Réginald Schultes, Theological Teaching Concerning the Explication of Faith (a. 6–10)

Sep 1

Brief Translation Introduction

This translation is presented as a relatively stable sketch of this chapter from Reginald Schultes’s Introductio in historiam dogmatum. The text has been edited and reviewed, though it is not in the kind of final form of review that I would do for a published translation. I am posting the text here on To Be a Thomist for those who might be interested in referring to an English draft.

I would like to thank Mr. Mitchell Kengor for his help filling out the details of footnote references.

Section III: Theological Teaching Concerning the Explication of Faith

Non-Catholic authors claim that the explication of faith necessarily involves alteration in the revealed teaching that was first handed on, bringing about additions that are extraneous to revelation, disfiguring and transfiguring the truths revealed by God. In short, they thus assert that this would be development or evolution in the general sense of the term, as organic realities or the ideas of any given school of thought develop and evolve with the passage of time. Thus, the explication of faith, proposed through the Church, would not be able to be the object of faith. Therefore, we must show how:

the explication of revealed truths takes place without any substantial alteration of doctrine;
the Church’s definitions are identical to the revealed teaching that was first handed on;
the Church’s dogmas represent only an explication of revealed [truths];
they are the object of faith.

Thus, in the next five articles, we will discuss:

The distinction between explicit, implicit, and virtual revelation (a. 6);
The way that revealed [truths] are variously known by us (a. 7);
Definitive explication for dogmatic definitions (a. 8);
The definability of theological conclusions (a. 9);
The terminus or effect of dogmatic progress (a. 10).

Article Six: On the Distinction Between Explicit, Implicit, and Virtual Revelation

I. The¹ explication of faith consists in the explicit proposition of implicit revelation. Therefore, the teaching concerning the explication of faith must begin by setting forth the notion of explicit and implicit revelation, which itself is founded upon the notion of revelation itself.

Most generally speaking, “revelation” refers to the manifestation of some hidden reality, as though a hidden or concealed treasure were revealed to someone. Now, revelation of this sort can take place either inasmuch as the reality itself is manifested in itself, so that it might be seen (as though a treasure were itself brought forth), or as much as knowledge concerning that reality is manifested. In the revelation of faith (or of those things to be believed) the very reality with which such revelation is concerned is not seen in itself, for we do not have faith concerning things that are seen.² Thus, revelation, properly so-called, which we are discussing here, is the manifestation of a hidden truth, brought about by God, such that the reality itself remains unseen in its very self. Therefore, through such revelation, what God knows concerning the revealed reality in question is manifested to us through knowledge.

However, such divine knowledge is not manifested to us in accord with how such knowledge is found in God—for in God such knowledge is identical to His very existence and act of understanding—but, rather, it is manifested to us in accord with our own manner of knowing. Now, the mode of knowledge that properly belongs to us involves the grasping of truth by way of judgment, by composing and dividing [realities, objectively grasped, as the subject and predicate of statements]. Therefore, the divine truth is revealed to us in the form of judgments (and it is so proposed to us by the Church, as is clear in the form used for dogmatic definitions).

Moreover, judgments are signified to man through propositions and through the terms of those very propositions, for man can only know revealed truth by means of cognition through concepts. Therefore, divine revelation is made in the form of propositions and through concepts (as the termini of our knowledge of these propositions). Thus, something will be revealed to us inasmuch as it is manifested to us through the terms of propositions.³ It is here that the distinction between explicit and implicit revelation is to be found.

II. Truth is said to be revealed either immediately or mediately. Something is said to be immediately or formally revealed when it is revealed or manifested in its very self, that is, if the truth is manifested as such through a proposition or the terms of a proposition (as though one were to say to someone, “The treasure you were seeking over there”). By contrast, something is said to be mediately or virtually revealed when it is revealed in its principles or causes, that is, if there were revealed some principle by means of which:

either, through one’s own intellectual activity the truth or doctrine in question may be manifested to me (as if I were to reveal to someone else that a certain person X knows where a treasure is and is prepared to point out the location);
or if there were a reality that was revealed such that on the basis of knowing it I might arrive at knowledge of another teaching, whether by knowing an effect from a cause, or a cause from an effect, or a property from an essence, or an essence from a property, or in some similar way (as though I were to manifest to someone a divining rod by means of which he could discover a hidden treasure).

III. Immediate or formal revelation is again subdivided into explicit and implicit revelation.⁴ A given doctrine is said to be explicitly revealed when the very terms of the proposition or of revelation, precisely in virtue of what is signified thereby, manifest, contain, or express this doctrine. By contrast, a doctrine is said to be formally-implicitly revealed if it is expressed in revelation only by means of equivalent or equipollent terms or concepts.⁵

Thus, in day-to-day speech, we signify, communicate, and express our judgment or knowledge either:

Formally, immediately, and explicitly, inasmuch as we signify it in itself, indeed making use of terms that properly signify this meaning;
Or, implicitly, inasmuch as we express it directly, yes, and in itself, although not by means of its proper terms but, rather, by means of equivalent ones;
Or, only virtually and mediately, inasmuch as we signify or express something from which that truth can be deduced.

Thus, similarly, in Sacred Scripture:

It is immediately and explicitly revealed that Christ is begotten of the line of David (Mt. 1).
It is explicitly revealed that God is incarnate and has become man.
Likewise, according to the definition promulgated by the Council of Trent in its Decree on the Eucharist, it is explicitly revealed that, at the Last Supper, it is clearly reported that the Redeemer, with plain and unmistakable words, gave Himself and His body to His disciples, and this is the proper and most obvious meaning of his words.⁶
It is implicitly revealed that God wills this or that man to be saved, for it is explicitly revealed that He wills that all men be saved (1 Tim. 2:4). However, the proposition, “God wills that all men be saved,” is equivalent or equipollent to the proposition, “God wills that this or that man, inasmuch as he now exists, to be saved.”
In the revelation of the incarnation of God, it is implicitly revealed that God was made a rational animal, for in the common usage of the terms, “man” and “rational animal” are equivalent or equipollent.
Similarly, in the words of the Council of Trent concerning the institution of the Eucharist there is implicitly contained the truth that Christ is truly, really, and substantially in the Eucharist, for there is equivalence or equipollence between the two propositions, “Christ gave Himself and His body to His disciples,” and “the Body of Christ was there truly, really, and substantially,” although the words of Christ, “according to their proper and benefit signification,” only say that He “gave Himself and His body to His disciples.”
In the revelation of the Incarnation, it is virtually or mediately revealed that Christ had an agent intellect, for the proposition, “God was made man,” does not, by force of its proper signification, manifest that Christ had an agent intellect, something that consequently is not explicitly revealed. Nor does that proposition express this implicitly, since those two propositions are not equivalent and do not express the same doctrine. Rather, the proposition concerning Christ having an agent intellect says something more; that is, it expresses a new and different teaching.
Finally, in the words by which Christ instituted the Eucharist there is virtually contained the teaching that accidents really differ from the substance in which they inhere, for this [new truth] can be known and deduced from the reality instituted and revealed by Christ.

IV. Concerning an implicit meaning, we must take care to avoid two different kinds of errors. (1) The implicit meaning does not embrace everything that God knows concerning the given revealed reality. For although God entirely knows the reality that He reveals to us, He does not however manifest His entire knowledge concerning that reality, but only those things that are expressed in the terms in which the revelation is made.⁷ (2) However, the terms in which revelation is made are not to be interpreted merely according to their bare grammatical signification, but rather, must be interpreted in their connection with the words, literary genres, circumstances, and, especially, the intention of the speaker. And we might add the very true dictum of Billuart himself: “The words by which God entrusts His gifts to us are neither exaggerated nor hyperbolic, as though they were to express something more than the reality in question, but rather, are below His gifts’ own greatness.”⁸

V. Fr. Francisco Marín-Sola rejects the aforementioned distinction between immediate and mediate revelation as being insufficient and false.⁹ According to him, every truth or proposition which in itself, solely by knowledge or explication of its terms, without any deductive discourse, appears in an evident manner as being revealed, is formally or immediately revealed. By contrast, every truth that, in order to appear as being revealed, has need of being deduced from another distinct proposition, is mediately revealed. For, as he says, all knowledge is either immediate or mediate, intuitive or deduced. Such is his position.

Unless I am wrong, he confuses two different things with each other, namely the objective distinction of modes of revelation and the distinction of the mode of knowledge, considered from our perspective. For the distinction of revelation that we set forth above is objective, considered from the perspective of revelation itself, namely, inasmuch as a given truth is expressed in the very terms of revelation (whether in the proper meaning of the words or in an equivalent way) or only in its principal or cause. However, Fr. Marín-Sola draws his distinction from the manner in which a given doctrine is known from revelation, and this distinction is not based on the reality of revelation itself [non est ad rem], as we will soon see.

Similarly, Fr. Marin-Sola holds the concept of virtual revelation is a flawed notion drawn from Francisco Suarez. In defense of this claim,¹⁰ he distinguishes three ways that a property may be said to be virtually revealed:

He distinguishes between essential properties (ones that are metaphysical, aptitudinal, or radical, which are identical with the essence in question, such as the ability to laugh is radically found in man) and physical or actual properties, which are accidents that are really distinct from the essence in question.
He distinguishes between: the pure essence in abstracto (e.g., rational animal), the essence in its connatural state (that is, with all of its actual properties), and the essence in its integral or perfect state (that is with all of its acquired or acquirable perfections).

On this basis, he then posits a series of corollaries:

Upon the revelation of the pure or metaphysical essence, the essential properties are, properly speaking, virtually revealed. Similarly, upon the revelation of the integral and perfect essence, the physical and actual properties are virtually revealed and can, properly speaking, be deduced through a theological conclusion.
Upon the revelation of the pure essence (that is, the essence in abstracto), the physical and actual properties are not properly speaking virtually revealed, nor can they be deduced in the manner of a theological conclusion properly so-called. For they are not connected with the pure essence by means of an absolute necessity, since through God’s will and power the essence could exist without them. Thus, although the Eucharist is the body of Christ, and bodies are naturally circumscriptively in place, nonetheless, we cannot conclude that the body of Christ would be circumscriptively in the Eucharist.
The majority of manuals after Suarez have drawn back from this teaching, by reducing the virtually revealed (or conclusions properly so called) to conclusions belonging to the second corollary (i.e., which are concerned with actual properties that are really distinct from the revealed reality).

Now, the first two corollaries quite certainly and excellently lay out a distinction. However, the author seems to go too far in the third. Indeed, theologians, quite rightly, hold that what is revealed in revelation is not the essence and its pure and metaphysical state, but, rather, integrally and perfectly. Thus, if God is said to be made man, it is not said that such revelation involves the assumption of a mere or metaphysical human essence, but rather, the assumption of human nature in its integrity and perfection. Similarly, if it has been revealed that the body of Christ is in the Eucharist, it is not revealed that the metaphysical or bear essence of Christ’s body would be there but, rather, that Christ’s concrete, historical, and integral body is there. Thus, if one were to conclude from that, “Therefore, Christ has a soul and an intellect. Therefore, the members of the body of Christ are in the Eucharist,” this conclusion does not proceed from the notion of the metaphysical essence of man, nor from the bare essence of the body of Christ.

To prove the third corollary, Fr. Marín-Sola brings forth the text of Suarez, De fide, disp. 3, sect. 11, no. 5: “Virtual revelation is concerned with a property that is in no way formally contained in the reality spoken of, but is there only radically, as is the case for the aforementioned example concerning risibility, or other such things.” And, in another text in the same place:

Note that a proposition can be contained in another revealed [truth] in two ways. One hand, it can be contained as in a reality that is entirely the same as it or at least as a part contained there, though vaguely [confuse], according to our manner of conceiving. On the other hand, it can be contained there as something distinct or as an effect in a cause, just as in the immediately revealed proposition, “Christ is a man,” there is mediately or virtually [virtute] contained “Christ is risible.” Therefore, according to the first way of speaking about a mediately revealed proposition, it is true that a proposition opposed to it is heretical, for a proposition that is revealed in that manner is simpliciter De fide…. This is because, although that proposition is vaguely conceived of from our perspective and according to our manner of knowing and thus is said to be mediately revealed, nonetheless in itself it falls under (or is within the extent of) revelation, which even immediately extends to it to… However, when a proposition is revealed in the latter way and is not in itself defined by the Church,… this does not suffice for it to be De fide.

On the basis of these words Fr. Marín-Sola establishes that the Suarezian doctrine is: (1) those things that are identical with a formally revealed reality [re] themselves also pertain to faith, but not to theology; (2) virtual revelation is only concerned with realities that are really distinct from formally revealed realities.

However, unless I am mistaken, this involves an equivocation which is easily resolved by means of a distinction. Indeed, Fr. Marín-Sola is concerned with the real distinction of properties from their essences, whereas Suarez is concerned with whether something formally distinct is being taught in two different propositions. Therefore, Suarez’s position is this: a deduced proposition which formally declares the same thing as an immediately revealed proposition is of itself (or materially) immediately revealed; however, a deduced proposition that affirms something other than what is affirmed in a formally revealed proposition is only virtually revealed. Therefore, he is not concerned with whether deduced properties would be distinct from their essence but, rather, whether a deduced proposition affirms something different from a revealed proposition.

Thus, Fr. Marín-Sola quite excellently indeed drives home the point that a virtually revealed reality is not necessarily really distinct from a formally revealed reality. Similarly, however, Suarez himself, as well as the common teaching [of theologians], most excellently hold that something virtually revealed is not formally contained in the reality spoken of, but instead, is only there radically. In other words, the deduced conclusion is not equivalent or equipollent to the formally revealed proposition but, rather, involves objectively distinct knowledge.

Thus, upon the revelation of God’s existence there is simultaneously also virtually revealed all of the absolute attributes of God, such as, for example, God’s free will, the fact that He is the Creator of all things, and that He exercises providence concerning created realities—for all of these can be deduced from God’s existence. Virtually revealed truths like this are said to be “formally distinct” from the formally revealed existence of God because as regards the reality spoken of (or the knowledge manifested) formally speaking the existence of God is one thing and His freedom, the creation of the world, or Providence over created realities are other things, although from the perspective of the reality itself in question, God’s existence, freedom, creation, and Providence are all one and the same. What we have said concerning the threefold division of revelation will be made even clearer in what we will say in the following considerations.

