Reginald Schultes, The History of Dogmas - Methodological Considerations as a Discipline (a. 17–19 and Conclusion)
Brief Translation Introduction
This translation is presented as a relatively stable sketch of this chapter from Reginald Schultes’s Introductio in historiam dogmatum. The text has been edited and reviewed, though it is not in the kind of final form of review that I would do for a published translation. I am posting the text here on To Be a Thomist for those who might be interested in referring to an English draft.
I would like to thank Mr. Mitchell Kengor for his help filling out the details of footnote references.
Chapter Three: The History of Dogmas [as a Discipline]
The teaching concerning the nature and development of dogmas resolves the question concerning the history of dogmas itself. Thus, we will summarize this in three parts by discussing:
1° The object of the history of dogmas (a. 17);
2° Its methodology (a. 18);
3˚ the necessity and utility of the history of dogmas (a. 19).
Article Seventeen: The Object of the History of Dogmas
I. The state of the question. – No few Catholics (and even more non-Catholics) think that, according to Catholic teaching, dogmas are not the object of history, at least not truly and properly speaking, and therefore hold that the history of dogmas, properly so called, is impossible. For, they say: history is concerned with what happens and changes; dogmas, however, are immutable. Hence, they admit indeed the history of theology, but not the history of dogmas properly so called.1
However, on the other hand, precisely according to the Catholic teaching on the nature of dogmas and the development thereof, the possibility and truth of the history of dogmas in fact follows, for according to that teaching, dogmas are truly and properly the objects of history.
Thesis: Dogmas are truly and properly the object of history, not indeed according to their revealed and immutable truth but, rather, according to the fact that they are constituted by the successive proposition and explication of revealed truths.
The meaning of this thesis is clear from what was explained above. Indeed, two things must be distinguished in a dogma: 1˚ the revealed truth of that dogma; 2˚ the presentation of this revealed truth in order to be believed (a. 2). The revealed truth itself is immutable, and hence, from this perspective, dogmas are not the object of history. However, the proposal of this dogma on the part of the Church is successive, especially inasmuch as it includes the explication and formulation of revealed truths. Therefore, from this perspective, dogmas become objects of history, thus meaning that the history of dogmas is indeed possible. Now, after everything we have discussed concerning the explication of revealed truth (a. 4–16), this hardly needs further proof. However, since no few people think2 that dogmas are at least not truly and properly the object of history (and therefore that, truly and properly, there is no such thing as the history of dogmas), we will show that the proposition and explication of revealed truths, and therefore dogmas, are truly and properly the object of history.
III. Proof. - History is defined as a science that investigates and explains the facts and causal connections involved in the development of human social activities.3
Now, the proposition and explanation of revealed truths: 1° is a historical fact; 2° takes place through an activity that is properly and immediately human; 3° has its own human causes and observes the conditions of man; 4° belongs to the social order; 5° takes place successively through time; and indeed 6° from certain causes. Therefore, in so far as they are fashioned through the exposition and explanation of revealed truths, dogmas have the required conditions for being the object of history and, therefore, truly and properly are the object of history.
The minor is proved in parts.
First, the proposition and explication of revealed truths clearly constitute a historical fact whose beginning, progress, conditions, causes, and effects can be investigated and determined just as is done for other historical facts.
Second, the proposition and explication of revealed truths takes place through an activity that is properly and directly human. For although a dogmatic definition does indeed take place with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, nonetheless this is brought about through men as through principal causes. For it is the pope himself who defines a given doctrine. Indeed, in this we have the distinction between revelation, inspiration, and dogmatic definition, namely that: revelation takes place immediately and exclusively by God Himself; in inspiration, God is truly the principal author, with the sacred writer being its instrumental author; and in the definition of dogmas man is the principal cause, though a secondary cause, under the special assistance of the Holy Spirit, by whose power the definition is preserved from all error. Therefore, the dogmatic definition is a properly human action. It is from man as its main cause, in the form of a conscious, free, and deliberate action, like any other historical activity. Therefore, dogmatic definitions constitute the object of history much more than do revelation and inspiration.
Third, although dogmatic definitions are made under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, nonetheless it has its human causes and observes the conditions of man’s intellect and will (with the exception of fallibility in the definition itself, on account of the charism of infallibility), as was set forth in a. 8.
Fourth, a dogmatic definition is the activity of a properly social order and therefore is properly historical (to the extent that only those facts that have a social character or influence on the community are properly considered to be historical). For the act of defining is not private, but rather, is performed by the Pope or a Council as a public person [or entity], binding the whole Church to believe what is defined, in a way that accords to the conditions or needs of the Church, influencing the religious and general life of the Church. In short, it has as much of a social and historical nature as is possible.
Fifthly, the proposition and explication of revealed truths takes place successively, as is factually obvious. For from the start of the Church’s history not all revealed truths were explicitly proposed by her to be believed. Rather, this took place over the course of time. Similarly, the deposit of faith is explained by the Church and explicitly recognized by the faithful through the years. For neither the existence of revelation nor the grace of faith bring with themselves the understanding, at least in full, of revelation: for revelation itself only establishes the possibility of this kind of knowledge and faith truly is an assent to a proposed truth and therefore presupposes knowledge or explication of such truth.
Sixth, the successive presentation and development of faith is not purely accidental, but follows from determinate causes, such that it is properly historical. For successive proposal and explanation follows:
a) From the nature of the human intellect. The proposition and explication of revealed truths is performed the Church as a human cause and therefore in accord with the conditions of the human intellect (except for fallibility). Now, it is a universal law of mankind that it is not perfect from the start but, instead, successively arrives at its perfection, something most evident in the case of the perfecting of cognition, whether in individual men or in the whole of mankind.4 And thus, the proposition and explanation of revealed truths needed to take place over time, just as even today a child or a man converted to the faith gradually learns the truths thereof.
b) It follows from the supernatural sublimity of revealed truths that they completely exceed the capacities of the human intellect, such that they cannot be deduced from natural principles, but, instead, can be known only by revelation, and, indeed, even by revelation cannot be comprehended. Thus, revealed truths present the greatest difficulty to the human intellect, for there is a kind of disproportion between the human intellect and such truths, such that man can only by great labor and strenuous efforts arrive at knowledge of revealed truths and at greater understanding of faith. Therefore, although God may always illuminate His Church, nevertheless because He enlightens it according to the particular modality and conditions of the human agent or society, it follows that the depth, fullness, and loftiness of revealed truth were known, proposed, and explained only over the course of time. How much time and effort was actually needed, at least for the most important truths to be properly explained and correctly made known to the faithful! As St. Thomas excellently notes: “It happened that, in the things of faith, it was necessary that human understanding gradually become accustomed to the things of faith.”5
c) It follows from the manner in which the revelation was made and handed on to us. For, in both the Old and New Testaments, God has generally revealed his secrets as veiled in figures, parables, and metaphors, in a complex and obscure manner, so that sometimes it seems as though he had hidden the very meaning that he wished to reveal.6 In addition to this, such revelation was made and handed down in an ancient tongue that is foreign to us. Hence, in general, no small effort is required to determine the meaning of any given revelation. The entire work involved in interpreting Holy Scripture consists in this, especially the labors of theologians. Indeed, what studious labors were required to determine the meaning of the words, “The Word became flesh”! Or how much disputation has there been concerning the text, “You are Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church”! And who has yet exhausted the whole meaning the revelation contained in Christ’s words, “I am the vine, you are the branches”?
d) It follows from the manner in which revelation was proposed in the beginning and through the Church’s continued progress. The Apostles themselves did indeed propose the revealed truth to the Church, though not all such truths in the same way but, rather, some more fluently and expressively, while they proposed others more succinctly and incidentally. Thus, the Apostle Paul demonstrated to the Corinthians the resurrection of the dead at length and to the Romans the necessity of faith, whereas he only briefly set forth the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Thus, in the Apostle’s Creed, the Trinity of the divine persons is proposed in a kind of indirect way, namely through the statement of faith in God the Father, in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and in the Holy Spirit. Likewise, in the creeds and definitions of later eras, the formulas of this or that given time are used to express mysteries though they sometimes thereafter create no small difficulties, as was the case, for example, for the term Hypostatic Union.
e) It follows from the universal or general law of divine providence, which provides for men according to their condition.7 Certainly, the explication of the revealed truths is a special work of divine providence and government. This is quite clear based on assistance promised to the Church for the infallible preservation and exposition of such truths. However, God executes this kind of special and immediate providence through men, that is, through the Church, and indeed in accord with the condition of men and the Church, for this is the general law of divine providence and governance.8 Hence, the reason St. Thomas gives for successive revelations9 likewise holds true, mutatis mutandis, for the successive explication of revealed truths through dogmatic progress. As he teaches:
The progress of knowledge takes place in two ways. In one way, it takes place on the part of the teacher, whether he be one or many, who over the course of time advances in knowledge. And this is the reason for the increase through reason’s labors applied to sciences devised by man. In another way, such progress takes place on the part of the person who learns. For just as a teacher who knows the full breadth of a given art does not immediately present it to the pupil from the start because the latter would not be able to grasp it, but instead, gradually teaches him by coming down to his level, so too have men advanced in the knowledge of faith through the passing of time.
Therefore, even as regards the explication of faith, God enlightens men—nay, the Church herself—gradually and by coming down to the level of mankind. In the response to the third objection of the same article, St. Thomas further explains this, saying: “In the manifestation of faith (either through a new revelation or through the definition by the Church) God is like an agent who has perfect knowledge from eternity:
In the manifestation of faith (whether through a new revelation or through a definition by the Church) God is like an agent who has perfect knowledge from eternity. Man, by contrast, is like matter receiving the influence of God’s activity. Therefore, it was necessary that men’s knowledge of faith should proceed from an imperfect state to one that is perfect. And although some men have played the role of being active causes, as teachers of the faith, nonetheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for the sake of the common good. Therefore, the Fathers,10 who were the founders of the faith, were only given as much knowledge of the faith as needed to be given to the people at that time, either openly or in a figurative form.
Thus, although dogmatic progress takes place under the special flow influence of God and infallibly, nevertheless, it takes place through men as immediate causes, over the course of time and in accord with their conditions. Hence, it is, properly speaking, a historical fact and the object of history.11 From this, it is likewise evident what the object of the history of dogmas is.
IV. The dogmas of the Catholic Church are the material object of the history of dogmas.—From the very term history “of dogmas” it is clear that dogmas are the proper object of this science. For by this very object, the history of dogmas is distinguished from secular history or even from ecclesiastical history, indeed from the history of theology, or of heresies, or even from the teaching of Fathers of the Church. Since dogmas truly speaking are only to be found in the Catholic Church, only dogmas defined by the Catholic Church constitute the object of the history of dogmas. For whatever truth might be found in various [other] Churches [sic], in no Church other than the Catholic Church are dogmas in fact admitted, at least in addition to those that have been defined by the Catholic Church. In the case of Protestantism, it is clear that its fundamental doctrine excludes the existence of dogmas.12 However, in the schismatic Greek Church, dogmas do exist materially, namely those that were defined prior to the schism, but after the time of the schism no new dogmas, properly speaking, can be said to have been proposed, given the lack of competent authority for doing so.13 Therefore, only the dogmas of the Catholic Church will be the object of the history of dogmas.14 Thus, too, we can regard its object as being completely determined. For the dogmas defined by the Catholic Church are certain things that are completely determined and concerned with a determinate matter. For if you trace along the passing of time, you have the dogmas concerning the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, grace, etc. Hence the history of dogmas will weave together the history of the dogmas concerning the consubstantiality of the Word, the Hypostatic Union, the Anti-Pelagian dogmas concerning grace, etc. Thus, in short, the history of dogmas is circumscribed by certain limits from the perspective of its object.
