Réginald Schultes, (a.4) Historical Overview of the Teaching of Sacred Scripture, the Fathers, and Especially the Scholastics Concerning the Explication of Revealed Truths

Very Brief Translator Remarks

I find myself deeply in the midst of a number of projects that I need to wrap up before vacation. Therefore, I’m going to now make available a draft translation of a very lengthy section of Reginald Schultes’ work on dogmatic development (the rest of which work I will be putting up as I have a chance to edit my other files). As I said, in my very first posting to To Be a Thomist, an integral element of my work as a Thomist thinker is to spend time “inside the minds of others” through my translation work and to make that work available to others. After my vacation, I will return to regular articles. However, because I must finish writing an important text on the topic of dogmatic development, I am somewhat short on time. Thus, I’ll use the next few posts merely to make available these texts of Schultes, which have been floating around on my drive for a while.

Several points. 1˚ This is a draft of a massive chapter, so excuse any infelicities. I was not able to do the full review that I normally would be able to do for a published translation. 2˚ In some places, I used the old English Dominican Friars translation of Thomas as a starting point, though I almost always changed the text in some way. 3˚ If I had more time, I would have made translator’s remarks here and there, to critically assess this or that point made by Schultes. Nonetheless, I feel that this text is an important marker in the history of Thomism (as will be clear from my further postings from the rest of the work). Some day, a very fair appraisal of the Schultes-Marín Sola debate will need to open up once again so as to settle this matter definitively. As things stand, Marín-Sola has won the day. With Schultes, Garrigou-Lagrange, and Laboudette, however, I have some remaining concerns, though the details of that matter belong to a different sort of posting or academic article. 4˚ I would like to thank my research assistant, Mr. Mitchell Kengor, for his help getting together the footnotes, etc. herein.

Chapter 2: The Progress or Development of Dogmas

Having explained and determined the nature of dogma, we must now consider from what perspective [qua ratione] and in what way dogma can be the object of history or, to put it another way, from what perspective and in what way dogma can and does undergo progress and evolution. For dogmas become the object of history precisely because they undergo progress or evolution. Therefore, we must explain and determine the nature of the development of dogmas.

Now, a serious difficulty seems to arise from the definition of dogma. For dogmas are revealed truths, infallibly proposed by the Church, indeed divine truths; however, history considers that which is human, that which progresses and changes, the very becoming of things. Likewise, even the terms progress and development seem to contradict the concept of dogma. Therefore, we must show from what perspective dogmas themselves involve a human, successive element, indeed a change from one state to another, in a word, progress or development according to conditions [of time and place] and through human causes.

However, generally considered, this difficulty is resolved by the very notion of dogma itself. For we have defined dogma as a truth revealed by God and proposed by the Church to be believed. Therefore, dogma involves a distinction between the revelation of a truth by God and its proposition by the Church. Such proposition by the Church is certainly distinguished from divine revelation: for revelation is properly the action of God, whereas proposition is properly and directly the action of the Church. Moreover, revelation came to its completion during the time of Christ and the Apostles, whereas the Church’s proposing begins after Christ and will continue until the end of the world. Therefore, dogmas can undergo progress or development, though not indeed on the side of revelation but, rather, on the side of the proposing of the revealed truth.

Secondly, in dogmas we must distinguish between revealed truth itself and our knowledge of that truth. For neither the revelation of a given truth nor the assent (or even the grace) of faith brings with itself knowledge, at least in full, concerning the meaning of revealed truths. For revelation itself only establishes the possibility of such knowledge, whereas faith only indicates assent to the revealed truth and therefore presupposes knowledge of the truth to be believed. Finally, grace illuminates the believer’s mind so as to grasp the revealed mysteries in some way, though according to the needs, conditions, and cooperation of men. Hence, the truth of dogmas cannot indeed be the subject for progress and development, though our knowledge of revealed truth can.

Therefore, dogmatic progress or the development of dogmas can take place inasmuch as the truths of revelation are successively proposed by the Church to be believed and come to be known more perfectly by us over the course of the ages.

Thus revelation was indeed complete with Christ and the Apostles, but the proposing of revelation begins after Him and “progresses”; indeed, Christ and the Apostles had a full knowledge of the revealed truths; however in the rest of the faithful (with the exception of some particular cases, such as the Blessed Virgin Mary) there is had only a partial and shadowy knowledge of revelation that has been made and accepted, which, however, must be (and indeed is) perfected over the course of the ages.

This twofold reason for dogmatic progress is likewise had in the concrete. For the proposing of revelation implies likewise implies a kind of knowledge of revelation, namely the knowledge that a given doctrine is revealed by God, or even a more determinate knowledge of a given revealed truth, inasmuch as a given doctrine is proposed as a legitimate interpretation of revelation. Similarly, knowledge concerning the meaning of revelation implies some proposition, or at least is presupposed for dogmatic proposition and prepares and leads to it.

Thus, the question concerning dogmatic progress or the development of dogmas will be concerned with the successive proposition and knowledge of revealed truths.¹

Regarding this matter, we will: 1˚provide a historical overview of the teaching of Sacred Scripture, the Fathers, and especially the scholastics (section 1); 2˚ establish the Catholic teaching concerning the essence of dogmatic progress (section 2); 3˚ determine the theological doctrine concerning the essence of dogmatic progress (i.e., concerning the explication of revealed truths) (section 3); and 4˚ inquire into the properties of this same dogmatic progress (section 4).

Section 1

Article 4: Historical Overview of the Teaching of Sacred Scripture, the Fathers, and Especially the Scholastics Concerning the Explication of Revealed Truths

It is not without serious reason that, before dealing with the question in itself in the usual scholastic manner, we will here begin with a historical overview of what Sacred Scripture, the Fathers, and Scholastics teach regarding this matter. Indeed, the positions found in Sacred Scripture, the Fathers, and the scholastics could be reported in relation to particular topics, as the occasion arises, but it is better that we set them forth in a single place with a historically connected narrative.

For in the writings of the scholastic authors, we can find a complete doctrine of dogmatic development, though in such a way that the teaching concerning the explication of revealed truths (as they call it) itself can be seen to undergo its own process of development. Hence, it does not suffice, or at least it is not expedient, to indiscriminately cite this or that text; rather, it is most expedient—nay, it is necessary—to consider and examine the teaching of individual scholastics in connection with this entire development, so that we might correctly determine its meaning, assess the strength of the arguments set forth, and understand the authority of the teaching itself. Hence—we hope—the scholastic teaching on the development of dogmas will thus be better understood and its truth will be more evident, and that many of the more recent controversies will cease. At the same time, this will have the benefit of also furnishing an example of the development of a given dogmatic teaching. Thus, even at the risk of dealing with certain issues twice, we will begin with a historical overview.² To fill out this exposition, we will begin by reviewing, together, the teaching of Sacred Scripture and the Fathers.

The Teaching of Sacred Scripture and the Fathers

II. As is true for other dogmatic truths as well, Sacred Scripture³ expresses the doctrine of dogmatic progress in its own particular way, using concrete and popular terms. First, it proposes the teaching of Christ as the Gospel of God incarnate and therefore as the absolute truth, indeed all the more so since the Gospel of Christ is the new law of the new messianic kingdom, promised in ages long past, to endure until the end of the world. Second, Christ promises the propagation and preaching of this Gospel throughout the whole world up to the end of time, namely, such that the Gospel becomes the law of believing and living in the kingdom of Christ.⁴ Third, according to the Lord’s promise, the Gospel will be preached through the Apostles, especially through Peter, to all nations until the end of time. Thus Christ, by his divine authority and power, declares, as something to come [per modum facti futuri], that the truth revealed by Him will be preserved unchanged and infallibly.

Hence, from the beginning, or from the first time He manifested His intention to found the Church, Christ declares that he wishes to establish an unfailing Church, set upon a rock as a firm foundation, against which not even the gates of hell will prevail (Mt. 16:18). Similarly, when he effectively establishes the Church (i.e., when He was about to ascend into heaven), He handed over his kingdom and power to the apostles. Not only did He entrust them with a right and duty—"teach all the nations; teach them to observe all that I have commanded you” (Mt. 28: 19), but at the same time promised that this will be so—i. e. that through the apostles the truth of the Gospel would really and de facto be preached, preserved, and put into practice, “for I am with you until the end of the age.” Finally, to this end, during His own earthly life, He had implored the help of the Holy Spirit (John 14:16, 17), promised Him (John 14:18, 26; 16:13) and on the day of Pentecost, sent from heaven the Holy Spirit (Acts 2:1ff), who will “teach” the Apostles and their successors “all things and recall to them” whatever Christ said (John 14:26).

However, it is specially promised to Peter that, as a firm rock, he will support the whole kingdom of Christ in the truth of Christ, against all attacks coming from powers opposing it (Matthew 16 18). He is specially entrusted with the task of strengthening the brethren (Lk. 22: 32). And, finally, through him, the flock of Christ will be fed the fodder of truth (John 21, 15–17).

Thus, in the kingdom of Christ, through Peter and the Apostles—whether in person or in their legitimate successors—by virtue of Christ’s command and promise and the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the Gospel of Christ is preserved, preached, taught, and believed unfailingly, unalterably, and therefore, infallibly. Hence, the teaching of the faith set forth by the teaching Church and the faith of the believing Church will always be identical with the Gospel of Jesus Christ, that is, with the revealed divine truth: The Church opposes the gospel of Christ both to the pagans and the Jews; the Church will defend and preserve the truth of the Gospel untouched and unchanged against corruptors and false teachers; in every question and necessity that will arise, the Church will teach the people what Christ said; the Church, and especially Peter, will provide fodder for fitting doctrine. Thus, the Gospel of Christ will be preached to every creature.

Hence, the Apostles “received their orders... and being strengthened by the word of God, with the sure confidence of the Holy Spirit, they went forth announcing the coming of the kingdom of God,”⁵ anathematizing those who preached any gospel “other than the one that we have preached to you” (Gal., 1:8). They explained the gospel of Christ, as especially Paul in his letters. At the Council of Jerusalem, they defined the questions of faith that had arisen (Acts 15). And they proposed to the Gentiles the doctrine received from Christ, using different words or formulas, as we see in the Prologue to John’s Gospel (i.e., his use of “Word”) and Paul in his letters.⁶

III. Similarly, the Church in subsequent eras continued to propose the Gospel of Christ to be held by divine faith. She continued to teach, protect, and explain the apostolic creed as a “rule of faith,” at first through her ordinary teaching, though later in the form of special declarations. Against the Gnostics she defended the divine and absolute truth of the Christian faith, expressing in new terms and formulas the doctrine she has received. She condemned Arians, Nestorians, Pelagians and other heretics, determining and explaining, through solemn definitions, the authentic meaning of revealed truth.

Thus, as is witnessed to by the history of the Church (especially of the Councils and Popes), in her very actions [via facti], the Church teaches what dogmatic progress is by exercising the office of teaching, interpreting, defining, and defending the deposit of faith that has been entrusted to her. Indeed, the Church of the first centuries did not perceive this kind of progress as a problem; in fact, she considered it exclusively to be the preservation and interpretation of the faith she had received. Thus, in each of the controversies about new doctrines, her exclusive concern was that the proposed doctrine be conformed to the teaching of Sacred Scripture and tradition, for before progress itself was placed before one’s eyes as a historical fact, progress itself could not raise a question for consideration.

Hence the definitions promulgated by the Councils manifest the doctrine of dogmatic progress, namely, in so far as the parts of the apostolic creed are successively determined by means of new terms or formulas. The fifth century canons concerning original sin and grace are expressly declared as conforming to “these ecclesiastical norms and proofs founded upon divine authority”⁷ and as interpretations of Sacred Scripture, such that “in no other way must one understand” them.⁸ Then, Pope Simplicius writes: “Since the doctrine of Our predecessors of holy memory is known, against which it is not permitted to dispute, and (since) no one who seems to think rightly has any need to be instructed by new explanations, but (since) all is clear and complete.”⁹ It leads to a new and advantageous inquiry, “when something new arose in distorted minds or something doubtful appeared in the explication of dogmas: so that, if there were any obscurity, those who were discussing it in common might be enlightened by the authority of priestly deliberation; just as, first, the impiety of Arius and, then, that of Nestorius and, finally, that of Dioscorus and Eutyches compelled (this) to be done.”¹⁰ Expressly, II Constantinople (553) confesses that it “holds and preaches the faith given from the beginning to the holy apostles,…confessed and explained by the holy Fathers, and handed on to the holy churches, and especially those [Fathers] who gathered together in the four sacred synods.”¹¹ The same was said at the subsequent Councils.¹² Therefore, the ancient Church properly insisted on the identity of ecclesiastical preaching and the Councils’ definitions with the teaching handed down by Christ to the Apostles. The Fathers held the same concerning this matter.

IV. Among the Apostolic Fathers, St. Ignatius of Antioch professes the faith that is in Jesus Christ as presented in the baptismal creed,¹³ the faith that exists in the Church and is denied by the heretics.¹⁴ He considers this kind of faith or doctrine simply as faith in God or Christ,¹⁵ though as proposed by the bishops. Hence, in all his epistles, he emphasizes need for union with the bishop as the surest sign and means of true faith, against the “rabid dogs” who are the heretics: “And as many as shall, in the exercise of repentance, return into the unity of the Church, these, too, shall belong to God, that they may live according to Jesus Christ.”¹⁶ Therefore, dogmatic progress is posited in the doctrine of the Church, joined to the refutation of heretics.

St. Polycarp considers the Church’s faith without qualification as being something given,¹⁷ handed down,¹⁸ and announced from ancient times,¹⁹ whereas heretics have altered the words of the Lord in accord with their own desires²⁰ and lead men into error.²¹ “Therefore,” he writes, “forsaking the vanity of many, and their false doctrines, let us return to the word which has been handed down to us”²² Thus, the apostolic fathers without qualification emphasize the identity of the doctrine of their (and the following) time with the doctrine of Christ, considering terminological change or internal development of the doctrine to be legitimate in itself.