VI. Any of these three modes of revelation are found in many and sundry forms.

First, something can be revealed explicitly in various ways, inasmuch as a reality or given knowledge can be signified or manifested in various ways in itself, directly and in proper terms. This can take place, in the following ways:

In a signified term (as when I say, “God is strong”) or a metaphorical term (as when I say, “God of hosts”), for the proper signification of a metaphorical expression is not the figure used, but rather that which is signified by means of it.¹¹
Clearly and distinctly or obscurely and vaguely [confuse], inasmuch as the reality or knowledge is more or less perfectly expressed.
In plain and unmistakable words, or more or less indirectly and obliquely. Therefore, John of St. Thomas rightly notes that explicit faith or revelation has a kind of latitude according to which something is more or less determinedly believed or revealed.¹² This fact is not always observed by all.

Second, a given doctrine can be implicitly revealed in various ways. According to the common position held by theologians, there are the following modes of implicit formal revelation:¹³

If the definitum is explicitly contained in the sources of revelation, the definition is implicitly revealed, and vice-versa.
If a whole is supposedly revealed, then its essential parts are implicitly revealed. Example, the fact that Christ is a man also implies that Christ has a body and soul. No, this requires us to distinguish between metaphysical, physical, and logical wholes. There is no doubt regarding the case of metaphysical wholes. As regards a physical whole, we should only consider to be implicitly revealed those parts that are constituent and integral, without which the whole in question could not exist. Surely, are not the following propositions contained under the proposition, “Christ is a man”: “Christ has a rational soul… an organic body… a heart, a head, and blood”? If the sources of revelation explicitly affirm or deny something concerning a logical whole, certainly they teach the same thing implicitly about the particular species or individuals that are evidently comprehended within that whole. Thus, along with an absolutely universal revealed proposition there are simultaneously and implicitly revealed particular propositions that are contained under it. However, if the universal proposition is conditional (such as, “every host that is consecrated in accord with correct ritual form contains the body of Christ”) the particular proposition is not revealed, unless the condition in question is absolutely satisfied (thus, it is not revealed that this given particular host contains the body of Christ).¹⁴

When one of two relative terms are revealed, its correlative is also revealed. Thus, contradictories or immediately contrary propositions are necessarily revealed together in this way: if one is revealed as being true the other is revealed as being false (e.g., on the basis of the revelation of the three divine persons in the Trinity, it is implicitly revealed that there are neither more nor less persons). Also, when an effect is revealed, its inseparable cause is revealed. Thus, the fact that John is the son of Zebedee and Zebedee is the father of John are both revealed if one of them is revealed.
If the sources of revelation explicitly contain both premises [of an argument], they implicitly contain the conclusion (not formally as a conclusion, but rather, as an object or materially). For example, it has been explicitly revealed that grace is required for every supernatural work, as well as that the beginning of faith is a supernatural act. Therefore, it is implicitly revealed that grace is required for the beginning of faith.

VII. However, here we must note that implicit revelation is not limited merely to the modes that we just indicated. For a given knowledge or reality can be implicitly signified and manifested in as many modes as there are modes of expressing a given proposition or doctrine equivalently or equipollently—and such modes are quasi-infinite. Indeed, in how many equivalent modes do we express our ideas in day-to-day life! So too, dogmas, after having been defined, are revealed in very different ways in Sacred Scripture or Tradition in equivalent or equipollent forms. Nay, Sacred Scripture itself expresses teachings that in one place are stated explicitly, whereas they are implicitly found in other places variously and are referred to as being equivalent. Thus, Sacred Scripture reveals implicitly and equivalently the formula of the Trinity inasmuch as in various places the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are presented as being one God. It teaches Christ’s twofold nature inasmuch as it here and there attributes to Him properly human and divine actions. It reveals the sevenfold Number of the sacraments inasmuch as it contains, in various places, the elements that are gathered together and compared to each other so that that collective truth might arise. Generally speaking, it teaches dogmatic formulas through terms and concepts that are equipollent. And so forth. Thus, the divinity of Christ is expressed equivalently by means of terms and forms such as: “splendor of the glory and figure of the substance” of God (Hebrews 1:3), “bearing all things by the word of God’s power” (ibid.), who is seated at the right hand of the seat of majesty in heaven (Hebrews 8:1), or “who sits at the right hand of the Father” and “is the image of the invisible God, the first born of all creatures” (Colossians 1:15), in whom “all things were created… He [who] before all things, and all things hold together in Him” (Colossians 1:16–17), He “who, being in the form of God, did not deem it robbery to be equal with God” (Philippians 2:6), etc. It is clear to anyone who diligently considers the concrete details of the history of dogmas that the dogmas of faith are implicitly revealed less so through things to be defined or universal formulas than through various equivalent manners of speaking.¹⁵

(3) Finally, virtual revelation admits various modes, in as much as something is revealed variously in its principles or causes. In one way or other it is contained in revelation or is deduced from it: presupposing faith, theological conclusions properly so called, judgments concerning dogmatic facts, beatification of Saints and the approval of religious orders.¹⁶ However, also, theological conclusions, properly so called, are virtually revealed in various ways, namely, in accord with all the various ways in which conclusions can be contained in their principles. But, if it is commonly said that something is virtually revealed when it is contained in a revealed reality as properties are contained in an essence, or effects in a cause, or vice versa, only some of the primary modes are indicated. Thus, in one manner [ratione] is the absolute freedom of God deduced from His perfection, whereas in another way [ratione] is the agent intellect deduced from Christ’s human nature or the real distinction of accidents from the essence in which they inhere deduced from the dogma of transubstantiation.

VIII. Now, up to this point we have properly considered the threefold manner in which a given determinate truth can be revealed, namely: in its very self (immediately or formally), whether in express terms or concepts (explicitly) or in equivalent terms or concepts (implicitly); or only in its principal (mediately and virtually). However, from what has been said, it likewise follows how it is that revealed [truths] variously relate to each other. Let us suppose three, different ways a proposition might be revealed:

(a) Explicitly revealed: the Word was made flesh (man).

(b) Implicitly revealed: the Word is hypostatically united to the human nature of Christ.

(c) Virtually revealed (whatever the truth of this Thomist conclusion): the supposit is really distinct from nature or essence.

If the implicitly revealed proposition is compared to that which is explicitly revealed, the implicitly revealed one is an explication, determination, and scientific formulation of the explicitly revealed proposition. From this, you can see the meaning of saying that something that is implicitly revealed is vaguely [confuse] revealed. Namely, what is meant is: the doctrine that is said to be implicitly revealed is contained vaguely or obscurely in the explicitly revealed doctrine, so that such an explanation is necessary so that it may be known distinctly and actually. Therefore, Suarez excellently says that something that is implicitly revealed would not be known if only the explicitly revealed [truth] were known. Thus, the doctrine concerning the hypostatic union is only vaguely and obscurely revealed in the words of John [the Theologian / Evangelist], “The Word was made flesh,” and would not be known if one only knew the explicit meaning of those words. Thus, dogmatic progress is said to be an explication of revealed [truths] in as much as that which is implicitly, vaguely, and obscurely revealed comes to be known explicitly, distinctly, and actually through explanation. Therefore, through the implicitly revealed doctrine, revealed realities come to be known more perfectly and more distinctly. Thus, the Eucharist is more perfectly and distinctly known through the implicitly revealed doctrine of the true, real, and substantial presence (that is, through the doctrine of transubstantiation) than solely through the explicitly revealed words, “This is my body.” Similarly, Christ is more perfectly known through the doctrine of the hypostatic union than through the Johannine dictum, “The Word became flesh.” Thus, defined dogmas in general express the revealed reality or doctrine more distinctly, clearly, and determinedly then does explicit revelation itself. And dogmatic progress and the explication of faith properly speaking consists in this.¹⁷

But if something mediately or virtually revealed is compared to that which is immediately or formally revealed, immediately revealed truth is not only the explication or determination of the proposition or doctrine immediately revealed but, rather, is a consequence [sequela] or conclusion deduced from it. It is in this way that it is said to be revealed virtually, or in its principle. Therefore, a virtually revealed proposition involves formally knowing something different from what is formally revealed. Thus, the virtually revealed proposition, “supposit (or hypostasis) is really distinct from nature or essence” (in created realities) involves the knowing of something that has formally distinct from explicitly revealed truths. For the doctrine that is said to be a principle is something different from that which is deduced from the principle.¹⁸ Nor does it follow that immediate and mediate revelation necessarily are concerned with different realities; indeed, it can be concerned with different realities (for discursive reasoning by its very nature can go from one reality to another), but it is not necessarily concerned with realities that are diverse (for discourse is indeed from one thing to another, though to another either according to reality or according to its notion [ratio], that is, to another truth or doctrine). Thus, from the revelation of the existence of God, I can deduce God’s freedom and His Providence over created realities. And in such a case one in the same reality is involved.¹⁹ Similarly, however, the real distinction between supposit and nature can be deduced from the doctrine of the hypostatic union, and the real distinction between substance and accidents from the doctrine of Eucharistic transubstantiation – and in these cases there are different realities [corresponding to the truths objectively asserted].

Therefore, it is likewise clear what the implicitly revealed is comparison with virtually revealed. Certainly, an implicitly revealed doctrine and one that is virtually revealed both add a kind of new knowledge over and above that which is explicitly revealed; however, the newness in question is different. Explicitly and implicitly revealed doctrines have the same formally known objects, though they involve different rationes. Thus, Christ can be known from the perspective [sub ratione] of filiation or that of consubstantiality, or from the perspective of the Incarnation or that of the hypostatic union. So too, the Eucharist can be known from the perspective of the real presence of the body of Christ or that of transubstantiation. And the perfection of the Blessed Virgin Mary can be considered either from the perspective of her perfect holiness or that of her preservation from original sin. Other examples could abound. However, by contrast, a doctrine that is only virtually revealed declares something formally known that is different from an explicitly or implicitly revealed doctrine. For example, neither the doctrine concerning the real distinction of accidents from substance in which they inhere, nor that concerning the distinction of supposit from nature declare truths that are formally known in explicitly or implicitly revealed truths. Thus, explicitly and implicitly revealed truths declare the same objective concept, though they involve different formal concepts. By contrast, virtually revealed truths declare an objective concept that differs from that which is formally revealed, whether concerning two distinct realities or about the same reality.²⁰

Article Seven: On the Way We Know Things that are Revealed to Us in Various Ways

The distinction among the kinds of revealed truths presented in the previous article is objective, taken from the side of revelation, that is, according to the manner in which a given doctrine is manifested in revelation itself. But, from that distinction of revelation there likewise follows the manner in which we, from our own perspective, variously know revealed truths. However, the object of the distinction of revelation does not coincide with the subjective distinction [differentia] of our knowledge.

I. Those things that are formally-explicitly revealed (that is, are the explicit sense of Sacred Scripture and Tradition), presupposing knowledge of revelation of that text or expression, are known inasmuch as the meaning of the terms of revelation are known or determined (e.g., knowledge concerning what is signified by the terms “Word” and “was made flesh”). Now, that which at first sight seems to be a rather simple affair, nonetheless not rarely, indeed quite regularly, involves great (and very often the greatest of) difficulty. For the sake of argument, consider the whole history of exegesis and, indeed, that of dogmas. Think of how many expositions and senses have been given to this one expression: “The Word was made flesh”! Who has to this very day exhausted the meaning of our Lord’s words, “I am the vine and you the branches” (John 15:5)? Cardinal Billot most excellently noted this fact:

What should here be noted is that one must not confuse what is signified by the express words in a given proposition with what is perceived at first glance upon a single reading or hearing of what is proposed. For it can happen that the meaning of its words come to be known only following upon much study, and therefore many explicitly revealed truths become apparent only following upon many arguments. And I am speaking of those kind of arguments which alone suffice for making clear, in a determinate context and in accord with the rules of hermeneutics, the suppositio, force, and connection of the terms in question.²¹

Rightly as well did the Salmanticenses hold that the ready and easy understanding that we now have concerning certain texts of Sacred Scripture must be attributed to the explanation that the Church provides today.

Now, the reason for this difficulty arises from two sources:

From the general kind of ambiguity and obscurity of the terms of human speech, which gives rise to such great difficulties and variations already in the exposition of other books more broadly;
But also, in a particular way, from the metaphorical speech used by Sacred Scripture, as well as by the very objective difficulty and sublimity of revealed doctrine.

Thus, St. Basil the Great writes, “One form of this silence is the obscurity employed in Scripture, which makes the meaning of ‘dogmas’ difficult to be understood for the very advantage of the reader.”²² Likewise, drawing on St. Augustine’s De doctrina Christiana, St. Thomas develops a similar thought in his seventh quodlibetal question:

God has appointed that the truth in Sacred Scripture would be manifested to our knowledge only with some difficulty, and this is of use in order to overturn human contempt, for greater attention is devoted to those things that are difficult, thereby overcoming weariness. Likewise, when man can grasp the truth of Sacred Scripture only with difficulty, this likewise helps to do away with an occasion for pride. Similarly, in this way, the truth of faith is defended against mockery by unbelievers.²³

Likewise, in another place, he states: “However, these few things that are revealed to us are proposed to us in the form of words that are obscure and that make use of likenesses, so that we might manage to grasp them only following upon dedicated study. Others, however, venerate them as being, as it were, hidden, and unbelievers find it impossible to attack them.”²⁴ And Domingo Bañez adds: “The majesty of the divine scriptures demanded, by its own rights, that the greatest number of most hidden senses might be hidden in them, and that the greatest mysteries might be embraced within the briefest words.”²⁵

Such was most excellently set forth by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical Providentissimus Deus:

For the language of the Bible is employed to express, under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, many things which are beyond the power and scope of the reason of man - that is to say, divine mysteries and all that is related to them. There is sometimes in such passages a fullness and a hidden depth of meaning which the letter hardly expresses and which the laws of interpretation (leges hermeneuticae) hardly warrant… Wherefore it must be recognized that the sacred writings are wrapped in a certain religious obscurity, and that no one can enter into their interior without a guide; God so disposing, as the Holy Fathers commonly teach, in order that men may investigate them with greater ardor and earnestness, and that what is attained with difficulty may sink more deeply into the mind and heart; and, most of all, that they may understand that God has delivered the Holy Scriptures to the Church, and that in reading and making use of His Word, they must follow the Church as their guide and their teacher.²⁶

Therefore, formally-explicitly revealed [truths] can be known by us in two ways:

Either, immediately, that is, upon hearing or reading the terms of revelation such as we now know the meaning of a great number of texts of Sacred Scripture;
Or mediately, that is, by inquiry, determining the meaning of a given text by means of various arguments, even scientific ones, as is done in the practice of exegesis or in dogmatic theology. Thus, the Council of Trent, stated²⁷ that, through the words, “This is my body,” the Lord, “declared in plain, unmistakable words”—that is, formally-explicitly—“that he was giving to them his own body.” However, think about how many difficult arguments are necessary for Catholic exegetes and dogmatic theologians to demonstrate this meaning in response to Protestants!²⁸

II. Implicitly revealed truths can be known through determination of the equivalent or equipollent meaning of the words. Such determination requires even greater labor than the determination of the explicit meaning, and it always presupposes the notion, at least in some form, of the explicit meaning.