Protestant authors face no small difficulty in determining the object of the history of dogmas. Indeed, for a long time, they have been in a state of confusion regarding the relationship between the history of dogmas and the history of theology or of the Fathers. In general, according to their various concepts of what dogmas are, they also have various opinions concerning the specific matters falling to the history of dogmas.15 However, for all Protestant, rationalist, and modernist authors, Catholic dogmas are at least for that reason matters belonging to the history of dogmas, so that by presenting their history they might show their error and human origin, or, as Krueger expressly states the end of the history of dogmas: “So that we might learn not to confuse dogma with the Gospel.”16 Thus, Harnack tries to show that dogmas concerning God, Christ, the Church, and so forth (inasmuch as they are even held by the Protestants) are formally and reduplicatively “Catholic” and consequently to be abandoned by true Protestants. Hence, he teaches that the history of those dogmas that exist concretely in history must be investigated, in short, the dogmas defined in the Catholic Church “prior to the Reformation,” so that their “origin, development, and outcome” might be determined.17
Thus, in the end, we can conclude but the only true and strict history of dogmas is found in the Catholic Church. This is clear from the perspective of its object, because only there are dogmas, truly so called, to be found. And from the perspective of the science of history this same conclusion follows from this fact: he who admits no infallible and divinely inspired authority for proposing dogmas, sees in the formulation, presentation, imposition, and development of ecclesiastical doctrine only the human element, the work of genius, and the fruit of human labor, that which constitutes the object of the history of theology or of the Church. However, if dogmas are considered as revealed truths, proposed, formulated, and explained by the infallible and divinely instituted magisterium of the Church, they are in fact the proper and specific or formal object of the history of dogmas. And this will ground the existence of the history of dogmas, truly so called.18 We will speak about this more in the following chapter.
V. The formal object of the history of dogmas is the successive presentation and explanation of revealed truths.—For dogmas are, properly speaking, the object of history, inasmuch as they involve the successive presentation and explanation of revealed truths (n. 1). Therefore, the formal object of the history of dogmas (i.e., the formality [ratio] under which dogmas are considered in the history of dogmas) will be the entire process of knowing, explaining, fearing, defining, and proposing the revealed truths to the point of dogmas coming to be established.
A number of people understand the nature of the history of dogmas in a broader sense, as though it included the entire “history” of dogmas, that is, everything that led to its definition, as well as the effects or fate of the definition. Thus, they begin with the revelation of certain dogmas in the Old Testament (e. g. that of the Trinity), then trace out the history of the definition in the Church and, finally, describe the acceptance of this dogma among Catholics and its denial among heretics, along with related consequences. Likewise, whatever has exercised any sort of influence on the “history” of dogmas or is in any way connected with a defined or to-be-defined dogma, they consider to be the object of the history of dogmas.
Nonetheless, it is clear that such a history is the history of the Church or of the Christian religion regarding a given determinate matter.19
6. The duties belonging to the history of dogmas.—Therefore, it will be the duty of the history of dogmas to show: which original doctrines come to be explained in later times; in what new forms, concepts, or terms they find expression in; by what means, by what reasons, and under what conditions the explanation was set forth; in short, whence came the dogma definitively proposed in the Church. Thus, the history of dogmas sets forth: the various means used by the human mind in explaining the revelation that was originally proposed; the winding paths along which this explanation proceeded; how strong, and yet also how weak, it is in fulfilling this duty; and finally, how much truth or falsity there is in the explanations given by the human mind. Likewise, it will become clear how much the development of faith depends on the conditions of human cognition. How great the host of errors and how numerous the quarrels! What a complicated interweaving of different opinions! What a history involved even in but one doctrine!
In particular, the individual parts and properties of dogmatic development must be determined historically. Thus, above all, it must show the way that revealed doctrine was explicated (see a. 6 and 7), whether it exits in Sacred Scripture or in Tradition, whether through simple analysis or through the mediation of philosophical doctrines. Non-Catholic authors generally consider only those doctrines that were used or brought forward as means of explication. Hence, throughout the doctrine of tradition they strive to establish the influence, “infiltrations,” and effects of pagan philosophy or religion. Thus, it is necessary to pay the greatest of attention to specifically what Christian doctrine is presupposed or taken up for explication. Thus, also, the specific difference between early Christianity and the various pagan religions will be clear and one will be able to easily determine what kind of influence and effect they exercised upon the development of dogmas.
A significant portion of the historical inquiry will be concerned with the interpretation of Sacred Scripture (see. a. 13), since both the Fathers and heretics either drew their doctrines from it or tried to prove them on Scriptural grounds. Thus, the history of dogmas shows what parts of Scripture have been explained, in what sense, what texts have been definitively clarified, what texts have served for dogmatic definition, in what sense, and how this interpretation developed.
As for tradition (cf. a. 12) the historian of dogmas will principally need to show the forms taken on by dogmas in tradition as they were defined over the course of time.20 And, certainly, diligent inquiry into doctrine of faith contained in tradition will bear witness to a marvelous multiplicity of statements and variety of forms, not only certain light traces, but explicit doctrines bear witness, equivalently or equipollently, to the implicit dogmas that would later on be defined.
Thus, the question of various formulations will arise (see a. 11), asking: under which formulas did a given doctrine exist in the primitive tradition? Which formulations passed down from Sacred Scripture into tradition? Which formulas from Sacred Scripture received a different formulation in the tradition? And how did the earlier formulas pass on to others at a later time? As is clear from the teaching that we set forth above concerning the explication of revealed truths, the main portion of the historian’s work will be the labor of determining such formulas and their causes and reasons. However, it does not properly belong to the historian to judge the objective equivalence of individual formulas, but rather, to show their existence and historical reasons.
The historian of dogmas will pay particular attention to the causes (see a. 15) of various explanations and formulations. And in this way, the history of dogmas will, properly speaking, be raised to the dignity of a science. Nor does this exclude investigating the various comparisons that can be made with pagan religions (the comparative science of religions), especially in order to defend the true and historical origin of dogmas against the errors of syncretistic teachings, which assert that Christian doctrines were drawn from foreign religions, albeit with certain modifications. The more a historian knows Christian doctrine, the more easily will he refute such errors.
Finally, the history of dogmas will have the special duty of investigating and showing how dogmatic definitions were arrived at amid various conflicting opinions and errors (cf. a. 14). Thus, one will need to consider: what doctrines have been expounded in various and erroneous ways; by means of what arguments; the means by which opposed opinions were challenged and the truth of faith defended; and what the effects of error, heresy, and dogmatic definitions have been. Protestant historians claim that traces of the original tradition can be found in several doctrines rejected by the Church, or conversely, that certain later-defined doctrines were based on previously rejected doctrines, or that certain doctrines were condemned by the Church for political reasons, even in opposition to their own tradition and the clearly stated truth.21 Therefore, Catholic historians have the special duty to show that all controversies were concerned with the interpretation of the traditional faith.
This kind of investigation into historical development is certainly very difficult, though deserving of the labors and talent of the best, and at the same time is a necessary task. As Tixeront excellently observes:
There is certainly no verbal resemblance between the teachings of Jesus Christ or St. Paul and those of the Council of Nicaea or the Council of Trent. However, we do see in them equivalence and identity in substance... Nonetheless, the question arises: how did one pass from the Gospel and St. Paul… the formulas of Nicaea or the profession of Pius IV?22
Article Eighteen: The Methodology to be Used in the History of Dogmas
I. Since the formal character [ratio] of any science follows the nature and properties of its proper object, the formal character [ratio] and methodology of the history of dogmas will likewise be determined from the teaching concerning the nature of dogmatic progress. First, we will establish the canon for such methodology; second, discuss various errors and controversial opinions concerning this matter; third, we will determine the formal character [ratio] of historical methodology, especially in comparison to the dogmatic methodology; and fourthly and finally, we will discuss the nature of theological criteria.23
II. General canon: Inasmuch as it is a kind of history, the history of dogmas must use a historical methodology these theories, though as a theological discipline it is subject to theological criteria. Based on the object of the history of dogmas it is easy to see that it is partly historical and partly theological as a discipline. Obviously, it is historical inasmuch as its formal object is the very coming-into-being of dogmas; however, it is theological inasmuch as the matter it is concerned with is the supernatural revelation expressed and proposed in the dogmas. Consequently, the history of dogmas, as history, must use the historical method as [its] proper [methodology], though as a theological discipline it is subject to theological criteria. This canon contains nearly all the difficulties that arise concerning the methodology of the history of dogmas. Indeed, the first part seems to be admitted by all, whereas many deny the second part or explain it in different ways.
Indeed, many historians, even Catholic ones, deny that the history of dogmas is a theological discipline. But generally speaking, this cannot be denied by anyone who accepts dogmas as divinely revealed truths: for revealed truths, considered in any way, constitute the proper object of theology. Nor is there any escape to be found in claiming that such truths are considered in the history of dogmas from a different perspective [sub alia ratione] than in dogmatic theology, for a different way of considering the particular disciplines of theology does not, however, divide theology itself: thus we have dogmatic, historical, and apologetic theology, just as on the basis of another division there is speculative and positive theology. Therefore, the only person who can deny that the history of dogmas is a theological discipline is he who, not admitting that dogmas are divinely revealed, considers them to be philosophical discoveries or human creations. Thus, the history of dogmas is a theological discipline based on its object, though it is properly historical based on its methodology.
III. Errors and controversial opinions concerning the methodology to be used in the history of dogmas. Two sorts of errors correspond to the dual character of this general canon: one is opposed to the historical method, inasmuch as the methods of dogmatic theology are imposed on the history of dogmas; the other error is opposed to the formal character [rationem] of the object, inasmuch as the theological criteria are either denied or set aside. Historians do, indeed, strongly assert that the methodologies of dogmatic theology must not be used for the history of dogmas. Nevertheless, although it cannot be denied that some dogmatic theologians have failed in this regard, this difficulty seems to be minor in comparison to the greater and most important difficulty concerning theological criteria. Now, the term theological criteria refers to “all the norms descending from revelation itself and the specific rules that revelation either requires by its nature or has assigned by reason.”24 Therefore, the theological criteria are: first, the revealed truths themselves; second, the Church’s infallible declarations; third, the precepts of the Church; fourth, certain conclusions drawn from revelation. They are called the criteria of the history of dogmas (but not its principles), inasmuch as they are norms or rules by which the historian is bound in making judgments, which must remain in conformity with them.
Protestant historians commonly err by making various false presuppositions. For example: an erroneous concept of revelation, faith, and dogma; false delimitations of revealed doctrine; theologoumena deduced from Protestant theology; philosophical doctrine contrary to the faith; denial of the Church’s infallible magisterium. Moreover, liberal Protestant authors deny all divine revelation and the existence of the supernatural order. It cannot be surprising that, based on such presuppositions, Protestants arrive at conclusions totally opposed to the Catholic faith and the history of Catholic dogmas. And the same is true for the history proposed by rationalists.
The chief error of the modernists is to be found in their profoundly wrong philosophy, namely, the philosophy of agnosticism, vitalism, and immanence, by which everything that is supernatural and divine is eliminated from real history and attributed to subjective opinion, consciousness, or religious feeling. From this presupposed principle there follows, in particular, the denial of true revelation, the denial of the Church’s infallible magisterium, their teaching concerning the relative value of dogmas, the distortion of tradition, and so forth. Nay, modernist criticism is founded upon this. As for the rest, the Modernists were imbued as much as possible with the false Protestant presuppositions and teachings.
Indeed, the Modernists, like Protestants and Rationalists, claim with all their might that their principles are based upon historical reasons, that is, from a consideration of the facts. Such was the claim made in the “Programma” of the Italian Modernists and the “Réponse” of the French. But unjustly! No one will dream that the Modernists, in chronological order, first stood for agnosticism, then for vital immanence, etc. and thus drew his conclusions. The meaning of what we stated is this: the Modernist teaching was not deduced in virtue of the facts, but rather, in virtue of their presupposed philosophy which was false and contrary to the faith. But, if someone objects—as they in fact do—that such a philosophy follows from historical facts when they are correctly considered, one must say in response that such a teaching cannot in any way be logically deduced from the facts. Thus, for example, the various opinions of people about the nature and existence of God in no way prove agnosticism, nor the immanence of life, nor the equal value of all religions, or the modernist notion of religious sentiment.
Hence, the history of the Modernists can and should be called a kind of pure and false apriorism.25 Nor is it surprising that historical records among the Modernists are not infrequently and most arbitrarily corrupted.
