Thomistic Note: The Imago Dei, Human Action, and Human Freedom

[This Thomistic Note continues themes found in this earlier entry on the imago Dei.]

The imago Dei serves as the theological matrix within which human action and habitus are understood and evaluated. The full splendor of sanctified moral order and the full gravity of moral disorder are only understood through a properly theological consideration of man’s rational nature as created ad imaginem Dei. St. Thomas explains that “the theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason.”¹

Of course, these two formal aspects, while distinct, are not at odds, one with the other. St. Thomas defines a good and virtuous action as “an ordinate and due act” (actus ordinatus et debitus) in accord with right reason, and sin as “an inordinate act”—an act not in accord with right reason.² He explains:

Man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. Now “man’s good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man’s nature, for as much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man’s nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.³

Here we recognize that a proper account of man’s rational nature is essential within any adequate understanding of human action. Because man is a rational animal, good and evil, virtue and vice, are understood in relation to rationality. Actions are in accord with reason insofar as they are in accord with man’s rational nature. Actions are not in accord with reason insofar as they are not in accord with man’s rational nature. Because man’s nature is created according to a particular divine pattern, however, a consideration of God is also important within any adequate account of moral action.

St. Thomas explains that the “two rules” which govern free human action are (1) human reason, and (2) “God’s reason” which he defines as the eternal law.⁴ The eternal law is how God knows the world to be. Moreover, the divine reason of the eternal law holds regulative and governing primacy over human reason. The eternal law is “the first rule” (or measure) because it establishes the fundamental structure, inclinations, and ends of all of reality within which the second rule of human reason operates. Thus, relying upon Augustine’s Contra Faustum, St. Thomas defines sin under two aspects: “one, pertaining to the substance of the human act, which is the matter, so to speak, of sin… the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin… ‘contrary to the eternal law.’”⁵

Although the insights of the wise moral philosopher and the wise moral theologian are both true, the light of faith affords the moral theologian a more intensive and extensive grasp of the nature and significance of human action and habitus. Only the wise theologian formally grasps the nature of the eternal law and its teleological orders—natural and supernatural. Thus, the light of faith enables the moral theologian to understand formally man’s rational nature as ordered to a participation in supernatural knowledge and love of God through grace. Hence, while the moral philosopher and the moral theologian both consider God as the end of man, only the moral theologian as such considers God as the supernatural end of the rational creature. Only the moral theologian recognizes that although “whatever things are comprised by the order of reason, are [also] comprised by the order of God Himself,” there are also “some things comprised by the order of God, which surpass human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone.” The moral theologian alone is able to grasp the full implications of the truth that “to sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order.”⁶

Moreover, the light of faith enables the moral theologian and only the moral theologian to recognize a Trinitarian formality within the human creature’s rational soul. The imago Dei is a natural image, “impressed upon man in his very creation, irrespective of his elevation to the supernatural.” Nonetheless, “it is not for that reason naturally knowable.” “On the contrary, it is only consequent to the supernatural revelations that there is [recognized] a Trinity of Persons, and that man is an image even of that Threeness, that it could ever occur to the mind of man to seek for that in which such an image might possibly consist.”⁷

The moral theologian considers human action not just in its relation to the perfection or frustration of the natural potencies of rational human nature, but also in its theological aptitude for God. In other words, the moral theologian considers human action—both virtuous and vicious—with special regard for man’s rational nature ad imaginem Dei, and the various degrees of natural and supernatural perfection possible for human nature. It is within this formal appreciation of the imago Dei vis-à-vis man’s rational nature that the full range of St. Thomas’s teaching on human action (whether good or bad) and on habitus (whether virtuous or vicious, moral or theological) receives full intelligibility. Virtuous human action perfects human nature and advances man’s conformity to God. Vicious human action harms human nature and frustrates man’s deeper conformity to God.⁸ In a word, the moral theologian recognizes how grave sin violates and compromises both the image of representation and image of conformity.

The problem of personal evil—how can a human being created with a rational nature ad imaginem Dei sin?—is solved through a proper understanding of the rational human nature as contingent and free. St. Thomas explains that “reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses.”⁹ The rational contingency of human nature establishes the foundation for human freedom. For insofar “as man is rational it is necessary that man have free-will.”¹⁰ The rational appetite is free with regard to contingent goods because the “proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another, and this is to choose.”¹¹ The will is per se “indifferent to good and evil choice.”¹² It stands in moral potency to both good or evil action, and thus an action of the will can be fully and accurately specified as either good or evil.

The will’s freedom—per se undetermined by any finite good—is founded upon its nature as the rational appetite. Thus, the rational appetite’s freedom is rooted in the intellect.¹³ St. Thomas teaches that “the will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good.” But “because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.”¹⁴ Moreover, because “the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it.”¹⁵ “Because the object of the will is universal or rational good, no finite good is so compelling that reason is bound to command the will to embrace it. Every limited or finite good is, in some respect, perceivable as not good.”¹⁶ Because of this, St. Thomas is able to educe some intelligibility from even sinful actions: “That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to rational nature, nevertheless is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit.”¹⁷ The will is always moved by the good. Because of evil’s essentially privative nature, and the will only moves to something objectively evil under the aspect of the good.

