an analogy to the development of bodily beings and seeds:

The growth of religion in the soul is akin to bodily growth, which remains the same even though it is developed and attains its full size through the course of years. There is a wide difference between the flower of youth and the maturity of age; nonetheless, they who were once young are still the same now that they have become old, such that his nature and his person both remain one and the same even though his stature and outward form has changed. An infant’s limbs are small, a young man's large, yet the infant and the young man are the same. Men when full grown have the same number of joints that they had when children; and if there be any to which maturer age has given birth these were already present in potency [in seminis], so that in older age nothing new is produced in them which was not already latent in them when they were children… But if the human form [species] were changed into some shape belonging to another genus of beings, or at any rate, if the number of its limbs were increased or diminished, the result would be that the whole body would perish, become a monstrosity, or at the least surely be weakened.

Thus Christian doctrine should follow these same laws of progress, so as to be solidified through the years, enlarged over the course of time, refined by age, and yet remain uncorrupted and intact, complete and perfect in all the measurement of its parts, and, so to speak, in all its proper members and senses, admitting no exchange, no wasting what is distinctly proper to it, and no variation in its definition…

There might be change in appearance or form, but the nature of each kind remains the same…

Therefore, whatever has been sown by the fidelity of the Fathers in this husbandry of God’s Church, this same thing should be cultivated and cared for by the industry of their children, this same thing should flourish and ripen, and this same thing should advance and press onward to perfection. For it is right that, with the passage of time, those ancient doctrines of heavenly philosophy should be cared for, smoothed, and polished. But, it would be wrong for them to be changed, maimed, or mutilated. They may receive proof, illumination, and definiteness; however, they must retain their completeness, integrity, and characteristic properties.¹²⁶

This classical analogy from Vincent of Lérins is primarily concerned with the substantial stability of revelation in the midst of dogmatic explication, and in this sense in particular has it been received by Catholic theology.¹²⁷ However, it indicates the nature of dogmatic progress only in a very vague way.¹²⁸ Hence, later theologians strove to determine more closely the analogy made to the growth of bodies and seeds.

III. John Henry Newman, while he was still a Protestant (though he later was a Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church [S. R. E.]), ingeniously made use of Vincent of Lérins’ analogy in order to determine the distinction between progress and corruption of Christian doctrine.¹²⁹ In the development of any organism, he says, the ultimate parts and proportions correspond to its original parts and proportions, even if great alteration takes place in between; by contrast, in organic corruption, the organism is dissolved into its parts, such that its unity is destroyed. According to this analogy, the corruption of ideas tends toward the dissolution of complex of ideas, the destruction of the unifying type, the removal of the vital principle, and the driving out of the original ideas by ones that are opposed to them. By contrast, the signs of true progress are: the preservation of the original type or idea, the continuity of principles, assimilative power in relation to other ideas, a kind of anticipation of later doctrine, logical connection, consonance of new things with old ones, and finally, historical continuity. Finally, he proves that this kind of progress is found in the development of Catholic doctrine.

Therefore, according to Newman, dogmatic progress has an analogy to the development of ideas, and the development of ideas to organic development. Now, with this explanation Newman certainly opened a new way for the teaching concerning the development of dogmas, although his proposed explanation falls short in many respects because his presupposed theory of knowledge. Newman does not, properly speaking, intend to explain the unique nature of the development of the Church’s dogmas, but instead wishes to show that the progress of Catholic doctrine is true and legitimate. Therefore, in the first chapter he shows, in general fashion, the need for ideas to develop; thereafter, he establishes the laws of such development and applies them to Catholic doctrine. In any case, the modernists unjustly exploited for their own ends the teaching that he set forth.¹³⁰

IV. Thus, Ambroise Gardeil judges Vincent’s analogy as follows:

This beautiful analogy has two undeniable merits. First, it takes into account the preponderant role played by the intimate and exterior divine influence upon the development of an essentially supernatural seed, which is why it is perfectly Catholic. Secondly, it provides a splendid illustration of the dual character of this process, which involves both novelty and fundamental identity in the midst of the successive movements involved in the objective affirmation of the revealed Truth. The notes that it provides for discerning authentic development are real and telling.¹³¹

V. Bernard Allo¹³² proposes, in place of the analogy of a seed, that of leaven. For Christian doctrine, he says, only progressed materially and accidentally, inasmuch as it was already fully and actually in the minds of the Apostles,¹³³ only to be formulated, defended, given systematic form, and thereafter applied.¹³⁴ Now, the comparison of Christian doctrine to leaven is excellent, inasmuch as this doctrine assimilated to itself human minds, manners, teachings, and institutions. Hence, in the end, he brings forward the analogy of a chemical agent.¹³⁵ As is clear from the context, Allo defends and illuminates the substantial stability of the Christian faith (against Loisy and Harnack); however, the analogy of leaven casts more light on the influence that Christian religion exercises on mankind than it does on its dogmatic progress.¹³⁶

VI. Arnoldus Rademacher was particularly concerned with articulating the analogy between organic and dogmatic growth.¹³⁷ Just as in organic growth, he says, not only is a whole divided into its pre-existing parts but also new formations arise which were found as such in the cell only in germ, so too in dogmatic progress certain ideas are not only divided into their parts but, indeed, at the same time, “simply speaking, new doctrines” are proposed, doctrines that as such existed only in the productive and teleological power of the primitive doctrine. Thus, he situates the analogy in view of the case of organic differentiation.¹³⁸ Through this analogy of differentiation or epigenesis new formulations can be illuminated in particular, as well as theological deductions. However, without cause, the author seems to presuppose that only very few ideas or doctrines have been revealed, and it cannot be admitted that even one defined dogma would exist in revealed doctrine only as in a productive power or only teleologically (as an end).¹³⁹

VII. Other authors, like De la Barre,¹⁴⁰ De Grandmaison,¹⁴¹ Bainvel,¹⁴² Gardeil,¹⁴³ and Garrigou-Lagrange¹⁴⁴ prefer drawing an analogy with human knowledge.