Next, the opinion of the majority of historians is that theological criteria are not (a priori) to be denied, but to be set aside and not considered. They posit the following as the canon of historical methodology: historical inquiry performed without presuppositions; it considers only the facts themselves, examined according to the rules of criticism; it proceeds in accord with the principles of science alone and thus abstracts from theological criteria. According to such a canon for historical methodology, it is indeed not permissible to assume principles opposed to faith, nor to attempt to demonstrate the falsity of dogmas, but similarly, it is not permissible to assume the truths of faith or sacred authority. Thus, the historian must have a “neutral” attitude towards the truth of faith, neither affirming nor denying it beforehand. They call this kind of methodology either simply the historical and scientific method, or historical-critical, empirical-psychological, and finally, free science or absolute science (Voraussetzungslose Wissenschaft).
Now, among the Catholics, some supporters of this view distinguish between the person of the historian and historical knowledge itself: indeed, they say that the historian, as a person who believes, is bound to hold the faith, whereas science or history, as history, is not bound to the consideration of faith, but can and must set it out of consideration in virtue of its scientific requirements. Others distinguish as follows: the faith and authority of the Church is a negative and extrinsic rule and norm. Indeed, they say it is negative inasmuch as a Catholic teacher is not permitted to maintain or defend anything that would contradict the faith, so that, if he comes to conclusions contrary to the faith, he must reconsider such judgments and take up new investigations. They say it is extrinsic inasmuch as historical research is undertaken in complete independence from faith and the authority of the Church; they say that they consider the teaching of the Fathers, like any other doctrine, as a historical fact, solely according to the principles of science, that is, exclusively in accord with the common rules of historical research. And they call history’s independence from theological criteria “methodological independence.” Thus, as much as is possible, they distinguish the historical and the dogmatic methodologies from each other, and do the same also for the distinction between historical theology and dogmatic theology. Thus, you have two entirely different disciplines, one of which proceeds from the principles of faith and under the positive and intrinsic direction of the Church, the other from facts solely according to the rules of science. Therefore, it is necessary that we explain what historical method properly means, especially, how it differs from dogmatic methodology, and whether it is necessary or permissible for theological criteria to be set out of consideration in history, especially in the history of dogmas.
IV. What does historical methodology involve? – Methodology refers to rational structure [ratio] or order in knowledge to be acquired. Therefore, the methodology of each science must be determined on the basis of that science’s nature. Historical science is defined as: the science that investigates and explains the facts of the development of human society and their causes.26 Therefore, history has two main tasks: research into historical facts and investigation into the causes of their development. And if historical facts are properly sought from historical sources or documents and causal connection determined from the facts themselves, then one properly and specifically makes use of historical methodology. Therefore, historical methodology is essentially positive and proceeds a posteriori, inasmuch as it gathers facts from historical evidence, considers their proper and immediate causes, and draws conclusions from the facts themselves, not from general principles. At the same time, it properly investigates and determines the development of these facts and the actual becoming of things. Therefore, in the history of dogmas, pursued in accord with historical methodology: first, the facts of the successive presentation and explanation of revealed truths are investigated and explained (exposition of historical doctrine) and, indeed, this is drawn from historical sources or documents themselves; second, the very becoming or development of the doctrine is determined; third, the causal connections in the process of development is explained, to the degree that both can be drawn from the historical facts themselves.
V. The distinction between dogmatic and historical methodologies. - Historical methodology differs from dogmatic methodology, on the one hand, as regards their formal objects, and on the other hand, as regards their manner of proceeding.
As regards their objects, the principal differences are as follows:
The dogmatic theologian considers the truth of a given doctrine, whereas the historian, is concerned with how that doctrine was known, explained, and proposed (or, in short, it considers the genesis of dogmas).
The dogmatic theologian investigates the faith of the Church today and makes use of past expressions of the faith in witness to the truth of faith in its present expression.
When the dogmatic theologian considers the faith of the past, he strives to show the harmony [convenientiam] of this faith with the teachings of Sacred Scripture and later defined dogma, whereas the historian inquires into the causes that led to the latter state of exposition and definition.
Hence, there are many historical questions that hardly affect the dogma, though they are of the greatest concern for the historian.
As for the manner of considering this object, dogmatic methodology explains and judges the doctrine of the Church properly and formally in light of the Church’s faith, indeed the explicated faith of the present day, whereas historical methodology explains and judges this doctrine in the light of historical facts and documents. Thus, 1˚ dogmatic methodology explains the teachings of the Fathers directly in light of the faith of the Church today, whereas the historian considers it from the perspective of the state or condition of the faith as it was at their own time or during that which preceded their writing. 2° According to dogmatic methodology, one determines the meaning of the teachings of the Fathers, its agreement with Sacred Scripture or the dogmas of the Church, and their probative force directly in accord with the Church’s own approval and declaration (e. g., the doctrine of St. Augustine on grace); by contrast, historical methodology directly determines, explains, and judges the teachings of the Fathers, heretics, and others through direct textual interpretation. Certainly, there cannot be one teaching according to the Church’s judgment and another based on the evidence of the sources. Nonetheless, there are different ways to determine that meaning. When interpreting texts, the historian mainly uses comparison—namely, comparison of the individual selections with their whole context, with the other opinions of the given author, with the opinions of opposing parties, with the similar positions in other theologians, philosophers, and indeed even in other religions, etc. (Thus, it is referred to a as a comparative methodology). 3° While the dogmatic theologian brings forth the teaching of Fathers of the Church directly as evidence of the Church’s dogmatic tradition, the historian considers the teaching of a given Father as an intermediate state in the development of doctrine and, thus, as the effect of the earlier explanation thereof and cause of the subsequent one. 4. The dogmatic theologian, precisely as a dogmatic theologian, considers the whole of the teachings of the Fathers primarily as the result of divine revelation and the magisterium of the Church, while the historian mainly investigates the influence of human labors and the temporal conditions involved in the process of development. Hence, the historian strives to explain the teaching of a given time on the basis of temporal and human conditions, which they call its historical understanding or historical sense.
Corollaries.—From what we have said, 1˚ it is quite clear that there is no small difference between a dogmatic and historical treatments of a subject, though they are in no way opposed to each other. At the same time, none will have grounds to claim that historical consideration been completely absent in Catholic theology, although it is cultivated more perfectly in our own days.27
2˚ Although a properly and purely historical consideration is obviously legitimate, it is no less obvious that it is extremely limited and therefore imperfect, since it does attain the explication of revealed truths only from a very restricted perspective. Thus, historical methodology does provide one with the best means for establishing historical facts and revealing and the influence of various teachings and human activity on each other, but by no means can this enable one to know the whole nature and condition of dogmatic progress. This is also how one should understand historians’ dictum: no absolute truth can be proved by history.28 However, from another perspective, historical facts can very well lead to the knowledge of universal and necessary truths, as is clear from apologetic theology. As a matter of fact, almost all historians draw philosophical and religious conclusions from history—which, ultimately, is the end and intention of every historical study—although in this regard they pass beyond the bounds of historical methodology.
3˚ From what has been said, it follows that in the history of dogmas the common practical and technical rules or norms of historical research must be observed, though with a certain accommodation to the particular material involved.29
4˚ Although Historical methodology is immediately the methodology properly belonging to historical science, it can also be very well applied in dogmatic theology itself. Some historians demand that dogmatic theology exclusively use a historical methodology, or that dogmatic theology become historical theology, as they say. However, this is wrong, for dogmatic methodology is primary, proper, and fundamental in theology. Nonetheless, among the theological sources [i.e., the “loci theologici”] there is numbered history whose methodology is properly historical. Nor do we deny that theologians basically to our own times have not considered and cultivated the locus of history, indeed precisely because they lacked a suitable methodology. Thus, there certainly is great merit in the work of historians who, investigating the whole of theological material “historically,” as they say, vindicated the rightful place of history in theology, and indeed to the great advantage of theology itself, as we will show in the next chapter. The need to defend the faith against the assertions of non-Catholic historians certainly contributed no small amount to this. This suggests the fifth corollary.
5˚ Although historical methodology is not per se apologetic, nonetheless nothing prevents—either from the historical perspective or from that of methodology—the historian, by using his methodology, from defending the doctrine of the faith against the historical fabrications of his adversaries; nay, in some situations and in certain matters this seems to be an obligation for him. For every science defends its principles and conclusions, and indeed, as is supposed, according to its own principles and methods. Hence this also has a place in the history of dogmas. As we saw above, in the study of the history of dogmas it will very easily—nay, almost inevitably—be the case that Catholics and others will be separated by very significant differences, as is quite clear to anyone who considers the matter today. Although such differences arise mainly from various false presuppositions, nevertheless in concrete cases it is necessary that one show the particular details of the defect in methodology or argumentation. In this regard, whether he likes it or not, the Catholic historian will be an apologetic by virtue of his doctrine. How for example can one explain the history of the dogmas of the two previous centuries without at least refuting the arguments of modernists and Protestants? More or less the same applies to later times. Moreover, the more the historian refutes the arguments of his opponents, the more he will also confirm his own conclusions. Indeed, nothing prevents a historian from intentionally refuting erroneous fabrications, provided that he defends nothing as proven without having thoroughly proven it by means of strict arguments, with the discussion proceeding according to the requirements of historical methodology.30
6˚ Some historians unjustly assign to the history of dogmas the duty to investigate and prove the truth of the development of Christian ideas.31 According to them, just as apologetics proves the truth of the faith in its own way, so does the history of dogmas in a historical manner. But the history of dogmas, according to its own, proper methodology, cannot judge concerning the objective truth of the explication of faith. It is of use for refuting historical arguments made against the truth of faith; indeed, it is able to prove the historical preambles of faith, which properly speaking belong to the field of history; and it can show the exposited doctrine that was the source of a given dogma. However, if he wishes to judge the truth of this definition—that is the conformity between the explicated doctrine and the defined dogma—he then, of necessity, transgresses the limits of historical methodology, since the latter is concerned solely with these historical facts and their causes and genesis. Much less is history able to judge the truth of the fundamental doctrine of [dogmatic] development itself. In point of fact, historians do judge concerning them, though according to given philosophical or theological principles, for they are not acting precisely as historians but, rather as theologians. Thus, the history of dogmas provides only the material for a judgment concerning the truth of dogmas. Nor does recourse to apologetics suffice. For it demonstrates the credibility of faith in virtue of its own methodology and discipline, using on the one hand historical facts, indeed with a historical methodology, and on the other hand, absolute principles and a philosophical methodology, as for example, concerning the question of the possibility and demonstrative value of miracles. It is clear, however, that nothing prevents a historian—functioning as a philosopher or a theologian, from showing the truth of the explication.
VI. On the use of theological criteria: Preliminary Remarks.—Before resolving this matter, certain things must be noted.
1° The condition of the believer differs from that of him who has not yet arrived at faith. We need only recall the definition articulated by of the [First] Vatican Council: “If anyone says that the condition of the faithful and of those who have not yet attained to the only true faith is the same, so that Catholics could have a just reason for suspending their judgment and calling into question that faith they have already received under the teaching authority of the Church until they have completed a scientific demonstration of the credibility and truth of their faith, let him be anathema.”32 Consequently, under no pretext, is a Catholic permitted either simply to deny the faith, or to suspend the assent of faith as though it did not exist or was not valid, or to hold a doctrine contrary to the faith.
2˚ In argumentation ad hominem33 it is sometimes permissible to set theological criteria out of consideration. Indeed, this manner of arguing implies neither the denial of faith nor the suspension of the assent to faith, but rather, only the non-use of faith. Thus, many Catholic historians in scientific debates say that it is necessary to set theological criteria out of consideration, and in fact do this so that they may convince Protestant historians, rationalists, and modernists of their errors. Obviously, here we are not talking about theological criteria to be admitted, but instead, only about the way of fashioning arguments or resolving objections. Thus, dogmatic theology also makes use of ad hominem arguments. Nonetheless, in the end, this method of argumentation is subject to the Church’s judgment, so that the question of theological criteria is not completely excluded. Finally, some irrationally demand that Catholic historians exclusively use this method of argumentation and research.