However, just as something can be implicitly revealed in various ways, so too can an implicitly revealed truth also be known in various ways. Now, all of these ways generally can be reduced to two, namely the analytic and synthetic. The analytical way is used for setting forth: how a particular proposition is found in a universal one; how a part is in a whole; how a negation is opposed to an affirmation and vice versa; and how a correlative is known in a given relation. By means of the synthetic way, various revealed doctrines are gathered together into one, as for example the revealed teaching concerning the divinity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are gathered together and the dogma of the Holy Trinity. By contrast you have the example of the analytic way used by the Second Synod of Orange, which, in light of the words of the Apostle, “For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God” (Ephesians 2:8), distinguishes two truths, namely, as is the case for the growth of faith, so to the very beginning of faith is not naturally in our power, but rather is given to us through the gift of grace.²⁹ Likewise, when the [First] Vatican Council sets forth the infallibility of the teaching Church (cf. Mt. 28:20; John 14:26 and 16:12–13), it thus distinguishes that the Church has received the revealed teaching as something that “has been committed to the spouse of Christ as a divine trust to be faithfully kept and infallibly declared.”³⁰

However, since the implicit meaning is a doctrine that is equivalent or equipollent to its explicit sense, knowledge of the implicit sense not only presupposes knowledge of the explicit sense and its determination in some way but also presupposes even knowledge of this equivalent doctrine as well as the comparison of the two to each other, so that their equivalence might be affirmed. Thus, for example, the consubstantiality of the Word to the Father is implicitly contained (that is, as an equivalent affirmation) in “the Word” or “the Divine Son.” However, in order to know that the Word is consubstantial to the Father, one first must have knowledge concerning the Word, or the Son, then, secondly, knowledge of the term consubstantiality (to the Father), and thirdly, knowledge that these two are equivalent to each other (namely the word or the son of God and consubstantiality).

Therefore, implicitly revealed [truths] are known through concepts that are equivalent to the explicitly revealed concept. This can come about by means of either immediate or mediate knowledge:

Immediate, if the equivalence between the two concepts is known immediately upon the proposal of the formally revealed concept (e.g. that Christ is the Son of God) and its equivalent concept (Christ is consubstantial to the Father);
Mediate if the equivalence is known only by way of syllogistic deduction, as, in the aforementioned example, the equivalence of Divine Filiation and consubstantiality to the Father is found to be demonstrated through the great deductive labors of the Fathers and later theologians. Now, a priori and, even more, upon the examination of history, it is clear that implicitly revealed truths are most often known by us only mediately, through difficult and often scientific inquiry and deduction, although, once this inquiry and demonstration has been performed, the equivalence is sometimes immediately clear to some, as is the case for the example of the equivalence between “Son of God” and “consubstantial to the Father.”

III. Virtually revealed [truths] are known as being something contained or manifested in a formally revealed truth (whether that truth be explicit or implicit) as in its principal or its cause. This kind of knowledge requires (a) knowledge concerning the meaning of the formally revealed truth in question and (b) knowledge concerning a given teaching’s connection with the formally revealed teaching in which it is contained as in a principal. Now, absolutely speaking, this connection sometimes can be immediately known (at least after one has knowledge through acquired deductive reflection), although, as a rule it is only known through deduction or discourse. Therefore, we mediately know virtually revealed [truths] from revelation:

Either solely objectively, inasmuch as revelation manifests to us only the principal in which such a truth might be known;
Or also subjectively, inasmuch as properly through discursive reasoning they are known from a revealed principle.

IV. Therefore, revealed truths can be known by us in various ways, through cognition that is either immediate or mediate—including in the case of that which is explicitly revealed—and therefore through discourse. And, up to the present day, this has been the cause of many theological debates, for it then seems to deny the distinction of revealed truths set forth earlier and likewise to endanger definability of implicitly revealed truths. Nonetheless, this entire difficulty arises from the confusion between the objective distinction of the kinds of revelation and the subjective distinction of our various ways of knowing revelation. The objective distinction is drawn in a view of the way that are given doctrine is manifested in revelation itself; the distinction drawn in terms of mediacy and immediacy is drawn from the perspective of our knowledge. Now, both the distinction of revelation and the definability of a given doctrine properly and exclusively depends upon the fact and mode of revelation.

V. Post-Tridentine theologians distinguish between two types of discourse or syllogism: discourse improperly so-called (explicative discourse) and discourse properly so called (illative discourse). If one correctly understands this distinction, this whole issue finds an excellent explanation. For a syllogism can be considered from two different perspectives. On the one hand, it can be considered purely formally, that is, as a logical form for deducing a given conclusion. On the other hand, it can be considered materially, that is, as regards the knowledge to be acquired or deduced. Now, if the syllogism is considered only formally, then, we make use of syllogistic logic in exactly the same way, using exactly the same logical laws, as when we know truths that are explicitly, implicitly, or virtually revealed. That is, when we know a formally revealed [truth], we make use of syllogistic logic in order to determine the meaning of revelation by means of equivalent concepts; however, when we know a virtually revealed truth, we do so in order to know consequences that are drawn from formal revelation. For this reason, the syllogism that is used for determining a formally revealed truth is called an explicative syllogism, whereas the syllogism used in drawing a doctrine that is virtually revealed is referred to as an illative syllogism. Therefore, when we speak of an improper (or explicative) syllogism, we do not mean that we make use of something that is less truly a syllogism but, rather, that an improper syllogism only sets forth a doctrine that was already revealed in itself, being expressed and known through different concepts. By contrast, a proper syllogism is used to deduce a consequence [sequla] of a revealed doctrine.³¹

VI. Fr. Francisco Marín-Sola has argued against the position that makes use of the distinction between proper and improper discourse.³²

First of all, he rightly denies that proper discourse requires passage from one reality to another, really distinct reality. Second, he energetically defends the claim that many dogmas have been deduced by theologians by means of proper and true, metaphysical discourse. And we quite readily concede—nay, affirm—this. Third, he distinguishes proper and improper discourse as follows: an improper syllogism is had (1) if one passes only to a distinct term, (2) in cases solely involving (nominal) explanation, or (3) or when the only thing being explained is the meaning of the terms, such that no new concept is involved; a proper syllogism is had if there is at least a distinction from one idea to another distinct idea.

Now, as it is proposed, such a distinction is without a doubt legitimate. However, it does not correspond to the historical distinction between a proper and an improper syllogism. For, an improper syllogism is not therefore called explicative as though it only sets forth the meaning of the terms of revelation in different words, but rather, likewise involves explaining the explicitly revealed doctrine in different [distinctis] concepts. Therefore, Fr. Marín-Sola’s distinction does not coincide with the one that we historically find in scholastic authors, but rather is a sub-distinction within the notion of an improper (or explicative) syllogism, namely, in as much as the explicitly revealed doctrine would be determined either through the concepts of revelation itself or by means of other, equivalent concepts.

In another place, Fr. Marín-Sola distinguishes between a proper syllogism in which the deductive middle term is a new and distinct reality, and a (proper) syllogism whose middle term is only a distinct concept.³³ Nonetheless, an improper (or explicative) syllogism can also involve a concept concerning a different reality as its middle term, as is clear in exegetical demonstrations. Nor, is it necessary that the conclusion be concerned with a really distinct reality if the deductive middle term is a distinct reality.

Finally, the distinction between discourse by way of inclusion (if the reasoning involves passing to a reality that is only virtually distinct) and by way of connection (if it involves passing to a really distinct reality) coincides with the distinction between improper and proper discourse, at least if the terms included and connected refer not to the reality in question but a revealed doctrine, so that in the former case a formally revealed doctrine would be explained and determined by another (included in revealed doctrine) and in the latter there would be the deduction of a doctrine that is in revelation only as contained in a principle (connected with revealed doctrine).³⁴

Thus, the distinction between an improper and proper syllogism is completely in agreement with that between formal and virtual revelation. Both are objective, taken from the perspective of the revealed and known doctrine. However, we here must note something of great importance.

VII. As is clear, what we have said must be understood formally, that is as holding for knowledge of explicitly, implicitly, or virtually revealed [truths] inasmuch as they are known as explicitly, implicitly, or virtually revealed, but not if they are understood from some other perspective [sub alia ratione]. Three things must be noted here.

First. One and the same revealed doctrine can be found either explicitly, implicitly, or virtually in various texts of Sacred Scripture or in both Scripture and Tradition. Thus, the proposition, “Christ was sorrowful” is explicitly revealed in Mt. 26:38 (“My soul is very sorrowful”), whereas it is implicitly or virtually revealed in John 1:14 (“The Word was made flesh”). Thus, one and the same doctrine can be known as explicitly revealed in one text while being known as implicitly or virtually revealed in another. That is, the doctrine that is known as being formally revealed in one text can be deduced from another as virtually or implicitly revealed.

Second. We can know one and the same implicitly revealed doctrine on the basis of one and the same explicitly revealed revelation in a way that is either implicitly or virtually revealed. Thus, for example, there is the formally revealed proposition: God was made man. This proposition implicitly contains the truth that Christ has a body and rational soul, for the term “man” in common uses signifies both, at least equivalently. Therefore, I can solely through analysis, at least by way of an explicative syllogism, draw from formal revelation itself, by way of knowledge of the implicit meaning, knowledge that Christ had a body and rational soul, and thus refute Apollinarianism. However, I can deduce this same knowledge in the form of virtual revelation by means of the following kind of syllogism: it has been revealed that God was made man; now, based on my philosophical knowledge of man, I know that man is made up of a body and rational soul; therefore, Christ had a rational soul. In this way I would refute Apollinarianism by means of a truth known in the light of virtual revelation. Moreover, nothing prevents me from knowing a given, determinate doctrine, from whatsoever revealed text, when it has some connection that can be established by means of many theological conclusions, as often takes place in theology.

Third. In the history of dogmas, a great number of formally revealed doctrines (implicitly, and indeed explicitly revealed ones) have been deduced by theologians not in a direct manner in the light of explicit or implicit formal revelation, nor solely through the explanation of the text in which the explicitly or implicitly revealed truth was contained, but rather, in light of virtual revelation. Heretics in particular, almost as a general practice, have set aside the texts that explicitly or implicitly contain the doctrine that they are fighting against, then deducing their heresies from other texts, whether they are pertinent or not. Thus, in response, Catholic theologians strove to deduce the orthodox doctrine from these are those other texts. Similarly, however, the Fathers at the same time regularly deduced doctrines or explicitly revealed truths from other revealed truths, whether in Sacred Scripture or Tradition. Thus, Saint Athanasius argued against the Arians by setting forth the consubstantiality and divinity of the Word by way of deduction from the fact that the Word was begotten³⁵ as well as from the doctrine in tradition concerning how we are deified through Christ.³⁶ St. Cyril of Alexandria deduced the hypostatic union from the dogma of redemption through Christ.³⁷ The Synod of Alexandria (362) condemned the teaching of Apollinaris on the basis of two different reasonings: first, because man cannot exist without a human spirit; secondly, because the word in Christ not only brought about salvation of the body but also of the soul and therefore also Himself assumed a soul.³⁸ In the same way, Pope Damasus, in the chapter “Miramur” argued:

“These falsely assert an imperfect humanity in the Son of Man. But if, indeed, he assumed an imperfect manhood, then the gift of God is imperfect, and our salvation is imperfect, because the entire man is not saved…We, however, who know that we have been saved completely and perfectly, confess, according to the profession of the Catholic Church, that the perfect God has assumed perfect humanity.”³⁹

Thus, St. Thomas also rather regularly deduces, in light of virtual revelation, formally revealed doctrines, doing so from one formally revealed truth to another.

VIII. Therefore, the greatest attention must be given to the difference between how it is that a given doctrine is objectively revealed (explicitly, implicitly, or virtually), and how a given doctrine is known subjectively, from our perspective. For the question concerning the definability of a given doctrine is founded on the mode of revelation involved in that truth. This will be clearer in the course of the following articles concerned with dogmatic definitions and the definability of theological conclusions.

Article Eight: On Dogmatic Definitions

As⁴⁰ is clear from the definition of what a dogma is, a dogma is constituted only through the definitive proposition of this truth by the Church. Thus, the explication of revealed [truths] involved in establishing a dogma is only brought to completion by a definitive judgment by the Church. Nonetheless, the whole process of explaining the faith prior to the ultimate definition of that dogma is the work of the Church. Four the explication is presented by theologians as though through an instrument or minister of the Church, who as such are illuminated by the Holy Spirit, as is especially clear in the cases of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Moreover, the whole Church watches over, direct, and promotes—whether directly or indirectly—the entire process of explication. In particular, the Church prepares for the definitive explication of the dogma in question by means of various intermediary judgments, especially by condemning errors that are opposed to the doctrine of faith, and in this way she influences the process of explication. Finally, the Church preserves faith in revelation and, therefore, with the greatest of efficacy, exercises mastery over the entire explication of revealed [truths]. Thus, the whole process of the explication of revealed [truths], even prior to the ultimate dogmatic definition, to the degree that it tends toward the establishment of dogmas, is the work of the Church, especially the Ecclesia docens, the Church as teacher. Nonetheless, a formal and definitive completion [complementum] is had in the infallible judgment of the Church when she proposes an explanation of revelation as a dogma to be believed. Therefore, we must ask how a dogmatic definition is related to the explication that has already been given for it. We will lay this out in the following propositions.

I. In a dogmatic definition, the Church (whether the Pope or a General Council) brings forth a new and distinct judgment concerning the revealed [truths] to be explained, namely, in as much as she declares a given doctrine as being a legitimate explication of revelation and proposes it has something to be believed by all the faithful. This is clear upon consideration of the history of the Church and that of dogmas.

II. The Church does not bring forth this kind of judgment either under the influence of inspiration (as is the case for the inspired authors of Sacred Scripture), nor through a new revelation,⁴¹ but by means of a proper, human form of knowledge, either acquired by way of study (as is most generally the case) or by supernatural infusion.