Such authors insist that the progress of science presupposes certain and immutable facts, which are indeed explored and explained, though in such a way that science, through the process of continuous reflection or, as it were, a return to the facts, examines its own conclusions in the light of the facts. This also takes place in the explanation of revealed truths, in which case revealed truth takes the place of sensible facts. Ambroise Gardeil furthermore strives to explain the mode of this analogy by making use of a three-stage process of development.¹⁴⁵

VIII. Garrigou-Lagrange prefers to use the analogy of the transition from vague to distinct knowledge, or from obscure to distinct knowledge.¹⁴⁶

IX. Conclusion.— All such analogies contain some truth. But they each fall short insofar as each only illuminates one portion of what dogmatic progress is. If, however, the different portions or aspects of dogmatic progress are distinguished from each other, then such individual analogies are best applied, and indeed others can be added to this list. Thus, the authoritative proposition of dogmas has an analogy with the act of legislation by the state, and similarly the interpretation of revelation with the authoritative interpretation of laws—with the difference, however, that the state or the Church passes the laws according to its own discretion and not infrequently modifies them by interpreting them, whereas the Church can only propose revealed doctrine to be believed. Progress from implicit faith or knowledge to explicit faith or knowledge is represented both by the analogy of organic growth and by progress in knowledge. However, according to the laws of nature, bodily growth necessarily follows the power and disposition of the seed and external causes, whereas the unfolding of revealed truths depends on the free activity of men and God’s own free illuminating activity. Similarly, progress in human knowledge is from universal knowledge to particular knowledge, whereas dogmatic progress is only from implicit to explicit knowledge, that is, to objectively equivalent knowledge. Dogmatic formulation is brought about in a way that is analogous to scientific formulation. However, in scientific formulation the formula used can be adequate, whereas concepts used in the process of dogmatic formulation only inadequately express the revealed reality, since they can only be applied to it in an analogous sense.

Similarly, the properties of dogmatic progress can be expressed by way of various likenesses. The substantial stability and immutability of dogmas is best represented by organismic stability; however, it also has an analogy to the stability of the first principles of knowledge. The infallible truth of dogmas has a kind of likeness to the natural necessity of organic evolution according to the laws of nature, founded by the Author of nature, whereas the infallibility of the Church in preserving, interpreting, and defining revealed truths is founded upon the supernatural assistance of the Holy Spirit. And accidents or errors in the explanation of revelation have a clear analogy in the history of science or human knowledge, though in such a way that error cannot prevail in the Church.

X. The terms used for dogmatic progress.—Even the names used for designating the process by which dogmas are made are themselves analogous. As we have seen, Vincent of Lérins calls this process “profectum, progress.” The scholastics in the Middle Ages created the term “explicationis revelatorum, the explication of the revealed truths,” which is indeed etymologically analogous, though from the teaching of the scholastics and the secular use made of it, the expression took on the force of a technical term and its own meaning. Hence, it must be completely retained as a technical and common term.¹⁴⁷ Modern Catholic authors often use the term “progressus dogmatici, dogmatic progress.” the analogy is clear, but the expression is too vague. Others prefer the term from common language (développement, sviluppo, development, Entwicklung). Such terms seem to correspond most closely to the Latin term “explicatio,” and hence it likewise should be retained in common language, although as a technical term, that is, according to the meaning determined in theology. Non-Catholics, however, as well as many Catholics, speak of the “evolutio, evolution [or development]” of dogmas, while many Catholics reject such a name. Certainly, Protestant, rationalist, and modernist authors wish to use this term to signify substantial change in the primitive doctrine [revealed by God]. And, consequently, the use of the term in this sense is to be avoided and condemned. Similarly, the term “evolution” is, in practice, the proper and technical name of organic evolution, meaning that it can only be analogically transferred to the explication of revelation. However, organic evolution is only one specific type of evolution. If, therefore, the term “evolution” is taken generically, especially if it is understood in the scholastic sense, as the transition from potency to act,¹⁴⁸ as far as the term itself is concerned, nothing prevents one from using the term “evolution [or development] of dogmas.” For in the history of dogmas there really is a transition from potency to act, both on the side of the ecclesiastical act of proposing truths (inasmuch as certain dogmas are actually and particularly proposed for be believed over the course of time), and also on the part of explanation, formulation, and knowledge, which really are brought into act successively. For this reason and in the sense that has been set forth up to this point, we too have in this work used the expression “evolutio dogmatum, the evolution [or development] of dogmas,” as have other Catholics.