3˚ Faith does not stand in the way of research and historical consideration, in the light of reason and the facts. For every believer can consider objects: either according to what faith teaches about them, or according to what reason is able to discover. Thus, concerning the things that they hold, believers generally at one time hold what faith says and other times what reason teaches. Thus, at one time we speak about what faith reveals concerning God, and at another what reason proves concerning it; so too we sometimes dispose of things in accord with revealed [moral] precepts, whereas at others according to the judgment of reason. Therefore, similarly, the teaching of the Fathers and the whole of dogmatic progress can at times be considered in the light of faith, or at others in light of the facts. Therefore, if the question is exclusively, “Is the historian permitted to consider and investigate the explication of faith and the teaching of the Fathers in the light of facts, texts, and reason,” nobody will deny it. And, this seems to have been the sense in which the majority of Catholics have spoken of “methodical abstraction” from theological criteria. Nonetheless, this point does not resolve the question of theological criteria. For the question immediately arises whether historical consideration itself, historical investigation itself, in the light of the facts is in no way bound by superior criteria. Therefore, the question is formally this: Does historical research, according to historical methodology, require the denial or at least the non-consideration of theological premises, or does it, on the contrary, admit, indeed require, the consideration of such criteria, and for what reason? We will respond in three conclusions, which simultaneously explain the propositions related to the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists.
VII. Conclusions concerning the use of theological criteria.
Conclusion I: Neither historical science nor historical methodology require the denial of faith (or the suspension of the assent of faith) nor the non-consideration of theological criteria.—This holds for two reasons. First, there is no opposition between true knowledge or the truth of facts and the teaching of faith. Second, just as the consideration of things in the light of faith does not exclude the consideration thereof in the light of facts, so too consideration in the light of facts does not exclude consideration in the light of faith. The opposed postulate of the Protestants, Rationalists, and Modernists is founded upon in the presupposed teaching that faith (i.e. the confession of a given sect) is not necessarily true and, likewise, that the teaching of the Catholic faith contradicts the truth of facts. Now, if this were truly the case, then the doctrine of faith would necessarily need to be set aside—nay, attacked by the truth of science.
Conclusion II: The doctrine of faith and, therefore, theological criteria must be held positively by the historian of dogmas and used in the practice of the discipline itself.— First, the authority of the author of the faith (i.e. of God who reveals) requires that the revealed doctrine and divine institutions be held by all, especially the faithful, as true and legitimate and put into practice. Therefore, the historian of dogmas may not set aside or neglect the doctrine of faith and the judgments or precepts of the Church's magisterium when he investigates the history of dogmas. Second, since the salvation of men depends most greatly on the truth and purity of doctrine, and is most greatly endangered by errors concerning what has been revealed, every error concerning faith must most assiduously be avoided in the history of dogmas. Now, as the facts themselves bear witness, errors of the greatest importance can very easily take place in the history of dogmas. Therefore, the historian is obligated to observe theological criteria for the sake of procuring salvation, lest he fall into errors or lead others into them. Third, a purely historical methodology does not suffice for rendering a complete and definitive judgment concerning the object of the history of dogmas; indeed, both the fact of the revelation of given doctrines, as well as the sense of Scripture, and the divine institution and infallibility of the Church’s teaching, as well as many other things, all pertain to revelation and to the Church’s magisterium. Finally, dogmatic progress itself is essentially constituted by a supernatural element that can only be known and judged according to theological criteria. Hence, on the one hand, judgment concerning dogmatic progress belongs to the competence of the Church and of theology and, on the other hand, the historian is subject to historical theological criteria.34
Conclusion III: The doctrine of faith, with its consequences for the historian, working according to historical methodology, does not hold the place of being principles from which to draw historical conclusions, nor the place of sources from which to draw knowledge of historical facts, but rather, plays the role of being a norm or higher rule or, properly speaking, as a theological criterion.—For from the determination of historical methodology it follows that the historian draws historical knowledge from the sources and concludes from such facts those things that can be drawn from them by reason. Therefore, the historian does not admit, accept, or propose as historically proven any statement that is drawn solely from the principles of faith or that is proposed solely by ecclesiastical authority. Indeed, the authority of the faith or of the Church does not make it be the case that historical arguments would be thereby supplied, nor that historical arguments would have probative force based on the Church’s approval, nor that the logical consequence of the facts would be denied, nor much less that facts or evidence would be corrupted or falsified in favor of the Church, as certain adversaries falsely assert.
VIII. The Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists.—In the second part of the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists, the Church spelled out, in a special way, the need for theological criteria when investigating the history of dogmas.35
The first proposition in the Oath requires one to declare, in a general fashion, that he submits himself to theological criteria: “I also submit myself with due reverence and adhere with all my soul to the condemnations, declarations, and prescriptions that are contained in the Encyclical letters Pascendi and in the Decree Lamentabili, especially as regards what is called ‘the history of dogmas.”
In the next five propositions five errors of the modernists are rejected and the doctrine opposed thereto is proposed. First, the person taking the oath declares that faith cannot contradict history: “I reject the error of those who hold that the faith proposed by the Church can contradict history and that Catholic dogmas, in the sense in which they are now understood, cannot be reconciled with truer details concerning the origins of the Christian religion” (see Lamentabili, props. 3 and 23).
Second, it is declared that the historian may not hold doctrines or premises that are directly or indirectly opposed to faith: “I also condemn and reject the opinion of those who say that a Christian man who is more learned should take on a kind of double persona, one of the believer and the other of the historian, as though the historian were permitted to hold things that contradict the faith of the believer or to establish premises that imply either that dogmas are either false or doubtful, so long as the latter are not directly denied” (see Lamentabili, prop. 24). Both propositions follow directly from the absolute nature of truth and from the obligation of faith, whereas the Modernists hold the opposite, for according to them, faith does not declare the truth of reality but, rather, only how things appear, such that faith and history would be two aspects of reality considered from two different and opposed perspectives. Hence, the Church not only defends the obligation and authority of faith but, at the same time, condemns the opposite error of the Modernists.
Third, theological criteria are accepted as norms for interpreting Sacred Scripture, the fictious claims of the rationalists are rejected, and it is declared that textual criticism is not the sole, supreme measure of interpretation: “I equally reject the method of judging and interpreting Sacred Scripture which holds in lesser esteem the Church’s tradition, the analogy of faith, and the norms of the Apostolic See, choosing, rather, to adhere to the fabricated claims of rationalists and to embracing, no less boldly than rashly, textual criticism as the sole and supreme norm of interpretation” (see Lamentabili, props 1–4 and 12). Likewise and fourthly, in the Oath, we declare that in the history of dogmas, theological criteria are not to be set aside or excluded, especially the doctrine of faith concerning the supernatural origin of the Catholic tradition and the declarations or precepts of the ecclesiastical magisterium:
Furthermore, I reject the opinion of those who hold that the person who teaches or writes concerning historical-theological matters must first set aside any preconceived opinion concerning the supernatural origin of Catholic tradition and concerning the divine assistance that has been promised [to the Church] for the sake of the perpetual preservation of every revealed truth, and that he should then interpret the writings of each of the Fathers solely on the basis of scientific principles, setting aside all sacred authority, acting with the same freedom of judgment that can be exercised in the investigation of all secular [profana] historical documents.
And fifthly and finally, in a general fashion, the modernist conception of the origin and development of dogmas is condemned: “Finally, I declare that I completely reject the error of the modernists holding that there is nothing divine in sacred tradition, or—far worse—saying that there is, though in a pantheistic sense, such that nothing would remain therein but this plain and simple fact—one that would be on the same level as the ordinary facts of history—namely, that human persons by their own industry, skill, and genius have carried on, through the subsequent ages, the school finds its origin in Christ and His Apostles.”
And in the final proposition of the Oath, we positively profess faith in the Church’s apostolic and infallible magisterium: “I most firmly hold the faith of the Fathers… concerning the charism of truth, which certainly is, was, and always will be found in the episcopal succession coming down from the Apostles. And this I hold not in order that dogmas might be tailored according to what seems better and more suited to the culture of each age but, rather, so that the absolute and immutable truth preached by the Apostles from the beginning might never be understood to be different, nor ever be understood in any other way.” Therefore, in the anti-modernist oath, the need for theological criteria is emphasized in a general fashion, and certain criteria in particular are determined as well.
IX. The question is properly concerned with the relation of reason to faith or revelation.—Some were surprised that the Church would so insistently emphasize the need for theological criteria. However, if one considers the matter aright, he will see that this is not solely a question concerning methodology is but concerned with the relationship between faith or revelation and reason. Thus, the question concerning the methodology of the history of dogmas is the same as that concerning the independence of philosophy from faith. For what the rationalists, Güntherians, and Hermesians called “philosophy” is today referred to as historical, psychological, or simply scientific methodology: for they too understand “philosophy” to refer to properly human science.36 Hence all the declarations of the Apostolic See concerning the relation between faith and reason likewise hold true concerning the relationship of historical science to faith.
Thus, in both philosophy and historical science, “in religious matters should not dominate but rather remain completely subservient” and “[dogmas] should remain most stable, not only concerning the distinction between science and faith, but also concerning the eternal immutability of faith”37 nor “that reason should also seize upon and disturb those things that pertain to faith.”38 Indeed, the following position (drawn from Frohschammer) was rejected: “all the dogmas of the Christian religion without distinction are the object of natural science of philosophy and that human reason, cultivated merely historically, can from its own natural powers and principle arrive at the true understanding concerning all—even the more hidden—dogmas, provided these dogmas have been proposed to reason itself as an object.”39 Indeed, this position granted to philosophy a freedom “that must be called, not the freedom of science, but an utterly reprobate and intolerable license of philosophy.”40 And finally, the Church has the “the duty...of proscribing and condemning all errors, if the integrity of faith and the salvation of souls so demand,” so that, “it is incumbent as a duty on every philosopher who wishes to be a son of the Church, and also on philosophy, never to say anything against what the Church teaches and to retract that about which the Church has warned them.”41 And gathering all of this together, the [First] Vatican Council, declares: “Nor does the Church in any way forbid that these sciences, each in its own domain, should make use of their own principles and of the method proper to them. While, however, acknowledging this just freedom, she seriously warns lest they fall into error by going contrary to the divine doctrine or, stepping beyond their own limits, enter into the sphere of faith and create confusion.”42 However, let us consider the arguments that are raised by opponents.
X. Objections against [the use of] theological criteria in the history of dogmas.
A first objection: No science must presuppose that which is to be proved in that science. Now, the truth of faith (which theological criteria follow) is the object to be proven through the history of dogmas. Therefore, theological criteria are not to be assumed in the history of dogmas.
Resp.: In this fundamental argument, first, simply it is a minor proposition to be denied. Indeed, it is asserted completely falsely, that the truth of the Catholic faith is to be proved by the history of dogmas, as if it were not otherwise established about it (see above, n. 6, coroll. sixth). The history of dogmas is indeed worth defending the Catholic faith against the false arguments of history, but it is not its duty to prove the truth of the faith: for the proper object and duty of the history of dogmas is to investigate the historical process of the unfolding of the faith. Hence it does not belong to her either to prove the truth of revelation or the truth of the explication of the revealed truths.
Secondly, the argument brought forward is resolved by means by drawing a distinction regarding the major premise. Indeed, no science should presuppose what it undertakes to prove by means of argumentation, for this is the meaning of the logical adage referred to. However, nothing prevents one from supposing, on the basis of some other source, the surety of the conclusion to be proven. Indeed, the historian who admits theological criteria does not use such criteria in constructing his arguments, although he assumes them to be true and certain on the basis of other sources. For the historian does not argue from theological criteria but, rather, from historical facts, and he draws his conclusions in the light of historical facts. In this respect, Catholic historians certainly differ in no way from other historians.— Finally, as we already noted above (n. 6, 3˚), faith in the truth of revelation—and consequently in the truth of theological criteria—does not hinder historical argumentation. Indeed, this is factually quite clear: for, notwithstanding their presupposed theological criteria, Catholic historians settle matters concerning dogmatic progress in a manner that is akin to the methodologies employed by other historians, doing so by means of properly historical argumentation. For just as Catholic philosophers, notwithstanding their faith in God, demonstrate the existence of God by means of philosophical reasoning, so too Catholic historians prove their conclusions by means of documents and facts. The only thing that follows from the argument above is this: it is not permissible for a historian to establish any fact as historically proven if it is not confirmed by historical sources. This conclusion follows from the distinction between the historical and the dogmatic method that we discussed earlier.