The role of rationality in human freedom is difficult to over appreciate. Indeed, in the De malo, St. Thomas states that “in every act of virtue or of sin there must be a quasi-syllogistic deduction.”¹⁸ An appreciation of this truth enables the moral theologian to explain the difference between the actions of the temperate and the intemperate man, as well as that of the continent and the incontinent man. For reasons of space, we will restrict our analysis to Aquinas’s consideration of the continent (enkratic, having control or power in moral choice and command) and the incontinent (akratic, lacking such control or power) man:

For the continent man syllogizes in this manner: No sin is to be committed. And this he proposes in accordance with the judgment of reason, yet according to the movement of concupiscence he turns over and over in his mind that everything pleasurable is to be pursued; but because in him the judgment of reason prevails he adopts the first proposition and concludes under it: this act is a sin, therefore, it is not to be done. However the incontinent man, in whom the movement of concupiscence prevails, adopts the second proposition and concludes under it: this is pleasurable, therefore it is to be pursued. And such is properly the man who sins from weakness… it is evident that although he may know universally [moral truth], nevertheless he does not know in particular because he does not adopt the premise in keeping with reason but in keeping with concupiscence.¹⁹

Although both freely choose their course of action, the continent man “moves according to reason to avoid sin,” while the incontinent man moves “according to concupiscence to commit sin.” In the continent man “the judgment of reason prevails,” while in the incontinent man “the movement of concupiscence prevails.”²⁰ Thus we see in this comparison two different actualizations of the moral potency of man’s rational nature. Both actualizations occur within the context of human freedom. Moreover, both actualizations retain a certain intelligibility—we can understand the action of the continent man and the action of the incontinent man. In light of the objective perfection of the rational potencies of human nature, however, the continent man’s action emerges as morally good and authentically perfective, while the incontinent man’s action emerges as morally evil and non-perfective.

Additionally, when we consider this situation in the theological light of man’s rational nature as created ad imaginem Dei, we recognize that the action of the incontinent man—because it turns towards a created good with a moral objectivity inimical to moral truth—is per se at odds with the graced image of conformity to God. It is impossible to know and to love God—to be united to him—through an unchaste human action.

This point presupposes the distinction between—and the integration of—the natural formality of moral fault and the supernatural formality of mortal sin. God is the author of nature. Moreover, he is the natural end and the supernatural end of the human person (i.e., according to distinct formalities—one God, but two objectivities). Thus, the natural formality of moral fault does indeed contradict the natural order of reality—which is really a theonomic order (i.e., God created and governs what he creates). Moral fault contradicts the order of nature as ordered by God. Nonetheless, considered as sin, such an act also suffers from an additional formality: supernatural disorder. And in the case of mortal sin the formality is aversio against God as supernatural end. Consequently, mortal sin extirpates the rational agent from the supernatural order—an order “ordered” to God in a way that exceeds the native capacities of the human person. (Of course, obediential potency is supremely relevant here.)

Thus, in order to restore the theological order he forfeited, the incontinent man in this example requires the sacrament of penance.

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1. STh I-II, q. 71, a. 6, ad 5.↩︎

2. STh I-II, q. 71, a. 1.↩︎

3. STh I-II, q. 71, a. 2.↩︎

4. STh I-II, q. 71, a. 6.↩︎

5. Ibid. Emphases added.↩︎

6. STh I-II, q. 72, a. 4.↩︎

7. William J. Hill, O.P., Proper Relations to the Divine Indwelling of Persons (Washington: The Thomist Press, 1955), 3.↩︎

8. Through the (supernatural) metaphysical disposition to further growth and through merit de condigno founded upon Christ's merit.↩︎

9. STh I, q. 83, a. 1.↩︎

10. Ibid.↩︎

11. STh I, q. 83, a. 3.↩︎

12. STh I, q. 83, a. 2.↩︎

13. See Steven A. Long, “Providence, Freedom, and Natural Law,” Nova et Vetera 4, no. 3 (2006): 557–606 at 603.↩︎

14. STh I, q. 82, a. 2.↩︎

15. Ibid.↩︎

16. Long, 564. Emphasis original. Of course, in these passages, Long is referring to what is called dominating indifference.↩︎

17. STh I-II, q. 6, a. 4.↩︎

18. De malo, q. 3, a. 9.↩︎

19. Ibid.↩︎

20. Ibid. Here is St. Thomas’s comparison of the temperate and the intemperate man: “The temperate man is moved only according to the judgment of reason; hence he uses a syllogism containing three propositions, making a deduction such as this: No fornication is to be committed; this act is fornication; therefore, this act is not to be done. But the intemperate man yields entirely to the movement of concupiscence, and so he too uses a syllogism containing three propositions, making a deduction such as this: everything pleasurable is to be enjoyed; this act is pleasurable; therefore, this act is to be done” (ibid.).↩︎