See Vincent of Lérins, Commonitorium, ch. 23.↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3016 [1796]).↩︎
ST I, q. 14, a. 1.↩︎
See ST I, q. 4 and 13, along with the texts of the Commentators; Édouard Hugon, “Les Concepts Dogmatiques” in Réponses théologiques à quelques questions d’actualité (Paris: Téqui, 1908), 91–182 (here 131ff); idem., Cursus philosophiae thomisticae [3^rd ed. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1922)] vol. 4, p. 136ff; vol. 5, p. 19ff, 50ff, 411ff; vol. 6, 79ff; Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Thomistic Common Sense: The Philosophy of Being and the Development of Doctrine, trans. Matthew K. Minerd (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2021); idem., “Le sens commun, La philosophie de l’être, et les formules dogmatiques,” Revue Thomiste (1908), 164–186, 259–300; Ambroie Gardeil, “La Réforme de la théologie Catholique: La Relativité des formules dogmatiques,” Revue thomiste 48 (1904): 48–75. [Trans. note: Fr. Schultes cites the first edition of Garrigou-Lagrange’s Sens commun. Later editions reordered but retained the content, though with a preface added to the third edition.]↩︎
As they have done with other facts, the Modernists have given a wrongheaded interpretation even for this natural inclination, almost as though it were exclusively a vital inclination to elaborate one’s own religious experience and communicate it to others. However, it is in fact a natural inclination placed in men by God in order to better grasp the revelation given by God. See Holy Office (Pius X), Lamentabili sane exitu, prop. 22 (Denzinger, no 3422 [2022]): “The dogmas the Church presents as revealed are not truths fallen from heaven, but a certain interpretation of revealed facts that the human mind has acquired by laborious effort”.↩︎
See the excellent remarks in George Reinhold, Praelectiones de theologia fundamentali exaratae (Vienna: H. Kirsch, 1905), vol. 2, 30ff.↩︎
St. Thomas, ST I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 1; see ST I, q. 36, a. 2, ad 2; II-II q, 1, a. 10, ad 1.↩︎
See the text of Reinhold cited in note 6 above. Also, see Matthias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, bk. 1 (Theological Epistemology), pt. 2 (Theological Knowledge Considered in Itself), trans. Michael J. Miller (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019), 36–42. [Tr. note: In consultation with the German, this is the section of text referred to, especially the section from page 40–42.]↩︎
See Matthias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, bk. 1 (Theological Epistemology), pt. 1 (The Objective Principles of Theological Knowledge), trans. Michael J. Miller (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019), 376ff.↩︎
See Athanasius, De synodis, no. 40.↩︎
Vincent of Lérins, Commonitorium, ch. 23.↩︎
See ST I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 1. Also, to the objection that, according to Isaiah 1:22, wine must not be mixed in with water, St. Thomas responds: “Those who use philosophical teachings in Sacred Doctrine [or “Sacred Scripture”], reducing them to the obedience of faith, do not mix water with wine but, rather change water into wine” (In Boethium De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5).↩︎
See Alfred Loisy, The Gospel and the Church, trans. [Christopher Home] (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988).↩︎
“In its conception and development dogma is the a work of the Greek spirit on the ground of the Gospel…. That is, the conceptual means, by which one sought to make the Gospel comprehensible in ancient times, were merged with the content of the Gospel and have thus come to be dogmas.” “Ecclesiastical dogmas are the Christian doctrines of faith conceptually formulated in a way that is of use for a scientific-apologetic treatment.” See Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, [4^th ed. (Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr, 1905), vol. 1, 321.↩︎
See ibid., 3 and 4.↩︎
Ibid., 12ff.↩︎
What we have said pertains to those dogmatic formulas that have been sanctioned by the Church in a definitive judgment. However, mutatis mutandis the same holds true concerning theological formulas that have been drawn up and more or less approved by the church. Therefore, it is not without injustice, or at least a fickle and shallow attitude, and commonly on the basis of false doctrinal bases [ex suppositis falsis doctinis], that certain theologians mock, despise, and forsake scholastic formulas.↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3020 [1800]).↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, canon 4.3 (Denzinger, no. 3043 [1818]).↩︎
See Joseph Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne, 5^th ed. (Paris: [Gabaldat], 1922), vol. 1, p. 432 and vol. 2, p. 34.↩︎
See, for example, the 22^nd Canon of the Second Synod of Orange: “Those things that are proper to man. No one has anything of his own except lying and sin. But if a man has anything of truth and justice, it is from that fountain for which we should thirst in this desert, so that, as though refreshed by some of its drops, we may not falter along the way.” (Denzinger, no. 392[195]) and the 27^th condemned proposition of Baius: “Without the help of God’s grace, free will can do nothing by sin.” (Denzinger, no 1927 [1027]).↩︎
See [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique, vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), (here, col. [1602–6]); [Henri] Pinard [De La Boullaye], “Dogme” in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique: contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines, [5th ed.], ed. Adhémar D’Alès, (Paris: G. Beauchesne, [1924-1931]), col. [1121-1184] (here, 1149–1151).↩︎
Josef Slipyi, Die Trinitätslehre des byzantinischen Patriarchen Photios (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1921), 24ff.↩︎
As much as possible, the teaching of St. Thomas cannot be exactly determined and understood without taking into consideration the various formulations of doctrine prior to his time, in his own writings, and in the later schools. How many disputes with cease if St. Thomas’s terms were correctly understood and not in light of the meaning of formulations that came after him!↩︎
See 1 Timothy 6:20 and 2 Timothy 1:14; [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3020 [1800]); Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3070[1836]). Cf. Vincent of Lérins, Commonitorium, ch. 22.↩︎
On the notion of tradition, in addition to the treatises presented in the books of apologetic or dogmatic theology, as well as in theological dictionaries, see Clemens Schrader, De theologico testium fonte deque edito fidei testimonio seu traditione commentarius (Paris: Lethielleux, 1878); Johannes Baptist Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et scriptura, 2nd ed., (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta, 1875); Cardinal Louis Billot, De immutabilitate traditionis contra modernam haeresïm evolutionismi, 2^nd ed., (Rome: Pontificia Instituti Pii IX, 1907); Jean-Vincent Bainvel, De magisterio vivo et traditione (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1905); Ludovico De San, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura (Bruge: [Apud Carolum Bayaert], 1903); Gerard Van Noort, De fontibus revelationis, 3^rd ed., (Bussum: P. Brand, 1920), ch. 2; Martin Winkler, Der Traditionsbegriff des Urchristentums bis Tertullian (Munchen: Rudolf Abt, 1897); Étienne Hugueny, “La Tradition: Étude Apologétique,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, vol. 6, no. 4 (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1912), 710–31; Adhémar d’Alès, “La tradition chrétienne dans l’histoire,” Études (1907), 388–392.↩︎