Certainly, adversaries still insist that the certainty that is perhaps derived from faith nonetheless stands in the way of the truthfulness and integrity of the historian’s research and argumentation. However, this is not an argument, but a prejudgment of the matter. For by making such a claim, these adversaries gratuitously and falsely suppose that faith and knowledge can contradict each other, or at least be mutually opposed. And if Harnack and others accuse Catholic historians of teaching in a way that is opposed to good conscience and better judgment, this is nothing more than purely gratuitous slander.43 The true difference between Catholics and their adversaries lies in the fact that Catholics hold the divine wisdom and divinely infallible doctrine of the Church to be the supreme criterion of truth, whereas their adversaries claim to follow human reason as the sole and universal criterion of all things. Generally, however, Protestant authors assume certain theologoumena or systems of Protestant theology as the basis of their historical research.44
The second objection says: something that itself has a historical development cannot be assumed by the historian.45 In response, we say: Certainly, it cannot be assumed as proven from historical sources, but it can, and indeed must, be assumed as certain from another source. Thus, for example, when the dogma of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is received as a theological criterion, it is not so received as something proven by the history of dogmas but, rather, as something established by faith. Therefore, the historian does not assume the development of a dogma (that is, the history of its proposing, explication, formulation) but, much rather, investigates into them. However, the truth of dogmas can be assumed; it does not belong to the historical order; nor is it the product of development; nor is it something to be proven by history, as is, once again, something falsely assumed.
Finally, others object that this stands in the way of freedom of science. Nonetheless, legitimate freedom is not violated by theological criteria, and the freedom that some claim46 is not legitimate but, instead, disregards and offends the divine right of God who reveals and the Church’s infallible authority.47 Indeed, the first law of history is the truth, according to the well-known dictum of Leo XIII: “The first law of history is that the historian should not dare to say anything false and, then, that he be prepared to recount the whole truth.”48
The opposing arguments more or less presuppose Voltaire’s principle: “Suspension of belief is the foundation of all wisdom.”49 However, they only prove that the historian must argue concerning dogmatic development on the basis of historical documents and sources; they in no way prove that theological criteria should be set aside.50
XI. How theological criteria are to be applied. Finally, we must determine how the theological criteria are to be applied. First of all and certainly, historical conclusions must be judged in accord with theological criteria. For, in a matter which in any way touches upon faith, no believer is permitted to hold or propose an opinion (sententia) unless he is certain that this opinion is not opposed to the doctrine of faith. Hence, the Catholic historian is undoubtedly bound to judge his conclusions in accord with the criteria of faith, before he enunciates them or even simply holds them. And if it is clear that something is opposed to the faith or other declarations of the Church, or to certain theological conclusions, this judgment must be retracted and a new investigation undertaken, utilizing the historical methods. Nor is it a disgrace for a man of science to yield to the truth.
Regarding questions about particular applications, we must distinguish several things. First, as regards textual interpretation, this kind of examination hardly raises any difficulty, since revelation does not directly say anything about them and, in general, ecclesiastical judgments do not extend to them. For the Church has made only very few declarations that determine the sense of the teaching of the Fathers, except perhaps only in general, declaring that the teaching of a given Father conforms to the Church’s faith or that the opinion of a given Father is unjustly dragged out in favor of this or that system. Indeed, in general, the Church does not even judge concerning the historical position held by the author but, rather, renders her judgment concerning the doctrine as it has come to be interpreted by men. This was the case in the matter regarding the “Three Chapter Controversy.” In the question of Augustine’s teaching, a number of main points of doctrine have been defined in accord with St. Augustine’s teaching, without, however, it being simultaneously defined that that the given defined doctrine would be that of St. Augustine. In the Jansenist question, however, the infallible judgment was broad, stating that the five propositions condemned by Innocent X were contained in the book entitled “Augustinus.” Therefore, we must heed the great difference between the history of dogmas and exegesis, for exegesis is directly concerned with the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures.
Conflict with theological criteria can more easily arise regarding general judgments, such as if someone were to conclude that the Fathers did not teach the jurisdictional primacy of the Pope, the existence of original sin, that the doctrine of faith has not changed in later times, or something similar that is opposed to the Church’s faith.
Secondly, the very methodology and principles, whether general or particular, used in argumentation and criticism must be judged in accord with theological criteria. Such methodology must be thus judged because it too can fall prey to errors. Thus, in the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists, the methodology to be used in the history of dogmas is determined.51 Its general principles, too, must be so judged, for an idealist or a pantheist judges things in a different way from someone who admits the existence of the Creator and the objectivity of knowledge. And even the interpretation of texts will be modified depending upon the various general principles that can be held, as can be clearly seen in the history of the Modernists. And the same is true for particular principles. For in rendering historical judgments, or even in textual interpretation itself, methodical and technical principles do not suffice on their own, but moreover, determinate judgments concerning reality itself necessarily are involved. And in the history of dogmas, by the very nature of its object, these judgments are concerned with theological realities and therefore very easily be erroneous. Not a few historians claim to use only texts, facts, methodological rules, and the common principles of logic. Nonetheless, logic itself teaches them that conclusions can be drawn only in virtue of given principles or premises, which, in the end, involve particular judgments concerning the matter in question. Here, the potential field for error is very wide.
What is the source of such diversity in the history of dogmas? Not the diversity of documents, since all historians more or less agree concerning the documented history of dogmas. Nor solely from fallacious reasoning [neque ex solis fallaciis in concludendo]. Rather, it primarily arises from different general suppositions or from various theological judgments concerning the matter of the history of dogmas. Thus, Modernism suffers from agnosticism, Protestants generally assume the teaching of idealism, and Rationalists hold that human reason is the sole, supreme measure of truth. Among Protestants themselves, each author proposes a different history of dogmas, due to the fact that they proceed on the basis of various theological positions held in Protestant theology (e.g., Harnack, Seeberg, Pfleiderer, Bonwetsch, Tröltsch). However, even among Catholic authors, error can occur either in certain general principles or in particular judgments. Hence the historian of dogmas is subject to ecclesiastical authority, especially as regards general principles and judgments concerning theological matters. And in this way, theological criteria enter into historical research itself.
Thirdly. The question raised was whether theological criteria were to be applied only in examining the conclusions of historical research or, at the same time, are to be applied in historical research itself.52 The resolution of this question follows from what we have already said. Indeed, theological criteria are not to be applied in the research itself (Forschungsprozess) as principles from which historical conclusions are drawn, for such conclusions must be proven exclusively through historical documents (see above, no. 7, concl. 3). Nonetheless, theological criteria must be applied in examining the principles and rules used by the historian in historical research.
12. Corollary: The historian must be very well instructed in matters of theological doctrine. From the object, nature, and criteria of the history of dogmas, it is clear that the historian of dogmas must be well instructed in matters of theological doctrine.53 In particular the historian stands in need of dogmatic theology (and moral theology, as far as moral dogmas are concerned). For dogmatics teaches that what the Church today holds as De fide, that is, as dogmas, and moreover which doctrines are Catholic and certain. If a historian were ignorant of this, he would not even know the very matter or object of his science. However, it is not enough that he merely have a rapid, superficial knowledge of these matters, as anyone could have; rather, he stands in need of scientific knowledge and a more profound understanding of the mind of the Church [sensus Ecclesiae], at least concerning those things that are connected with questions receiving historical investigation. Certainly, the more a person penetrates the mind of the Church, the more securely will he investigate the matters he is considering and the more easily and correctly will he judge them. For in our days or times, the knowledge and proposition of the revealed truths is very explicit, and therefore, such knowledge will undoubtedly help like a guiding star. However, he who neglects it exposes himself to danger, and as a man who is ungrateful for so great a favor from God, he who dismisses it as something unimportant will necessarily fall into shameful errors. Finally, experience itself testifies that those who lack accurate dogmatic knowledge become incapable of interpreting the Fathers of the Church.54 The scientific knowledge of scholastic theology will most greatly help the historian and, indeed, will not seldom be absolutely indispensable for him. For scholastic theology, both ancient and modern, especially the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, which has been approved on so many occasions, certainly presents the Church’s mind (sensus) and teaching in an exceptional way. Bessmer55 rightly notes that whoever is ignorant of speculative and scholastic theology will not notice how various doctrines of the Fathers are interconnected, even when this is mostly openly the case, and will declare that certain positions are foreign, when a scholastic theologian would nearly immediately recognize that it is the explanation or consequence of another dogma or text of Sacred Scripture.
The teaching of De locis theologicis falls to dogmatic theology. He who is not well versed in this teaching or who holds a false opinion, for example, concerning the nature of the inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures, the nature of tradition, the infallibility of the Church, or the authority of the Fathers, must be judged, without qualification, incapable of judging matters related to the explication of revealed truths. This seems to be a particularly important source of many errors that have arisen, even among Catholics.
As we already said above, in addition to dogmatic theology, knowledge of the sources of dogmas, that is, of tradition and especially of Sacred Scripture, is absolutely required, whether of the whole of Scripture as regards the whole of what it teaches or of their parts in particular as they touch on different historical questions. It hardly needs to be noted that, even as regards Sacred Scripture, the knowledge of what the Church’s teaching has declared does not suffice but, moreover, exegetical knowledge is needed, at least for perfection in knowledge of these matters.
Finally, as in the whole of theology, so too in the history of dogmas, and indeed as much as is possible, one absolutely must have humility, combined with zeal and patient devotion to study, docility with the most exacting and scrupulous accuracy and conscience!56
Article Nineteen: The Definition, Distinction, Usefulness, and Necessity of the History of Dogmas
I. Definition.— According to what we have said up to this point, the history of dogmas is defined thus: the historical science of the successive proposition, knowledge, explication, and definition of revealed truths in the Church. Or more briefly: The history of the explication of revealed truths.57 For every discipline is defined by its object (both its material and formal objects) and by its own proper methodology or manner of considering things. Thus, in the definition given here, “revealed truths” indicates the material object of the history of dogmas (a. 17, no. 2). The words “successive explication” or “successive proposition, knowledge, explication, and definition” indicate its formal object, or that which it properly considers regarding revealed truths or dogmas (a. 17, no. 3; a. 4–16). The words “history” or “historical science” designate the use of historical methodology (a. 18). And, at the end “in the Church” is added because dogmatic progress is only truly found in the Catholic Church.58
II. Distinction history of dogmas in relation to other disciplines.—The definition of the history of dogmas that we have given is especially supported by the fact that the history of dogmas is thereby easily distinguished from other theological disciplines. Indeed, it differs (a) from dogmatic-moral theology, both as regards their objects and methods. Dogmatic (and moral) theology and the history of dogmas do indeed have the same material object, namely, revealed truths. However, they differ as regards their formal objects,59 for dogmatic theology considers the revealed truth or doctrine itself, whereas the history of dogmas is concerned with the successive elaboration of this doctrine or truth. Hence, the former makes use of a dogmatic method, whereas the latter’s methodology is historical.60 The difficulty is involved in determining how it differs from the various historical theological disciplines, that is, from the history of revelation, Church history, and historical theology.
It is easy to understand (b) the distinction between the history of dogmas and the history of revelation, for the explication of revelation through new revelations is one thing and the explication of revelation through the Church’s exercise of her teaching authority is another. Nor are God’s action and that of man measured by the same standard.61
Between (c) Church history and the history of dogmas there is this difference: Church history examines the entire life and activity of the Church, whereas the history of dogmas exclusively is concerned with her doctrinal life. However, even the Church’s doctrinal life is itself considered from different perspectives in these two disciplines. In Church history, it is considered as regards its extrinsic manifestation (quoad partem extrinscam), for example, as regards the convening of Councils, the persons who intervened, the difficulties of times and places, and so forth. By contrast, the history of dogmas is concerned, rather, with the interior reality of this doctrinal life (quoad partem interiorem), that is, the very explication of doctrine. Hence, it has a distinct object.62
Although (d) historical theology and the history of dogmas do have the same methodology, they have different objects. For historical theology investigates any theological doctrine, whether of Sacred Scripture, divine tradition, the ecclesiastical magisterium or scientific theology, using a historical methodology. The history of dogmas, however, only considers those doctrines that are causally connected to a dogmatic definition. The former considers doctrinal progress, the latter the process of becoming that dogmas undergo. Hence, historical theology has a broader material extension of concerns. Indeed, as regards the earliest period of the Church’s history, the material of the two disciplines does, to a large extent, coincide, since the theological questions of that time were in general concerned with matters of faith, properly speaking, that were defined by the Church’s magisterium. However, when we begin to consider the Middle Ages, as well as more recent days up to our own, we find that there are countless theological doctrines that either, by their very nature, are not definable (theological conclusions) or de facto have not been defined, such that dogmas stand in the midst of theological teachings like islands in the midst of a vast sea. For similar reasons does (e) the history of dogmas differ from the history of theology. Finally, the history of dogmas (f) is distinguished from positive theology because the latter does not exclusively use a historical methodology,63 because positive theology does not properly and directly investigate the development of faith but, instead, the truth and understanding thereof. Nonetheless, if positive theology wishes to be perfect, it must necessarily and properly be historical; that is it must use a historical methodology as the principal way and means for achieving its ends.64 Thus, the history of dogmas is a discipline distinct from all other theological disciplines.