III. Therefore, when the Church brings forth such a statement, she judges by means of human cognition and its normal conditions. And this is why: (1) the Church only successively proposes given explications; (2) dogmas in general appear only as a kind of mature fruit from the explications offered by the Fathers and theologians; and (3) defined dogmas are reminiscent of the condition and spirit of theology at the time when they were pronounced.

IV. When she brings forth her definitive statement, the Church makes use of the labors, science, demonstration, and explication offered by the Fathers and theologians as means of cognition, as is clear from the examination of history. However, when she makes use of theological teaching in this way, the Church exercises her judgment independently, in accord with her own judgment and her own authority. Thus, the decree Lamentabili rightly condemns the sixth modernist proposition: “The ‘Church learning’ and the ‘Church teaching’ collaborate in such a way in defining truths that it only remains for the ‘Church teaching’ to sanction the opinions of the ‘Church learning.’”⁴² Thus, whenever the Church approves and explication provided by theologians, she nonetheless does so in as much as she knows and declares it to be a legitimate explication of the truth in question. However, the Church often proposes in her definition a new explication or herself defines and expresses the theologians’ teaching, at least in better and more exact terms.⁴³ Finally, the definition generally is made in order to decide: whether a given teaching proposed by theologians is true; which teaching proposed by theologians is true; or, how the teaching of the Fathers is to be interpreted.

V. Now, although when the Church knows revealed truths she proceeds by means of human cognition and its normal conditions, she is infallible in the definitive statement brought forth with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, such that the explication proposed is not only relatively truer than others but is the true explication, simply speaking. By the divine power assisting her, in the statement to be brought forth (though this is also true in the preparation for the definition), the Church is negatively preserved from error and positively illuminated so that the revealed [truth] may be rightly known and explained and so that she may rightly judge concerning the revealed character of a given doctrine or whether a given explication is legitimate. Although the Church knows the statement to be defined by means of human cognition and its normal conditions, the notion of infallibility stands exclusively in the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit, but not in the reasons for the formed judgment.⁴⁴

VI. Finally, the infallible judgment or infallibility of the Church in a given dogmatic definition does not bear upon the truth of the theological deduction or its knowledge properly [as theological] but, rather, immediately in the truth of the very doctrine that has been proposed or, more exactly, in the fact that the proposed doctrine is revealed. And this was why the infallibility of the Church or the assistance of the Holy Spirit was promised, so that she might faithfully guard the deposit of faith and infallibly declare or exposit it.

Thus, the Church’s magisterium does indeed approve the conclusions brought forth by theologians and proposes them for belief. However, she does not do so precisely in as much as they are conclusions, nor in as much as they are known by way of deduction from these theologians’ arguments—nay, not even from the arguments of the Fathers of a Council or the Pope—but rather, does so in as much as, objectively speaking, from the perspective of reality and doctrine, they are expositions of revealed doctrine and hands are themselves revealed. In this sense, John of St. Thomas teaches: “When she defines,… the Church passes from the discourse and disputation by which she inquired into whether this was contained in gods revelation to immediate testification to the faith, because it is thus seen to be from the Holy Spirit, not because it had been debated.”⁴⁵

Thus, the teaching concerning the immaculate conception of the blessed virgin Mary, which had been certainly known by theologians in the form of a deduction, came to be defined as a doctrine, “revealed by God and, therefore, to be firmly and constantly believed by all the faithful.”⁴⁶ Similarly, the doctor and concerning Papal infallibility was defined as a “divinely revealed dogma.”⁴⁷ Or, sometimes in the dogmatic definition itself one part of the definition is defined as being a consequence of another part. Thus, the [First] Vatican Council first defined that the pope is infallible when he speaks ex cathedra; then, it added: “And therefore such definitions of the Roman pontiff are therefore irreformable of themselves, not because of the Church’s consent”⁴⁸ Likewise, in the Anti-Modernist Oath, the following are proposed for belief: “That God… through whom all things were made… can certainly be known and therefore can also be demonstrated to exist.” As is at least clear in the definition from the [First] Vatican Council,⁴⁹ both parts of the definition or defined as revealed doctrines: the first is proposed simpliciter, and the other (as regards our way of conceiving things at least) as a consequence of the first, though too is likewise asserted as being a revealed doctrine.

Therefore, in her dogmatic definitions, the Church proceeds according to a way of knowing that is properly human, making use of inquiries and deductions. However, as regards the doctrine to be defined, infallibly judging with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, she only defines the revealed doctrine in question, although it is declared and set forth [with reasons that she judges to be apt to this proposition]. Thus, the revealed truth of definitions and the infallibility of the Church is easily reconciled with the historical facts of the history of dogmas. Likewise, this also resolves the question concerning the object of dogmatic definitions, in particular concerning definability of theological conclusions.

Article Nine: On the Definability of Theological Conclusions

1. Status quaestionis. A theological conclusion is a proposition or teaching that is deduced from revelation by means of discursive reasoning. It is called a “conclusion” and as much as it is known through discourse; it is said to be “theological” in as much as it is deduced from revelation. Therefore, a theological conclusion presupposes revealed truth, though such a conclusion is drawn from it only by means of discourse, properly so called. Thus, as we have seen, many theologians hold that theological conclusions are, simply speaking, virtually revealed. And this is the source of the difficulty involved in this question, as we discussed earlier.⁵⁰ Therefore, we must ask whether conclusions like this could be defined as dogmas to be held by divine faith.

Now, while looking to resolve this question, however, we first must presuppose that the Church certainly is infallible even concerning virtually revealed [truths] (or, theological conclusion) for otherwise she would not be able to fulfill her duty of faithfully guarding and infallibly declaring the deposit of faith. As we have already seen, this kind of infallibility is not indeed that of a defined dogma but, nonetheless, is that of a Catholic and certain doctrine.⁵¹ Nor must churches in fallible judgment concerning those things that are connected with revelation be confused with the dogmatic definition of a revealed truth namely by which a given doctrine is proposed as something to be believed as a divinely revealed [truth].

Second, similarly, it is clear that all formally revealed [truths] are certainly definable as dogmas, not only ones that are explicitly revealed but also those that are implicitly-formally revealed. For it is clear from the notion of dogma that it is a truth that has been revealed and proposed by the Church for belief; it is taught through the Church’s continuous practice that she defines not only explicitly revealed [truths] but also implicitly revealed ones as well; it is confirmed through the common teaching of theologians;⁵² and finally, it follows from the very notion of that which is implicitly revealed. Indeed, an implicitly revealed [truth] is in itself revealed, although only through an equivalent concept. Indeed, revelation, definitions, and faith, do not terminate in (formal) concepts or in their terms but, rather, in [our] knowledge or teaching about realities themselves, for we only form concepts in order that through them we might have knowledge concerning realities.⁵³

Therefore, the difficulty is twofold. First of all, and properly speaking, it is concerned with truths or doctrines that are only virtually revealed. Now, the solution to this question is rendered difficult by the various and vague ways that people understand the notion of virtual (or mediate) revelation, as we set forth earlier. Secondly, there is the problem concerning the definability of theological conclusions precisely as such, namely, inasmuch as a doctrine deduced from revelation by way of syllogistic reasoning does not seem to be able to constitute an object for the assent of faith, which takes place properly and exclusively on account of the authority of God who reveals. Now, the resolution of this question is intertwined with the confusion of virtual revelation with theological conclusions [as such], as we saw earlier in the writings of a number of theologians.⁵⁴

II. However, the resolution of this question properly follows from what we said, on the one hand, concerning the objective distinction between formally and virtually revealed [truths]⁵⁵ and, on the other, about our mode of knowledge concerning things that are revealed in various ways.⁵⁶ For this way the true concept of virtual revelation is provided and the confusion a virtual revelation with theological conclusions is done away with. Indeed, we must distinguish between theological conclusions quoad se (i.e., doctrines that are only virtually revealed) and theological conclusions quoad nos tantum (i.e., doctrines that objectively, or from the perspective of revelation, are formally revealed, whether implicitly or explicitly, though, from our perspective, or according to our manner of knowing, they are known from revelation only through discursive reasoning). Thus, a theological conclusion quoad se refers to a doctrine that objectively, from the perspective of revelation itself, is only virtually revealed (i.e., the only thing that is revealed is the principle from which that teaching could be known by discourse); by contrast, a theological conclusion quoad nos refers to a teaching that we know in some way from a given revealed truth by way of discourse. Therefore, theological conclusion quoad nos tantum is a teaching that objectively, from the perspective of revelation itself, is formally revealed (whether expressly or in equivalent terms), though we only know it by way of deduction from revelation.

The distinction between conclusions quoad se and quoad nos (tantum) coincides with the distinction between proper and improper conclusions. For a proper conclusion refers to a teaching that is objectively contained in revelation only as in a principal or a cause. Therefore, such a conclusion, properly speaking, is a consequence [sequela vel consequentia] of revealed doctrine. Thus, properly speaking and simpliciter it is called a “conclusion.” An improper conclusion refers to a teaching that objectively speaking is only an exposition, precise expression, or determination of a revealed doctrine itself, though subjectively speaking, from our perspective, it is known by way of deduction from revealed truths. It is called an “improper” conclusion not because there is something truly lacking in the argumentation itself, but rather, because from the perspective of the object (that is, of the doctrine that is known), one does not thereby know a consequence [sequela vel consequentia] of revelation but, rather, the reveal doctrine itself, though in a more fully exposited or determinate form.

Thus, we will use the terms “proper conclusion” and “conclusion quoad se” interchangeably. So too for “improper conclusion” and “conclusion quoad nos tantum.”

However, in order to avoid all ambiguity and confusion of terms, we should note the various ways that many Thomists use these and related terms.

As we noted earlier, conclusions are called “theological” on two heads: (a) and as much as they are the object of theology, by which we know revealed [truth] itself by way of conclusion; (b) and as much as they are properly speaking conclusions deduced from revealed [truths].

The first is how Capreolus (and following up on him, in general, older Thomists) understood the nature of “theological” conclusions. For this reason, they spoke of “properly theological” conclusions to refer to those that are concerned with formally revealed doctrines, which they explain or determined or prove. The second is how more recent Thomists spoke of “theological conclusions.” Thus, they spoke of “proper theological conclusions” to refer to those kinds of conclusions that are concerned with consequences of revealed [truths]. Our usage will be in line with the second [more recent terminology].

Hence, we will respond to the question before us with two propositions.

III. Proposition 1. Theological conclusions quoad se (i.e., teachings that are only virtually revealed) cannot be defined as dogmas.⁵⁷ Based on what we have already said, this proposition can be summarized very briefly as follows.

(1) A dogma is a revealed doctrine that has been proposed precisely as such by the church for belief. Now, only formally revealed [truths] (whether implicitly or explicitly revealed) are properly speaking revealed. Virtually revealed [truths] are said to be revealed only by way of analogy, namely, inasmuch as the principal from which they are deduced is itself revealed.⁵⁸

(2) Those things that must be believed by divine faith are believed on account of the authority of God who reveals and not also on account of some other formal character [rationem formalem]. By contrast, virtually revealed [truths] cannot be held on account of the authority of God who reveals, but rather are held simultaneously with the precise cognitional insight by which those things that are in revelation as in a principal are manifested, from which they are deduced by discourse.⁵⁹

(3) The pope does not have the office of defining as dogmas [truths] that are virtually revealed (or doctrines deduced from revelation). Rather his office is to “faithfully keep and infallibly declare”⁶⁰ the revealed doctrine, so that he might “reverently guard and faithfully explain the...deposit of faith”,⁶¹ that is, to infallibly define formally revealed [truths].

(4) Nor, can one prove that a given doctrine was only virtually revealed from the fact that it had been defined as a dogma by the Church.⁶²

Now, some do indeed bring forward in objection the definition of the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Nonetheless, according to the judgment of theologians in general this doctrine is implicitly contained in Mary’s fullness of grace, and certainly was defined as being “revealed by God.”⁶³ Others bring forth the anathemas of Cyril of Alexandria; however, these can easily be shown to be objective explanations of the fact of the Incarnation. Fr. Marín-Sola sets forth 18 examples of definitions drawn from theological conclusions by affirming that those dogmas were revealed only in other truths and deduced by a proper and, indeed, metaphysical syllogism.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, all of the dogmas that he refers to, considered from the perspective of the object or doctrine that they contain, our only equivalent formulations, explications, or interpretations of some formally revealed truth. We cannot, however, show this point by point in detail here, for that would be a lengthy task. We quite willingly concede that those dogmas had been known by theologians in the midst of discussion, indeed, sometimes being deduced from revelation as virtually revealed [truths] (e.g., the Blessed Virgin Mary’s freedom from sin being deduced from the divine maternity). However, this way of knowing the truth and question by theologians does not prevent the deduced doctrine from being formally revealed from the perspective of the object and revelation. Therefore, those dogmas are indeed in other revealed truths, though not only virtually there but implicitly. Similarly, they are not known through a proper syllogism but rather through an improper one, that is, as regards the way the doctrine is known, as we explained earlier.⁶⁵

Finally, even if certain theologians declare as a deduced conclusion a doctor and that would be later defined (as Domingo Bañez did concerning Papal infallibility), this was because either they did not yet have sufficient knowledge of that doctrine’s mode of revelation or they simply indicate [that they understand this truth according to] the mode of theological knowledge. Thus, Tanquerey excellently remarks: “Sometimes it happens that truths that were first held as being virtually revealed later one, following up on a full or weighing out of the matter, come to be seen to be formally-implicitly revealed.”⁶⁶

Fifth. Since our conclusion is disputed, let us consider the arguments set an opposition to it. By resolving them the very conclusion itself and the arguments in support of it below will be even clearer. We can divide these arguments into two series, the first being drawn from arguments offered in the form of theological reasoning, and the latter arguing from authority.

First Series of Objections (Based on Theological Reasoning)

Objection 1:

All revealed doctrines are definable as dogmas. Now, all conclusions are revealed. Therefore, theological conclusions, whether proper or improper, are definable.

Response. To the major premise: I make a distinction regarding the claim that revealed doctrines are definable. I concede the point if one means that they are formally revealed in themselves. However, I deny it if one means that they are virtually revealed in another truth. Moreover, I contradistinguish the minor premise. I deny the claim that proper conclusions are revealed in themselves or formally. However, I do concede that they are revealed in their principle or virtually. Hence, I deny the inference and the conclusion.