See Joseph Kleutgen, Die Théologie der Vorzeit, 2^nd ed., (Münster: Theissing, 1874), vol. 5, 405.↩︎
Johann Baptist Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2^nd ed., (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta: 1875), th. 1–4 and th. 11 (p. 99).↩︎
Thus, the Council of Trent distinguishes between “traditions…as coming from the mouth of Christ or being inspired by the Holy Spirit and preserved in continuous succession in the Catholic Church.” (Council of Trent, Decree on the Reception of the Sacred Books and Traditions, Denzinger no. 1501 [783]).↩︎
See Joachim Joseph Berthier, Tractatus de Locis Theologicis (Turin: Marietti / New York: Benzinger, 1888), p. 29–36; De San, De traditione, p. 101ff and 123ff.↩︎
See a. 2, no. 3, C above.↩︎
The best exposition of the state of the question concerning this matter can be found in Van Noort, De fontibus revelationis, 3^rd edition, p. 93–97.↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, no. 15.↩︎
Alfred Loisy, Évangile et Église, 9. See Alfred Loisy, The Gospel and the Church, trans. [Christopher Home] (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988).↩︎
[Henri] Pinard [De La Boullaye], “Dogme” in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique: contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines [5th ed.], ed. Adhémar D’Alès. (Paris: G. Beauchesne, [1924-1931]), col. 1153–57.↩︎
Council of Trent, Decree on the Reception of the Sacred Books and Traditions (Denzinger, 1501 [783]).↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3070 [1836]).↩︎
See Gerard Van Noort, De fontibus revelationis, 3^rd ed., (Bussum: P. Brand, 1920), nos. 158–175↩︎
As regards the preservation of tradition by the assistance of the Holy Spirit, Melchior Cano most excellently notes: “It is ridiculous to believe that the apostolic traditions cannot be preserved in the hearts of the faithful with the same faith and diligence as if they were written upon paper. For the writing of the living spirit of God is not erased more easily than letters penned in ink, and there are many traditions that you may see retained very easily by custom and practices. And if the providence of Christ were lacking for the Church of Christ, then, indeed, I would defend neither the traditions preserved nor the authority of Scripture, for both of them would not stand without God’s continued action” (De locis theologicis, bk. 3, ch. 7). Similarly, Van Noort excellently remarks: “The preservation of tradition is unjustly presented as something exceedingly arduous; for tradition is not to be conceived as a long and disordered collection of propositions to be retained by memory, but rather as the essence of faith and Christian life, which is for the most part contained in daily profession, liturgical and disciplinary practice, and in Christian customs themselves. Moreover, it is expressed in various ways according to the needs of places and times and is increasingly clarified day by day” (Van Noort, De fontibus revelatonis, p. 106).↩︎
There is, indeed, a difference in so far as the Apostles were inspired, whereas the Church only enjoys infallibility.↩︎
See the inscription in his letter to the Romans.↩︎
See St. Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, 3.2.2.↩︎
See St. Cyprian of Carthage, Letter 48, no. 3.↩︎
Johann Adam Möhler, Symbolism: Or Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences between Catholics and Protestants, as Evidenced by their Symbolical Writings, trans. James Burton Robertson (New York: Edward Dunigan, 1844), §40 (p. 360–2). [Tr. note: Fr. Schultes shortens and slightly alters this quote a bit. However, for the sake of complete context, I have chosen to include this whole text.]↩︎
ST III, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2. [Tr. note: Parenthesis are Fr. Schultes.]↩︎
ST III, q. 27, a. 4.↩︎
ST II, q. 27, a. 5, ad 1.↩︎
ST III, q. 7, a. 10, ad 1.↩︎
Thus, rightly does [Edmund] Dublanchy note in [col. 1644] of his entry “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 2^nd ed., vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann. (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), col. 1574-1650]: “It cannot be doubted that a constant practice of the Church—even if, from the start, it was not accompanied by some kind of formal doctrinal declaration—could permit us to hold that the doctrine that it necessarily implies would be explicitly revealed, at least at some very minimal degree. This conclusion is particularly true when, during the centuries that follow, the same practice comes to be maintained with substantial identity, with the doctrine associated with it receiving explicit attestation as soon as this is required by some pressing occasion, as when it is attacked by some heresy or an urgent need to explain more completely what had been believed heretofore.”↩︎
Council of Trent, Decree on the Sacrament of Penance, ch. 5 (Denzinger, no. 1683 [901]).↩︎
See F. Mallet and Maurice Blondel, “Un Nouvel Entretien Avec M. Blondel” (Suite) (1) in Revue de clergé français, tenth year, vol. 38 (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1904), 513-530.↩︎
Juan Arintero, “El progreso dogmatico-objetivo” La Ciencia tomista 3, No. 9, (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1911), 379-393.↩︎
St. Vincent of Lérins, Commonitorium, ch. 23 (32). See Étienne Hugueny, “La Tradition: Étude Apologétique,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, vol. 6, no. 4 (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1912): 710–731.↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 2 (Denzinger, no. 3006 [1787]). Also see canon 2.4 (Denzinger, no. 3029 [1809]).↩︎
See ST II, q. 1, a. 7 and q. 174, a. 6.↩︎
See Leo XIII, Providentissimus Deus; ST II-II, q. 171–174; Reginald Schultes, “Lehre des Hl. Thomas über das wesen der biblischen inspiration,” in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie 16 (Paderborn: Druck und Verlag von Ferdinand Schöningh, 1902): 80-95; Domenico Zanecchia, O.P., Divina inspiratio sacrarum scripturarum ad mentem s. Thomae Aquinatis (Rome: Fridericus Pustet, 1898); Hugo Pope O.P., The Scholastic View of Biblical Inspiration (Rome: [Printing-]Office of Ricardo Garroni, 1912); Innocentius M. Jacomé, O.P., Dissertatio de natura inspirationis S. Scripturae (Vienna, Typis Congregationis Mechitharisticae, 1919).↩︎
See Joseph Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne, 5^th ed., (Paris: [Gabaldat], [1922]), vol. 1, p. 6.↩︎
See Johann Baptist Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2^nd ed. (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta, 1875); Louis Billot, De inspiratione sacrae scripturae: theologica disquisition, 2^nd ed. (Rome: Universitas Gregoriana, 1922); Jean Vincent Bainvel, De scriptura sacra (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1910); Adulphus Cellini, Propaedeutica biblica: seu, Compendium introductionis criticae et exegeticae in sacram scripturam ad usum studiosae iuventutis catholicae, vol. 2 De Theopneustia (Ripatransone: Barigelletti, [1909]); Séraphin Protin, “La nature de l’inspiration” in Revue Augustinienne, vol. 8 ([Louvain: Maisons d’études des Augustins de l’Assomption], 1906), 25-50; Petrus Dausch, Die schriftinspiration: eine biblisch-geschichtliche studie (Freiburg: Herder, 1891); idem., Die Inspiration des Neuen Testamentes (Münster: Aschendorff, 1912); Ludovico De San, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura (Bruges: [Apud Carolum Bayaert], 1903).↩︎