Finally, from the reasons we have set forth, it follows that the history of dogmas must be treated as a unique discipline in schools of theology, as Cardinal Katschthaler already asked in 1882.65 For the history of dogmas has both its own proper object (the very becoming of the dogmas or the successive explication of the revealed truths), as well as the proper methodology (historical). Neither dogmatic theology nor Church history can adequately treat the matters that should fall to the history of dogmas, which already have more than enough material to cover. Indeed, as regards dogmatic theology, there is also the fact that the latter has a different methodology from that to be used in the history of dogmas. Therefore, if they were combined, either dogmatics or the history of dogmas would suffer a loss.
III. The usefulness and necessity of the history of dogmas.66— The usefulness and necessity of the history of dogmas seems stand in need of explanation rather than proof.
a) The development of dogmas is a worthy and necessary object of theological research. As is the case for the truth of dogmas, so too, the proposition and successive explication of revealed truths assuredly constitutes a worthy and necessary object of theological research. For as long as the fact of this kind of development was less well known, the need for historical research was felt less urgently. However, now that the reality of such dogmatic progress is readily known by many, this excuse no longer can be admitted. Finally, as we have already noted, we are dealing with the extraordinary work of the Holy Spirit, the Church, and human genius. Hence in order for theology to have its full integrity, the following are required: first of all, theological teaching concerning the nature and conditions of dogmatic progress (what we strove to furnish in our treatise); secondly, the history of dogmas itself.
b) The history of dogmas (and historical theology) is useful for perfecting dogmatic theology; nay, it is necessary for the perfection of dogmatic theology. Dogmatic theology draws its arguments from Holy Scripture and divine tradition as if from primary sources; but it does so inasmuch as Scripture and tradition are exposited and explicated by the definitions and declarations of the ecclesiastical magisterium, as well as by the Fathers and later theologians. Therefore, in order for dogmatic theology to be perfect, it altogether requires exact and definite knowledge of how doctrine was understood in the past. This cannot be had without historical studies.
It is easy to see why this is the case. For the testimonies of the ancients have generally been handed down to us shrouded in their historical trappings, such that they can only be accurately discerned by means of historical studies. Similarly, the meaning of individual texts can hardly be determined, if these texts are only considered only one by one. Therefore, the way that individual doctrines and texts are connected to each other must be investigated, and this interconnection is above all found in the successive explication of revealed truths, which the history of dogmas investigates and determines67. Not infrequently, even a given teaching’s harmony with a later-defined dogma can be seen only insofar as that doctrine is considered and judged in the light of the ecclesiastical consciousness of its time. The history of dogmas ex professo prepares one to have such knowledge concerning the past consciousness and holds it out, as it were with open hands, to the dogmatic theologian.
Thus, without the help of historical science, dogmatic argumentation from the Fathers easily declines into nothing more than a mere accumulation of texts, no longer manifesting the force of the texts in question. By contrast, theological argumentation will be utterly complete if one has shown how the same, enduring doctrine takes on different forms over the course of time, undergoing increasing elaboration, until the time when it arrives at the perfection of being a dogma. Thus, finally, dogmatic methodology is itself, in a way, legitimized by the history of dogmas, insofar as what the Church teaches today (which dogmatic methodology follows) is proved to be in harmony with the doctrine of the past while, at the same time, being a more perfect and more explicit form of that same teaching.68
In concrete terms, the history of dogmas does not have the task of forming, properly speaking, historical arguments for dogmatic theology; rather, it falls to it to furnish (ministrare) material that is used in the constructing of such arguments, though such matter is, so to speak, in its ultimate state of disposition. For if the history of dogmas, fulfilling its particular office, has determined the various forms taken on by later-defined dogmas over the course of time as they were found in the Church’s teaching, the dogmatic theologian will find it easy to use such matter in forming, as one says, an “argument from tradition.” Thus, lest dogmatic theology become overburdened with historical research, it can and should use the conclusions of the history of dogmas, turning all its attention to the work of explaining dogmas. Then, however, the proper office of dogmatic theology will be to show the equivalence of the individual formulas or doctrines by which later-defined dogmas were taught in the Church over the course of time. Thus, the history of dogmas will prepare the ultimately disposed matter for theologizing, and the proper work of dogmatic theology will remain to be accomplished.
c) Most of all, positive theology needs the help of history and is perfected by it. Positive theology seeks knowledge and understanding concerning faith properly from Sacred Scripture, from the documents of tradition, and the works of the Fathers and later theologians. However, especially as it works through its investigations [praesertim in via] this requires the use of historical inquiry, methodology, and science. First, there is no better aid for investigating the meaning of Sacred Scripture than examining the successive explanations offered by the Fathers, up to the time when the given dogma was given its determinate form. Similarly, the best (and, ultimately, the only perfect) way to investigate what the Fathers taught is, on the one hand, by considering the prior development of that teaching (the fruit of which ordinarily is the doctrine of some Father) and, on the other hand, by seeking to know how such a teaching was explained and interpreted by later Fathers and theologians in later eras. Thus, for example, most of St. Augustine’s teachings were given a solid and determinate form by later Fathers ([e.g.] St. Prosper of Aquitaine), the declarations by the Church, and scholastic theologians—indeed, not only in terms of objective truth, but likewise as regards the historical meaning of St. Augustine’s teaching. Thus, positive theology must energetically investigate the historical documents and make use of philological methods, comparative investigations, and other aids offered by contemporary historical science—in the end, however, exact knowledge and pure understanding of the true doctrine (doctrinae veritatis) is achieved only through knowledge of the successive explication of this teaching. Otherwise, what we have said about the usefulness of the history of dogmas for dogmatic theology holds true for positive theology as well.
d) Nor will scholastic theology fail to receive the greatest of benefits from the history of dogmas.— Scholastic theology does not, properly speaking, differ from positive theology, which strives to achieve an understanding of faith through the application of our intellectual capacities, the use of logic, and especially by means of philosophy. In these labors, however, historical knowledge is quite necessary, and theology certainly receives the greatest of aids from history. For, first of all, scholastic theology (as such) presupposes knowledge of what is taught by Sacred Scripture, the Fathers, and later theologians. Such knowledge is itself supplied by positive theology and, consequently, by the history of dogmas or historical theology. Without a doubt, all argumentation, deduction, and systematization are in vain if it does not proceed from true understanding and exact knowledge of what is taught in Sacred Scripture and the Fathers. Many disputations and controversies among scholastic theologians either would never have taken place or would have quickly come to a close if they had more exact and truer knowledge of Sacred Scripture and the Fathers. Therefore, the history of dogmas and, in general, historical theology will provide scholastic theology a solid and suitable foundation for its speculative deductions and explications.
Secondly, however, scholastic theology itself is positive: for it argues from the authority and teaching of its own theologians. Now, how many are the controversies concerning what these theologians—for example, St. Thomas—taught! Therefore, scholastic theology, even for determining its own teaching, needs the help of historical science. Thirdly, in scholastic theology, over the course of time, many controversies—indeed, concerning fundamental questions, such as grace and God’s activity in the free acts of creatures—have taken place and still exist. Such controversies do no small damage to the authority of scholastic theology, hinder true progress, and certainly indicate some kind of deficiency, so that, as far as possible, they must be reconciled and resolved, in order that the truth may at last be clear. Now, the best means for resolving such controversial questions—which are far too great in number—will be found in exact knowledge concerning the entire development of the question and teaching in scholastic thinkers. For, through knowledge of the successive development of a teaching the true teaching and the value of arguments brought forth are, in general, easily determined.
Finally, in general, the teachings and arguments of scholastics will be altogether more authoritative and effective, if the whole development of scholastic teaching is placed before one’s eyes: thus, too, more abundant fruits will be secured from the labors of earlier thinkers.69 Therefore, scholastic theology very much needs the help of the history of dogmas, so that it may have a truly solid foundation, secure the due fruit from its own teaching, and be freed from defects. In this sense, Pius X urged scholastics to make greater use of positive theology, “by throwing the light of true history upon it”70
e) Apologetic necessity.71—In our days, the Catholic faith is challenged with the greatest of force by historical arguments, especially those drawn from the history of dogmas. Therefore, knowledge of the history of dogmas is absolutely necessary for defending the faith. In these affairs, however, two things must be distinguished: 1˚ the historical facts that are brought against the truth of faith; 2˚ the historical methodology by means of which facts are determined and arguments against faith are fashioned.72 Therefore, it is not enough for Catholic theology to defend the true historical facts in any indiscriminate way whatsoever; rather, it is utterly necessary that the truth of the faith also be defended from a historical perspective and according to the requirements of historical methodology. For adversaries having scientific tools in hand will be effectively convinced only if we make use of his own weapons, according to his own method.73
Nor, in my opinion, does it suffice to take up the purely critical or negative labor of refuting adversaries’ errors, but as much as possible, we should desire to undertake a positive and systematic exposition of true dogmatic progress. This is the best and most effective way to conquer erroneous historical fabrications. In the end, the one and true Catholic history of dogmas is opposed to our adversaries’ histories of dogmas in their varied and conflicting forms. Not only dogmatic truth, but also the historical truth as well, will set us free!74
f) The moral usefulness of the history of dogmas. As Cardinal Katschthaler most excellently notes,75 the history of dogmas shows, on the one hand, how weak human character is, how much damage is wrought by pride, and how great is the danger occasioned by obstinacy in holding one’s own opinion. On the other hand, it shows the good found in the progress of knowledge and it urges one to love the truth and the Church and to submit freely to the Church’s infallible magisterium.
Fr. De Groot seems to determine the importance of history very well: “We claim that human history is useful to theologians because history, taken in general, is thought to be the greatest aid to theology, not, however, because of any intrinsic weakness of those premises (i.e., theological ones), which we call necessary and proper, but rather, because of the weakness of the human mind, which is more easily turned away from errors and more firmly established in the truth by the aid of arguments drawn from history.”76
g) The history of dogmas is the special task (officium) of the theology of our time. Just as the gifts and duties (officia) of individual men differ, the same is true for each age of history. Thus, different eras of theology involve different tasks and different graces. Whereas the Fathers determined and explained the whole of revealed doctrine, scholastic theologians expressed the same doctrine in scientific formulas, rendered it into a scientific system, and derived many theological conclusions from it. I consider such a work to be complete and perfect in substance. A sign of this is that in the last two centuries there has been no significant progress in speculative theology. More recent works of scholastic theology generally reproduce the teaching of earlier scholastics, with minor modifications added to them—and this fact is already indicated by the form these works take on, namely that of compendia. In short, it may be asserted, without risk of injustice or audacity, that speculative genius is languid in our days. Therefore, a special gift is lacking for this and [theology’s] tasks [in this regard] are fulfilled by knowledge and suitable exposition of the received teaching.
By contrast, however, in our days the “historical spirit” is ardent and what is most pressing is the task of investigating and fully surveying the historical development of Christian doctrine. Hence, it seems that the special gift and task of theology in our time is to investigate Christian doctrine in a historical manner. In this way, modern theology will satisfy the needs of the present day and add its own, new development to theology.
IV. On the mutual assistance which the history of dogmas and dogmatic theology lend to each other.—The reasons we have adduced certainly suffice for showing the necessity and usefulness of the history of dogma. Notwithstanding these, however, scholastic dogmatic theology (theologia dogmatica, eaque scholastica) must be judged to be primarily and most necessary and useful. For it is principally necessary that we know what should be believed, held, and done; and this is what dogmatic theology teaches us. Although the “historical spirit” is flourishing in our times, reason [sic] seeking understanding retains its value, and only scholastic dogmatic theology can satisfy this desire. Neither the history of dogmas nor historical theology can replace dogmatic theology, for amid the various explications, teachings, and conclusions found throughout history, we stand in need of as sure and ready a rule as is possible so that we might judge between truth and falsity.77 Indeed, dogmatic and historical theology are not opposed to each other, nor are they mutually exclusive, but on the contrary, they mutually support each other: historical theology brings dogmatic theology the best help and light, while dogmatic theology, through its concepts, definitions, and rules, prepares and directs the historian so that he might be able to grasp and discern the various explications and interpretations [set forth in the course of history]. How many errors have crept into history due to false or deficient theological concepts! If dogmatic theology will fail to be complete without historical knowledge, much more will historical theology be defective without dogmatic science.