Against the Gnostics, St. Irenaeus defends the faith of the Catholic Church as uniquely and absolutely true, handed down by the Lord to the Apostles, communicated by the Apostles to the Church, and infallibly preserved in her by the successors of the Apostles through a particular charisma of truth.²³ The substance of this faith is contained in the baptismal creed,²⁴ which is therefore the rule of faith,²⁵ to be explained and determined according to the doctrine of the Apostles handed on to the Church. Thus, in the fifth book of Against the Heresies and especially in the Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, Irenaeus himself determines the doctrine expressed by the Apostolic creed. Therefore, he holds that the whole of dogmatic progress is found in the full explication of the Apostolic creed, which is the true γνῶσις, “the most complete treatment, receiving neither addition nor removal.”²⁶

Origen was the first to set forth an explicit doctrine concerning the progress of faith, namely, in the prologue of his De principiis. He states, as a principle, that the knowledge of faith must be drawn from no other source than the words and teaching of Christ (no. 1). Indeed,

Since many, however, of those who profess to believe in Christ differ from each other, not only in small and trifling matters, but also on subjects of the highest importance, as, e.g., regarding God, or the Lord Jesus Christ, or the Holy Spirit… it seems on that account necessary first of all to fix a definite limit and to lay down an unmistakable rule regarding each one of these, and then to pass to the investigation of other points.²⁷

The rule is: “Given that the teaching of the Church, transmitted in orderly succession from the apostles, and remaining in the Churches to the present day, is still preserved, [the following stands as a rule:] that alone is to be accepted as truth which differs in no respect from ecclesiastical and apostolic tradition.”²⁸ Then, he distinguishes two kinds of truths in the apostolic tradition, for

in preaching the faith of Christ, the holy Apostles delivered themselves with the utmost clarity on certain points that they believed to be necessary for everyone, even for those who seemed somewhat dull in the investigation of divine knowledge. They left, however, the grounds of their statements to be examined by those who should deserve the excellent gifts of the Spirit, and who, especially by means of the Holy Spirit Himself, should obtain the gift of language, of wisdom, and of knowledge, while on other subjects they merely stated the fact that things were so, keeping silence as to the manner or origin of their existence. They clearly did so in order that the more zealous of their successors, who should be lovers of wisdom, might have a subject of exercise on which to display the fruit of their talents — those persons, I mean, who should prepare themselves to be fit and worthy receivers of wisdom.²⁹

Thus, in ecclesiastical preaching there are certain things that are defined (no. 4), concerning which the whole Church holds one position (no. 8) and that are clearly handed down (no. 4). However, some “have to be inquired into out of sacred Scripture according to the best of our ability, and which demand careful investigation”³⁰ Therefore, according to Origen, there is progress in knowledge of Christ’s teaching, indeed for two reasons: because the Apostles did not teach all truths in the same, open manner; and because the truths expressed in ecclesiastical preaching are not all equally extant there. Such progress primarily takes place through ecclesiastical preaching, then through charismatically enlightened men, and finally through studious investigation. However, the fruits of such progress will be more manifest preaching, knowledge of the reasons for the truths of faith, and knowledge concerning the meaning and foundations of the doctrine of faith.

St. Athanasius opened his mind on the occasion of defending the definition promulgated by the Council of Nicaea. For it established that the terms “of the essence (of the substance)” and “of one essence (consubstantial)” are nothing other than a legitimate interpretation or exposition of the terms of Sacred Scripture, by which the error of the Arians is more effectively repelled. Thus, concerning the decrees of the Council of Nicaea, he writes:

But since the generation of the Son from the Father is not according to the nature of men, and not only like, but also inseparable from the essence of the Father, and He and the Father are one, as He has said Himself, and the Word is ever in the Father and the Father in the Word (John 10:30), as the radiance stands towards the light (for this the phrase itself indicates), therefore the Council, as understanding this, suitably wrote “one in essence,” that they might both defeat the perverseness of the heretics, and show that the Word was other than originated things. For, after thus writing, they at once added, “But they who say that the Son of God is from nothing, or created,… these the Holy Catholic Church anathematizes.” And by saying this, they showed clearly that “of the essence,” and “one in essence,” are destructive of those catchwords of irreligion, such as “created”…³¹

He therefore established that the Nicene definition is identical with the revealed doctrine, having been established because of the need to refute the Arians. Hence he follows:

Therefore if they, as the others, make an excuse that the terms are strange, let them consider the sense in which the Council so wrote… But if they still complain that such are not scriptural, that very complaint is a reason why they should be cast out, as talking idly and disordered in mind. And let them blame themselves in this matter, for they set the example, beginning their war against God with words not in Scripture. However, if a person is interested in the question, let him know, that, even if the expressions are not in so many words in the Scriptures, yet, as was said before, they contain the sense of the Scriptures.³²

And, similarly, he adduces Dionisius of Alexandria: “Even if I did not find this expression (homoousios, consubstantialis) in the Scriptures, yet collecting from the actual Scriptures their general sense, I knew that, being Son and Word, He could not be outside the Essence of the Father.”³³

Gregory of Nazianzus continues in the line of Athanasius. Concerning the formulas “unbegotten” and “unoriginate,” he writes:

Is it not evident that they are due to passages which imply them, though the words do not actually occur? What are these passages?—I am the first, and I am the last, and before Me there was no God, neither shall there be after Me. For all that depends on that Am makes for my side, for it has neither beginning nor ending. When you accept this, that nothing is before Him, and that He has not an older Cause, you have implicitly given Him the titles Unbegotten and Unoriginate. And to say that He has no end of Being is to call Him Immortal and Indestructible.³⁴

And by the same reasoning, he defends the divinity of the Holy Spirit, which he considers to be stated in Sacred Scripture, though not in express words:

But if, when you said twice five or twice seven, I concluded from your words that you meant Ten or Fourteen; or if, when you spoke of a rational and mortal animal, that you meant Man, should you think me to be talking nonsense? Surely not, because I should be merely repeating your own meaning; for words do not belong more to the speaker of them than to him who called them forth. As, then, in this case, I should have been looking, not so much at the terms used, as at the thoughts (τα νοούμενα) they were meant to convey; so neither, if I found something else either not at all or not clearly expressed in the Words of Scripture to be included in the meaning (νοούμενον), should I avoid giving it utterance, out of fear of your sophistical trick about terms (ὄνομα).³⁵

The opinion of St. Augustine shines forth chiefly from a double head: firstly from his teaching on the infallible authority of the Church, secondly from his own theological teaching. In fact, “it is the holy Church, the one Church, the true Church, the Catholic Church, fighting against all heresies: it can fight, it cannot conquer.” Hence he simply identifies the true faith and the faith of the Church. “The Church always holds true and faithful faith.” “Keep the Catholic Church, do not depart from the rule of truth.” Thus the entire theological work of St. Augustine is in explaining and defending the doctrine of the Church.

St. Augustine’s position manifests itself most especially on two heads: first, in his teaching concerning the Church’s infallible authority; second, in his own theological teaching authority. In fact, “It is the Holy Church herself, the one Church, the true Church, the Catholic Church, fighting against all heresies: she can fight but cannot be conquered.”³⁶ Hence, he simply identifies the true faith and Church’s faith: “That the true and Catholic faith which the Church always holds”;³⁷ “Hold fast to the Catholic Church, and do not depart from the rule of truth.”³⁸ Thus, Augustine’s entire theological work is engaged in explaining and defending the Church’s doctrine.

However, St. Augustine distinguishes between simple faith and the understanding of faith. In fact, the confession of faith “which is briefly contained in the creed, when known carnally is the milk of the little ones, but when spiritually considered and treated, it is the food of the strong.”³⁹ Still more, he distinguishes between the Church’s authoritative teaching and uncertain or controversial teachings. Some things “pertain to the foundations of the faith itself, while there are others that sometimes involve disagreement among even the most learned and best defenders of the Catholic rule, except for the framework of the faith.”⁴⁰ For we must distinguish between “an error that is to be borne, concerning matters that have not been diligently arranged and handled, not being established by the full authority of the Church, and an error that is not to be borne, one that seeks to shake the foundation of the Church itself.”⁴¹

He declares that the faith was most especially explicated on the occasion of heresy or some other controversy. “Indeed,” he says, “while the hot restlessness of heretics stirs questions about many articles of the Catholic faith, the necessity of defending them forces us both to investigate them more accurately, to understand them more clearly, and to proclaim them more earnestly; and the question mooted by an adversary becomes the occasion of instruction.”⁴² And, similarly, concerning the question of baptism in the midst of the Donatist controversy:

How could a matter which was involved in such mists of disputation even have been brought to the full illumination and authoritative decision of a plenary Council, had it not first been known to be discussed for some considerable time in the various districts of the world, with many discussions and comparisons of the views of the bishop on every side? But this is one effect of the soundness of peace, that when any doubtful points are long under investigation, and when, on account of the difficulty of arriving at the truth, they produce difference of opinion in the course of brotherly disputation, till men at last arrive at the unalloyed truth; yet the bond of unity remains, lest in the part that is cut away there should be found the incurable wound of deadly error.⁴³

Below (in no. 5), we will set forth some other headings of St. Augustine’s teaching.

In his “Commonitorium,” Vincent of Lerinus goes even further in his consideration of such progress, although in the end he also considers such progress from the perspective of the identity of doctrine. Vincent presupposes that every Catholic should, “fortify his own belief in two ways: first, by the authority of the Divine Law (of Scripture), and then, by the Tradition of the Catholic Church.”⁴⁴ Thus, he establishes as a general rule:

In the Catholic Church itself, all possible care must be taken that we hold that faith which has been believed everywhere, always, by all. For that is truly and in the strictest sense “Catholic,” which, as the name itself and the reason of the thing declare, comprehends all universally. This rule we shall observe if we follow universality, antiquity, and consent.⁴⁵

To preach any doctrine therefore to Catholic Christians other than what they have received never was lawful, never is lawful, never will be lawful.⁴⁶

In these ways, alteration in the faith is indeed excluded, though not the progress in faith. Thus:

But someone will say, perhaps, “Shall there, then, be no progress in Christ's Church?” Certainly there will be all possible progress. For what being is there, so envious of men, so full of hatred to God, who would seek to forbid it? Yet on condition that it be real progress, not alteration of the faith. For progress requires that the subject be enlarged n itself, alteration, that it be transformed into something else. The intelligence, then, the knowledge, the wisdom, as well of individuals as of all, as well of one man as of the whole Church, ought, in the course of ages and centuries, to increase and make much and vigorous progress; but yet only in its own kind; that is to say, in the same doctrine, in the same sense, and in the same meaning.⁴⁷

In short, he explains this by using an analogy with the growth of a body or of grain:

Whatever has been sown by the fidelity of the Fathers in this husbandry of God's Church, the same ought to be cultivated and taken care of by the industry of their children, the same ought to flourish and ripen, the same ought to advance and go forward to perfection. For it is right that those ancient doctrines of heavenly philosophy should, as time goes on, be cared for, smoothed, polished; but not that they should be changed, not that they should be maimed, not that they should be mutilated. They may receive proof, illustration, definiteness; but they must retain withal their completeness, their integrity, their characteristic properties.⁴⁸

Thus:

The Church of Christ, the careful and watchful guardian of the doctrines deposited in her charge, never changes anything in them, never diminishes, never adds, does not cut off what is necessary, does not add what is superfluous, does not lose her own, does not appropriate what is another's, but while dealing faithfully and judiciously with ancient doctrine, keeps this one object carefully in view — if there be anything which antiquity has left shapeless and rudimentary, to fashion and polish it, if anything already reduced to shape and developed, to consolidate and strengthen it, if any already ratified and defined, to keep and guard it. Finally, what other object have Councils ever aimed at in their decrees, than to provide that what was before believed in simplicity should in future be believed intelligently, that what was before preached coldly should in future be preached earnestly, that what was before practiced negligently should thenceforward be practiced with double solicitude? This, I say, is what the Catholic Church, roused by the novelties of heretics, has accomplished by the decrees of her Councils—this, and nothing else—she has thenceforward consigned to posterity in writing what she had received from those of olden times only by tradition, comprising a great amount of matter in a few words, and often, for the better understanding, designating an old article of the faith by the characteristic of a new name.⁴⁹

By contrast, it is characteristic of heretics “that, not content with the rule of faith delivered once for all, and received from the times of old, they are every day seeking one novelty after another, and are constantly longing to add, change, take away, in religion, as though the doctrine, Let what has once for all been revealed suffice, were not a heavenly dogma but an earthly rule—a rule which could not be complied with except by continual emendation, nay, rather by continual fault-finding.”⁵⁰

But the Greek Fathers especially extolled the infallibility of the Church’s doctrine (i.e. the explication of the faith proposed by the Church, especially against the portents of heresy). Thus St. Epiphanius, after expositing eighty heresies and just before setting forth his faith, addresses the Church: “When we come to you, we will cease from these most sad troubles of heresy... for a time..., resting in you, Holy Mother Church, and let us breathe here, in your holy doctrine and God’s sole faith and truth.”⁵¹ For the Church is “the one and chaste virgin, and the same bride, the dove, the lamb, the holy city of God, the faith and firmament of truth, the firm rock, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail.”⁵²

Conclusion. From what has been said, it follows: Both Sacred Scripture and the ancient Church acknowledge that dogmatic progress takes place and they determine its nature.—Indeed, the Gospels announce dogmatic progress as a future reality, inasmuch as Christ, by His divine authority, ordered the Apostles to propose His doctrine to all, forever unchanged and intact, and inasmuch as He promises, by His divine power, that this reality will truly be so in the future. The ancient Church, however, taught about the nature of dogmatic development in her very actions [via facti], that is, by exercising the office of teaching, interpreting, defining, and defending the deposit of faith. Thus, Sacred Scripture especially emphasizes the divine precept and aid of the assistance of Christ and the illumination of the Holy Spirit for the unfailing and infallible preaching and exposition of the evangelical doctrine. The ancient Church insistently asserted the identity of ecclesiastical preaching with the revealed word of God. The ancient councils present their dogmatic definitions as the true understanding and due interpretation of the doctrine of faith. Moreover, the Fathers teach the successive manifestation, explication, and determination (through new terms) of the doctrine that has been received.

Therefore, dogmatic progress is represented by Sacred Scripture from the perspective of the indefectible preaching of the Gospel of Christ, by the Church Councils from the perspective of the authoritative and binding determination of the received faith, and by the Fathers from the perspective of progress in the knowledge of the faith and infallible determination concerning disputed questions of faith. Therefore, concerning the evident fact of dogmatic progress, the whole of Christian antiquity emphasizes the immutability and identity of doctrine.

We will now pass on to the teaching of the scholastics. First, however, several of Augustine’s teachings concerning this topic must be explained, given how they serve as the basis of what the first scholastics taught.