See ST I, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1; q. 1, a. 9, ad 2; Mattias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, bk. 1 (Theological Epistemology), pt. 1 (The Objective Principles of Theological Knowledge), trans. Michael J. Miller (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019), 207ff.↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, chs. 1 and 4 (Denzinger, nos. 3053 and 3066 [1821 and 1833]).↩︎
See Council of Trent, Decree on the Eucharist (Denzinger, no. 1636 [874]).↩︎
See Council of Trent, Decree on the Sacrament of Penance, can. 3 and 20 (Denzinger, nos. 1703 and 1710 [913 and 920]).↩︎
See Council of Trent, Decree on the Sacrifice of the Most Holy Mass, can. 2 (Denzinger, no. 1752 [949]).↩︎
See Council of Trent, Decree on Justification (Denzinger, no. 1520ff[792ff]).↩︎
Council of Trent, Decree on the Vulgate Edition of the Bible and on the Manner of Interpreting Sacred Scripture (Denzinger, no. 1507 [786]).↩︎
See Leo XII, Providentissimus deus; Pius X in the [Holy Office’s decree] Lamentabili sane exitu, the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis, and the Antimodernist Oath.↩︎
Louis Billot, De immutabilitate traditionis contra modernam hæresïm evolutionismi, 2^nd ed., (Rome: Pontificia Instituti Pii IX, 1907), p. 47–59.↩︎
See Ambroise Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie. [2^nd ed., (Paris: [Librairie Victor Lecoffre J. Gabalda & C^ie], 1910)], 162: “We first find the general overall intuition of revelation by the primitive Christian community’s adherence in faith; then, there is the ferment that rouses all the energies of human knowledge so that it might more distinctly and integrally take possession of this datum; finally, there is a kind of return movement to merge the definitive acquisition from this process of elaboration with the criterion of the revealed datum.” See Gardeil’s explanation and application of this on p. 163–184.↩︎
[Henri] Pinard [De La Boullaye], “Dogme” in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique: contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines, [5th ed.], ed. Adhémar D’Alès, (Paris: G. Beauchesne, [1924-1931]), col. 1169ff.↩︎
This is explained by the very nature of human knowledge. As St. Thomas says in ST I, q. 85, a. 3: “Our intellect proceeds from a state of potency to one of act. However, every power that thus passes from potency to act first arrives at incomplete act… before reaching perfect act. Now, the intellect’s perfect act is complete knowledge [scientia], when the reality in question [res] is distinctly and determinately known, whereas its incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly and in a vague way [sub quadam confusione]. Thus, we first know revealed realities in a vague way, “without proper knowledge of each thing contained in them” (ibid.). Composite realities are known before their constitutive parts (a. 8), the intellect “first grasps something concerning the reality itself…, Then understands the properties, accidents, and various ways that its essence is related to what is connected to it in some way [habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam]” (a. 5), and finally, it grasps that which is simply indivisible and simple , “for that which is indivisible has a kind of opposition to bodily reality [which is the proper object of the human intellect in this state].”↩︎
^S ST II-I, q. 2, a. 1.↩︎
ST II-II, q. 1, a. 9.↩︎
See Johann Bapist Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2^nd ed., (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta: 1875), thesis 23.↩︎
See [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” In Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann, (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), col. 1607–11.↩︎
See Matthias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, trans. Michael J. Miller (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019), vol. 1.1, p. 214ff.↩︎
See Matthias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, trans. Michael J. Miller (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019), vol. 1.1, 216ff.↩︎
See Pius VI, Auctorem fidei, canon 1 (Denzinger, 2601 [1501]): “The proposition that asserts ‘that in these later times there has been spread a general obscuring of the more important truths pertaining to religion, which are the basis of faith and of the moral teachings of Jesus Christ’, (is) heretical.”↩︎
See Pius VI, Auctorem fidei, canon 1 (Denzinger, 2601 [1501]). Also see the 95^th proposition against Quesnel in Clement XI, Unigenitus Dei filius (Denzinger, no. 2495 [1445]).↩︎
Denis Pétau (Petavius), Dionysii Petavii opus De theologicis dogmatibus, vol. 2, [5^th ed.], [eds. J.B. Thomas and Francesco Antonio Zaccaria] ([Bar-le-Duc: Typis et sumptibus Ludovici Guerin, 1864-1870]), ch. 1, no. 12.↩︎
And this needs to be noted well. For older authors like Petavius only considered the era of antiquity and the history of one dogma, namely the Trinity. However, the same question is involved with later times and the history of other dogmas such that the issue touches upon the entire history of dogmas and even the present state of Catholic doctrine.↩︎
[Tr. note: Reading “definiendi” for “deficiendi.”]↩︎
Johann Bapist Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2^nd ed., (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta: 1875), thesis 23.↩︎
Hence, when theologians define implicit faith, they add the condition: “Provided that he does not stubbornly adhere to any contrary opinion.” Cf. ST II-II, q. 2, a. 5, ad 2 and 3; q. 11, a. 2, ad 3; and ST I, q. 32, a. 4. Thus, the Gallicans and Febronians, who truly had implicit faith, submitted to the definition promulgated by the [First] Vatican Council, whereas the Old Catholics became heretics, denying both explicit and implicit faith.↩︎
In light of our conclusion, we also can understand the opposition and indignation which first arose against the doctrine of Petavius, for in the opinion of some, he seemed to grant too much, though others thought he did not grant enough. The reason for this opposition was twofold: on the one hand, on the part of the theologians and on the other on the part of the historians. For the theologians, confusing the revealed doctrine with later explications and formulations thereof, did not sufficiently distinguish between explicitly and implicitly proposed doctrines; but, on the other hand, historians did not consider what was presupposed and held in religious explanations as being de fide (namely, what Petavius called “the substance of the dogma” in question).↩︎
See Gottlieb Nathanael Bonwetsch, Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte, 2^nd ed., (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, [1919]), p. 2.↩︎
Leo the Great, Letter 103 (PL 54, col. 989).↩︎
See Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum, vol. 3, disp. 1, q. 1.↩︎
See Juan de Lugo, De fide, disp. 3, sect. 5, no. 69.↩︎
See John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, vol. 7 (Paris: Vivès, [1885]), De fide, disp. 6, a. 2.↩︎
See Aurelio Palmieri, II progresso dommatico nel concetto cattolico, 2^nd ed., (Florence: Libreria editrice fiorentina, 1910), p. 91-130; [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 2^nd ed., vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann. (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), col. 1611–1619; [Henri] Pinard [De La Boullaye], “Dogme” in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique: contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines, [5th ed.], ed. Adhémar D’Alès, (Paris: G. Beauchesne, [1924-1931]), col. 1164ff; Matthias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, trans. Michael J. Miller (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019), vol. 1.1, 376ff. [Tr. note: This seems to be the Scheeben reference he has in mind, though the German pagination (201ff) here does not quite match what one would expect, based on the earlier citations. That would correspond to 292ff in the current English.]↩︎