Finally, as we have already said, the history of dogmas itself commends dogmatic theology by showing how much progress and what kind of doctrinal perfection scholastic theology represents. Therefore, Aurelio Palmieri excellently observes: “It would be utterly wrong for one to abandon dogmatic theology and therefore to expend all of one’s effort on historically exploring dogmatic formulas, led by the unexamined persuasion that this would enable one to more effectively overcome the errors of today.”78
All of this is confirmed and can be brought to a close with the words of Pius X, by which he decrees:
We will add that we deem worthy of praise those who with full respect for tradition, the Holy Fathers, and the ecclesiastical magisterium, undertake, with well-balanced judgment and guided by Catholic principles (which is not always the case), seek to illustrate positive theology by throwing the light of true history upon it. Certainly more attention must be paid to positive theology than in the past, but this must be done without detriment to scholastic theology, and those are to be disapproved as of Modernist tendencies who exalt positive theology in such a way as to seem to despise scholastic theology.79
V. In the end, the value of history of dogmas will shine forth. As we have seen, the development of dogmas is a most difficult object, an exceptional work of the Holy Spirit, the Church, and human genius. Thus, the history of dogmas certainly stands out among other theological disciplines. Moreover, the historian of dogmas looks at the theological doctrines of the present and past as though from a lofty watchtower, not yet from the perspective of eternity but, instead, under the light of nearly two thousand years. He who, properly equipped with the necessary philosophical and theological notions, studiously dwells upon the history of dogmas, will experience in himself the truth of the saying: History is life’s teacher!
Conclusion
At the opening of our work we cited the words of the Wise Man: “Not only have I labored for myself but for all who seek the truth” (Sirach 24:47). With these words, the fruit of dogmatic progress and the intention of our work are both expressed at once. Certainly, every explanation of revealed truths is for the common benefit, and the history of dogmas strives to make known to all this kind of fruit. It was in order to make this fruit more easily, abundantly, and securely available that we elaborated and proposed our introduction to all those who seek the truth.
Thus, in the first chapter, we determined the true concept of dogma, so that we might have a solid foundation for explaining the nature of the progress and history of dogmas. In the second chapter, we took up the task of elaborating the development of dogmas itself. In the first section of this chapter, we provided a historical overview of the Catholic doctrine concerning the evolution of dogmas (a. 4), thus presenting the history of a given dogma concerning the development of dogmas. Based on this, we established the doctrine concerning the essence of dogmatic progress. First, we took up the Catholic doctrine, which holds that the development of dogmas is the proposition and successive explication of revealed truths (a. 5). Next, we discussed theological explication by laying out the distinction between the various kinds of revelation of particular doctrines, our manner of knowing truths revealed in various ways, the definitive act of proposing revealed truths to be explicated, and finally, the progress from implicit faith to explicit faith (a. 6– 10). Next, in order to determine the properties of dogmatic development, we considered it from various perspectives, namely, as regards: dogmatic formulas (a. 11); tradition (a. 12); Sacred Scripture (a. 13); its various states (a. 14); its causes and laws (a. 15); and the analogies connected to the developments in other domains (a. 16). Finally, in the third chapter the doctrine thus established was applied to the history of dogmas. For, from this, it is readily evident that dogmas are truly and properly the object of history; likewise, this makes clear from what perspective (qua ratione) dogmas are the object of history (a. 17), what the methodology of the history of dogmas is (a. 18), and what kind of utility can be drawn from it (a. 19).
Much indeed still remains to be said. However, we have omitted such things, partly for the sake of brevity, partly as matters sufficiently known from elsewhere, and partly because, especially as regards particular applications to given historical facts, they require lengthy historical exposition. Nonetheless, we believe that we have provided a sufficient explanation concerning the necessary points, indeed, in such a way that it will be easy for one to apply what we have said to the particular points of the history of dogmas. Thus, we strongly recommend the history of dogmas to students of theology and to theologians (viris theologiae). If the true idea of the explication of revealed truth shines forth, the study of the history of dogmas will not be at all dangerous; on the contrary it will enlighten and solidify the faith. It will shed the greatest of light upon God’s special providence in governing and enlightening the Church, by which she is established as “the pillar and foundation of the truth" (1 Tim., 3:15) and devotion to the Holy and Apostolic See will increase, to whom the Lord has entrusted his sheep so that they might be certainly pastured upon the truth. In short, God will be magnified in His works, He who manifests His truth—or rather, Himself—in the past through various revelations but now and until the end of the world through the explication of revelation. In fact, “In many and various ways did God once upon a time speak through the prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us in the Son” (Hebrews 1:1–2) However, what the Son has spoken to us, He Himself sets forth for us in and through the Church, namely, through the Holy Spirit whom He promised: “But the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things and will bring to your mind all the things whatsoever that I will have said to you” (John 14:26).
To the King of the Ages,
He who is Immortal and Invisible,
God Alone,
be glory forever!
See M. Jacquin, “Question de mots: Histoire des dogmes, histoire des doctrines, théologie positive,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, vol. 1, no. 1, (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1907), 99-104, see 103.↩︎
In particular, for example, the followers of Georg Hermés. See Constantin von Schäzler, Die Bedeutung der Dogmengeschichte vom katholischen Standpunkt aus erörtert, ed. Thomas Esser. (Regensburg: Manz, 1884), 36ff.↩︎
See Ernst Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen methode und der geschichtsphilosophie. Mit nachweis der wichtigsten quellen und hilfsmittel zum studium der geschichte, 5th and 6th ed., (München, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1914), 9: “The science of history is the science that investigates and describes the temporally and spatially determined facts of the development of humans in their activities as social beings in connection with psycho-physical causality.” [Tr. note: This seems to be a bit of a modern-scientistic or positivist way of stating things. The potential establishment of a scientific state for historical thought is a difficult and complicated affair that deserves its own, more detailed treatment.]↩︎
See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7, ad 2.↩︎
In III Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 2.↩︎
See a. 7, no. 1 above.↩︎
This is explained excellently as follows by Jacque Marie Achille Ginoulhiac, Histoire du dogme Catholique: pendant les trois premiers siècles de l'eǵlise et jusqu'au Concile de Niceé, vol. 1, 2nd ed., (Paris: Auguste Durand, Libraire, 1866), p. xxv: “If it has pleased God, in revealing His truth, to imprint it with characteristics that do not allow one to think that it is man’s work, nonetheless, He has also willed that its manifestations throughout the centuries take place in a way that is in harmony with the conditions of our present existence.”↩︎
See ST I, q. 22, a. 3 and 1. 103, a. 6.↩︎
See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7, ad 2.↩︎
That is, to the patriarchs and Old Testament prophets. However, the same holds true for the Fathers of the Church, the later theologians, and indeed for the very magisterium of the Church.↩︎
This also shows why even though the expression “history of dogmas,” was first introduced by Protestants it is legitimate and does not have the savor of Protestantism, as Fr. Jacquin fears, in the “Question de mots: Histoire des dogmes, histoire des doctrines, théologie positive” p. 103. However, see what we said above in a. 5, prop. 5.↩︎
See Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, [vol. 1, 4th ed. (Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr, 1905), 4ff.↩︎
See Aurelio Palmieri, II progresso dommatico nel concetto cattolico, 2nd ed., (Florence: Libreria editrice fiorentina, 1910), 67–90.↩︎
It may be asked whether the infallible judgments of the Church concerning things connected with the deposit of faith belong to the history of dogmas. It seems that we must say, however, that any declarations by the Church in addition to dogmatic definitions belong to the secondary object of the history of dogmas. That is, they must be considered as a way or preparation for ex cathedra definitions. And this is how the teaching of the Fathers or theologians is considered therein too.↩︎
See Gustav Krüger, Was heisst und zu welchem Ende studiert man Dogmengeschichte?, (Fribourg: J.C.B. Mohr, 1895).↩︎
Ibid., 55.↩︎
See Harnack, Lehrbuck der Dogmengeschicte, vol. 1, 3ff and 15ff. Cf. Friedrich Loofs, Leitfaden Zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, 4th ed., (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1906), 10. Hence, even among Protestant authors, Catholic dogmas are the matter studied by the history of dogmas.↩︎
As is excellently observed by Bernhard Dörholt, Über die entwicklung des dogma und den fortschritt in der theologie. Habilitationsrede, (Münster: Aschendorffsche buchhandlung, 1892), 22n2.↩︎
See Albert Ehrhard, Stellung und Aufgabe der Kirchengeschichte in der Gegenwart, (Stuttgart: J. Rother, 1898), 15.↩︎
See the excellent observation in Alexis-Henri-Marie Lépicier, De stabilitate et progressu dogmatis, 2nd ed., (Rome: Desclée et Socii, 1910), 167: “The law that should guide every prudent historian is to keep before his eyes the dogmas now held by the Church as he himself strives to detect their earlier traces in tradition.”↩︎
As, for example in the question over Nestorianism.↩︎
See Joseph Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne, vol. 1, [5th ed.], ([Paris: [Gabaldat], [1922]), 2.↩︎
More recent authors deal with the methodology of the history of dogmas in works written against the errors of the Modernists, especially in commentaries on the anti-modernist oath. See the list above in a. 3, Other works will be cited as the occasion calls for it.↩︎
Cardinal Louis Billot, De immutabilitate traditionis contra modernam haeresïm evolutionismi, 2nd ed. (Rome: Pontificia Instituti Pii IX, 1907), p. 82.↩︎
See Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, nos. 6–11 and 30ff.↩︎
See Ernst Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen methode und der geschichtsphilosophie. Mit nachweis der wichtigsten quellen und hilfsmittel zum studium der geschichte, 5th and 6th ed. (München, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1914), 5.↩︎
Therefore, Bernheim unjustly holds that the Middle Ages, or at least the scholastics, were incapable of understanding the conditions of other times.↩︎
See, for example, Adolf von Harnack, Das Wesen des Christentums: sechzehn Vorlesungen vor Studierenden aller Facultäten, [2nd ed. (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1901)], 11.↩︎
The authors of works concerning the history of dogmas generally, at the start of their works, only indicate that historical methodology must be followed. See Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3rd ed. (Freiburg: Mohr, [1894-1897]), 14ff; Seeberg, Lehrbuch der D.G.I, 13. Similarly, they generally recommend a synthetic methodology and a division of the matter into historical periods. See Joseph Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne, [5th ed.] [Paris: [Gabaldat], [1922])], vol. 1, 9ff; Jacque Marie Achille Ginoulhiac, Histoire du dogme Catholique: pendant les trois premiers siècles de l'eǵlise et jusqu'au Concile de Niceé, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Paris: Auguste Durand, Libraire, 1866), xci (and following); Albert Michael Koeniger, Voraussetzungen und Voraussetzungslosigkeit in Geschichte und Kirchengeschichte (Munich: J. J. Lentner, 1910), 29ff; Johann Zobl, Dogmengeschichte der Katholischen Kirche (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1865), 13.↩︎
In his article “Dogme” in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Dublanchy excellently adjudicates the matter as follows: It cannot be demanded that the historian of dogmas pursues apologetic or dogmatic ends in all his investigations. However, this cannot be prevented in the name of science, provided that the rules of his methodology are strictly adhered to. Hence, the defense of the faith does not per se fall under a [moral] precept (certainly for each particular historian or as regards any particular matter). Nay, too much apologetic or dogmatic concern can damage one’s scientific reputation. Nonetheless, under the actual conditions in which one finds oneself, a true Catholic can hardly refrain from all apologetic or dogmatic work, without, by omission, mortally sinning against precept of charity [contra grave praeceptum charitatis delinquat].↩︎
See Felix Haase, Begriff und Aufgabe der Dogmengeschichte (Breslau: Goerlich & Coch, 1911), p. 45, 3 [sic], 68.↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, canon 3.6 (Denzinger, no. 3036[1815]); also see ibid., ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3014[1794]).↩︎
[Trans. note: The contemporary use of “ad hominem” to designate a fallacy redirecting attention to the character or person of an interlocutor is, in fact, a relatively modern understanding of this older logical term. One can find the shift present by the time of Arthur Schopenhauer’s The Art of Controversy and the Elements of Logic by Richard Whately (a text for the composition of which the young John Henry Newman played an important role). For a basic explanation of the argumentum ad hominem, see Tommaso Zigliara, Summa philosophica in usum scholarum, vol. 1, 12th ed. (Paris: Briguet, 1900):
An absolute demonstration is one which proceeds from premises whose truth we admit and assume in order to then draw an inference, absolutely speaking, as when we demonstrate the real existence of God on the basis of the contingent character of creatures, and other such demonstrations. However, a relative (that is, ad hominem) demonstration is one which proceeds from principles which are admitted by the person we are arguing against and which we assume for the sake of refutation, setting aside the question of the truth of such principles, as when someone assumes principles admitted by materialists or by rationalists, in order to convince them that their doctrine is false.”