St. Augustine

V. St. Augustine teaches the following points, which are the foundation and origin of the entire scholastic doctrine concerning the development of dogmas.

a) It is through the same faith that the righteous of both the Old and the New Testaments were saved, as is true for whoever is saved: “For our faith is the same as theirs; since they believed as something laying in the future that which we believe has now taken place. And, indeed, the sacraments could differ according to the diversity of times, but nevertheless they converged most harmoniously in unity of the same faith.”⁵³ “The saints and righteous men of those times all believed and hoped for the same things.”⁵⁴

b) Faith in Christ was always necessary. “Of whatever virtue you may declare that the ancient righteous men were possessed, nothing saved them but the belief in the Mediator.”⁵⁵ “Without faith, therefore, in the incarnation and death and resurrection of Christ, the Christian faith unhesitatingly declares that the ancient saints could not possibly have been cleansed from sin so as to have become holy, and justified by the grace of God.”⁵⁶

c) However, certain things were believed in the Old Testament in one way, and in the New Testament in another. “The faith that was veiled at the time of the Old Testament, was revealed at the time of the New Testament.”⁵⁷ “Righteous men of old saw in their sacraments the herald of the future revelation of faith, which they did themselves see, even though it still remained obscure and hidden… Therefore, at that time, faith was obscure. For all the righteous and the saints even in those times believed and hoped in the same things. However, the faith in which those people were confined while under the custody of the law is has now been revealed.”⁵⁸ “Grace was first made manifest in the coming of the Mediator. Not, indeed, that this grace was absent previously, but, in harmony with the arrangements of the time, it was veiled and hidden. For none, even of the just men of old, could find salvation apart from the faith of Christ; nor unless He had been known to them could their ministry have been used to convey prophecies concerning Him to us, some more plain, and some more obscure.”⁵⁹

However, in the New Testament, he distinguishes two ways of understanding the faith: “Out of this confession of faith, which is briefly comprehended in the Creed, and which, carnally understood, is milk for babes, but, spiritually apprehended and studied, is meat for strong men, springs the good hope of believers; and this is accompanied by a holy love.”⁶⁰

d) The Apostolic Creed is a kind of summary of the faith. “The creed is the summary or gathering of our faith, one that is simple, short, and full, so that such simplicity corresponds to the faithful’s lack of sophistication, its brevity to memory, and its fullness to the doctrine itself.”⁶¹ “Therefore, a creed (symbolum) is a complex rule of faith in brief form… It is called a symbol in which Christians recognize themselves; this is the first thing I will proclaim to you. Then… I will open it to you, so that you may also be able to understand what I want you to hold.”⁶²

St. Augustine’s teaching most excellently exposits the Church’s doctrine concerning the unity of salvation and faith in both Testaments. It is founded on the Apostle’s teaching concerning the way that the Old Testament is a “type” of the New: “All these things took place as a figure (τυπικως) of those [things that were to come]” (1 Corinthians 10:6);“Before faith came, we were confined (συνκλειόμενοι) to custody under the law in that faith that was to be revealed” (Gal. 3:23).

Hugh of St. Victor and the Master of the Sentences

Taking up this teaching from St. Augustine, the scholastics asked: whether the faith of the ancients and that of the moderns was one; whether faith has grown or whether the articles of faith have grown; and what given ages and peoples have needed to believe. To resolve these questions they established the distinction between implicit and explicit faith.

Thus, first, Hugh of St. Victor, “the greatest of the dogmatic theologians of the twelfth century”⁶³ posed the question “concerning the growth (incremento) of faith.”⁶⁴ He distinguishes two kinds of growth: “As regards knowledge, faith grows when it is instructed for knowledge. As regards affection, it grows when it is aroused to devotion and strengthened in constancy” (ch. 4). In ch. 6, he asks whether faith has changed in accord with the changes of various eras. He rejects the position held by those who suppose that the same thing was believed or known by all at all times. “If these claims are true, either in ancient times salvation was extremely rare or perfection was too numerous” (col. 336). Thus, he responds: “Therefore, considering what is held by right faith... let us confess: even the knowledge of those things which pertain to faith—just as we acknowledge it to differ, at one and the same time, depending upon the capacity of different people, so too we do not doubt that, from the start, it has increased in the faithful themselves by certain increments over the course of time. However, with complete certitude we confess that there was one and the same faith in those who came before and those who came thereafter, though, they did not have the same knowledge, just as among the faithful of our day we find that they share the same faith, though not the same knowledge of faith. Thus, through the ages, faith in all grew so that it became greater, though it did not change so that it would have changed. Before the Law, God was believed to be the Creator, and salvation and redemption were expected from Him. However, as to the question of by whom and how such salvation was to be fulfilled and brought to perfection, such was known only by those few people who had received a unique office to know this, though it was not known by the rest of the faithful. Then, under the Law, the person of the Redeemer was preached as Him who was to be sent and was expected as Him who is to come; however, whether this person himself would be a man, an angel, or God had not yet been manifested. This was known only by those who had been uniquely enlightened by the Spirit for such knowledge. But, under grace, both how redemption would take place and what kind of person the redeemer would be are now, in a manifest way, both preached to and believed by all. Now, we believe that faith and knowledge of the Incarnation and Christ’s passion have always existed in the Church of God, from the beginning, for from the beginning [of the era of grace], those who knew this have never been lacking. Others were saved because they were joined to simple perfection of faith in these and followed them by doing good deeds” (col. 339).⁶⁵

VII. Scholastics coming after Hugh treated the problem in a different way. Abbot Joachim of Fiore and his followers (Gerardus de Borgo San Donnino, Angelus de Glaren, Ubertino of Casale) taught a kind of apocalyptic mysticism, as though the explication of the faith took place in three distinct and increasingly perfect periods, so that in the third period, coming after Francis of Assisi, a purely spiritual explanation of all the Gospels, namely, in the eternal Gospel, would at last be had. Others proceeded along a purely dialectical path, comparing the faith of the ancients and Christians from a purely logical perspective.⁶⁶ Thus Stephen Langton, in the chapter, "On the ancient fathers: did they believe the same articles as we do?", raises this particular difficulty: “Abraham believed that Christ would come to be incarnate; however, we believe that Christ has become incarnate. And these are completely different.” This was also the position of Gilbert Prevostin of Cremona, Duns Scotus,⁶⁷ and others.⁶⁸

Following in the footsteps of Hugh of St. Victor, the high scholastics tried to resolve the question using theological principles.

VIII. The question was formally put forward by the Master of the Sentences in bk. 3, dist. 25.⁶⁹ There, in the chapter “on the faith of the ancients” and “of simple believers,” he summarizes the teaching of St. Augustine and Hugh, namely, that nobody, even in the Old Testament, was saved except by faith in Christ. “What, then, shall be said concerning those simple believers to whom the mystery of the Incarnation had not been revealed, men who piously believed what had been handed down to them? It can be said that nobody was just or saved without revelation having been made to them, whether in a distinct or veiled way, whether openly or in mystery—distinct as to Abraham or Moses and other greater believers who had the distinction of the articles of faith; veiled as to the simple believers to whom it was revealed that they must believe those things that those greater ones believed and taught, though the former did not have such knowledge of them in an openly distinct form. This is like how in the Church there are some who have less ability and are unable to distinguish and assign the articles of the creed, even though they believe everything that is contained in it. For they believe what they do not know, having a faith veiled in mystery. Thus, in earlier days, they who had less ability, by means of some revelation made to them, clung to the greater believers, to whom they, as it were, entrusted their faith” (ch. 2, On the faith of the simple). Similarly, he sums up the teaching of Hugh of St. Victor: “Faith seems to have progressed over the course of time, just as knowledge has progressed” (ch. 1).

And thus, Peter Lombard resolve the question concerning the progress of faith by means of a distinction between veiled faith and distinct faith, that is, by holding that there is progress from veiled faith to distinct faith. This teaching is the foundation and origin for the distinction between implicit and explicit faith and for the doctrine concerning progress from implicit faith to explicit faith. However, his teaching is itself based on that of St. Augustine, which was discussed in v(c) above.

The teaching of the Master of the Sentences is of particular interest because it represents the state of the question up to the 14^th century, for the medieval scholastics proposed their teaching concerning the explication of revealed truths almost exclusively upon the occasion of their commenting upon Sentences bk. 3, d. 25. Peter Lombard, however, first asks about the progress of faith or the increase of the articles as regards the time before Christ or the Apostles. Therefore, properly speaking, he is not concerned with dogmatic development but, instead, with the development of faith through revelation. However, on the occasion of the question thus posed, already the Master himself applies this teaching to the question of explaining dogmatic development, and even more so do the great scholastics after him. Secondly, the Master formally raised the question concerning the growth of the articles of faith which are the articles of the creedal expression of faith [articuli symboli fidei]. Thirdly, in Peter Lombard, the formula used for this distinction is: distinct or veiled faith (fides distincta-velata); faith had openly or faith had in mystery (fides in aperto-in mysterio); and faith veiled in the faith of greater believers (fides velata in fide maiorum). This way of speaking would remain in use up to the fourteenth century. However, the first time that the formula “to believe implicitly or to believe explicitly (credere implicite-explicite)” is found in place of “distinct faith or veiled faith” is in the writings of Peter of Corbeil (†122[2]): “In the Old Law, they worshiped the Trinity implicitly, though we now do so explicitly.”⁷⁰ Other formulas that are used are fides in universali or fide in generali and fides distincta or fides in particulari. However, the terms “explicit faith” and “implicit faith” soon came to be the primary usage, becoming, as it were, a technical term.⁷¹

The Teaching of Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, [St.] Albert the Great, Peter of Tarentaise (Bl. Innocent V), St. Thomas Aquinas, [Bl.] John Duns Scotus, and Richard of Mediavilla

A. On the progress of faith

As regards the progress of faith, all hold that, in all eras, faith was the same, though it grew as regards knowledge thereof, not through the addition of new articles, but through the explication of those things that were implicit.

To understand this doctrine, the following points must be noted. The high scholastics are properly and directly concerned with the progress of faith, comparing the Old Testament with the New. Therefore, their concern is directly focused on the progress of faith through new revelations. The progress of faith in the New Testament is explained only indirectly and by way of consequence alongside their primary concern. However, like Peter Lombard, the 13^th century scholastics also have before their eyes St. Augustine’s teaching concerning the unity of faith in the Old and New Testaments. Hence, they are concerned with articulating how, in the Old and New Testaments, the faith would be the same, that is, whether the faith of the “moderns” (i.e., in the New Testament) and of “the ancients” (i.e., in the Old Testament) is the same faith, notwithstanding the progress of revelation. Thus, for the scholastics, it does not suffice merely to say that faith grew in accord with the progress of revelation; rather, at the same time, they strove to explain, as much as they could, how the unity of faith was preserved in the midst of the progress of revelation. Hence the Scholastics hold, first of all, that faith has been the same at all times. Secondly, they all presuppose that faith has grown as regards knowledge thereof (i.e., on account of new revelations). Thirdly, however, they teach that later revelations are not simply or absolutely new but, instead, more exact explanations or determinations of the earlier revelation, which to that point had been undetermined or vague, as Victor de St. Hugh had already held (see VI above). Therefore, later revelations were implicitly contained in prior revelation, the progress of revelation takes place through the explication of what is implicit, and finally, the progress of faith is progress from implicit faith to explicit faith. Thus, the progress of both revelation and faith is an organic progress.

IX. Thus, St. Bonavanture teaches (In III Sent., d. 25, a. 2, q. 1):

There are two ways that we can understand the claim that the credibilia can increase in number: either through the addition of new articles or through the explication of those things that were implicit. If we understand it the first way, then we cannot admit that faith has advanced as far as the multitude of things to be believed is concerned. However, if we understand it in the second way, we can say that they have advanced over the course of time, for what was believed at one time implicitly and, as it were, in one article, was explicated over the course of time and, as it were, distinctly in many credibilia. For example, in an earlier era, it sufficed that one believe in the future Redeemer; now however, there are seven explicated articles concerning the Redeemer Himself, and many further consequences and truths connected to them have been manifested.

Therefore, according to Bonaventure, “as regards the multitude of things to be believed, faith has progressed, not through the addition of new things but in a certain way through the explication of what is implicit” (ibid.) and, “faith has, in a certain way, extensively progressed, as regards the explication of the articles” (In III Sent., d. 25, a. 2, q. 3, coroll.). And, “Such multiplication of the articles, in which way we say that faith has advanced, does not change the object in a substantial way but only in an non-essential way (secundum accidens), because it explicates what was implicit” (In III Sent., d. 25, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2).

Hence “faith grew so as to be greater, though it was not changed.” Richard of Mediavilla († c. 130[8]) teaches the same thing in nearly the same words: “Faith did not grow as regards the multitude of things to be believed, through the addition of new articles but, instead, by the explication of those things that were implicit, for what at one time was implicitly proposed for belief and was implicitly believed, in later days later have come to be explicitly proposed for belief and are explicitly believed” (In III Sent., d. 25, a. 5, q. 1,).

Already before this, Alexander of Hales⁷² taught that the truth believed in did not grow in itself but, instead, as regards its effect: it grew as to its use, that is, in knowledge, constancy, and firmness, in fervor and devotion, in action and operation (Summa, pt. 2, q. 81, m. 2 [sic]).

Duns Scotus raises the question as follows: “Was the act of faith elicited by the ancients concerned with the same credibilium as is ours” (In III Sent., d. 25, q. 1, ultimo⁷³). He answers briefly: “I believe that there is nothing in the New Testament that could not be drawn from the Old Testament in some allegorical, tropological, or anagogical sense.” As for the rest of the issue, Scotus treats the question in a rather dialectical manner, namely, asking whether faith in the future Redeemer and in the Redeemer who has come are concerned with the same logical proposition.

Peter of Tarantaise (Innocent V) thus teaches: “The number of things to be believed can be understood in two ways: either as what is explicitly or implicitly to be believed. The number of things to be implicitly believed did not increase, though the number of things to be explicitly believed has. However, such an increase is accidental to faith, not substantial, and, moreover, holds on the side of the believer, rather than on that of the things to be believed” (In III Sent., d. 25, q. 5, a. 1). To the question concerning whether “the faith of the moderns is greater than that of the ancients,” he responds that "the faith of the moderns is greater in regard to knowledge as regards its common state,” “although, according to the state of certain persons, it might be equal.” However, it is greater “either by the revelation of grace, by the perception of doctrine, by the outcome (eventus) or evidence of a reality believed in, or by study and meditation” (In III Sent., d. 25, q. 5, a. 2). Therefore, the number of things to be believed was not always manifest (ad 1); and progress is had on the part of the disciples (of revelation—of the faithful) (ad 2) or from our perspective (quoad nos) (ad 3).

Albert the Great holds a position along the same lines:

As regards understanding (faith grows) in four ways: by illuminating revelation from above; through doctrinal explication; by the thing believed coming to pass; and by study of the truth opening the understanding thereof. It takes place by way of revelation because he who receives greater revelations sees more clearly what is believed and better perceives it. Through doctrinal explication, to the degree that an article is expressed by more properties or more articles are expressed, to that degree are they better understood.

By the thing believed coming to pass knowledge (scientia) of the faith grows because, as Jerome says, what is seen with the eyes is better understood than what is foretold in the future. However, through study, the reason for understanding what is believed is also disclosed… because faith sometimes seeks understanding through study. (In III Sent, d. 25, a. 1).

Hence, he concludes: “The articles did not grow in themselves, though interpretation and revelation of the articles grew” (ad 2).

St. Thomas holds the same doctrine, even as regards its formulation. In the Commentary on Sentences he answers the question about the progress of faith as follows (In III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1): as regards the quantity of the articles, faith neither increases nor decreases, since it always remains the same; however, as regards knowledge, faith can progress, while remaining the same, depending on various human conditions. For “in these things that are De fide it happened that it was necessary that the human intellect gradually become accustomed to the things of faith. Thus, the Lord said to his disciples: ‘I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now’ (John 16:12)” (ad 2). In the disputed questions De veritate, q. 14, a. 12, he asks, “Is the faith of the ‘moderns’ and the ‘ancients’ one and the same?” In response, he begins by rejecting the position held by those who have said that the same statement can be stated regarding the past (Christ suffered), which we believe, and about the future, which the ancients believed (Christ-God will suffer). Secondly, he sets aside the position holding that faith is the same because faith is not concerned with the content of statements (non sit de enuntiabili) but with reality, and the reality believed is the same [thus meaning that faith has remained the same on these grounds]. Third, he responds:

The object of faith can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, it can be considered in itself, as it is outside the soul, and thus it properly has the nature of an object and thereby gives rise to the multitude or unity of habitus. On the other hand, it can be considered inasmuch as it is participated in by the knower. Therefore, it must be said that if we consider the object of faith (i.e., the reality believed) as it exists outside the soul, the faith of the ancients and our faith refer to the same thing; and, thus, faith receives unity from the unity of the reality-thing in question. However, if it is considered in accord with our reception of it, it is thus multiplied into different statements, though faith is not diversified by such diversity (De veritate, q. 14, a. 12c).