See Constantin von Schäzler, Die Bedeutung der Dogmengeschichte vom katholischen Standpunkt aus erörtert, ed. Thomas Esser (Regensburg: Manz, 1884), p. 32; cf. idem., Introductio in S. Theologiam dogmaticam ad mentem D. Thomae Aquinatis, ed. Thomas Esser (Regensburg: Manz, 1882), p. 146-153.↩︎
See what is said above in ch. 1. Also, see Francisco Marín-Sola, “La Homogeneidad De La Doctrina Católica,” in La Ciencia thomista 10, no. 29 (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1914), p. 177ff.↩︎
[Trans. note: As an Eastern Catholic sensitive to papal maximalism, I note that while inspired by the correct desire to emphasize the role of the papacy in the definitive proposal of the truths of the faith for the whole Church, such language is also marked by the maximalism of the era when Schultes’ writing.]↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Pastor Aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3071 [1837]).↩︎
See Francisco Marín-Sola, “La infalibilidad de la Iglesia y sus relaciones con la revelación, la fe y la teología,” in La Ciencia Tomista 14, no. 40 (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1917), p. 5–36.↩︎
See Ambroise Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie [2^nd ed., (Paris: [Librairie Victor Lecoffre J. Gabalda & C^ie], 1910)], p. 180ff.↩︎
See the excellent remarks in [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 2^nd ed., vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann. (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), col. 1611–19.↩︎
[Tr. note: I am merely here noting, as a matter of “Byzantine Catholic conscience,” the slight pugnacity of Fr. Schultes, though I recognize the developments regarding the filioque, while also recognizing the Byzantine Catholic and Orthodox practice of Creedally emphasizing the ultimate principle of the persons being in the Father, from whom both proceed, though the Spirit as also opposed to the Son, who is from the Father.]↩︎
See Francisco Marín-Sola, “Raciocinio y progreso dogmático,” in La Ciencia Tomista 18, no. 54, (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1918), p. 267-280; 19, no. 55, (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1919), p. 34-48; 21, no. 62, (Madrid, Dominicos Españoles, 1920), p. 164-175.↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3016 [1796]).↩︎
See Giovanni Battista Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2^nd ed., (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta: 1875), th. 25.↩︎
However, we do not wish to deny the merit of works written by Protestant authors in literary and historical studies concerning the Sacred Scripture and teaching of the Fathers. [Tr. note: One would think that Fr. Schultes would also extend this sentiment to the Orthodox, with whom he was likely less likely to interact. While personally noting the problems that do exist even for our separated Orthodox brethren in regard to the living universal magisterium, I would personally soften Fr. Schultes’ language in some of the places above, though I note here his gestures in a magnanimous direction, especially for his day and as a conservative Roman professor.]↩︎
See what is said concerning the rationalist theory concerning the influence of historical conditions and “popular impulse” in [Henri] Pinard [De La Boullaye], “Dogme” in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique: contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines, [5th ed.], ed. Adhémar D’Alès, (Paris: G. Beauchesne, [1924-1931]), col. 1165.↩︎
St. Augustine, De civitate dei, bk. 16, ch. 2. Cf. In Ps. 54, no. 22 and In Ps. 67, no. 39.↩︎
ST II-II, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1; cf. II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 2; I, q. 29, a. 3; I, q. 36, a. 2, ad 1 and 2.↩︎
Cf. See Alexis-Henri-Marie Lépicier, De stabilitate et progressu dogmatis, 2^nd ed. (Rome: Desclée et Socii, 1910), p. 177ff and 279ff; Bernhard Dorholt, Über die entwicklung des dogma und den fortschritt in der theologie. Habilitationsrede (Münster: Aschendorffsche buchhandlung, 1892), p.25 ff; Cardinal Billot rightly notes that heretics did not initiate dogmas [Cardinal Louis Billot, De immutabilitate traditionis contra modernam haeresïm evolutionismi, 2nd ed. (Rome: Pontificia Instituti Pii IX, 1907), p. 43]. For we must distinguish between controversies in the Church herself and heresies. Even before the Council of Nicaea, the Arian doctrine was a heresy, since it was contrary to explicit faith in the divinity of Christ; no less was the Protestant doctrine clearly opposed to those that had already explicitly been proposed for belief by the Church’s magisterium, whether solemnly or ordinarily, such as that the Pope is the divinely established head of the Church, that Christ is really present in the Eucharist, and so forth. (cf. Bañez, In ST II-II, q. 1 a. 7). Therefore, heresies presuppose a given, already complete dogmatic explication and are merely an occasion for the doctrine already proposed to be so solemnly defined and given greater determination. Cf. Joseph Kleutgen, Die Théologie der Vorzeit, 2nd ed., (Münster: Theissing, 1874), vol. 5, 421ff, 622ff.↩︎
See Constantin von Schäzler, Die Bedeutung der Dogmengeschichte vom katholischen Standpunkt aus erörtert, ed. Thomas Esser (Regensburg: Manz, 1884), 158ff; idem., Introductio in S. Theologiam dogmaticam ad mentem D. Thomae Aquinatis, ed. Thomas Esser (Regensburg: Manz, 1882); Giovanni Battista Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2^nd ed. (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta: 1875); Arnoldus Rademacher, Der Entwicklungsgedanke in Religion und Dogma (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1914), 63, 77, 87.↩︎
Arnoldus Rademacher, Der Entwicklungsgedanke in Religion und Dogma (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1914), 87.↩︎
See [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 2^nd ed., vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann. (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924). [Tr. note: No exact page numbers are cited by Fr. Schultes.]↩︎
ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7, ad 2. Although St. Thomas is here speaking immediately about new revelations, nonetheless the reason set forth also holds true for a dogmatic explication.↩︎
See Pius IX, Ineffabilis Deus (Denzinger, no. 2803 [1641])↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3073 [1839]).↩︎
See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 9.↩︎
See the Decree Lamentabili, props. 39–51; Alfred Loisy, The Gospel and the Church, trans. [Christopher Home] (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988) [p. 175ff in the original Évangile et église.]↩︎
See Albert Maria Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, 5^th ed., vol. 5 ([Freiburg: Herder, 1907-1922]), pt. 3.↩︎
See Christian Pesch, Theologische Zeitfragen 4: Folge, Glaube, Dogmen und geschichtliche Tatsachen: eine Untersuchung über den Modernismus, (Fribourg: Herder, 1908), 193: “Dogma causes… perpetual increase in holiness in the Church.”↩︎
Leo XII, Tametsi, no. 9.↩︎
Take care not to confuse the matter of dogmatic progress with the matter of the history of dogmas. For the matter of the history of dogmas includes everything that in any way concurs in the explication of revealed truths, whether they are revealed truths themselves, or heresies, or popular ideas, or philosophical and religious systems.↩︎
Harnack notes the following causes of dogmatic progress (in Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3^rd ed. (Freiburg: Mohr, [1894-1897]), 13):