Objection 2:

Along with the revealed principle there are also simultaneously revealed the consequences of that principal, at least those that are metaphysically necessary.

Response. I concede that they are consequences of revelation in an analogical sense. However, I deny that they are such univocally or with the same formal character [eadem ratione] as the principle.

Further explanation. The second objection attempts to overthrow the distinction between formally and virtually revealed [truths]. Nonetheless, the entire strength of the argument stands up on the identity of the term: revealed. For certainly the consequences of revealed truths can and must be said to be revealed in some manner—but not in the same manner. An explicitly revealed principle is called “revealed” on the basis of one kind of formality [ratione], but a conclusion deduced therefrom is said to be revealed on the basis of a different formality [ratione]. The presupposed principle that is in itself revealed is called “revealed” in the proper sense, whereas a conclusion deduced from it is called “revealed” only in an analogical sense. And this very analogy is what is signified when we say that such a consequence is “virtually revealed.” Therefore, in order to avoid all equivocation, many more recent authors distinguish simpliciter between what is revealed and what is connected with revealed [truths]. This kind of terminology rules out the present objection from the start.

Objection 3:

It as much as something is revealed it is definable. Therefore, that which is virtually revealed is definable.

Response. Given doctrine is definable because it is revealed; however, not inasmuch as what is revealed (i.e., in whatever way that it is revealed).

Further explanation. This objection wishes to prove that even virtually revealed [truths] , precisely as virtually revealed, would be definable. Nonetheless, it falls into the [equivocational] fallacy of “quid pro quo.” Indeed, to the question, “What is definable?”, it responds by way of the principle: “That which is revealed.” However, this sort of objection gratuitously extends that principle so as to assert: “It is definable in whatever way it is revealed.”

Nor is the inference valid: a given doctrine is definable because it is revealed; therefore it is definable in whatever way it might be revealed (i.e., whether formally or virtually).” For this in fact involves the passing from that which is simpliciter the case to that which is secundum quid.

Objection 4:

According to the common opinion of theologians, improper conclusions are definable. Now, improper conclusions, as well as proper conclusions, are known by way of deduction from revealed [truths]. Therefore, proper conclusions are also definable.

Response. I will pass over the major premise; however, I make a distinction regarding the minor premise. I will let pass the claim that both kinds of conclusion are similarly known by way of a syllogism, as regards our way of knowing, speaking of the logical form that our knowledge takes on. But I deny the minor premise when considering such reasoning from the perspective of the reality or doctrine that is known.

Explication. This objection wishes to do away with the distinction between a proper and improper conclusion. However, it falls short by confusing the formal mode of our knowing with the material and objective distinction between a proper and improper conclusion. Indeed, as we explained earlier,⁶⁷ we must distinguish: (1) between the various kinds of revelation of a given doctrine and the ways that it is known; (2) between the logical form of knowledge and the known reality. From our perspective, the mode of knowledge (i.e., knowledge in the logical form of deduction) does not prevent a given doctrine from being in itself revealed and therefore definable. However, define ability is prevented by the fact that a given doctrine would be, from the perspective of revelation itself, only virtually revealed. Therefore, a deductive syllogism is concerned with a different matter than an explicative syllogism.⁶⁸

Hence, an improper conclusion is not definable, precisely as a conclusion. However, a proper conclusion is not subject to dogmatic definition both when precisely considered as a conclusion and on account of the matter [it declares] or revelation [objectively considered].

Objection 5:

A⁶⁹ theological conclusion either is concerned with the same entity as the revealed principle from which it is deduced or is concerned with a really distinct entity.

Now, (a) if the conclusion is concerned with the same entity as the revealed principle, the conclusion is identical with the revealed principle and therefore is definable. However, (b) if the conclusion is concerned with a really distinct entity, then it is not a true (i.e., certain) conclusion. Therefore, it is not of concern for us here. Therefore, all (metaphysically) certain conclusions are definable.

Response. Conceding the major premise, I will make distinctions concerning the parts of the minor premise. (a) First, I will make a distinction concerning the claim that a conclusion that is concerned with the same entity as the revealed principle is identical with that principle. I concede the point in the sense that it would be concerned with the same entity. But I deny it in the sense that it would be an identical doctrine.

The other part of the assertion must be distinguished in the same way.

When it is said that a conclusion that is identical with its revealed principle is definable, I make the following distinction. I deny the claim for that which is concerned with only the same reality in question. But I concede it when it is a question of doctrinal identity.

(b) I deny the other part of the proposition. And thus, likewise deny the inference and the conclusion.

Further explanation. This objection intends to prove that all conclusions (and only those conclusions) that are concerned with the same identity as the revealed principal are definable. However, the argument fails by committing an equivocation with the term identity. For two propositions are said to be identical in as much as they set forth the same doctrine or objective truth. However, the objection says that to propositions are identical when they have the same material object. And this claim is opposed to the common terminology used by theologians. Thus, consider three propositions: “God exists”; “God created the world”; “God has a free will.” All three are indeed concerned with the same entity. However, who would dare to call these propositions identical?

Now, by applying the distinction to our question, the following must be said. Doctrines that are (objectively) identical with revealed principles are indeed definable—that is, if it is a question of the same doctrine objectively speaking—even though they might be expressed through different formal concepts, as when the Son of God is said to be the Word and consubstantial to the Father. However, in order for a conclusion to be definable it does not suffice that the conclusion be concerned with the same material object as the revealed principle. Indeed, when God manifests one truth concerning a given reality, He does not manifest other trades concerning the same thing, except perhaps as in a principle. Thus, when the existence of God is revealed, His freedom in relation to all other things but Himself is not revealed.

Finally, we have denied the assertion that a metaphysically certain conclusion cannot be deduced from a really distinct reality, that is, one that is distinct from the reality for which it serves as the principal for knowing. For such an assertion flies in the face of the facts. Thus, theologians deduce from the doctrine of transubstantiation the real distinction between substance and accidents in bodily realities; and from the doctrine of the hypostatic union, they deduce the real distinction between nature and supposit in created realities; and so too in many other cases, in all of which they draw a certain conclusion concerning a reality that is really distinct from the principle in question. For by its very nature a conclusion can be concerned with a reality that is different from its principal, since of syllogism is brought about through a comparison of two things to a third.

Therefore, this objection falls short in two ways. (a) It supposes that the define ability of a given conclusion merely would require that the conclusion be concerned with the same material object as the revealed principle. (b) It wrongly denies the possibility of a metaphysically certain conclusion being drawn from a distinct reality, that is, distinct from the reality with which the revealed doctrine in question is concerned.

Second Series of Objections (Based on Authority)

Objection 6:

The [First] Vatican Council did not define that only formally revealed [truths] are to be held with divine faith.

Response. It thus follows that the doctrine concerning definability of proper conclusions, whether affirmative or negative, would not be defined de fide. However, it does not follow that the council taught the definability of logical conclusions [definibilitatem consequentiarum]. Nay, the contrary can be legitimately deduced from the Council’s words.

Further explanation. The [First] Vatican Council teaches that revealed truths proposed by the Church for belief must be believed by divine and Catholic faith. However, the terms of definitions must be understood in their proper and formal sense, not in their improper or solely analogical sense. Thus, from the definition set forth by the Council: (1) it follows that formally revealed truths are definable; (2) it cannot be concluded that truths that are only virtually revealed are definable; (3) it can be deduced that only formally revealed truths are definable. And this is confirmed by other teachings by the Council, since it declares in her definitions the Church “faithfully keeps and infallibly declares”⁷⁰ or “reverently guards and faithfully explains”⁷¹ the revealed doctrine of faith. Now, this only pertains to improper conclusions.

Objection 7:

Saint Thomas and other scholastic theologians from the 13^th century teach that following up on the Church’s definition theological conclusions pertain to faith, although indirectly and secondarily, that is, and as much as when someone denies them some corruption of an article of faith follows. Therefore, in the opinion of these scholastic theologians, all necessary conclusions are definable.

Response. Without qualification it must be held that conclusions proposed by the Church as dogmas pertain to faith. However, this does not mean that all conclusions, even proper ones, are definable.

Further Explanation. Certainly, all scholastic theologians teach that dogmas defined by the church must be held on divine faith. However, it does not follow from this that truths that are only virtually revealed can be defined as dogmas. Indeed, (a) as we discussed earlier⁷² it cannot be proven that some doctrine that was only virtually revealed has been defined by the church as a dogma; (b) the scholastics of the 13^th century only spoke of improper conclusions (or, conclusions quoad nos), as we showed at length earlier.⁷³

Objection 8:

The distinction between implicitly and virtually revealed truths with its doctrinal consequence concerning the definability of theological conclusions was an innovation proposed by Suarez. This new theological terminology drew doctrinal confusion in its wake.

Response. The distinction between implicitly and virtually revealed truths was a new teaching (both as regards to the things in question and the terminology used) inasmuch as it gave more exact determination to the pre-existing teaching and terminologies. However, it was not an innovation contrary to the older authors’ position. The confusion arose because the new distinction and terminology, from the very beginning, was neither perfectly explained, nor consequently correctly applied. And most importantly, the difference of terminology was not observed by all authors. However, of itself the new distinction was not the cause of confusion, but, on the contrary, it was brought forth precisely to avoid confusion [concerning this matter], which we believe that we have set forth clearly enough in our earlier discussions.⁷⁴

Objection 9:

The majority of theologians hold, without qualification, that [theological] conclusions are definable.

Response. I deny the assertion, at least as regards the claim that the greater part of theologians would teach explicitly and properly the definability of conclusions quoad se or doctrines that are only virtually revealed. Indeed, as we believe that we have shown with sufficient detail above,⁷⁵ in the Middle Ages and up to the 16^th century theologians either taught that conclusions quoad nos are definable or used the term conclusion indistinctly or indeterminately. Then, following upon the proposal of the distinction between implicitly and virtually revealed truths, many did indeed retain the indeterminate older teaching; however only a few expressly defended the definability of a teaching that is only revealed in its principal. Finally, a solid argument cannot be composed from an indeterminate doctrine.

Objection 10:

At the very least, the distinction between dogmas to be held by divine faith and the infallible judgments of the Church concerning truths that are connected with revealed truths, to be held through ecclesiastical faith, is new.

Response. The distinction between divine and ecclesiastical faith was new, just as many other distinctions and teachings by scholastic theologians. However, it was the legitimate fruit of the precise determination of the nature of dogma. Thus, it most excellently distinguishes between God’s revelation and the Church’s infallibility, resolves a number of theoretical and practical difficulties concerning the decrees of the popes and councils, and reserves the proper honor to be given to dogmas while simultaneously teaching the due assent to be given to the Church’s infallible judgments.

Thus, the arguments opposed to what we have said do not weaken but, rather, confirm the teaching that conclusions properly so-called are not definable. Likewise, from what we have said, it is clear what holds for the case of improper conclusions.

Proposition II. Theological conclusions quoad nos tantum, as regards the teaching asserted in them—nay, as regards the manner in formulas by which such a teaching is expressed—can be defined as dogmas, though not precisely in as much as they are known syllogistically but, rather, inasmuch as, according to the Church’s judgment, they are contained within the bounds and comprehension⁷⁶ of formal revelation. The truth of this proposition is clear (a) based on historical facts, (b) from the consent of theologians, (c) on the basis of theological reasoning.

(a) The history of dogmas brilliantly makes clear the fact that many teachings that had formerly been known by theologians by way of deduction have come to be defined by the church as dogmas, indeed using the very formulas used by the theologians for proposing those truths. This is clear from start to finish in the history of dogmas, from the definition of the Word’s consubstantiality to the Father to the definitions declared at the [First] Vatican Council.

(b) This second proposition is also confirmed by the common teaching of theologians, set forth above,⁷⁷ which we will here merely briefly summarize. First, the greater scholastics of the 13^th century considered conclusions drawn from the articles [of faith]. That is, they considered particular revealed truths as determination and consequences of the principal truths stated in the Apostles’ Creed. Thus, in their writings it is not a question of truths that are only virtually revealed but, rather, formally revealed ones such as, for example the Eucharist. Second, the scholastics of the 13^th century held that the Church’s dogmatic definitions were explications of formally revealed truths, though such explications came to be known and established by theologians. (In other words, they would be conclusions quoad nos.) In practice, the greater scholastics as a rule considered theological teaching as being properly revealed.

The scholastics of the 14^th and 15^th centuries—in fact, all the way up to the time of the council of Trent—nearly all held the position that Catholic truth (i.e., those things to be believed) is a truth had through divine revelation, explicitly in the proper form of the words [in which it was formulated] or explicitly in good and necessary consequences (Gerson). However, they too speak properly concerning conclusions quoad nos tantum (i.e., concerning that which is implicitly revealed or is an explication of revelation).

Post-Tridentine theologians, first, in general held a dual thesis: (a) conclusions, precisely as conclusions, are not definable De fide; (b) formally revealed doctrines (whether implicitly or explicitly revealed) are definable, although we know them by way of deduction. Then, theologians of this era, correcting (or, rather, determining) the received way that theologians had spoken about this topic drew a twofold distinction. First of all, they distinguished between what is formally or immediately revealed and what is virtually or mediately revealed (Cajetan, Cano, Suarez, and others after them). Second, they distinguished among the kinds of conclusions that are deduced by reasoning, though drawing this distinction in different ways:

(a) between an improper improper syllogism (the Salmanticenses and Suarez);

(b) between an explicative and elective syllogism (John of St. Thomas and Vincenzo Gotti);

(c) between a deduction by reason of what is signified by revealed truths and one drawn on the strength of a natural connection (Billuart).

According to this distinction, the aforementioned authors, and others with them, held:

(a) doctrines that are formally revealed, although only implicitly or vaguely [confuse] and deduced by way of a syllogism that is improper, explicative, or drawn by reason of what is signified by the terms, are definable;

(b) truths that are only virtually revealed are not the object of divine faith and therefore neither are doctrines deduced by a syllogism that is proper, illative, or drawn on the strength of a natural connection.

Now, the modern scholastics, defended the teaching of the [earlier] scholastic theologians, the most precious fruit of many labors, by means of this terminology and distinction between a conclusion quoad se and one that is quoad nos tantum. Indeed, conclusions quoad se are the same as ones that are only virtually revealed and known by way of deduction through a syllogism that is proper, illative, or drawn on the strength of a natural connection. However, conclusions quoad nos tantum are the same as truths that are formally revealed and known by way of a syllogism that is improper, explicative, or drawn by reason of what is signified by the terms, are definable. Now, this terminology and the distinction between conclusions quoad se and conclusions quoad nos tantum unifies and gathers together the teaching set forth by earlier scholastics, expresses it more briefly and more exactly, and makes it more intelligible. Thus, we have also made it our own. The same holds true concerning [the terminology of] conclusions properly and improperly so called.