For some history and consideration of this topic, see David Hitchcock, “Is There an Argumentum ad Hominem Fallacy?” in On Reasoning and Argument: Essays in Informal Logic and on Critical Thinking (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 409–419; Graciela Marta Chichi, “The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem-Argument,” Argumentation 16, no. 3 (Jan. 2002): 333–348.]↩︎
See Billot, De immutabilitate traditionis, p. 81ff; Alexis-Henri-Marie Lépicier, De stabilitate et progressu dogmatis, 2nd ed. (Rome: Desclée et Socii, 1910), p. 169ff; Jacque Marie Achille Ginoulhiac, Histoire du dogme Catholique: pendant les trois premiers siècles de l'eǵlise et jusqu'au Concile de Niceé, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Paris: Auguste Durand, Libraire, 1866), ch. 1, p. lxxviiff.↩︎
A declaration of this kind must be regarded as infallible. The last proposition is proposed as a doctrine of faith and therefore to be believed by divine and Catholic faith, whereas the other propositions (in the second part) are proposed as being connected with the doctrine of faith and therefore to be held by the authority of the Church (by ecclesiastical faith). See Lépecier, De stabilitate et progressu dogmatis; Reginald Schultes, Was beschwören wir im Antimodernisteneid?: theologische Erklärung des Antimodernisteneids (Mainz: Kirchheim and Co., 1911), p. 7–10; Anton Straub, De Ecclesia Christi, vol. 2 [(Oeniponte [Innsbruck], Typis et sumptibus Feliciani Rauch, 1912)], 402.↩︎
See Joseph Kleutgen, Die Théologie der Vorzeit, 2nd ed., vol. 5 (Münster: Theissing, 1874), p. 446–469 and 482–490.↩︎
Pius IX, “Eximiam tuam” (Denzinger, no. 2829 [1656]).↩︎
Pius IX, “Gravissimas inter” (Denzinger, no. 2854 [1670]).↩︎
Ibid. (Denzinger, no. 2857 [1673]).↩︎
Ibid. (Denzinger, no. 2858 [1674]), (Emphasis Schultes’).↩︎
Ibid. (Denzinger, no. 2861 [1676]).↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3019 [1799]), (Emphasis Schultes’).↩︎
Adolf von Harnack, Aus Wissenschaft und Leben, vol. 1 (Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1911), p. 257, 259, and 264.↩︎
In response to the criticisms raised by Krüger, Otto Bardenhewer responds in Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur, vol. 2 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, [1913-1924]), vii: “Krüger’s ‘Geschicte der altchristlichen Literatur’… Is based on Harnack’s constructions concerning dogmatic history, whereas my ‘Geschichte der altkrichlichen Literatur’ is based upon belief in the divine origin of the ancient Church’s doctrine and the unsullied propagation of this same teaching. In this are the works opposed to each other, indeed it is the source of the entire opposition.”↩︎
Felix Haase, Begriff und Aufgabe der Dogmengeschichte, (Breslau: Goerlich & Coch, 1911), p. 12-20.↩︎
Cf. H. Koch in Das Neue Iahrhunderf, 1912, n. 45-49, with our critique in Archiv. f. K. K. R., 1912, p. 459-471; Albert Ehrhard, in Internationale Wochenschrift, 1908, n. 3; Ibid., Stellung und Aufgabe der Kirchengeschichte in der Gegenwart, (Stuttgart: J. Rother, 1898), p. 14ff.↩︎
Cf. Sadocus Szabó, Albert Ehrhards Schrift: “Katholisches Christentum und moderne Kultur”: ein Beitrag zur Klärung der religiösen Frage in der Gegenwart ([Graz: Moser Verlag, 1909]), p. 145ff; Josef Mueller, Die Enzyklika Pius X gegen den Modernismus und Ehrhard's Kritik derselben (Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1908), p. 28ff.↩︎
Leo XIII, “Saepenumero considerantes,” August 18, 1883 (Acta Sanctae Sedis, vol. 16 [1883–84], 54). [Tr. note: The text is, in fact, drawn from Cicero’s De oratione, 2.15. Reading “Primam… legem” where Fr. Schultes incorrectly has “Primam… legum”.]↩︎
Voltaire, Histoire de Charles XII: [nouvelle édition (Paris: Hachette, 1908)], preface.↩︎
Albert Michael Koeniger, in his brief work, Voraussetzungen und voraussetzungslosigkeit in Geschichte und Kirchengeschichte (München: E. Stahl, 1910), provides an excellent general resolution to the question concerning the issue of presuppositions [in historical investigations]. His theses are as follows. 1˚ History necessarily presupposes certain philosophical principles (p. 14–16). 2˚ Methodology itself is a kind of presupposition, though it indicates what in particular is to be presupposed or not. The same methodological principles hold for profane and ecclesiastical history (p. 16–34). 3˚ The influence of physical, social, subjective, and psychological conditions must be avoided as much as possible. This is commonly the source of prejudices (p. 34–42). 4˚ Scientific presuppositions, and especially religious ones, are the guarantee of objective knowledge (p. 42–50)↩︎
Cardinal Billot, admitting that history has its own methodology and rules, adds, in “À propos d’un livre récent de théologie historique,” Gregorianum 2, no. 1 (1921), 3–12 (here, 11): “Yes, without doubt it has them; however, such rules, procedures, and methods can be misunderstood, only imperfectly understood, or especially applied indiscriminately. For this reason, where the history of the divine revelation is in question, the living rule of our Tradition will provide us with the sure means for orienting ourselves, helping us to discover the right and legitimate way to make use of them... As the compass used by sailors, far from substituting itself for the rules of the art of sailing or contradicting them, or modifying them, or in any way obstructing how they are handled, on the contrary, only assures that these rules are rightly applied, so too the supreme rule of the Church’s magisterium [in relation to the work of history.]”↩︎
See Joseph Mausbach, Der Eid wider den Modernismus und die theologische Wissenschaft (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1911).↩︎
See Julius Bessmer, Philosophie und Théologie des Modernismus: eine Erklärung des Lehrgehaltes der Enzyklika Pascendi, des Dekretes Lamentabili und des Eides wider den Modernismus (Freiburg: Herder, 1912), 589ff.↩︎
See Édouard Hugon, De deo uno et trino (Paris: Lethielleux, 1921), 16.↩︎
See Bessmer, Philosophie und Theologie des Modernismus, 592.↩︎
See Jean Mabillon, Treatise on Monastic Studies, trans. John Paul McDonald (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004), pt. 3, chs. 1–5.↩︎
Constantin von Schäzler, Die Bedeutung der Dogmengeschichte vom katholischen Standpunkt aus erörtert, ed. Thomas Esser (Regensburg: Manz, 1884), p. 166; Cornelius Krieg, Encyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften nebst Methodenlehre, 2nd ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1910), p. 241; Joseph Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne, vol. 1, [5th ed.] ([Paris: [Gabaldat], [1922]), p. 2ff; Johann Haring, Einführung in das Studium der Theologie (Graz: Moser, 1911), p. 40ff; Albert Ehrhard, Stellung und Aufgabe der Kirchengeschichte in der Gegenwart, (Stuttgart: J. Rother, 1898), p. 15.↩︎
Particular Catholic authors propose different definitions, especially according to their various conceptions of the development of dogmas. However, they agree in substance. Regarding Protestant and modernist authors, see a. 3 above.↩︎
[Tr. note: Without further qualification, this is a bit problematic, given the unity of discursive theological wisdom. At most, it can only be a question of, perhaps, integral parts. Emphasis on perhaps.]↩︎
Its distinction from apologetic theology, exegesis, and canon law is immediately obvious.↩︎
See Giovanni Battista Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2nd ed. (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta, 1875), thesis 26; Christian Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, vol. 1, [4th ed.] ([Freiburg: Herder and Co.], 1915), p. 358.↩︎
Joseph Schwane, Dogmengeschichte der vornicänischen Zeit, 2nd ed., vol. 1. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1892), p. 13.↩︎
Édouard Hugon, “De la division de la Théologie en spéculative, positive, historique,” Revue thomiste 18 (1910), p. 652–656.↩︎
See no. 3, C below.↩︎
Johannes Baptist Katschthaler, “Begriff, Nutzen und Methode der Dogmengeschichte” in Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, vol. 6, no. 3 (Innsbruck: Austrian Province of the Society of Jesus, 1882), p. 472-528.↩︎
[Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme,” In Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), col. 1648ff; Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, p. 11ff; Schäzler, Die Bedeutung der Dogmengeschichte vom katholischen Standpunkt aus erörtert, p. 150ff; Katschthaler, “Begriff, Nutzen und Methode der Dogmengeschichte,” p. 472-[528]; [Georg] Pfeilschifter, [Münchner Studien zur historischen Theologie: Herausgegeben in Verbindung mit E. Eichmann...von G. Pfeilschifter. Fortführung der "Veröffentlichungen aus dem Kirchenhistorischen Seminar München." 0. Besitzerspezifische Fußnote (Kempten: Josef Kösel & Friedrich Pustet, 1921)], p. 61-80.↩︎
Already, in pt. 2, ch. 8 of his Treatise on Monastic Studies, Jean Mabillon wrote, “We can be certain that without such study, one cannot have a perfect understanding of the Fathers, nor of theology, and that it is through this kind of study that one learns... the dogmas of our religion.” And in pt. 2, ch. 20: “By studying scholastic theology, one receives the first elements of this science. However, it must be perfected by a serious study of Scripture... and of the Church’s Tradition, which is contained principally in the Councils and the Fathers. It is necessary that one examine their sentiments and maxims, striving try to reconcile them with each other, and by this means join the doctrine of the first centuries with the most recent of days. This act of joining the past to the present is what, properly speaking, makes up the Tradition...”↩︎
Schäzler, Die Bedeutung der Dogmengeschichte vom katholischen Standpunkt aus erörtert, p. 165.↩︎
For an example of (as well an argument for) this, see the historical overview of the scholastic doctrine concerning the development of dogmas which we have written (in a. 4 above).↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, no. 46.↩︎
See what we said above in a. 18, no. 4 (remark number 5).↩︎
See Jacques Marie Achille Ginoulhiac, Histoire du dogme Catholique: pendant les trois premiers siècles de l'eǵlise et jusqu'au Concile de Niceé, 3rd ed., vol. 1 ([Paris: Auguste Durand, Libraire, 1867-1922]), xlviii.↩︎
See Dublanchy, “Dogme,” In Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 1648ff.↩︎
See Katschthaler, “Begriff, Nutzen und Methode der Dogmengeschichte,” 515ff.↩︎
See ibid.↩︎
[Johannes Vincentius] De Groot, Summa apologetica de ecclesia Catholicae: ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis, 3rd ed. (Regensburg: Institutum Librarium Pridem G. J. Manz, 1906), q. 24, a. 2, p. 878.↩︎
Albert Maria Weiss, Lebens- und Gewissensfragen der Gegenwart (Fribourg: Herder, 1911)↩︎
Aurelius Palmieri, Theologia dogmatica orthodoxa (ecclesiae graeco-russicae) ad lumen catholicae doctrinae examinata et discussa, vol. 1 (Florence: Libreria editrice fiorentina, 1911), 118.↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, no. 46.↩︎