The concept and demarcation of the canonical books;

the doctrinal tradition of an earlier period that is no longer understood;

the needs of worship and right order [constitutionis];

the desire to reconcile the teachings of religion (or religious doctrine) with prevailing scientific teachings

political and social conditions

different conceptions of a perfect moral life;

“so-called” logical consequences, that is, the analogy of dogmas;

the will to reconcile the different “directions” and oppositions that exist within the Church;

the intention to reject doctrines that are considered erroneous;

“the sacrosanct force of blind custom.”↩︎
See Jacques Marie Achille Ginoulhiac, Histoire du dogme Catholique: pendant les trois premiers siècles de l'eǵlise et jusqu'au Concile de Niceé, 3rd ed., ([Paris: Auguste Durand, Libraire, 1867-1922]), xxviiff.↩︎
“Certain things are said to be similar which share in the same form [forma], but not according to the same ratio..., but rather, according to some analogy” (ST, q. 4, a. 3); "a name that is thus said in many ways signifies different proportions to one thing" (ST I, q. 13, a. 5); “A similar ratio according to proportion—this is what is properly called analogy” (Cajetan, in his work De analogia nomina; cf. idem, In ST I, q. 13, a. 5, no. 12).↩︎
See Arnoldus Rademacher, Der Entwicklungsgedanke in Religion und Dogma, (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1914), 91.↩︎
Nearly all modern explanations of dogmatic progress only make use of analogies, neglecting proper, theological explanations, especially those of the scholastics.↩︎
See Vincent of Lérins, Commonitory, ch. 23 [others, 28] [ed. Gerhard Rauschen, Florilegium patristicum, tam veteris quam medii aevi auctores complectens, ([Bonn]: sumptibus Petri Hanstein, 1906), fasc. 5].↩︎
Ibid. The closing words were cited and approved by the [First] Vatican Council in Dei filius, ch. 4 and canon 4.3 (Denzinger, nos. 3022 [1800] and 3043 [1818]).↩︎
Ibid. [Tr. note: For these, I referred to the Heurtley translation, though with significant alterations and an eye to Fr. Schultes’s own Latin, which is mostly the same as the underlying text for Heurtley. See Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 11. trans. C.A. Heurtley, eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1894), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3506.htm>]↩︎
See Cf. Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, “Premier avertissement sur les lettres de M. Jurien,” c. 4, in Œuvres, vol. VIII [No Publication Information], p. 217ff.↩︎
See Ambroise Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie. [2^nd ed., (Paris: [Librairie Victor Lecoffre J. Gabalda & C^ie], 1910)], 159ff; W.S. Reilly, Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus, étude sur la règle de foi de S. Vincent de Lérins, thèse soutenue à la Faculté de théologie de l'Institut catholique de Paris, par W.-S. Reilly, (Tours : A. Mame et fils, 1903); Étienne Hugueny, “La Tradition: Étude Apologétique,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, vol. 6, no. 4 (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1912), 710–731.↩︎
See John Henry Newman, An Essay on Development of Christian Doctrine (London: Basil Montagu Pickering, 1878). See the exposition of his argument presented in [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique, vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), cols 1630–1636.↩︎
See Anton Gisler, Der Modernismus [4th ed., (Einsiedeln: Benzinger, 1913)], 604–8; Christian Pesch, Theologische Zeitfragen 4: Folge, Glaube, Dogmen und geschichtliche Tatsachen: eine Untersuchung über den Modernismus, (Fribourg: Herder, 1908), 174–200; P.P. McKenna, The Theology of Faith, (Dublin: Brown and Nolan, Limited, 1914), 262ff; and also see the article by Dublanchy in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique cited above.↩︎
Ambroise Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie. [2^nd ed., (Paris: [Librairie Victor Lecoffre J. Gabalda & C^ie], 1910)], 155; see the author’s restrictions on 156ff.↩︎
See Ernest Bernard Allo, “Germe et ferment” in Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, vol. 1, no. 1(Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1907), 20–43; Foi et systèmes [Paris: Bloud, 1908], 223–262; and Ambroise Gardeil “Le développement du Dogme” in Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, vol. 3, no. 3, (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1909), 447–469.↩︎
See Allo, Foi et systems, 238: “This doctrine is not a seed, for it has not developed [évoué], nor has it been perfected intrinsically, and was already fully present in the souls of the first preachers of the faith. It became deformed, shrunken, or diluted in the systems of heterodox persons. But in Catholicism, it remained whole and entire, though without making any progress there, for it had no further need to do so, being definitive." And ibid., 253: “Religious knowledge of God is not, in itself, of a different nature, nor to be found at a different degree of perfection, than what it had on the day of Pentecost.”↩︎
Ibid., 250–253.↩︎
See ibid., 261: “The agent seems to operate by mere contact, without itself undergoing any easily-observable reaction or loss. A simple and popular example is that of the leaven which, after having made the dough rise is neither more nor less leaven than before. This is one of the interpretations that can be given to the parable: Simile est regnum coelorum fermento; The kingdom of heaven is like leaven…”↩︎
Cf. Arnoldus Rademacher, Der Entwicklungsgedanke in Religion und Dogma (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1914), 91.↩︎
See Arnoldus Rademacher, Der Entwicklungsgedanke in Religion und Dogma (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1914); cf. Karl Beth, Die Entwicklung des Christentums zur Universal Religion (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1913).↩︎
See [ibid.], 7–83.↩︎
See [ibid.], 83.↩︎
See André De la Barre, La vie du dogme catholique, (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1898), appendix.↩︎
See Léonce De Grandmaison, “Le développement du dogme chrétienne,” Revue pratique d’Apologétique, vol. 5, (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1908), 521-542; vol. 6, (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1908), 5-33, 401-436, 881-905, here 902.↩︎
Jean Vincent Bainvel, De magisterio vivo et traditione (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1905), 145.↩︎
Ambroise Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie. [2^nd ed., (Paris: [Librairie Victor Lecoffre J. Gabalda & C^ie], 1910)], 157ff.↩︎
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Thomistic Common Sense: The Philosophy of Being and the Development of Doctrine, trans. Matthew K. Minerd (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2021), 229ff; idem., On Divine Revelation, trans. Matthew K. Minerd (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2022), vol. 1, 317–346. [Tr. note: Fr. Schultes cites the first editions of these works, both of which were not the definitive form of texts used for the contemporary English translations. Respectively see Le sens commun, 113ff and De revelatione, 169–180.]↩︎
See Ambroise Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie. [2^nd ed., (Paris: [Librairie Victor Lecoffre J. Gabalda & C^ie], 1910)], 160ff.↩︎
See Garrigou-Lagrange, Thomistic Common Sense, 230–231 and 231n3: “The true analogy that should be used for understanding the nature of the development of dogma is the progress that we noted in the knowledge we have concerning the first rational principles or, again, in the knowledge we have concerning the notions of freedom, spirituality, and so forth… Everyone possesses the first principles. They are like the very structure of reason, but the common person cannot formulate them [precisely]. Effort had to be expended by philosophers in order for this precise formulation to be discovered, determining the ways that these different principles depend on the supreme principle, the principle of identity. Real progress does indeed take place by passing from the simple adherence of common sense to what is found in the fourth book of the Metaphysics, dedicated by Aristotle to the principle of contradiction. However, this real progress is only a passage from the actual-implicit to the actual-explicit. These are the same, explicit principles.”