Nor, is there real force behind the objection that would say: “This distinction is recent and, properly speaking, something belonging to the scholastics from the 18^th century onward.” For this kind of objection would hold if it we were dealing with a doctrine that were contrary to the older position; however, it has little value if we are dealing with something which provides an exactor determination and distinction for the traditional teaching. Indeed, otherwise every explication of revealed truths throughout dogmatic progress might be declared vain and all formulas and doctrines that have greater distinction might be done away with. Thus, we would be justified in doing away with the dogmas of the hypostatic union or that of transubstantiation and as much as they were new and did not exist once upon a time. Now, the proposed distinction between definability of theological conclusions is not opposed to the older doctrine, but, rather, only more fully determines and specifies it.

(c) On the basis of the illogical reasoning, the truth of this second proposition also is certain, for definability of a given doctrine is in no way affected by the fact that such a doctrine is known through discourse from revelation by us or theologians, provided that objectively speaking (in itself and from the perspective of revelation) it be formally revealed, weather explicitly or implicitly (that is, in an equivalent form). Therefore, conclusions precisely as they are conclusions are indeed not definable, but rather, are subject to such definition only as regards the teaching that is deduced, provided that it be equivalent to a formally revealed doctrine. Thus, in the end, the question is easily resolved through the distinction between the modes of divine revelation and the modes of our knowledge of revealed truths.

IV. Now,⁷⁸ from what we have said it is clear that we cannot consent to what Fr. Marín-Sola teaches concerning this matter. For he holds that all theological conclusions are definable when they are deduced from revealed truths by way of inclusion, that is, if the reality with which the conclusion is concerned is identical with the reality involved in what is formally revealed. Nonetheless, we must distinguish between what is included on the side of reality and what is included from the perspective of revelation. And that which is included in revelation itself—that is, that which is manifested there, even if vaguely [confuse], indistinctly, only in equivalent terms, and implicitly—certainly is revealed and can be defined, even if it happens to be known by us by way of conclusion. For in that case, as Fr. Marín-Sola states, the church truly does not fabricate a formally revealed truth out of one that is virtually revealed, but rather removes our own [discursive] way of knowing and judges without qualification that something is revealed. However, that which is only included in a revealed reality or is identical with it is not, properly speaking, revealed, except in its principle or cause. Thus, when the unity of God is revealed the Trinity of Persons is not, although the reality in question is identical. Similarly, when the unity of God is revealed, His free will is not, although such freedom of will can be deduced from the notion of God and is the same as Him in reality. For the real identity of the objects of two doctrines or cognitions neither leads to possession of knowledge concerning a second object once we have knowledge of the first, nor does it imply that upon one cognition being manifested or revealed that another would be manifested or revealed. However, the entire question concerning the define ability of a given doctrine depends upon whether or not that doctrine is revealed and manifested by God.

Finally, Fr. Marín-Sola’s position leads to problematic conclusions. For it would follow that all theological conclusions concerning God would be definable. The same could be said for the other mysteries of the faith, since, in the end, every theological doctrine concerning a given mystery expresses the same reality as the revealed mystery in question. Fr. Marín-Sola himself concedes and asserts that the entire Summa theologiae of St. Thomas is definable, namely, as regards “all his conclusions that are deduced from revelation with absolute (i.e., metaphysical) certainty.”⁷⁹ This would include, for example, the real distinction between essence and existence in created realities.⁸⁰ Thus, in the end, every metaphysical truth—nay, every philosophical one, and even every mathematical one—would be definable as a truth revealed by God!

Thus, we judge that the teaching of the scholastic theologians of the 17^th and 18^th century set forth above must be held without qualification, whether in the form that directly denies that virtually revealed truths or definable or de fide (as is commonly asserted among Jesuit theologians), or that which distinguishes conclusions into those that are implicitly revealed and those that are virtually revealed (as is commonly asserted among the Thomists), or that was distinguishes between syllogisms that are explicative and those that are deductive (as we find in other schools).

V. Finally, allow us to add several points to be noted, so that our considerations in this article might be complete.

First: Sometimes there can be a doubt whether a given doctrine is proposed by the church as a revealed dogma or weather the church is expressing some other judgment, even one that is infallible, concerning it. Therefore, we must distinguish between what is de iure the case (whether the Church can define theological conclusions as dogmas) and what holds de facto (whether a given doctrine has been defined as a dogma).

Second, we must note that the judgment concerning whether a given doctrine is a theological conclusion quoad se or, instead, quoad nos tantum (and thus can be defined as a dogma) does not pertain to history as such but rather to exegesis and, properly speaking, to dogmatic theology and, ultimately and most properly, to the Church’s own magisterium. Therefore, historians abstain from judgments of this kind. Indeed, since to the eyes of historical consideration defined dogmas appear to be doctrines that have been produced following upon lengthy labors by theologians, historians easily judge that all dogmas are “conclusions.” And, this is what non-Catholic authors, as a rule, judge to be the case. For Catholic authors, the temptation is less to call defined dogmas universally “theological conclusions” than to judge that this is the case at least for the teachings of the Fathers of the Church and theologians, though in this they not infrequently no less fall into error. Nay, dogmatic theologians themselves not in frequently all too easily hold that many teachings are conclusions quoad se. For even if it should not be granted that God has revealed everything that He Himself knows concerning a revealed reality, nonetheless, it is very difficult to determine what, in the end, is formally expressed through the terms of revelation, just as, on the other hand, it is difficult to discern whether a given teaching is only an equivalent formulation of a revealed doctrine, only an exposition thereof, or a declaration and interpretation of the deposit of faith, or, by contrast, is truly and properly a conclusion quoad se, that is, something only virtually revealed. Therefore, in such a matter, the Church’s judgment must stand, and this is precisely why the church defines that a given teaching is a dogma, namely, so that there may no longer be any doubt concerning its revealed character.

Third, our thesis resolves the question concerning the homogeneity of revealed doctrine or dogma with theological teaching. Indeed, scholastic theologians in general hold that theological conclusions are the proper object of theology (hence, the term, “theological conclusion” has arisen in use). However, in this matter, we must distinguish between theological conclusions quoad se and quoad nos.

Indeed,⁸¹ certainly, the position held by the scholastics must not be understood as though theology were solely or principally concerned with theological conclusions quoad se (i.e., conclusions that are only virtually revealed), for the primary and principal object of theology is made up of the revealed truths themselves and dogmas properly so called. This is manifestly obvious upon reading the books or the very teachings set forth by such theologians. However, theological science does not consider such revealed truths or dogmas as though they were to be believed on account of the authority of God who reveals—for, from the latter perspective they are the object of the theological virtue of faith—but rather, theological science takes up revealed truths or dogmas as matters to be proven or deduced, that is, so that they might be proven either on the basis of authority (through the texts of Sacred Scripture, through the teaching of the Fathers and theologians, etc.) [i.e., in positive and historical theology], or through [faith-illuminated theological] reasoning, that is, through deduction from other revealed truths, dogmas, or whatsoever theological teachings (theological conclusions quoad nos). Thus, the primary and principal object of theology is made up of theological conclusions quoad nos (i.e., revealed truths themselves or dogmas) such that, from our perspective, they are deduced or proven from other revealed truths. Then, secondarily and as a consequence, theology also deduces from revealed truths those things that are only virtually contained in revelation (conclusions quoad se).⁸²

Thus, theological conclusions are indeed the proper object of theology, inasmuch as it proves or deduces its teaching; however, theological conclusions quoad nos tantum [i.e., truths directly in the depositum fidei] are the primary and principal object of theology. Thus, theological teaching and the doctrine of faith are homogeneous, i.e., identical quoad se.⁸³

Fourth. Since, as regards the means and mode of knowledge, defined dogmas, from the perspective of theologians, nay, from the perspective of the Church herself, are as a rule [communiter] known through discourse from revelation, the historian is utterly free—nay, he has the right and duty—to inquire into the process of this kind of deduction, looking into all of its causes, conditions, and laws. Therefore, the question concerning the definability of theological conclusions torments theologians more than historians.

Fifth. Nonetheless, the teaching concerning the development of dogmas and, consequently, the teaching concerning the nature and duties of the history of dogmas, has no small variation as regards the various positions held regarding the definability of theological conclusions. For, in the opinion of those who hold that conclusions [quoad se], or virtually revealed [truths], are definable as De fide or as dogmas, hold that dogmatic development takes place through the definitive proposition both of revealed truths themselves, and through the definition of consequences following from revelation. However, in the opinion of those who hold that only formally or immediately revealed truths are definable in the form of dogmas, dogmatic development takes place exclusively through the proposition and explication of formally revealed truths. As is clear, the difference is not small, especially if we then add the theory of Suarez and Lugo that the Church’s act of defining has the power of divine speech and completes and consummates revelation itself. The first position seems easier and more apt to resolve a greater number of difficulties; nonetheless, the other is truer, more in harmony with theological principles, and in the end, alone able to explain how the Church’s definitions our proposed as revealed truths and dogmas to be believed by divine faith. And thus, it alone in the end, refutes Protestant and modernist objections against Catholic faith. Moreover, I venture to add that it also provides a better explanation for the facts of the history of dogmas. Thus, we should greatly desire and strive that there be, at long last, clarity and truth among theologians concerning this matter.

Finally, in the next article, we must discuss the effect of dogmatic progress.

Article Ten: On the Terminus or Effect of Dogmatic Progress

We can distinguish five termini or effects of dogmatic progress: formal, objective, subjective, social, and religious.

I. The formal terminus, namely, by which dogmatic progress is constituted, is the very explication of revealed truths or explicated revelation, as we already have discussed.

II. The objective terminus of dogmatic progress, as an immediate and proper fruit, is the constitution of dogma or the divined dogmas themselves. Indeed, the entire process of the explication of revealed truths tends toward this effect, just as the life of a tree is oriented toward the production of its fruit. Therefore, in dogmatic progress, the explications set forth by theologians are, as it were, flowers, whereas defined dogmas are akin to ripe fruit.

Thus, the entire process in the explication of revealed truths does not only tend toward doctrinal explication, nor is and explication perfect or complete before the doctrine is proposed through the Church’s judgment as a dogma to be believed. However, development in the explanation of whatever has been revealed arrives at its terminus or culmination when the explication of a given doctrine is proposed by the Church for belief.

But, moreover, when the Church defines a given dogma, this does not indicate an absolute terminus in the explication of a given revealed truth. Indeed, this explication has an absolute character in the sense that what the Church defines is absolutely true and is irreformably defined and to be believed as a divine truth. Nonetheless, in another respect such a definition by the Church is a kind of intermediary, indeed, in two ways. First, no definition, at least based on the facts as they stand so far, sets forth or exhausts the entire meaning of revelation concerning any given revealed truth. Therefore, it does not exclude the possibility that there would be further explication concerning this truth, just as it does not exclude formulation in other [subjective] concepts or terms. Second, the dogmatic definitions themselves are doctrines that, once more for their own part, stand in need of explication and are in fact explained [by theologians and the Church herself]. That is, just as the meaning of revelation has only been explained successively over the course of time, the same is true concerning the meaning of dogmatic definitions. Therefore, whatever we said earlier concerning the successive explication of revealed truth also holds true, mutatis mutandis, for the explication of dogmatic definitions. Dogmas themselves serve, in turn, as a beginning, head, and origin for new explications.

Thus, the first dogmatic proposition, formulated in the Apostle’s Creed, was the origin and occasion, as it were, for the whole dogmatic development that took place in the Greek Church and the fountainhead of the definitions of the First Councils. The definition of the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father was the reason for the dogmatic explication of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. This explication required the greatest of labors on the part of the Fathers of the Church, and it was the head of the definition of the divinity of the Holy Spirit at the First Council of Constantinople. Similarly, the Council of Ephesus’s definition concerning the Hypostatic Union marked the start and origin of the Incarnation of Christ. Nay, it was, as it were, the central nerve for the later dogmatic development in the Greek Church. The same could be said concerning other defined dogmas as well. As regards more recently defined dogmas, we have not yet observed or known of an explication caused solely by the definition, for just as revealed truths surpass our knowledge so too do dogmatic definitions. Therefore, their meaning and reason are successively known by us in entirely the same way as we know that of revealed truths. Nay, sometimes there will be disputation concerning the immediate meaning of a given definition (just as their can be concerning the meaning of a given revealed text) as, for example, concerning the word “simul” in the text of Lateran IV’s definition decreed against the Albigensians and Cathars⁸⁴ or in the concerning certain definitions by the Council of Trent. And certainly it is not uncommon that questions exist concerning whether a particular teaching Falls under the definition or condemnation issued in a given canon, as the books of theologians show. Thus, also, just as the Church determines the meaning of revelation, she also can define the meaning of a dogmatic definition, as Pius X, in the Anti-Modernist Oath, interpreted definition set forth by the [First] Vatican Council concerning the knowability of God, using the term “demonstrability of the existence of God.” For certain knowledge of a cause from an effect can only be had by us by way of demonstration. Thus, when Pius X proposed the demonstrability of God’s existence as a doctrine of faith, he only proposed the implicit meaning of what was defined at the [First] Vatican Council.⁸⁵

Moreover, defined dogmas are not only the matter or subject of later explication, but likewise, are a kind of active power enabling the explication of the faith. For, any given defined dogma is, as it were, a kind of light in which other revealed truths are also better known, whether on account of the analogy of realities with each other or on account of a kind of formal connection. Thus, the definition of consubstantiality was the light in which further investigation concerning the Trinity took place; the definition of the Hypostatic Union was the light for defining the doctrine concerning the two natures, two wills, and two acts [of willing] in Christ; St. Augustine’s doctrine concerning grace was the beginning of the entire scholastic teaching concerning grace; the definition concerning transubstantiation what is the origin of the profound depths of the doctrine concerning the Eucharist; the definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary was the reason for a more scientific teaching concerning the Mother of God; the definitions set forth by the Council of Trent and the [First] Vatican Council began a new period of theology; and so forth.

III. The subjective terminus of dogmatic progress (i.e., in the minds of the faithful) is explicit faith and, from this perspective, dogmatic progress is progress from implicit to explicit faith.