(For) to know in a general manner (implicitly) and in a particularized manner (explicitly) does not diversify knowledge except in so far as the manner of knowing is concerned, though not as regards the reality known, from which a habitus has unity (ad 1).

Thus, rejecting a purely dialectical explanation, St. Thomas explains the unity of faith on the basis of the habitus of faith. For he says, with St. Augustine: “We must firmly hold that the faith of the ‘ancients’ and ‘moderns’ is one, for otherwise, there would not be one Church.”

He explains the matter more explicitly in ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7 (“Did the articles of faith increase over the course of time?”). Note, as we saw in the state of the question among other scholastics, it is also clear here that St. Thomas’s text is concerned with the same matter: in this article, he does not ask about whether dogmas increased in the Church herself, after Christ, but rather about the increase of articles from the beginning of the world up to the time of Christ and the Apostles. Thus, already in the Sed contra, he cites as the primary textual authority the remarks of Gregory the Great in his homilies on Ezekiel.⁷⁴ There, Gregory states: “The fathers’ knowledge of spiritual things grew with the passage of time. For Moses was more instructed in the knowledge of the omnipotent God than was Abraham, and the Prophets more than Moses, and the Apostles more than the Prophets.” Thus, along these lines, Gregory concludes, “The nearer the world is led to its ultimate end (ad extremitatem ducitur), the more fully is access to eternal knowledge opened up for us.” Similarly, it should be noted that St. Thomas speaks only of the articles of faith properly so called, namely, those that are contained in the creedal statement of the faith. St. Thomas responds as follows:

The articles of faith are related to the doctrine of faith in a way akin to how self-evident principles are related to a teaching based on natural reason. Among such principles there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others, so that all the principles are reduced, as to their first principle, to this: “One and the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time…

In like manner, all the articles are implicitly contained in certain first credibilia, namely, that it is believed that God exists and exercises His providence over the salvation of man, according to Hebrews 11:6: “He that approaches God must believe that He exists and rewarders those who seek Him.” Therefore, the divine existence includes everything that we believe exists eternally in God, and in these our beatitude consists. However, faith in Providence includes all those things which God arranges in time for the sake of man’s salvation, and which are the way to such beatitude. And in this way, certain subsequent articles are contained in others, as faith in the Redemption of mankind implicitly contains the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion, and all other such things.

Therefore, we must say that, as regards the substance of the articles of faith, they have not undergone increase with the passage of time, for whatever those who lived later believed was already contained, though implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who came before them. However, as regards their explication, the number of articles has grown, for certain things have were explicitly known by those who lived later on, though they were not explicitly known by those coming before them. Thus,… The Apostle says (in Ephesians 3:5): “(The mystery of Christ) was not known by other generations, as it has now been revealed to His Holy Apostles and Prophets.”

Therefore, in this article, like other theologians [of his era], St. Thomas explains the increase of the articles by successive revelation, though in such a way that all the articles are said to be explications of the first two credibilia, in which the others were implicitly contained, namely, by implicitation [or implication] from the perspective of the reality believed in. Thus, as to their substance, the number of articles has not increased, and the unity of faith in the New and Old Testaments thereby is preserved. Therefore, explication was brought about through new revelations, by which the revelation that had already been made receives further determination or explication.

St. Thomas explains himself in greater detail in his answers to the objections, thereby making his meaning more readily understandable. In ad 2, he teaches that the explication of revealed truths is successively brought about in respect to men:

Thus, the teacher, who has full knowledge of his art, does not hand it on to his student all at once and from the very outset, for if he were to do that, the student would not be able to grasp what he was being taught. Instead, he stoops down to the student’s level, instructing him step by step. In this way, men progressed in knowledge of faith over the course of time. Hence, the Apostle (in Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood.

In ad 3, he teaches the same thing by comparing humanity to matter, which passes from imperfect to perfect:

In the manifestation of faith (i.e., revelation), God is like an active cause who has perfect knowledge from all eternity; man, however, is akin to matter receiving the influx of God’s action. Therefore, in men, it was necessary that the knowledge of faith pass from imperfection to perfection, and although some men have acted after the manner of active causes (because they were teachers of faith), nonetheless the manifestation of the Spirit (i.e., revelation) is given to such men for the common good, as is said in I Cor. 12:7. Therefore, knowledge of faith was imparted to the fathers (the patriarchs and the prophets) who set the foundations of the faith as far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.”

And in ad 4 he explains why revelation was complete in Christ: “The ultimate consummation of grace (of the supernatural order) was brought about by Christ. Therefore, his time is called the “time of fulness” [sic] (Galatians 4:4).” Thus, he likewise explains why the perfection of revelation was had in the time of Christ, during the period immediately preceding him and that following him: “Hence those who were nearest to Christ—either before, like John the Baptist, or after, like the Apostles—had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith (i.e., had a fuller revelation). For even in regard to man’s own state we find that the perfection of manhood comes in youth, and that a man’s state, whether before or after, is all the more perfect to the degree it is nearer to the time of his youth.”⁷⁵

Note. Therefore, heed the fact that, in ad 4, St. Thomas is exclusively speaking about the completion of revelation at the time of Christ. This does away with the difficulties in Cajetan (on this article), Bañez, (in the same place), John of St. Thomas (De fide, q. 1, disp. 6, a. 2), and Suarez (De fide, disp. 2, a. 6).

St. Thomas teaches the same in ST II-II q. 174, a. 6 (Whether the degree of prophecy varies according to the progress of time). St. Thomas distinguishes three states of prophecy: Abraham, Moses, Christ. In each of the three stages, the ever-successive revelations were founded on the more excellent one most recently made: "Thus, also in the time of grace the whole faith of the Church is founded on the revelations made to the Apostles concerning faith in the One and Triune God” (also see ad 1).

Therefore, the high scholastics first explained the explication of revelation through new revelations: “the explication of things to be believed is brought about through divine revelation.” However, mutatis mutandis and preserving the terms of the analogy, the principles they have handed down can be applied very well to the explication of the faith by the Church’s magisterium, just as they have been applied. For even in the development of dogmas in the Church herself there has been an increase of things to be believed through explication of revealed truths, though there is no increase in the substance of what is believed, namely inasmuch as only those things that already were revealed are explicated, though not through new revelations but, instead, merely by way of exposition, not through further determination of some things only revealed in a general way (in universali) but, instead, through the mere determination and formulation of the meaning that had already been revealed. Hence, the way the scholastics formulated this is suitable both for defining the development of dogmas and for explaining the development of revelation. Finally, the scholastic arguments for successive revelation hold even more strongly for the case of the successive development of dogmas. For even in this development, it is necessary that one stoop down to the capacity of men (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7, ad 2), that one proceed from the imperfect to the more perfect (ibid., ad 3), that the manifestation of the Spirit is given for the advantage [of those two whom it is given] and according to necessity (ibid.), that the human mind must become accustomed to the things to be believed (In III Sent, bk. 3, d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, q. 1) that such knowledge is brought about by God illuminating one from above, by doctrinal explanation, and by the reality believed in coming to be (e.g. as regards the constitution of the Church), and that understanding might be opened through studying of the truth (either on the part of the teachers or on the part of the Church proposing the truth in question⁷⁶). Thus, in short, already in this section we already have a sufficient teaching concerning the development of dogmas.

Nonetheless, the scholastics also directly tried to explain at least some part of the development of dogmas in the Church herself, indeed even the promulgation of the Apostle’s Creed and the Creeds that followed thereafter. Since the Creed is the main and primary fact in the development of dogmas, both historically and dogmatically speaking, the teaching of the scholastics about this fact is of the greatest importance.

B. On the Promulgation of the Creed

X. First of all, the high scholastics all hold that the Creed is a collection of all the principal truths of the faith, made by the Apostles. Albert the Great (In III Sent. d. 24, a. 7) refers to the words of Cassian, stating that the Creed should therefore be called a collation, “Because having been gathered together (collata in unum) by the Apostles of the Lord whatever of the whole Catholic law of faith is scattered throughout in immense abundance throughout the whole body of divine volumes is all gathered together into the creed with perfect brevity… Thus, we have this, this brief formulation, which the Lord made, gathering together the faith of his double testimony in a few words and summing up the meaning of all the scriptures in a short form, making his own out of his own, and executing the force of the whole law through brevity.” Similarly, Bonaventure holds (In III Sent, d. 25, a. 1, q. 1) that the Apostle’s Creed sufficiently contains those things that are principal and proper in the doctrine of faith. And Richard of Mediavilla also agrees with this: “This creed was composed for the sake of providing a kind of brief tradition and expression of the truth” (In III Sent, d. 25, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1). St. Thomas says the same in In III Sent, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 and ST II-II, q. 1, a. 9.

St. Thomas also assigns the reasons for this work of gathering together. In his Commentary on Sentences he briefly states: “From different places in Sacred Scripture those things that are to be believed are gathered so that they might be readily at hand” (In III Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3); “It was necessary that those things that were handed down in different places in Sacred Scripture should be gathered together in one place, so that the faith might be more readily at hand” (ibid. ad 1). The Creed “was promulgated in order to set forth the faith (ad proponendam fidem)”(ibid., ad 4). In ST II-II, q. 1, a. 9 he asks, “Is it suitable that the articles of faith should be expressed in a creed?”, that is, whether it was fitting that a creed be composed and proposed for belief. He responds:

As the Apostle says (in Hebrews 11:6), “He who approaches God, must believe that He exists.” Now, a man cannot believe unless the truth be proposed to him so that he might believe it. Hence the truth of faith needed to be gathered together so that it might more easily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through ignorance of the faith. It because it is a collection of statements of faith that creeds are called a “symbols” [from the Greek symbol symballein, to put together].

And he provides further explanation for this in ad 1:

The truth of faith is spread out throughout Sacred Scripture, using various modes of expression and sometimes communicated in an obscure fashion, so that long study and practice is needed in order for one to gather the truth of faith from Sacred Scripture. Now this is unattainable by all those who for whom knowledge of the truth of faith is necessary, for many of them have no time to set aside for study, given that they busy with other affairs. Therefore, it was necessary that a clear summary be gathered together from the sayings of Sacred Scripture and proposed to all for belief. This indeed was not added to Sacred Scripture but, rather, was drawn from it.

However, in what way are all the truths of faith contained in the Creed, given that it contains nothing, for example, concerning the inspiration of Sacred Scripture and the Eucharist? Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and St. Thomas answer this question in different ways. All of them divide the credibilia into three classes: articles, presuppositions or antecedents, and consequences or corollaries.

Thus Albert the Great teaches (In III Sent., d. 24, a. 8):

Just as in the other sciences some things are principal and some substantial, as the principal conclusions of an art, and some consequences, as secondary conclusions, from which, however, something further can be inferred through the work of that art (as in geometry there are suppositions, theorems, and corollaries) so too do matters stand in faith. And first of all, for in my judgment I must assume what is required to believe in God (credere Deum) and to believe God (credere Deo), namely, that God exists and that his words in Scripture are true. And these are suppositions and positions [dignitates] (i.e., axioms). However, the articles themselves are like the main conclusions of science, and those that pertain to good morals, are like corollaries that follow therefrom.

St. Bonaventure writes (In III Sent., d. 25, a. 1, q. 1):

The doctrine of faith has certain antecedents, consequences, and principal objects. As we see, in other sciences, that there are certain common principles which are presupposed as positions [dignitates], while certain principles are proper to those sciences as the intrinsic principles of their demonstrations, whereas some are, as it were, consequences, as are corollary conclusions. Likewise, in this way, in the doctrine of faith those matters that are concerned with the dictates of the natural law are antecedents. However, the principal things are those that are directly under the guidance of the illumination of faith, and these are called articles. The consequences are those things that can be drawn from those articles and have to follow from those articles [ad illos articulos habit sequi].

Therefore, everything that is principal and proper is contained in the Apostolic Creed, whereas other things are only there as antecedents and consequences. Therefore, Albert the Great (In III Sent., d. 24, a. 6), Bonaventure (In III Sent. d. 25, a. 1, q. 1), and indeed even St. Thomas (though from a different perspective) (In III Sent., d. 25, a. 2, q. 1; ST II-II, q. 1, a. 8) seek to determine to which articles other doctrines of the faith (e.g., the doctrine concerning the Eucharist) “are reduced.” And here, we must note that, according to the opinion of the scholastics, “consequences or corollaries” are not contained in the articles as though they could be deduced from them by reason alone but, rather, in a way that is similar to that by which particular articles are contained in certain general articles, as Christ’s passion is contained in the redemption.

St. Thomas maintains a similar distinction, though he proposes it in a less express form. Presuppositions for faith are those doctrines about God which can be proven demonstrably. If these also are revealed, “They are numbered among the things to be believed, not because there is simply faith in them among all (that is, not as mysteries which can only be known by faith), but because they are pre-required for the things of faith, and it is necessary that such things be presupposed at least by faith by those are not able to demonstrate them” (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3). Articles are the parts or principal or organic classes of revealed truths (ST II-II, q. 1. a. 6–9). Consequences are the particular revealed truths that are implicitly contained in the articles, which “pertain to one article” (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 6), “are included in one article or are ‘embraced’ under one, or are ‘ordered to one’ (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2 and 3), as the Eucharist "is embraced under the omnipotence of God” (ibid., ad 6).

However, St. Thomas examines more deeply the nature (rationem) of the articles. In ST II-II, q. 1, he first determines the formal object faith (a. 1–5), then its material object. Regarding the latter, he first asks whether the credibilia ought to be distinguished into certain articles (i.e. whether the whole sum of revealed truths ought to be divided into certain parts, as a body is divided into its members, as into its principal and organic parts (a. 6), and such parts of the credibilia are called articles. St. Thomas distinguishes between those things that are credibilia per se (i.e., which order us directly to eternal life and which today are called “matters of faith and morals”⁷⁷) and those that are credibilia in relation to others, matters that are to be believed “not as though they were principally intended but, instead, are for the manifestation of the first sort of credibilia, for example, the fact that Abraham had two sons” (ad 1). Only credibilia per se ought to be distinguished into various articles.

Second, St. Thomas teaches that the division of the credibilia into articles takes place inasmuch as the credibilia involve some specific thing that is not seen or a specific difficulty for believing, for the object of faith is not seen (see a. 6c). “Therefore, wherever, for some specific reason, something is unseen there will be a specific article. However, when, under the same aspect, several things are known or not known, we are not to distinguish various articles… (In other words,) they belong to one article (ibid.). Thus the division of credibilia into articles is shown to be necessary from how faith is related to the credibilia.