“Likewise, every man is aware of his free choice; he feels himself to be the master of his acts, the master of acting or of not acting. He has an idea of freedom that is not obscure, but rather clear, in the sense that it suffices for enabling him to recognize what is free and what is not. But, nonetheless, this clear idea remains, in itself, vague [confuse]; it will be distinct only when philosophical reason determines its comprehension and defines it by connecting it to being…

“This is how we must conceive of dogmatic development, at least for fundamental dogmas like the Trinity and the Incarnation that from the earliest days were an object of explicit faith and expressed in terms drawn from common sense. The explication of their already-clear formula was only a passage from the vague to the distinct… For other dogmas, like the infallibility of the pope or that of the Immaculate Conception, which were not the object of explicit faith from the first days, they involved passing from the obscure to the distinct, not from the vague [confuse] to the distinct. The infallibility of the pope was contained obscurely in the dogma of the infallibility of the Church and in that of the primacy of the successors of St. Peter. Likewise, the Immaculate Conception was contained in the fullness of grace attributed by the Archangel Gabriel to Mary. Thus, in the natural order, the certitude of the objectivity of our knowledge contains the certitude that the formal object of the intellect is being; this latter proposition is not contained clearly in the common man, but only obscurely, whereas he knows freedom clearly. Likewise, again, as Leibniz said (Gottfried William Leibniz, Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain, ([Paris: Ernest Flammarion, éditeur, 1921]), bk. 2, ch. 29), the common man [vulgaire] has an obscure knowledge of the various species of plants, the gardener a clear knowledge of them, and the botanist a distinct knowledge.”

[Tr. note: There are only very slightly differences in Fr. Schultes’s text in comparison with the final edition used for the English translation of Le sens commun. I have used the contemporary translation, with slight modifications to match Fr. Schultes’s citation.]↩︎
See a. 5, prop. V above.↩︎
[Trans. note: Although, according to the theory held by Schultes, one must distinguish this passage from potency to act in proposition and explication from the objective passage from potency to act, as would be the case in some form of virtual revelation.]↩︎

Réginald SchultesDogmatic DevelopmentDogmatic Corruption

Dr. Matthew Minerd

A Ruthenian Catholic, husband, and father, I am a professor of philosophy and moral theology at Ss. Cyril and Methodius Byzantine Catholic Seminary in Pittsburgh, PA. My academic work has appeared in the journals Nova et Vetera, The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, Saint Anselm Journal, Lex Naturalis, Downside Review, The Review of Metaphysics, and Maritain Studies, as well in volumes published by the American Maritain Association through the Catholic University of America Press. I have served as author, translator, and/or editor for volumes published by The Catholic University of America Press, Emmaus Academic, Cluny Media, and Ascension Press.

https://www.matthewminerd.com