The constituting of a dogma is, indeed, the objective terminus for the process of explicating revealed truths. However, a dogma is not constituted ultimately for its own sake, that is, so that there might be a dogma, but rather, dogmas are defined so that there may be faith in revealed truths. For revealed truths, by their very nature, are ordered to faith, because therefore truth is revealed in order to be believed. Also, the Christian soul itself seeks out, not speculations and the scientific doctrines of theologians, nay not even the theoretical definitions of dogmas, but properly speaking the object to be believed, that is to be embraced by faith. And it does so:

Out of reverence for God, whose revealed secrets the faithful soul profoundly desires to embrace through faith;
On account of the poverty of the believing subject whose faith seeks to extend itself, in act, to the whole of its object, just as science strives to completely embrace its own object (indeed, as perfectly as possible);
For extrinsic reasons, namely, because there has been the denial or corruption of revealed doctrines by heretics or errant Catholics;
Finally, because faith by its nature seeks certitude to the degree that that is possible.

Although many abhor the idea of new dogmas (for they only consider dogmas to be a kind of obligation imposed on the believer), nonetheless, in reality itself, the pious soul, the loving inclination of the will toward belief [affectus credulitatis], and the needs of life itself continuously impel one onward toward dogmatic definitions. Thus, dogma is properly the fruit of dogmatic development, “as that which is expected as coming at the end, itself perceived as having a kind of sweetness.”⁸⁶

Therefore, just as revealed truths find a greater objective explanation through this process of explication, so too the subjective faith of the faithful becomes more explicit and determined. And just as the dogmatic progress is formally speaking progress from the implicit to the explicit, so too, subjectively in the minds of the faithful, it is progress from implicit to explicit faith. Likewise, just as the objective terminus of the explication of revealed truths is the increasingly explicit and determinate proposition and definition of revealed truths, so too is its subjective terminus a faith that day by day becomes increasingly explicit and distinct.

The distinction between explicit and implicit faith was already set forth at sufficient length earlier where we discussed the teaching of scholastic theologians concerning this topic.⁸⁷ Only, in order to combine that with what we have said thus far, and also in order to correctly understand and apply it to the history of dogmas, several points must be noted.

Explicit faith is related to implicit faith in the same way, mutatis mutandis, as explicitly revealed truths are related to implicitly revealed ones. That is, faith is said to be explicit went through it something is explicitly believed, whereas implicit faith refers to that by which something is implicitly believed. Now, something is explicitly believed when it is believed in itself, or as St. Thomas says, “when we affirm something by thinking it in act”; and something is implicitly believed when it is believed in something else that is explicitly believed, or as St. Thomas says, “We sometimes affirm certain things in which such (implicitly believed truths) are contained as in universal principles.”⁸⁸

However, we said that faith is said to be explicit and implicit faith are the same, mutatis mutandis, to explicit and implicit revelation because revelation is called implicit in as much as something is implicitly revealed or manifested in another explicitly revealed truth; however, implicit faith is spoken of inasmuch as one thing is implicitly believed in another. One thing is revealed or manifested in another in one way, but something is believed in another in another way—namely, respectively according to the conditions of revelation and faith. Therefore, the mode of implicit faith must be determined from the nature of faith, just as that of implicit revelation must be determined from the nature and condition of revelation.

However, something can be said to be implicitly believed in four ways (implication of faith). First, from the perspective of the reality believed, namely, and as much as a reality believed in is contained in a reality that is explicitly believed. Thus, St. Thomas teaches that in explicit faith in God and in His providence all the faithful of all times implicitly believed all revealed truths, namely inasmuch as “in the divine existence are included all the things that we believe exist eternally in God, in which our beatitude consists; however, in faith in Providence are included all the things that God does in time for the salvation of men, which are the way to beatitude.”⁸⁹

Second, something can be implicitly believed in the formal object of faith (whether the formal object “quod” or “quo”). For whenever someone believes something on account of the authority of God who reveals, implicitly in the authority of God who reveals he believes everything that God, the First Truth, has revealed, inasmuch as they are revealed by God.

Third, something can be believed implicitly in as much as it is contained in the rule of faith, whether the proximate rule (in the Authority of the Church proposing revelation) or the remote rule (in Sacred Scripture, tradition, or the Creedal expression of the faith). For whoever “affirms the teaching of the Church as an infallible rule, assents to all that the Church teaches,”⁹⁰ namely, implicitly. Similarly, he who believes sacred scripture to be the Word of God believes everything that is contained in Sacred Scripture. And the same is true concerning Divine Tradition.

Fourth, something can be implicitly believed from the perspective of the mode of revelation inasmuch as it is contained as what is implicitly revealed is contained in something explicitly believed, as we set forth above. For whoever believes that something is revealed likewise implicitly believes the explication, determination, and formulation of that very truth which is revealed and believed in, for faith ultimately is concerned with the revealed truth itself, and not exclusively with the terms or actual formulation of revelation.

Also, in accord with the various modes by which faith involves implication there are four kinds of progress from implicit to explicit faith. First, there is explication of general faith in God Himself and in His Providence, as it is the principal reality believed in, that is, in as much as many things concerning God and His works are believed in act, and God and his saving works come to be known and believed with greater determination and particularity. Second, there is explication of general faith in God who reveals, inasmuch as many things revealed by God come to be believed in act and in themselves. Third, there is explication of general faith in the rule of faith (both the proximate and remote rule), that is, in the teaching of the Church, sacred scripture, tradition, or also in the creedal statement of the faith, namely, inasmuch as many truths or teachings of the Church, Sacred Scripture, Tradition, and the Creed come to be believed in act and in themselves. And fourth, faith that is already explicit concerning a given particular revealed truth comes to be given greater determination and explication through later determinations and explications. And in this final sense in particular the explication of faith is said to be the proper end and fruit of the development of dogmas.

For the explication of faith takes place both through revelation and through dogmatic development, though in different ways. It takes place through revelation inasmuch as through new revelations by God more and new things are revealed concerning God or revelations that already have been made receive greater determination. Thus, for example, redemption by the Messiah is declared either as an explication of revelation that had already been given, as sometimes in the Prophets, or as the Lord and the Apostles explicated the revelation set forth in the Old Testament by way of new revelations. However, dogmatic development does not involve new revelation, but rather only involves the explication of faith brought about exclusively through the explicit proposition of a truth that had been implicitly proposed and through the explication of the meaning of an implicitly revealed truth of faith. Scholastics in the Middle Ages spoke of the explication of faith in the broadest of senses, referring to both that which took place by way of new revelations as well as that which takes place solely through the explication of implicitly revealed truths. In the same way, they also spoke in a very broad sense concerning how truths of faith are implied, namely, either that faith would be implied in an identical reality believed in, in the object or formal motive of faith, in the rule of faith, or in revelation itself. For these older scholastic authors spoke of the implication and explication of faith in the broad sense of these terms, in order to explain how faith was identical in the Old and New Testaments, seeking “whether contemporary and ancient believers had one and the same faith,”⁹¹ and asking “whether the articles of faith grew,”⁹² that is, whether the articles of the Apostles Creed were revealed over time. However, the question concerning the development of dogmas does not only involve whether there was one in the same faith as a habitus but, moreover, whether one and the same revelation would be thereby believed.

IV. The social terminus of the development dogmas, by which dogma determines the faith of the Church as a society, is Catholic faith precisely in as much as through the Church’s activity of proposition and definition the explication of faith is proposed to all the faithful for belief: “all those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith that are contained in the word of God... and which by the Church...are proposed for belief as having been divinely revealed.”⁹³

V. The ultimate terminus or, rather, effect of dogmatic progress is the good of religion and the salvation of men. For the explication of revealed truths intrinsically and per se is ordered to the end to be increased, promoted, determined, and confirmed, primarily in believers themselves, though likewise and secondarily in those who do not yet believe. Next, it is ordered to action, that is, so that the faithful might direct their actions and establish their lives in accord with explicit faith, which moreover incites them through richer motives and the exercises of the virtues. Likewise, the worship of God is promoted both immediately through more explicit faith and mediately through the way that explication of faith stirs up the lives of the faithful and directs them in their action. Finally, the very salvation of men is promoted and increased in as much as the means of salvation come to be known more easily and perfectly, through the wider application of these means (e.g., through the decree by Pius X concerning the conditions required for daily communion), by greater clarity concerning the norms and conditions of Christian perfection, by how Christian souls are aroused to desire eternal beatitude all the more greatly by the greatness of the divine favors and what God has established (though, most especially, by more perfect knowledge of God and eternal salvation), and finally, as the faithful exult in a peace and joy that has thus been strengthened. And thus, the explication of faith serves to promote most greatly the honor and glory of God.

Therefore, the scholastic teaching concerning the explication of faith, making use of the distinction between explicit and implicit faith, is the best doctrinal explanation of dogmatic progress or dogmatic development. Indeed, it explains and preserves both the substantial identity, continuity, and stability of faith amid its development or change and also the development, progress, and change that takes place in the midst of this identity and stability of faith. Likewise, it explains and preserves both the human conditions involved in the very act and effect of such development, as well as the infallibility and authority of the Church. Indeed, on the basis of this teaching’s distinction between the explicit and implicit meaning of revelation, it explains how dogmatic definitions are identical with revelation itself (thus explaining the identity or stability of faith in the midst of this development). Moreover, by setting forth how the implicit meaning of revelation comes to be successively explicated through knowledge and definition, it explains the truth of progress and development. And, finally, by distinguishing between doctrinal explication and authoritative proposition, this teaching explains and preserves the dogmatic character or effect of this entire process of development.

What we have said here will be all the clearer in light of what we will say concerning the way that this teaching is applied to the explanation of the properties of dogmatic progress.

See a. 4, nos. 37–47 above. Albert Michel notes, quite rightly, in his article, “Explicite et Implicite” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, vol. 5.2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), col. 1869: “The notion of implicit and explicit revelation provides the complete foundation for the theory of dogmatic progress.”↩︎
See Hebrews 11:1. Cf. ST II-II, q. 1, a. 4 and 6.↩︎
St. Thomas treats the nature and mode of revelation in his discussion of prophecy in ST II-II, q. 171–174. The best exposition of this can be found in Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation, vol. 1, trans. Matthew K. Minerd (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic Press, 2022), ch. 4 (p. 275–317). See a. 2 above. [Tr. note: Fr. Schultes cites the 2^nd edition of Garrigou-Lagrange’s Latin De revelatione.]↩︎
Although he uses the terms “explicit” and “implicit” in the broader sense, St. Thomas explains them as follows in De veritate, q. 14, a. 11: “Properly speaking, something is said to be implicit because many things are contained in it in a kind of unified manner, whereas something is said to be explicit when each thing in it is considered in itself. Now, these terms are transferred from bodily realities to spiritual ones. Therefore, when a number of things are contained within the power (in virtute) of some one thing, they are said to be implicitly in it, as conclusions are in a principle. However, something is contained explicitly in a given thing if it exists therein in act. Thus, the person who knows given universal principles has implicit knowledge concerning all the particular conclusions that can be drawn therefrom, although he is said to explicitly know them only when he actually knows those conclusions.” Thus, a given doctrine is said to be explicitly revealed if it is in revelation in act and manifested in itself, whereas it is said to be implicitly revealed if it is contained only “within the power” (in virtute) of revelation. Note well, however, that St. Thomas uses the expression “in virtute” in a broad sense, namely for whatever manner that something might be contained in this way, whether mediately (virtually) or implicitly in the stricter sense.↩︎
The equipollence (of propositions) is defined: “The same power and the same meaning of two propositions, coming from an equivalence of signs.” See Tommaso Zigliara, Summa philosophiae, vol. 1, [6^th ed.], ([Paris: Delhomme et Briguet, 1887)], (p. 30). [Tr. note: See Austin Woodbury, Logic, Ch. 17, a. 4, dis. 1 (no. 213): “NOTION AND DIVISION OF IDENTITY OF PROPOSITIONS: Concerning these it is sufficient to observe: A. That the identity of propositions is the property by virtue whereof two or more propositions express THE SAME TRUTH. B. The identity of propositions is twofold, to wit: a. EXPLICIT identity which is had according as several propositions express by diverse terms the same truth with THE SAME CONCEPTS: as an example, take these two propositions: a1. ‘Homo est mortalis’; a2. ‘Man is mortal’. b. IMPLICIT identity, which is had according as several propositions express the same truth by diverse terms and DIVERSE CONCEPTS: b1. As an example, let us take these two propositions: b1a. ‘Man is mortal’; b1b. ‘Rational animal is mortal’. b2. In these examples the subjects differ conceptually: for in the latter, the subject is the definition which, manifesting the subject of the former example (the defined: ‘man’), expresses it in a more distinct way. C. Which may be thus summarized: a. There is IDENTITY of propositions provided they express THE SAME TRUTH, - even though they express it by diverse terms and even diverse concepts. B. And indeed: b1. If they express it by diverse terms but the same concepts, then the identity is EXPLICIT; b2. But if they express it by diverse terms and also diverse concepts, then the identity is IMPLICIT only.” (The John N. Deely and Anthony F. Russell Collection, Latimer Family Library, St. Vincent College, Latrobe, PA.), (p. 160). My particular gratitude is owed to Mitchell Kengor for getting this text. However, as noted above, his help was critical for getting the citational information contained throughout these drafts.]↩︎
Council of Trent, Decree on the Eucharist, ch. 1 (Denzinger, no. 1636 [874]).↩︎
See Alfred Vacant, Études théologiques sur les constitutions du Concile du Vatican, vol. 2, (Paris: Delhomme et Briguet, 1895), 293.↩︎
Charles René Billuart, Summa sancti thomae, vol. 3 (Paris: [Publisher Unknown] 1895), De gratia, diss. 4, a. 3 (p. 371).↩︎
Francisco Marín-Sola, “La Homogeneidad De La Doctrina Católica” in La Ciencia tomista (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1911), no. 10 (p. 63[-69]).↩︎
Francisco Marín-Sola, “El Verdadero virtual revelado o teológico según Santo Tomás” in La Ciencia tomista (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1917), no. 43 (p. 5–32).↩︎
See ST I, q. 1, a. 10, ad 2.↩︎
See John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, vol. 7 (Paris: Vivès, [1885]), De fide, diss. 4, a. 1 (p. 94).↩︎
From more recent authors, see, for example, Christiano Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, vol. 8, [4^th and 5^th ed.], ([Freiburg: Herder and Co.], [1912-1922]), no. 268; Gerard Van Noort, De fontibus revelationis, 3^rd ed., (Bussum: P. Brand, 1920), no. 192ff; Adolf Tanquerey, Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae specialis, 14^th ed, vol. 1, (Rome: Typis Societatis Sancti Joannis Evangelistae, 1913), no. 181.↩︎
See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4.↩︎
Indeed, all such modes of revelation could be reduced to the mode of the revelation of the definition through the revelation of the reality thus revealed, provided that “definition” be understood in the broadest sense possible. [Tr. note: This remark is rather terse, and I believe that the final definition is material in its suppositio. The original is: Possent quidem omnes tales modi revelationis reduci ad modum revelationis definitionis per revelationem rei revelatae ita tamen, ut definitio in sensu omnino largissimo accipiatur.]↩︎
See J. Vincenz De Groot, Summa apologetica, 3^rd ed., (Regensburg: Institutum Librarium Pridem G. J. Manz, 1906) q. 9, a. 2–6, (p. 309-343).↩︎
We have said, “distinct” terms, because an implicitly revealed truth, properly speaking, is not had if the explicitly revealed truth is only expressed in different synonymous or tautological terms.↩︎
“To discourse is, properly speaking, to pass from one thing and thought to another” (St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 8, a. 15). “Discursive knowledge involves the passing from something that was first known to something different that comes into cognition thereafter, having been previously unknown” (ST I, q. 58, a. 3, ad 1).↩︎
[Tr. note: Note well the distinction between res and obiectum here. This is regularly noted in Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange’s critiques of Fr. Marín-Sola.]↩︎
See Joseph Gredt, Elementa philosophiae, 2^nd ed. (Freiburg: Herder, [1909-1919]), p. 10: “The concept (i.e., idea [understood in the broad sense]) is what is expressed by and in the mind by which we understand or conceive the reality [that we know as an object of knowledge]…. The formal concept is that in which we understand, whereas the objective concept is that which we formally understand… that is, the objective ratio, which is immediately set before the mind by means of the formal concept.” Thus, these three concepts—Son of God, Word, and consubstantial to the Father—involve the same objective concept (for they involve knowing one and the same formal object), although there are various formal concepts or ideas [in the broad sense of “idea”] (for we know one and the same thing, which is itself formally known from various different formal perspectives [sub diversa ratione formali]). Thus, too, as Zigliara states, “Ideas are diverse when they join together with different notes” (Zigliara, Summa philosophiae, Logica, 8, III). That is, they represent different properties of the reality which either are truly distinct in the reality itself or are only grasped as being distinct. See Tommaso Zigliara, Summa philosophiae, vol. 1, [6^th ed.], ([Paris: Delhomme et Briguet, 1887)], ch. 1, VI, (pg. 30-35).