Hence, thirdly, it is thus clearer how all (per se) revealed truths are contained in the articles. For since by means of articles all the credibilia are divided into their principal and organic parts, the articles clearly contain all the credibilia, just as the members of the body (as the principal parts of the body) contain all of its particular parts. Thus, the articles explicitly set forth one revealed doctrine. For example, the doctrine of the Incarnation is stated in one article, though all other doctrines pertaining to the Incarnation are implicitly contained in it. Thus, particular doctrines properly “pertain to one article,” “are included in one article,” “comprehended under one,” and, “ordered to one. In this way, the Eucharist “is embraced under the omnipotence of God” or “under the Holy Church.” Thus, according to St. Thomas, the “articles” do not contain what is per accidens revealed, though they do contain everything that is per se revealed, either explicitly or implicitly.

Concerning articles of this kind, St. Thomas then asks: whether they grew over the course of time through revelation (a. 7); whether they were fittingly enumerated (i.e., whether the articles enumerated in the Creed and as distinguished by theologians are the principal parts of the credibilia [a. 8]); whether they are fittingly placed in the Creed (i.e. proposed for belief in a creedal form [a. 9]). Thus St. Thomas gives the theological reason for the first dogmatic activity, namely, the proposing of a creed: a creed proposes the principal parts of the credibilia, for the benefit of the faithful in accord with their needs. St. Thomas’s teaching concerning the Creed is by far the best of all the explanations offered, at least as regards theological reasons, and it is in perfect harmony with what the ancient Church held concerning how the creed is the rule of faith.

C. On the Explication of the Creed

XI. In addition to the historical fact of the Apostles Creed, the high scholastics explain the historical fact of the following Creeds. Their general and common doctrine holds that the following creeds are nothing other than the explication and determination of the Apostles Creed. Thus, Albert the Great (In III Sent., d. 24, a. 7), while inquiring into “the difference between creeds”, responds (ad 3): “All the other Creeds interpret the Apostle’s Creed. They add nothing to it but, rather, explain what was already included therein”; “The Creed of the Fathers (of Nicaea) is an explanation formulated against heresies” (ad 4); “The Apostles’ Creed contains nothing other than a simple confession of faith... but the Creed of the Fathers... contains an explanation of the faith, by debating against the outcry of heretics” (ad 5); The Athanasian Creed especially contains an “explanation or, rather, extermination of Arian faithlessness and, at length, all that was laid down in the Nicaean Creed” (ad 6). Similarly, St. Bonaventure (In III Sent., d. 25, a. 1, q. 1) states: “Two other creeds, namely, the Athanasian and Nicaean Creeds, provided a greater explanation of the faith and the refutation of heresy” (ad 5); “The Apostles’ Creed contains fewer things than the others because it seeks to precisely express the articles; however, the two other symbols seek to refute heretics. Hence, even if the others involve the addition of something as regards how certain articles are expressed, nonetheless, the articles are not expressed more fully.” “And thus, it is clear that these creeds are not superfluous, nor was the Apostles’ Creed diminished in form, for although the faith is contained therein in a sufficient form for the proper and simple confession of faith, nonetheless, it was advantages that something be added in the form of explanation, given the need to refute the claims of heretical depravity.”

St. Thomas teaches, in ST II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 2:

All of the creeds teach the same doctrine of faith. Nonetheless, when errors arise, people need more careful instruction concerning the truth of faith, lest the faith of simple believers be corrupted by heretics. This is what gave rise to the need for several creeds to be formulated, though they in no way differ from one another, except insofar as, on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one creed contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly.

And also: “For the later creed does not abolish the one that came before it but, instead, expounds it” (ad 4); "The Creed of the fathers [of Nicaea] explains the Apostle’s Creed” (ad 6).

Therefore, the high scholastics held that dogmatic development was an explication of the Apostles’ Creed. The historical reason for this position lies in the fact that the majority of the ancient Church’s definitions were made by way of determining the Apostles’ Creed (as took place in the ancient Councils). However, the theological reason for their position lies in the scholastics’ teaching concerning the office and nature of the Apostle’s Creed. Nevertheless, the high Scholastics already considered later development.

Thus Albert the Great himself completed his teaching concerning the diversity of Creeds by adding the following remarks (In III Sent., d. 24, a. 7, ad 7):

If the necessity requires it, the Pope, having convened a council of experts and invoking the Holy Spirit, could explain and establish among the explicit articles something that is implicitly contained in the Apostles’ Creed, for this would not involve the discovery of a new article rather but the explanation of one that was always there. This is what Anselm says in the Proslogion.

Albert’s teaching here seems to have been the reason or occasion for St. Thomas’s well-known ST II-II, q. 1, a. 10 (“Whether it belongs to the Supreme Pontiff to draw up the symbol of faith”). He assigns the following reasons for the drawing up of the Creed: “Because there must be one faith in the whole Church…, which could not be preserved without the determination of matters of faith that have arisen… in order that the whole Church might firmly hold this position” (a. 10c). Indeed, “the truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching of Christ and the Apostles; however, because wicked men pervert the Apostolic teaching, other doctrines, and the scriptures to their own destruction… it was, therefore, necessary, with the course of time, that the faith be explicated in response to the errors that arose" (ad 1). For the new statement of the Creed does not “contain a different faith but, rather, the same faith in a more expounded form. For, in this way, each council has taken into account that subsequent councils would expound something beyond what the preceding one had expounded, due to the needs arising from some heresy that had arisen” (ad 2). He holds that the reason why the declaration of the Creed belongs to the Pope is that "it pertains to his authority to provide a final determination concerning those matters that are of faith, so that all might hold them by unshakable faith” (a. 10c).

Conclusion. Therefore, the scholastics of the 13^th century define dogmatic progress as being the successive proposition and explanation of the credibilia (i.e., of revealed truths). The proposing of revealed truths is most especially found in the edition of the promulgation of the Creeds, first the Apostle’s Creed, then in the subsequent creeds. In addition to these, there are the definitions by the Pope, by which questions of faith that have arisen are finally determined. The explication of the credibilia is brought about through the determination of revealed truths. This takes place in two ways. First, it takes place through new revelations, thus giving us progress in revelation: "the explication of revealed truths is brought about through divine revelation” (ST II-II, q. 2, a. 6). Second, such determination takes place without involving new revelation, taking place, rather, solely through the explication, exposition, manifestation, and precise expression (formulation) of truths that already have been revealed. This is how dogmatic progress takes place. In this way, the Apostles’ Creed is a summary collection of (per se) revealed truths and, thus, later creeds (i.e. [sic], those of Nicaea and Constantinople) explicate the Apostles’ Creed and in like manner do the definitions by the Pope finally determine matters of faith. Therefore, the term “explication of faith” is properly a formula used by the scholastics expressing the essence of dogmatic progress.⁷⁸

Scholastics of the 14^th and 15^th Century, as well as up to the Council of Trent

XII. After the time of the high scholastics, the question concerning the development of dogmas was less directly discussed. Instead, the general practice was to refer to the opinion of the high scholastics. Thus, as regards the promulgation of the creed (though the point holds true regarding any kind of definition), Durandus of Saint Pourçain writes: “There were two benefits involved in the establishing of the creed, namely, certain and easier knowledge of the credibilia and greater caution against the deceits of heretics corrupting the faith” (In III Sent., d. 25, q. 2). And he adds (ad 1):

There is nothing to be added above and beyond the Sacred Scripture that would be inconsistent with it, corrupting it in some way. However, something can indeed be added so that the truth might be more fully declared through Sacred Scripture [bene potest addi illud quod per Sacram Scripturam habet amplius declarari], according to the words of Sirach 14: “Those who enlighten me will have eternal life.” For it is useful to select from Sacred Scripture those things that must be believed, though they are spread all throughout the Scriptures, so that one might thus gather them together in order to provide easier instruction for simple believers and respond to the cunning claims of heretics. And this was done by means of creeds.

Similarly, Gabriel Biel, “the last scholastic,” while considering the question of "whether the articles of faith increased over the course of time", answered, with St. Bonaventure:

Faith can be understood to have progressed in two ways: either through the addition of new articles or through explication of implicit ones. It has not increased through the addition of new articles, for however many new articles have been added through revelation (per exhibitionem), that many old ones concerning what was awaited in the future came to a close…. However, it grew as regards explication, for the faith was more clearly explicated by the coming of the truth than it was under the shadow of a figure. And, it grew as regards devotion, with the coming of the fullness of time: on account of the full luminosity shed by the exhibition of the truth; on account of the greater outpouring of grace in acts of charity; and on account of the clearer instruction in the preaching of the word of salvation. Now faith is even more ably (aptius) preached... However, as regards its firmness, it likewise has grown, both through greater devotion and also through of clearer knowledge. For the faith is stronger in those articles that believers know more ably and to which he more devoutly assents (In III Sent., d. 25 q. un., dub. 2).

However, during the period leading up to the Council of Trent, the overall state of the question changed significantly. The high scholastics raised the question in the form, “Whether the articles of faith, or faith itself, has grown,” just as they had asked whether the articles of faith were to be explicitly believed. But now, leaving behind the question concerning the articles, the concept of “Catholic truth” was put forward, thereby referring to all the credibilia. The question is no longer: “What is an article? Which crediblia are articles? Which articles are to be explicitly believed and to what extent?” Instead, it has changed to: “What is Catholic truth? Which doctrines are Catholic truths? Which of them must be explicitly believed or known (sciendae)?”⁷⁹ Thus, the question concerning dogma is properly placed under the heading of “Catholic truths.” The special fruit of this period of theological speculation is to be found in the teachings offered concerning this question, though the answer given was not yet complete and fully exact.

Nominalism was the reason for this change was the alteration of the status quaestionis. It rejected the deeper problems discussed by the high scholastics and [vel] their theological way of considering matters, striving to resolve the question according to the norm and methods of nominalist logic. Thus, first, by abandoning the division of the credibilia into articles, antecedents, and consequents—nay, even abandoning St. Thomas’s distinction the credibilia into those that are per se credibilia and those that are only such as ordered to others—they gathered all the credibilia simply and uniformly under the logical concept of Catholic truth. Second, the nominalist concept of faith is of no small importance. For the Nominalists generally held that the immediate object of faith was some universal proposition by means of which other particular propositions were to be believed. Thus, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain held that the proposition, “The Church is governed by the Holy Spirit,” was the principal object of faith, in virtue of which all other propositions of faith would be believed and to which all the credibilia would ultimately be resolved. For through this, he teaches, as though through a middle term, we consent to all that we believe, just as we consent to scientifically known things through demonstration (In III Sent., d. 25, q. 1). John Brevicoxa (†1423), a professor at the University of Paris, established as the first proposition: “All things revealed by God are true.”⁸⁰ Finally, by means of this statement and acquired faith, all particular truths are then believed. Similarly, Gabriel Biel considers the same proposition as the proper object of infused faith (In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 1, nota 1). Thirdly, there is the distinction between infused and acquired faith, namely in the sense that infused faith, at least immediately, only gives one readiness to believe and the supernaturality of the act, whereas assent would take place immediately through acquired faith.⁸¹

Therefore, the question is now put in this form: which truths are Catholic truths? Ockham refers to two opinions. The first asserts:

The only truths to be considered Catholic and to be believed as necessary for salvation are those that are explicitly or implicitly asserted in the canon of the Bible, so that if any truths are not contained in the Bible in their proper form, the only such to be counted among Catholic [truths] are those that can be inferred as necessary and formal consequences solely from scripture’s contents. ⁸²

The second opinion holds that other truths besides those contained in Holy Scripture are to be believed as Catholic [truths]. They are reduced to three classes. First, there are truths that are concerned with God and Christ. (Salvation depends principally on these.) Second, there are truths that come down to us “from God’s revelation or approval,” partly through Sacred Scripture and partly through the apostle. (These are also to be believed, together with [their] conclusions.) Third, there are doctrines that follow not only directly from Sacred Scripture or tradition, but from one or more truths of Sacred Scripture and tradition and at the same time “from certain other factual truths,” such as, for example, that St. Augustine’s teaching is Catholic and that four Councils have defined Catholic truth. However, such truths are not regarded as being strictly Catholic, but it is fitting that they “have the sense of being Catholic truths” [ipsis proprie convenit “sapere catholicam veritatem].⁸³

In ch. 5, an enumeration is provided concerning the five kinds of doctrines that are regarded as Catholic: doctrines of Sacred Scripture and tradition, historical facts, conclusions, and new revelations. The definitions by the Church do not constitute a proper genus, because what the Church defines must be contained in some such genus (loc. cit.). However, regarding this, he reports three opinions: first, that of the canonists who simply admit that a new article of faith can be fashioned by the Pope;⁸⁴ second, that which holds that any doctrine, even if it agrees with Sacred Scripture or contradicts it, is not [of itself] Catholic or heretical, but only becomes such when the pope defines it as such, so that the Pope could thus fashion a new article;⁸⁵ finally, the opinion asserting that a doctrine that would already be considered Catholic could be declared Catholic by the pope, so that it would be known to be Catholic, though it does not actually thereby become Catholic.⁸⁶

What is particularly new in this doctrine is that even conclusions drawn from revealed truths are established as being Catholic truths and to be believed [by divine faith]. And this teaching is to be considered as properly belonging to this period. Thus, Gerson enumerates as Catholic truths, firstly, “truths that are directly and explicitly revealed by God” and “those that, in the form of a judicial definition, the Church hands on as matters to be believed,” among which he also includes personal revelations.⁸⁷ Second, there are “Each and every (omnes et singulae) truth that is can be reached as a conclusion from the foregoing truths through a certain inference in the light of faith or in the evident light of natural reason, though they are not found there in the words’ strict meaning (non in propria forma verbum illic habeantur).” However, a doctrine that is deduced “through an inference that is only probable or topical” or by means of natural truth that is not immediately evident, “cannot simply be said to be De fide, because such a conclusion will be marked by the character of weaker premise (quia sequitur debilior partem).”⁸⁸ From this, he defines Catholic truth as follows: “Catholic truth can be described as a truth held by divine revelation either directly or mediately, explicitly in the strict sense of the words or implicitly in good and certain consequences.”⁸⁹ Brevicoxa gives the same definition.⁹⁰ Peter Auriol teaches the same from the Scotists, namely that a conclusion that is necessary from one or two propositions of faith is to be believed, since the contrary would declare something heretical. Indeed, he states: “The conclusion drawn in this way is nothing other than something explicit drawn from the previous article in which it was implicit.”⁹¹ Even among the Thomists, Juan de Torquemada holds the same. According to him, Catholic truth is, “that which, from the supernatural light of divine revelation, is had directly (from God) or mediately (by angels or men), either explicitly in the strict sense of the words or implicitly as a good and necessary consequence.”⁹² Then he enumerates the following classes of Catholic truths: the formal doctrines of Sacred Scripture, apostolic traditions, the definitions by the Councils and the popes, the doctrine of the faith held by the Fathers and theologians, and conclusions from the doctrines enumerated.⁹³ However, Capreolus, the “prince of the Thomists,” held a different position by declaring that theological conclusions are the object of theological science: “The formal object by which something is considered in this science, that is the means by which all the conclusions of this science are known, is the light of divine revelation or (seu) the articles of faith, which we hold by the habitus of faith, from which we draw theological conclusions.”⁹⁴

Thus, according to him, “Theology is not the science of the articles of faith but of the conclusions that follow from them.”⁹⁵ The meaning of this doctrine is: conclusions, as conclusions, are not the object of faith but, instead, of theology. Otherwise, Capreolus simply proposes St. Thomas’s teaching that the explications determined by the Church also pertain to faith. Therefore, what is new here is the distinct concept and term theological conclusion.⁹⁶

***

Therefore, during this period, what are considered as being Catholic truths or dogmas include not only expressly doctrines revealed (i.e., in the proper form of words) but also implicitly revealed truths; and implicitly revealed truths are determined to be those that follow as “good and necessary consequences” from revealed truths or the Church’s definitions.