[Tr. note: Technically, the term “idea” is reserved, in strict scholastic language, for the creative idea directing the work of an artist. See Maritain, Dream of Descartes, Art and Scholasticism, et alia.; M-D Philippe, L’activité artistique.]↩︎
Louis Billot, De virtutibus infusis, vol. 1, 2^nd edition, (Rome: [Ex Typographia Iuvenum Opificum a S. Ioseph], 1905), p. 258.↩︎
St. Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, trans. Blomfield Jackson, From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 8, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1895.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight.<http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3203.htm>. ch. 27, no. 66 (PG 32.190).↩︎
[St. Thomas and Michele De Maria, Opuscula Philosophica et Theologica: Ad Usum Studiosae Juventutis Selecta et Juxta Ordinem Rerum Quae in Scholis Tractantur Nunc Primum Digesta et Exact; Accedunt Quaestiones Quodlibetales,] Quodlibet VII, a. 14. [(Ed. Michele De Maria). (Tiferni Tiberini, Italy: Ex Officina Typographica S. Lapi, 1886)] [Tr. note: Opuscula, ed. M. De Maria, II, 429.]↩︎
SCG IV, ch. 1. See In Boetium de trinitate, q. 2, a. 4; ST II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 1; III q. 42, a. 3; In Matthew, 13:34 (ed. Taurin [sic], 1893, p. 195).↩︎
See Domingo Bañez, In ST II-II, q. 1, a. 10.↩︎
See Leo XIII, Providentissimus deus, no. 14.↩︎
Council of Trent, Decree on the Eucharist, ch. 1 (Denzinger, no. 1637 [874]).↩︎
Therefore, undeservedly is the formally-explicitly revealed said to be that which we know immediately as being revealed.↩︎
See Second Synod of Orange, canon 5 (Denzinger, no. 375 [178]).↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger 3020[1800]); cf. Pastor Aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger 3070 [1836]).↩︎
See Salmanticenses, De fide, disp. 1, dub. 4, no. 112 (see a. 4, no. 56 above); Suarez, De fide, disp. 3, sect. 11, no. 6; Christiano Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, vol. 8, [4^th and 5^th ed.], ([Freiburg: Herder and Co.], [1912-1922]),

no. 263.↩︎
See Francisco Marín-Sola, “La Homogeneidad De La Doctrina Catolica” in La Ciencia tomista (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1911), no. 10, p. 49–53 (and throughout, especially no. 54, 55, and 62)↩︎
See Francisco Marín-Sola, “La Homogeneidad De La Doctrina Catolica” in La Ciencia tomista (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1915), no. 31, p. 23ff.↩︎
See a. 6, no. 5 above.↩︎
See St. Athanasius, Oratio I Contra Arianos, ch. 1–37, trans. M. Atkinson and Archibald Robertson, from Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 4, eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1892.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/28081.htm>.↩︎
See St. Athansius, De Synodis, ch. 51, trans. John Henry Newman and Archibald Robertson, from Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 4, eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1892.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2817.htm>; Oratio 1 Contra Arianos, ch. 39, trans. M. Atkinson and Archibald Robertson, from Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 4. eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1892.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/28081.htm>. In ch. 38 of the latter, he proves it from the adoration of Christ.↩︎
See St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on the Gospel of John Vol. I trans. P.E. Pusey (London, England: James Parker and Co., Oxford, 1874), bk. I ch. 8 and 9 (p. 75-99). Commentary on Jn. 1:9. Concerning the other “dogmatic” conclusions of St. Cyril, see Joseph Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes dans L’Antiquité Chrétienne, [2^nd ed.], ([Paris: Lecoffre & Gabalda, 1912]), vol. 3, 70.↩︎
Tomus ad Aniochenos, trans. H. Ellershaw, from Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 4. Eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1892.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2818.htm>. 7.↩︎
Damasus I, “Fragments of Letters to the Eastern Bishops” (Denzinger, no. 146).↩︎
See what was said above in a. 2, no. 3 and a. 4, no. 65.↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Pastor Aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3070 [1836]); see a. 2, no. 3 above.↩︎
Holy Office (Pius X), Lamentabili sane exitu, no. 6 (Denzinger, no. 3406 [2006]). Emphasis is Fr. Schultes’s.↩︎
See a. 11 below (On Dogmatic Formulas).↩︎
Therefore, the arguments brought forth by the Councils for a definition are not De fide, unless they too have been defined.↩︎
John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, In ST I, q. 1, diss. 2, a. 3, no. 6. See a. 4, no. 55 above.↩︎
Pius IX, Ineffabilis deus (Denzinger, no. 2803 [1641]).↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Pastor Aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3074 [1839]).↩︎
Ibid.↩︎
As regards the proposition found in the Anti-Modernist Oath, some hold that the second portion (“and therefore can also be demonstrated to exist”) is defined “indirectly, as a necessary conclusion”. See Édouard Hugon, Tractatus dogmatici, [5^th ed.], vol. 1 (De deo uno, etc.) ([Paris: Lethielleux, 1927]), 36. [Tr. note: Fr. Schultes does not cite the edition, but this matches the pagination.]↩︎
See a. 4, nos. 48–62.↩︎
See works of dogmatic and apologetic theology, such as [Johannes Vincentius] De Groot, Summa apologetica de ecclesia Catholicae: ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis, 3^rd ed. (Regensburg: Institutum Librarium Pridem G. J. Manz, 1906), p. 309–315; Christian Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, vol. 1, [4^th ed.] ([Freiburg: Herder and Co.], 1915), prop. 48; Anton Straub, De Ecclesia Christi, (Oeniponte [Innsbruck], Typis et sumptibus Feliciani Rauch, 1912), thes. 25.↩︎
See a. 4 above.↩︎
See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; De veritate, q. 14, a. 8, ad 5.↩︎
See a. 4, nos. 48–62 above.↩︎
See a. 6 above.↩︎
See a. 7 above.↩︎
This conclusion is that the heart of the controversy discussed earlier in a. 4, nos. 48–51.↩︎
See a. 1, no. 3(b) above.↩︎
[Tr. note: I have slightly nuanced this sentence, in view of the argument being made. However, lest I have put my thumbs on the scale of the interpretation of a very important point, I provide the original here. Note that I have explicitly chosen to add truths where one would normally perhaps put things (or perhaps might substantivize the rendering to “the virtually revealed”) precisely to avoid leading the reader to confuse res and obiectum, which is very important in the background of the difference between Schultes and Marín-Sola. The original of this sentence is: Virtualiter vero revelata non possunt teneri propter solam auctorit atem Dei revetantis, sed tenentur simul intuitu cognitionis propriae qua ea quae in revelatione tanquam in principio manifestantur, per discursum deducuntur.]↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Dei Filius (Denzinger, no. 3020).↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Pastor Aeternus (Denzinger, no. 3070).↩︎
We already judged the hypothesis put forth by Francisco Suarez and Juan de Lugo, holding that the Church’s definition would supply in some way for something lacking in revelation. See a. 4, no. 52ff above.↩︎
See Pius IX, Ineffabilis deus (Denzinger, no. 2803 [1641]).↩︎
Francisco Marín-Sola, “Raciocinio y progreso dogmático.” in La Ciencia Tomista 18, No. 54 (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1918): 267-280; 19, No. 55 (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1919): 34-48; 21, No. 62 (Madrid, Dominicos Españoles, 1920): 164-175.↩︎
See a. 8 above.↩︎
Adolf Tanquerey, Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae specialis, 14^th ed., vol. 1, (Rome: Typis Societatis Sancti Joannis Evangelistae, 1913), no. 193.↩︎
See a. 6 and 7 above.↩︎
See a. 7, no. 6 above.↩︎
[Tr. note: This objection addresses a point that Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange constantly made in this connection. Fr. Labourdette also registers the same concerns with regard to Marín-Sola’s position.]↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Dei Filius (Denzinger, no. 3020).↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Pastor Aeternus (Denzinger, no. 3070).↩︎
See the opening remarks to this first proposition above.↩︎
See the appendix to ch. 4.↩︎
See ch. 4, para. 41ff.↩︎
See ch. 4, para. 12ff.↩︎
[Tr. note: That is the notional content thereof.]↩︎
See a. 4, nos. 48–62 above.↩︎
[Tr. note: I note here again the point that Frs. Garrigou-Lagrange and Labourdette would maintain against Marín-Sola.]↩︎
[“Respuesta a algunas observaciones sobre el progreso dogmático.” La Ciencia Tomista 22, No. 66 (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1920): 289-305], see p. 301.↩︎
See the note on the same page.↩︎
[Tr. note: This is an immensely important paragraph. Although no few scholastics speak as though illative conclusions are the only truths properly belonging to theology, it shows that someone who is held (in a distortive manner, in my opinion) to be a conservative was well aware of how such an understanding would be wrongheaded. I wish I had known of this remark when I was writing my article “Wisdom be Attentive” in Nova et Vetera in 2020.]↩︎
This is how one must understand St. Thomas’s teaching that theology is argumentative in character (ST I, q. 1, a. 8). Indeed, he teaches, “This teaching does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but rather, proceeds from them to set forth something , just as the Apostle argues in proof of the General resurrection on the basis of Christ’s resurrection (see Corinthians 15). And: “this teaching argues from the articles of faith to other things,” (ad 1), “in order to manifest certain other things that are handled on in this teaching” (ad 2). Hence, in q. 1, St. Thomas uses the expression “sacred doctrine” to refer to both revealed truth and theological teaching. Thus, St. Thomas himself strives to prove or deduce Catholic teachings on the basis of other truths.↩︎
As regards the diversity of expression, see a. 11, on dogmatic formulas.↩︎
Lateran IV, Definition against the Albigensians and the Cathars (Denzinger, no. 800 [428]): “We firmly believe and confess without reservation that there is only one true God, eternal, infinite, and unchangeable, incomprehensible, almighty, and ineffable, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; three Persons, indeed, but one essence, substance, or nature entirely simple. The Father is from no one, the Son from the Father only, and the Holy Spirit equally from both. Without beginning, always, and without end, the Father begets, the Son is born, and the Holy Spirit proceeds. They are of the same substance and fully equal, equally almighty, and equally eternal. {They are} the one principle of the universe, the creator of all things, visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who by his almighty power from the beginning of time made at once out of nothing both orders of creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, that is, the angelic and the earthly, and then the human creature, who, as it were, shares in both orders, being composed of spirit and body. For the devil and the other demons were indeed created by God naturally good, but they became evil by their own doing. As for man, he sinned at the suggestion of the devil.”↩︎
See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, “La démonstrabilité de l’existence de Dieu selon le serment antimoderniste,” Revue pratique d’apologétique 12 (1911): 481–497; Reginald Schultes, Was beschwören wir im Antimodernisteneid? : theologische Erklärung des Antimodernisteneids (Mainz: Kirchheim and Co., 1911), 14ff.↩︎
ST I-II, q. 11, a. 1.↩︎
See a. 4, nos. 30–36 (cf. nos. 1–29).↩︎
St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14, a. 11.↩︎
ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7.↩︎
ST II-II, q. 5, a. 3.↩︎
See De veritate, q. 14, a. 12.↩︎
See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7.↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 3 (Denzinger, no. 3011 [1792]).↩︎

Francisco Marín-SolaRéginald SchultesDogmatic DevelopmentHistory of DogmasVirtual RevelationDefinability of Theological Conclusions

Dr. Matthew Minerd

A Ruthenian Catholic, husband, and father, I am a professor of philosophy and moral theology at Ss. Cyril and Methodius Byzantine Catholic Seminary in Pittsburgh, PA. My academic work has appeared in the journals Nova et Vetera, The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, Saint Anselm Journal, Lex Naturalis, Downside Review, The Review of Metaphysics, and Maritain Studies, as well in volumes published by the American Maritain Association through the Catholic University of America Press. I have served as author, translator, and/or editor for volumes published by The Catholic University of America Press, Emmaus Academic, Cluny Media, and Ascension Press.

https://www.matthewminerd.com