Now, what was the source of this doctrine? It seems to me that its foundation is found in Albert’s and Bonaventure’s teaching concerning the antecedents and consequences of the articles [of the Creed], though this teaching was unjustly [immerito] transferred to Catholic truths. For the high scholastics established that the consequences of the articles are credibilia, because they divided the credibilia into articles, presuppositions, and corollaries, and they supposed that the consequences of the articles are immediately revealed. By contrast, the nominalists also held that the consequences of Catholic truths (i.e. the consequences of all revealed truths) are objects of faith.

However, the beginning of this sort of transition can already be seen in Duns Scotus. In In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 3, no. 5 (on the occasion of the question of transubstantiation) Scotus writes⁹⁷: “Nothing is to be held as the substance of faith except what can be expressly drawn from Scripture, what has been expressly declared by the Church, or what obviously [evidenter] follows from something clearly [plane] contained in Scripture or clearly [plane] determined by the Church.” In another text, he expresses the same teaching concerning consequences from the articles:

Different things are to be believed explicitly this group (namely, those of a higher degree [maiores]) and by that (namely, those of a lower station [minores]) because their truth has not yet been determined by the Church. Many such conclusions are necessarily included in the articles that are believed; however, prior to being declared and explicated by the Church, it is not necessary for anyone to believe them. Nonetheless, one must soberly opine about them, so that a man would be prepared to hold for the time when the truth comes to be declared [pro tempore pro quo veritas fuerit declarata] (In IV, d. 5, q. 1 no. 7).

This makes sufficiently clear how this opinion spread, especially among the Scotists, for whom this teaching, up to this point, was something they held, as it were, as their own particular position. At the same time, we have an explained for the fact that Post-Tridentine scholastics at first held it in a generally shared fashion. However, another reason for the new formula is found in the 13^th century scholastics’ teaching concerning the explication of revealed truths. For the formula of the high scholastics was: the truths to be believed [credenda] are revealed, though inasmuch as they are explicated or determined by the Church. Since theologians’ explication of revealed truths takes place through discourse, it was easy to transition to the formula: the truths to be believed (Catholic truths) are revealed with their consequences. Likewise, the teaching concerning explicit and implicit faith constituted a foundation for this position as well. Finally, an opening was made by the distinction (which was less well articulated) between those things that directly pertain to faith and those that only indirectly pertain to it. We will discuss this matter below in the appendix to this article. Thus, we also can see why even certain Thomists (e.g Torquemada) admitted the new formulation.

Nor, strictly speaking, is this period’s formulation erroneous. However, it falls short in two respects. First, it holds that conclusions are per se, before their definition, to be held by faith, whereas the high scholastics held that only declarations made by the Church are to be believed De fide. Secondly, the new formula is too true, in that it does not yet distinguish between conclusions that are explications of revealed truths and conclusions that are strictly inferred (sunt proprie consequentiae) from revealed truths.

However, note that only particular conclusions were admitted as Catholic truths, namely, those which follow as “good and necessary consequences” (i.e., those that, by means of an immediately evident proposition, follow, with logical certainty, from a given truth of Sacred Scripture or some other dogma of faith). Finally, such conclusions will only be explications or determinations of the meaning of Sacred Scripture or tradition. This is also shown by the examples used, as though one were to deduce from the fact that Christ is true God and true man: therefore he has two wills; or, therefore he has a human soul. Finally, the same thing is signified by the conventional formula: Catholic truth is that which is contained in Sacred Scripture either explicitly in its proper form or implicitly as a good and necessary consequence. Therefore, the teaching that some would come to hold later on, holding that theological conclusions are simpliciter definable, goes beyond what was taught during this period. Granted, the notion of dogma still too broad during this period, given how it even includes private revelations and does not yet sufficiently determine what is implicitly revealed. Nonetheless, during this time, thinkers did articulate the elements of the definition of dogma: an implicitly or explicitly revealed teaching that is proposed by the Church to be believed. Thus, the period of “scholasticism in decline (scholasticae decadentis)” did not remain without benefit and fruitless.

XIII. Finally, the Council of Trent, which was occupied with other questions, did not directly define anything concerning the matter at hand. Nonetheless, it did indirectly approve the teaching that to that point had been commonly handed on. Indeed, it placed as the goal before its gaze, “that in the Church errors be removed and the purity of the gospel be preserved” and confesses “the traditions concerning faith and practice...preserved in continuous succession in the Catholic Church.” And likewise, “decrees that no one, relying on his own prudence, may twist Holy Scripture in matters of faith and practice that pertain to the building up of Christian doctrine, according to his own mind, contrary to the meaning that Holy Mother Church has held and holds—since it belongs to her to judge the true meaning and interpretation of Holy Scripture—and that no one may dare to interpret the Scripture in a way contrary to the unanimous consensus of the Fathers.”⁹⁸ With these words, the Council is referring to the scholastic teaching concerning the necessity, advantages, and purpose of the creedal expressions of the faith, though along with the teaching concerning the Church’s authority and duty to promulgate anew the creed in response to errors that arise throughout the ages. Thence, approving the scholastic teaching with deeds rather than words, the Council also defined the doctrine of the faith in accord with the prevailing explanation found in the Church.

From the Council of Trent to the [First] Vatican Council

XIV. After the rise of the so-called reformation, scholastic theologians held the following main points concerning the development of dogmas:

1. They apply (and explicate) the high scholastic teaching concerning the development of revelation to the development of dogmas in the Church herself;

2. They provide further definition concerning the distinction between explicit and implicit faith and apply it to the distinction between explicit and implicit revelation, in addition to the distinction between implicit and virtual revelation;

3. They investigate more deeply into the question concerning the belief-status [credibilitate]⁹⁹ or definability of theological conclusions;

4. They establish a more exact notion of Catholic truth and, thus, delineate the concept of dogma;

5. and, finally, establish and determine the Pope’s authority in defining dogmas.

Note, however, that the post-Tridentine scholastics were more concerned with showing the stability of dogmatic doctrine than with its development, for in their fight against Protestant errors they mainly defended the revealed character of Catholic doctrine. However, such arguments furnished an occasion for explaining the specific issue of dogmatic progress.

I. The Teaching Concerning the Essence of Dogmatic Progress

XV. The post-Tridentine Scholastics all [uno ore] applied to the development of dogmas in the Church herself both the teaching and formula that St. Thomas used for explaining the progress of revelation and the identity of faith in the Old and New Testaments (ST II-II, a. 1, a. 7), namely: “As regards the substance of the articles of faith, they have not undergone increase with the passage of time, for whatever those who lived later believed was already contained, though implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who came before them. However, as regards their explication, the number of articles has grown.” Therefore, the new formula by which dogmatic progress was defined came to be: Through the course of dogmatic progress, faith has not grown in its substance, though it has grown as regards its explanation. What this formula asserts was approved by the [First] Vatican Council. The main merit of this period [of development concerning this question] lies in the application and determination of this formula.

The Thomists’ Teaching

XVI. This was especially the case for the Thomists. Cajetan (1469–1534) seems to have been the first to use the new formula, for in his commentary on ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7, he seems to have understood St. Thomas’s formula not so much (or at least not only) as being concerned with the progress of revelation as with the progress of faith in the Church herself. Peter de Soto (1493–1563) was the first to express the formula in a new sense, still at the time of the Council of Trent: “It is clear that, in substance, faith has not changed, having neither increased nor diminished; however, as regards how it has been explicated and preached, depending upon the various ages, it has been explained in this or that way.” Hence he also defined dogma: “What the Church has declared and taught at different times in order to avoid different heresies and to instruct the faithful must be explicitly believed.”¹⁰⁰

XVII. Among the Post-Tridentine theologians, Domingo Bañez, O.P. strove to propose a teaching concerning the development of dogmas.¹⁰¹ As a general thesis, he establishes St. Thomas’s principle: “The articles¹⁰² of faith did not receive any increase as regards their substances; however, the number of articles has increased as regards how they have been explicated” (conclusion of a. 7). Like Caietanus, Bañez also understands this principle not so much in terms of the progress of revelation as of the development of dogmas. Thus, he holds that all dogmas that have come to be defined were at first implicitly contained in certain revealed truths and, in the end, in the two first credibilia concerning God’s existence and providence. However, he explains this doctrine very well, for he teaches: specific dogmas are not contained virtually or implicitly in those two general principles (concerning God's existence and providence) insofar as they can be known by natural light or cognition but, rather, insofar as they are knowable by supernatural light (i.e. through revelation and faith). However, such dogmas are not inferred from that universal and primary revelation by way of necessary consequence (or logical deduction), for [as he argues], explication can only be made through divine revelation (dub. 2).

As regards Bañez’s particular teaching concerning dogmatic development, one must pay particular attention to the historical state of the question. For Bañez is specifically asking: “Whether over the course of time after the Apostles something more explicit is known by the faithful concerning matters of faith than was known by the Apostles themselves.” Therefore, the development of dogmas is, properly speaking, considered in comparison not so much to the deposit of faith as to the fullness and perfection of the knowledge or science had by the Apostles. The reason for this kind of consideration is what St. Thomas teaches in ST II-II q. 1, a. 7, ad 4: “Those who were nearer to Christ, either before [like John the Baptist] or after [like the Apostles], had fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith.” For when Bañez (with Cajetan) interpreted that passage not only as referring to the perfection of revelation but also to the perfection of the knowledge of revelation, a serious difficulty arose as to how St. Thomas’s remark could be reconciled with the obvious fact of dogmatic progress: for this seems to rule out all dogmatic progress after the time of the Apostles.

Bañez draws three conclusions. First conclusion: “It is an error in faith to assert that, after the time of the Apostles, the Doctors of the Church, or even the Church herself, has believed more things concerning matters of faith or believed more explicitly than the Apostles and the sacred authors of the Gospel doctrine believed.” Proof. “Because, to our day, nothing that the Church has proposed or defined to be believed by the faithful was not itself contained, expressly or virtually in the scripture or Apostolic traditions such that it would be deduced from them through as an evident inference.” Confirmation. “Because the Church does not need new revelations, nor does she have them in order to define matters of faith, but instead, has only the assistance of the Holy Spirit so that she might not err in the transmission and explication of the Gospel teaching that she has received from the Apostles.” Second Conclusion. “It is not necessary that as the Church became more distant from the time of the Apostles, her knowledge of the mysteries of the faith would be less perfect.” Proof. “Because the Church has recognized exceptional teachers in explaining matters of faith and in conquering heretics, men who excelled in the explanation of sacred scripture (sacrarum literarum) and were later followed by the line of scholastic theologians.” Third conclusion: “As regards the science of scholastic theology, which is established through human diligence, nothing prevents us from asserting that, with the course of the ages, certain things have come to be more richly and accurately investigated by later teachers than they had been defined by earlier ones.”

In the response to the third objection, Bañez himself explains his third conclusion as follows:

What St. Thomas argues here does not imply that with each year after the time of the Apostles there would need to be ministers of less and less learning [in sacred things]; rather, he (St. Thomas) is comparing wholly different (a toto genere differentes) states of the Church.And so, it is true that after the time of the Apostles the Church had the most learned of Fathers in the understanding of the mysteries of faith..., after whom an army of scholastics was needed in the Church of God on account of the wicked onslaught of heresies. And although the aforementioned teachers are both called and truly held by all Scholastics to be the Holy Fathers, nonetheless in certain conclusions of sacred theology that are concerned with dialectic and philosophy or metaphysical knowledge, it is not surprising if something is defined more expressly and certainly by the scholastics, who have gone over everything with a more subtle precision and a more attentive reflection… We always, however, make exception regarding the Apostles… Nor, however, should the most recent teachers be valued more highly. For they are like little children standing on the shoulders of giants, who do not marvel at the fact that, raised as they are to such gigantic heights, they reach something loftier.

Finally, the entire theory is explained as follows:

The Spirit of Truth remains in the Church forever in order to preserve the apostolic teaching and tradition and to propose the understanding of the Holy Scriptures, as necessary, for the building up of the Church’s faith, and finally, in order that He might assist the Pope and councils assembled by his authority, such that he might not err in defining and explaining matters of faith. However, the Holy Spirit does not assist the Church in making new revelations concerning mysteries of faith that were not made to the Apostles while they were alive (ad 1).

Therefore, the later councils did not define many things pertaining to faith more elaborately, but, rather, because of the malice of the times and of heretics they gave various explications concerning the mysteries of faith (ad 2). Thus, finally, the Apostles, at least before their death, “(received) such a full knowledge of the mysteries of faith that nobody living thereafter can be compared with them” (ad 1). In this sense, in his commentary on a. 10, Bañez proves that the Pope cannot err in defining the doctrine of faith (doubt 2).

Therefore, according to Bañez, the Church’s later definitions represent a pure explication of the knowledge had by the Apostles and handed down to the Church, with the addition of a kind of greater scholastic scientific explication, such that the evangelical and apostolic doctrine has always been preserved without error in the Church. In this, you have the formulation of the whole of post-Tridentine scholasticism. This is why we have reported it in detail.

XVIII. John of St. Thomas, the most faithful 17^th century interpreter of the Angelic Doctor, continues Bañez’s teaching. His conclusions are: 1˚ Nothing at all is believed in the Church which was not clearly and distinctly revealed to the Apostles; 2˚ after the Apostles, the holy Doctors of the Church surpass all others in the distinct knowledge of the mysteries of faith; 3˚ in these days, on the occasion of the uprising of heretics and the refutation of them by the fathers and most learned theologians, the knowledge of the mysteries of faith is very abundant and, indeed, some things have been known in specific details (in particulari) and explicitly which had not yet been known among the learned men who came before us “just as” daily experience bears witness.¹⁰³

To the objection (no. 4) that after the time of the Apostles many previously hidden truths of the faith have come to be known, John of St. Thomas answers: “There is nothing newly defined by the Church and the Popes pertaining to the faith which the Apostles did not know... No one can doubt that the Apostles knew all these things explicitly, since these definitions arise from the Scriptures of the same Apostles.”¹⁰⁴ He resolved the other objections, especially concerning the assistance of the Holy Spirit, in the same way as Bañez did, adding, however:

Furthermore, I think that, through infused knowledge, the Apostles knew the truths pertaining to the declaration of the mysteries of faith, while theologians have obtained such truths only through discourse… In the same way, I am persuaded that the Fathers, from whose writings the scholastics draw their own teaching, knew the truths that theologians grasp through discourse, and although they did not have so full an infused knowledge as did the Apostles, nonetheless, I believe that, moved by a special instinct coming from the Holy Spirit, they wrote many things pertaining to the teaching of faith and morals.¹⁰⁵

Thus, he supposes that the Holy Apostles had “the most complete and perfect knowledge of the faith, surpassing all who came before or after them,”¹⁰⁶ although our knowledge involves progress “in a qualified sense (secundum quid)”¹⁰⁷ (n. 14). Thereafter, in his disputation related to a. 10, he defends the “Catholic position (sententia),” that “judgment concerning matters of faith, as well as the proposition, explication, and determination of them” belongs to the Pope.

XIX. At the beginning of the 18^th century, Cardinal Vincenzo Ludovico Gotti (1664–1742), the most renowned Thomist [of that age], distinguished two questions: 1˚ whether the articles of faith have grown; 2˚ whether the dogmatic definitions of the Church involve a new revelation or merely the declaration and statement of the revelation that had already been made.¹⁰⁸ He answers:

The articles of faith have not grown in substance, but only in explication. Therefore, when the Church determines that something is to be held De fide which was not previously held De fide, she does not receive a new revelation, nor does she make to be De fide something that was not hitherto De fide, but instead, only declares believers must hold De fide as revealed something that, although it previously would have been revealed and De fide nonetheless was not held by us as De fide because it had not been proposed as being revealed and to be held De fide.

For if all the credibilia have been revealed, at least implicitly, such that, the only thing that took place with the passage of time was the explication of what was implicitly contained in those already revealed truths, then when the Church proposes something to be held De fide, she does not do this through a new revelation that would be made to her but, rather, by a new explication of the revelation that had already been made or [seu], things already revealed. Hence the Church has never proposed or defined as something to be believed by the faithful anything that was not at least virtually contained either in Sacred Scripture or in divine or apostolic tradition.”¹⁰⁹

Therefore, a dogmatic definition is described as “the declaration and proposition of a given truth that is implicitly contained in Sacred Scripture or divine traditions, proclaiming it to the faithful as something to be believed explicitly by divine faith.”¹¹⁰ The effect of the definition is therefore the obligation to explicit faith, as well as the explicit proposition of this truth. Regarding the last point, he notes: “When the Church defines that something that was not held before must now be held De fide, she does not make that which was only mediately revealed to now be immediately revealed. Instead, she declares that certain truths were immediately revealed, obligating the faithful to believe them precisely as such. Although such truths had been directly revealed to the Apostles, they had not been established to have been directly revealed, and therefore the Church had not hitherto obligated the faithful to believe them. For in order for something to oblige one to believe, it is not enough that it be immediately revealed but, moreover, it must be proposed as being revealed.”¹¹¹ He assigns the following as the reason why definitions are needed: “Even though all things of the faith were revealed and handed down from the beginning, nonetheless in the course of various heresies that arose the faith was so enveloped [involuta] that the knowledge of many of them departed from the minds of the faithful and such that they were de facto obliged to believe it, and thus we need the Church’s magisterium.”¹¹² “In later centuries, given how the faith was obscured by heresies for many people or how the memory of certain things that had been implicitly believed was obliterated by the injustice of the times, it was necessary for the Church to present these truths expressly to all as having been revealed”¹¹³

20. Finally, Contenson¹¹⁴ asserts, “There has been no essential addition or growth to the articles of faith but, instead, a greater explication and, as it were, elucidation thereof.” "However,” he says, “over the course of time, concerning such things many things have been discovered and uncovered which heretofore had been either completely hidden or at least known only vaguely [confuse] and obscurely.” From this, he concludes: “It is certain... that all the articles of faith had been revealed from the start, at least implicitly, through the sacred authors of the Catholic Church.” He explains the reason for the successive development of dogmas as follows: “And, of course, in order to avoid overwhelming those whom he is striving to educate, the divine teacher acts like a wise teacher who does not propose his whole teaching to his disciples from the beginning, but in conformity with their limited abilities, he gradually sheds the light of his teaching, beginning with the easier truths so that he might then disclose more difficult matters.”¹¹⁵

XXI. Therefore, the Post-Tridentine Thomists especially emphasize that nothing has been defined by the Church in successive eras except what was revealed to the Apostles, such that there would be no new revelations in the Church. By this teaching, they expressly attack the opinion of Abbot Joachim of Fiori and Suarez. Thus, they show why it is that faith or the articles of faith did not increase in their substance; that is, they explain the “substance of faith” through revealed doctrine, contained in Sacred Scripture and apostolic traditions.¹¹⁶ They explain dogmatic development through the express proposition and explication or determination of the deposit of faith on account of the needs of faith [in response to the controversies of a given era]. Therefore, the Thomists excellently applied St. Thomas’s teaching to the development of dogmas in the Church herself.

XXII. Jesuit theologians generally followed the Thomists. Gregory of Valencia (c. 1550–1603), the "restorer of theology" in Germany, teaches:

It indeed falls to the Church to hand on the truths of faith which the apostles either knew or handed down, doing so as necessity demands, sometimes anew, in a more detailed manner, to the faithful and to rescue them, with her infallible authority, as it were, from the darkness into which they have sometimes sunk, owing to men’s negligence or shamelessness and perversity of character, there lying hidden, and perhaps still lying hidden in the Church. However, the Church does not teach, nor will she ever teach, any truth that is so new that the Apostles would not have known it.¹¹⁷

Suarez’s Teaching

XXIII. Similarly, Suarez, the foremost Jesuit theologian, holds to the common doctrine, adding, however, some new explanations.¹¹⁸ He proposes the following theses:

1. From the first days of mankind’s existence up to today, faith has always been the same as regards the substance of things believed (which he explains in the same way as St. Thomas).

2. Faith has always been explicit in the Church (i.e., in the Old and New Testaments), at least in the main points and principles as regards the Old Testament, though now even the people have an explicit faith, especially concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation.¹¹⁹

3. Over the course of the ages, the matter of faith grew toward explicit faith,¹²⁰ for through different eras, there were various divine revelations through which the doctrine and matter of faith was more expressly proposed to men.

4. He explains how this increase took place by setting forth the traditional twofold rule (which, to his eyes, seem to be opposed to each other): the rule set forth by St. Thomas (in ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7, ad 4) namely, that those who were closer to Christ had a more explicit faith; and the rule expressed by St. Gregory, namely, that “The nearer the world is led to its ultimate end (ad extremitatem ducitur), the more fully is access to eternal knowledge opened up for us.”¹²¹

With Bañez, Suárez first of all holds that, as regards the common state and the main points, during the time closer to Christ, knowledge of the faith was greater (although with a kind of variation), so that one should not think that after the Apostles some had a greater knowledge of the faith. Thus, he wishes to retain St. Thomas’s rule.¹²² However, secondly, he holds that, as regards the knowledge that has been acquired in the Church, there has been variety and progress in various periods: “For all this depends on the order of divine providence, together with the care of the shepherds.”¹²³

Now, thirdly, he approaches the problem of whether faith has grown in Christ’s Church in such a way that certain propositions would need to be believed De fide. in a later times although they were not previously believed as being De fide. Suarez holds two things regarding this. First, a given De fide proposition is now explicitly believed though it previously was not explicitly believed by the Church, although it was implicitly contained in ancient doctrine (e.g., concerning the baptism of heretics):¹²⁴

Nor is a new revelation necessary for this; instead, the Holy Spirit’s infallible assistance suffices for explicating and explicitly proposing what was previously only implicitly contained in the revealed truths... For that explication... is performed through the explication of a new proposition contained in the ancient teaching. However, that proposition is never a new article, because it does not belong to the, as it were, substantial material of faith to be believed explicitly by all. For it has always been sufficiently explicit in the creed, though it often pertains to the doctrine of faith which must be known by teachers in the Church, according to the various conditions and needs of the times.¹²⁵

Suarez concludes by explaining and delimiting the knowledge had by the Apostles. For he distinguishes a dual order of propositions which are explicitly believed over the course of time. Some pertain “as it were, to the substance of the mysteries,” and one must believe¹²⁶ that such things were known by the Apostles explicitly and not only implicitly. However, there are other contingent propositions which had not yet come forth at the time of the Apostles (e.g. that this or that person would be the pope, that this or that council would be a true council). It was not necessary that the Apostles know such things explicitly, for a merely general knowledge (tantum in universali) sufficed regarding such things.¹²⁷ Therefore, with the Thomists, Suarez holds that the Apostles explicitly knew all that was revealed, so that nothing was later determined which they would not have known (except as regards the determination of certain contingent facts which were only revealed only in a general way). However, progress has indeed taken place as regards the simple explication of the revealed truths. Thus, we now explicitly believe things that were previously only implicitly believed. And progress takes place as regards acquired theological science. However, Suarez adds that this kind of explanation or determination of universal revelation has the force of revelation: “The Church can make progress in knowing these things, even with the certainty of faith, by the Church expressing a definition which, on account of the Holy Spirit’s assistance, has the force of revelation or infallibly applies universal revelation to a particular object.”¹²⁸

XXIV. This last point represents a new element in the explanation of the development of dogmas: the Church’s magisterium has the infallible force of revelation. According to this teaching, the development of dogmas would take place through some kind of new revelation, obviously not through the revelation of new truths but, instead, through the explication and determination (of already revealed truths) which would in a way be equivalent to a new revelation or act of divine speech. Rightly, the Thomists attacked this teaching. Many Jesuits, however, followed it during this period. This teaching is ultimately based upon on an analysis of faith which holds that the authority of the Church is a partial and integral motive for the assent of faith, as can be found in particular in Juan de Lugo.¹²⁹ As is clear, through this teaching (namely, that the Church’s act of defining is “a kind of divine utterance which would be an explication and complement to the revelation that had been given of old [explicatio et complementum revelationis antiquae]”¹³⁰), the question concerning the development of dogmas would itself have changed. Likewise, this would also imply that theological conclusions, properly so called, are definable, and it was even for this end, at least in part, that this teaching had been established. However, the teaching lacks a solid foundation, given that the Church’s authority is only a means for proposing and explicating revealed truths, but not the motive of faith, not even partially. In the same way, it overthrows the teaching held by the older scholastics. However, especially after the [First] Vatican Council, it is hardly possible to maintain it. Certainly, a theory of the development of dogmas can hardly be built on the foundation of this doctrine.

Otherwise, even those who promoted this doctrine explain the development of dogmas as taking place within the same meaning of the older doctrine, not by virtue of a new doctrine. As we have seen this was Suarez’s own position. So too Haunold, who writes:

When some theologians are accustomed to say that in the Church no new dogmas are believed, they do not intend to say anything more than that nothing new begins to be formally and explicitly De fide which had not been before that radically and virtually De fide, inasmuch as the Church undoubtedly defines only those things to be explicitly believed which, through the Holy Spirit’s assistance, she knows are contained virtually (virtute) in an object that was already formally revealed... That is, through the Church, God explains what he has spoken concerning certain particular objects when he uttered universal revelations.”¹³¹

XXV. Heinrich Kilber explains this matter very well:

The articles of faith, or their number, are said to increase either without qualification (simpliciter) or a qualified sense (secundum quid). They increase, without qualification, if something new is revealed which had not been previously revealed; they increase in a qualified sense if something previously revealed begins to be able to be believed by us (aliquid ante revelatum incipit quoad nos esse credibile). Now, this can take place in three ways: 1˚ when a revelation made once upon a time, though obscurely, is further explicated by an infallible interpreter; 2˚ when a similar but controversial one is decreed with certitude (certificatur) by an infallible judge of controversies; 3˚ when universal revelation is applied to particular matters by a legitimate authority. Moreover, just as it is certain that the Church has such a threefold power, so too it is likewise certain that the Church has never defined anything to be believed by divine faith anything which was either explicitly or formally-implicitly revealed.¹³²

Therefore, the Church’s definitions are “only explications belonging to one of these three modes.”¹³³

XXVI. From the Franciscan school we might quote what Lucius Ferraris (1687–1763) writes in the entry “fides” in Prompta biblioteca.¹³⁴ He teaches that many things that were not believed as being De fide were not so believed, although in such a way that they were always to be believed, in themselves, though not from our perspective:

The change has only taken place by way of greater explication of them (i.e., the credibilia) and through the obligation to expressly confess and explicitly believe those articles which were in the past were only believed implicitly, as being contained in other credibilia or articles of faith... Hence, as to its substance and in itself, faith never changes, nor have its articles grown with the passing of time in this sense, though it has done so only from our perspective, that is, as regards the obligation imposed on us to explicitly believe many articles which before this were implicitly believed.¹³⁵

XXVII. Among those who taught at the Sorbonne, it suffices to cite the teaching of Louis Habert (1635–1718):

Since the time of the Apostles, faith has not grown in substance, for such growth is possible only if there would be a new revelation made to the Church, since the motive of faith is divine revelation... It is certain that the Church expresses greater explication concerning that which was more obscurely handed down by the Apostles and proposes it with greater clarity against those heresies which arise. (And thus,) over the course of the ages, those things that were more obscurely revealed in the Scriptures and Tradition receive greater and greater illumination.¹³⁶

28. Therefore, the commonly held¹³⁷ thesis of this period is: nothing is defined except what had been revealed to the Apostles (at least universally or confusedly), so that the development of dogmas is the determination or explication of the revelation that was fully made in Christ and the Apostles. In short, the scholastics understand the principle thus: in the development of dogmas, faith or the doctrine of faith remains unchanged as to its substance. This fundamental teaching can be explained more clearly and determinately by means of the distinction between explicit and implicit (and also virtual) revelation.

II. The Distinction Between Explicit and Implicit, as well as Immediate (Formal) and Mediate (Virtual), Faith and Revelation

29. As we have seen, the post-Tridentine scholastics took the formulas that St. Thomas had used to account for how the explication of faith takes place through new revelations and applied this formulas, mutatis mutandis, to the explication of faith through dogmatic progress.¹³⁸ However, when this sula was thus transferred, the teaching concerning explicit and implicit faith (that is, the way that some credibilia can be implied in other credibilia) stood in need of further determination. The formulas used by St. Thomas and other scholastics sufficed for explaining the progress of faith through new revelations, but not for explaining the explication of faith through the activity of the Church’s magisterium, that is, through dogmatic development. Hence the particular fruit of post-Tridentine scholasticism was the further determination of the distinction between explicit and implicit faith. At the same time, however, that distinction was transferred to the distinction between explicit and implicit revelation, along with the [additional] distinction of virtual or mediate revelation. Likewise, the latter distinction paved the way for the distinction between dogmas and theological conclusions.

a) The distinction between implicit and implicit faith

30. In distinguishing between explicit and implicit faith, nearly all theologians use St. Thomas’s formula. Bañez explains it thus: “Explicit faith in a given reality is that which is expressly restricted to that reality (terminatur expresse ad illam rem). On the other hand, implicit faith in a given reality is that which is expressly restricted to that reality but to another in which that reality is contained as in a cause and a genus.”¹³⁹ However, explicit and implicit faith do not differ “according to species” but, instead, “as something folded up and that same thing unfolded (explicatum).”

Gregory of Valencia distinguishes them thus: “We are said to have explicit faith about a given truth when we elicit assent immediately concerned with that truth; on the other hand, we have implicit faith when we do not assent to some truth in itself but, instead, have it in a way that is, as it were, implicit in another one of our acts which has another immediate object.”¹⁴⁰ Suarez gives this definition: “To explicitly believe is nothing other than to believe something in itself, so that it is the proximate object in which the assent of faith falls; on the other hand, to implicitly believe is to believe only in something else, because what is thus believed is not really known, nor does the intellect form the proper conceptualization (conceptum) of the proposition which is said to be only implicitly believed but, instead, forms a conceptualization of another in which that is contained.¹⁴¹ Hereafter, this definition would come to be used endlessly by other authors.

31. This distinction, however, would soon receive two additions. First, explicit faith itself will come to be subdistinguished again; secondly, implicit faith will be identified with vague (confusa) faith, and explicit faith with clear and distinct faith. Bañez already distinguishes explicit faith into distinct and vague faith, namely according to whether it is more determined or more universal (such as, for example, faith in Christ). However, even distinct faith can itself be found in various degrees, just as the theologian knows and believes the mystery of the Trinity more perfectly than a uneducated man (homo rusticus).¹⁴² Along these same lines, John of St. Thomas declares that “explicit faith has a kind of latitude.”¹⁴³ Similarly, Suarez distinguishes two sorts of explicit faith: “perfect and distinct, such that whoever has it, would be able not only to assent to the mystery but also to explain it and give account of it”; and “explicit faith is that by which a reality is believed in itself and in its own proper reason (sub propria ratione)."¹⁴⁴

And in another place, he writes: “(To explicitly believe) various as being more or less explicit to the extent that one can form a more distinct (expressior) or less perfect conception (conceptus) concerning one and the same mystery, or even insofar as more or less things can be known concerning one and the same reality that is believed in.” However, he adds: “However, if one considers this matter correctly, such diversity consists either in several acts of faith through which several truths pertaining to one and the same reality that is believed in are believed explicitly and in themselves, or, at least, if one and the same truth is expressed with greater or lesser distinction (expressio), then the diversity lies more in the apprehension than in the assent of faith itself, and thus it may come from human learning and diligence through acquired science or through greater genius or broader experience (meliores species).”¹⁴⁵ Now, Suarez’s opinion concerning this matter contributed no small amount to the complicating of the teaching concerning dogmatic progress. However, Suarez identifies implicit faith with vague faith: “explicit faith is that by which a reality is believed in itself and in its own proper reason (sub propria ratione), and this is contrasted to implicit faith, that is, faith that is vague (confusa) and contained in another universal or material object”¹⁴⁶ Therefore, whereas Bañez subdivided explicit faith into distinct and confused, Suarez equated explicit faith with distinct faith and implicit faith with vague faith.

32. Later theologians, including Thomists,¹⁴⁷ followed Suarez’s way of speaking. Thus, explicit faith will be called particular, clear, distinct, and express, whereas implicit faith will be called vague, universal, and general. Thus, Franciscus Sylvius writes: “To explicitly believe a reality or a given proposition is to assent to it in a way that its terms are understood in their particular meaning (in particulari) and as known in act. To believe certain things implicitly is to assent to one thing as to the universal principle in which those things are contained.”¹⁴⁸ Thus, “He who professes from his heart that he believes whatever the Church believes explicitly believes this, whereas he implicitly believes that there are seven sacraments and other things that are contained in this general belief, so long as he does not obstinately hold anything in particular to the contrary of this.”¹⁴⁹ Similarly, Cardinal Gotti writes: “To explicitly believe something is to believe that in its particular meaning and as something known in its proper meaning (secundum proprios terminos). However, to implicitly believe is to believe something only in a general way (in universali) and as contained in something else as in an explicitly believed universal principle.”¹⁵⁰ Rather, Pietro Maria Gazzaniga (1722–1799) teaches: “(Explicit faith) is had when the articles of faith are known and believed clearly, distinctly, and in themselves; on the other hand, implicit faith is had when something is believed only in a vague way, as he who believes the Church in general also implicitly believes everything the Church has defined and proposes to be believed by all the faithful.¹⁵¹

33. The moral theologians of this period (who in general were casuists) exerted a great influence on the doctrine of explicit and implicit faith. Indeed, they considered the question from a different perspective: whereas dogmatic theologians ask how dogmas subsequently proposed for belief are contained in the faith of those who came before or in revelation, moral theologians ask what must be believed explicitly (by a necessity of precept or a necessity of means) and how all believers would implicitly believe all the credibilia. Hence the moral theologians of this period generally say that implicit faith is that by which something is believed in the faith of the Church, namely inasmuch as one explicitly believes that whatever the Church hands on as something to be believed is true.¹⁵² This way of considering the question came to overshadow, in particular, the question concerning the way that implicit faith is implied in explicit faith, and the more profound teachings of the high scholastics fell, as it were, into oblivion. Thus, theologians came to propose different theories.

34. The high scholastics had generally explained the implicitation of faith such that implicit faith would be concerned with that which is implicitly contained in another article which was explicitly believed. Bañez still explains implication in this way¹⁵³ (in II II, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2). He teaches: implicit faith is related to explicit faith as “the enfolded (involutum) to the unfolded (explicatum)”; hence, implicit faith necessarily presupposes faith in some given supernatural truth. Thus “the natural knowledge of God was at no time an implicit faith in a given mystery,” namely, in which some given mystery would be implicitly believed. Hence, faith in God's existence and providence, required by the Apostle (in Hebrews 11), cannot be faith in God only inasmuch as He would be naturally known or faith in the Author of nature but, instead, is necessarily faith in a supernaturally revealed God or in the Author of grace. Gregory of Valencia teaches that such implicitation can take place in two ways, one on the part of the intellect and the other on the part of the will:

We can consider from two perspectives our act in which assent to certain things are judged to be implicit. On the side of the intellect, for example in the case of supernatural faith itself, by which we believe some more universal truth of faith, and thus are ready and prepared to explicitly believe another more particular truth that is contained in the aforementioned universal truth as though in potency or is concerned with it in some way. The other act is on the side of the will, by which one is ready to believe what other, wiser members of the Church explicitly believe.¹⁵⁴

Therefore, Gregory of Valencia considers the implicitation from the perspective of the subject or act of the believer rather [than from that of the object]. Suarez assigns four ways that implication takes place: first, by reason of the formal object of faith (inasmuch as he who believes in God who reveals is also prepared to have faith in everything that God has revealed); second, by reason of others’ faith (thus simple faithful believe what the Church believes); third, by reason of the object of belief (thus a particular proposition is implicitly believed in a universal proposition); fourthly, by reason of the substance of the thing believed (thus circumstances are implicitly believed, as Christ's death for the salvation of men is implicitly believed when one believes in the mystery of the Incarnation). The Thomists, however, generally insist more on objective implicitation. Thus Fulgenzio Cuniliati to this point says: “Implicit faith is had when one believes one article expressly, while others contained in it are thereby believed. For example, he who expressly believes in the Trinity of persons in the unity of essence implicitly believes in the procession of the Word from the Father.”¹⁵⁵ A similar position can be found in Concina¹⁵⁶ and Gotti.¹⁵⁷

35. At the end of this exposition of the teaching concerning the distinction between explicit and implicit faith, allow us to note the defense of the teaching concerning implicit faith. John Calvin had written against implicit faith: “They have invented the fabricated notion of implicit faith, using this term to dress up the grossest ignorance and delude the wretched masses to their great ruin.”¹⁵⁸ Thus, he calls it a “papist phantom” and “monstrosity.” Finally, Calvin interprets implicit faith thus: “To believe this is to understand nothing and only to submit your understanding (sensum) obediently to the Church”, “that we be ready to accept as true whatever the Church has written,” “that we relegate to the (Church) herself the office of investigating and knowing ,” “so that everything, sometimes including even the most monstrous of errors, are held, without any discrimination, by the ignorant as though they were spoken by oracles.” Such implicit faith is not faith except, perhaps, faith in the Church, without any knowledge. “The papists,” he writes, “Will say that faith is to believe in their Holy Mother Church; and then they do not know who is their Redeemer, they have no understanding at all, as is necessary for praying to God, nor how one must live.”¹⁵⁹ Modern Protestants, such as Harnack in particular, exaggerated such accusations even further, holding that implicit faith is in no way faith but, rather, only blind obedience and an act of purely legal submission to the authority of the Church, a kind of “coalminer’s faith” (fides carbonaria).¹⁶⁰

Accusations or interpretations of this kind are already sufficiently refuted by what we have set forth regarding the teaching on implicit faith. However, they were also expressly refuted by the scholastics. We have already seen the testimony of Bañez, who denies the claim that that implicit faith differs in species from explicit faith. Similarly, Francisco de Toledo: “These are not two faiths… but, rather, one faith had two ways.”¹⁶¹ Gregory of Valencia laconically responds: “This heretic (Calvin) does not know what he is talking about”¹⁶² (1. c.). The Salmanticenses explain themselves thus: “Just as to know something in a general way (in universali) is not to be ignorant but, rather, to know (scire) something less perfect which, however, disposes one to perfect knowledge (scientiam), so too to implicitly believe is not to be ignorant but to believe in a less expressed way, inasmuch as by explicitly believing certain more necessary and universal mysteries, the believer remains ready to believe others if they are explicated and now really believes them as implicit and contained in the others.¹⁶³ Finally, Gazzaniga writes: “It is one thing to fail to exercise due diligence in religious zeal (in religionis studio) on the pretext of having implicit faith, something that all Catholics profess is culpable and most deplorable. It is another thing to reach a full and distinct understanding of all the articles of our faith, something scarcely possible for the wise and learned, let alone for the uncultured and illiterate. But, in his attempt to present Catholics in an offensive light, Calvin deceitfully confuses these two sorts of believers.”¹⁶⁴

36. We have set forth the doctrine of explicit and implicit faith in no small detail,¹⁶⁵ though not without reason. For first of all, on the basis of this teaching, one can clearly understand in what sense the scholastics held that dogmatic progress is the explication of faith or progress from implicit faith to explicit faith. For it is a proper effect or terminus of the development of dogmas that what was formerly believed in an implicit, general, and vague way (either in faith in God or in faith in the Church, or in faith in a given article or another dogma), later on, having become explicit, particular, and determined by a new definition or statement (propositione), would be believed as something known in more defined terms (secundum terminos expressos). Thus, properly speaking, dogmatic progress is the explication of faith and the credibilia, especially of those things that are implicitly contained in one article or dogma which was previously known. Hence the Thomists commonly insist on this kind of implicitation. Secondly, the distinction between explicit and implicit faith is the foundation (just as it was the reason or the occasion) for the distinction between explicit and implicit revelation, so that both distinctions are intimately connected and, as it were, bound by the same historical fate. Nonetheless, these two distinctions are not wholly the same. The fact that many did not notice this fact was the cause of no small confusion and complication regarding this question. This was, finally, the source for articulating the distinction between implicit and virtual revelation.

b) The Distinction between Explicit, Implicit, and Virtual Revelation

37. Historically speaking, the distinction between formal (immediate) and virtual (mediate) revelation first appears after the Council of Trent, such that, however, formal revelation comes to be subdivided into explicit and implicit. Cajetan seems to have given the first impulse to this, following in the footsteps of Capreolus. Melchior Cano was the first to specifically raise the question. Suarez in particular brought the threefold distinction into theology and applied it to the question of faith.

Just as Capreolus had already distinguished between the articles of faith and the conclusions drawn from them, so too Cajetan distinguishes a twofold revelation: “that which is formally revealed, i.e. in itself, and what is virtually revealed, i.e. in its principles.”¹⁶⁶

Cajetan understood this distinction as being between revealed truths and theological doctrine, for in the same place he teaches: St. Thomas (in ST I, q. 1, a. 1) “uses ‘sacred doctrine’ to refer to knowledge that is revealed by God, whether formally or virtually, as it has the formal character of being a form of teaching (ut habet rationem disciplinae).” Therefore, Cajetan follows Capreolus. And Thomists henceforth would, in general, hold Cajetan’s terminology. Thus, I said: Cajetan seems to have given the first impulse for this, although soon thereafter others would understand the term “virtual revelation” in a different sense.

38. Melchior Cano first proposed the teaching already flourishing at his time: “Not only does that which was expressly revealed to the Apostles pertain to Catholic doctrine, but also that which is arrived at, by means of an evident syllogism and inference, drawn from one revealed proposition and another that is certain in the natural light of reason.”¹⁶⁷ However, he adds: expressly revealed truths and conclusions do not belong to faith in the same way; the former belong thereto immediately and the latter mediately.¹⁶⁸ Hence, he distinguishes two degrees of propositions of faith: “The first of these will be the rightful principles of theology. Whatever kind they may be, whether primary or secondary, this represents all those things that God has revealed in themselves to the Church. But the latter such degree will be those things that are necessarily inferred (colliguntur) from the previous ones. For this genus of conclusions, as matters connected to things of faith, also is concerned with faith. For, on account of their necessary inferential connection, when the superior truth is conceded, one is compelled to concede the inferior one, and when one denies the inferior truth, one likewise finds oneself forced to deny the superior one.”¹⁶⁹ Cano again subdivides such conclusions as follows: “There are two kinds involved in the latter degree (of conclusions). One such kind of conclusion is comprised of those that arise solely from the principles of faith. The other are those that are not fashioned by faith alone, without the aid of external disciplines, but rather, by drawing in one or several principles known by natural reason And, indeed, even if these are not in the same locus and degree, nonetheless, they can all be, simply and without addition, called questions of faith, certainly since the truth of faith depends on both, given that both are connected and coupled together.”¹⁷⁰

Furthermore, Cano again divides into two classes those things that immediately pertain to faith. Certain things are “expressly” contained in Sacred Scripture,¹⁷¹ as “the clear sense of Scripture,” “if a place in Sacred Scripture has a plain and open meaning, either from the context or from another place in the same Scripture or clearly in light of the words themselves.”¹⁷² Some “more obscure” things are contained in Sacred Scripture,¹⁷³ for “the original and authentic meaning of Sacred Scripture is sometimes obscure and complicated (implicata), nor has it always been investigated and known what truths the Apostles handed down, in unwritten form, to history.”¹⁷⁴

Therefore, according to Cano, a given doctrine can pertain to faith and be revealed: first of all, immediately and in itself or secondly, mediately and in another doctrine, as a conclusion in a revealed principle. And moreover, immediately revealed truths are contained in Sacred Scripture or tradition either expressly, openly, and plainly, or obscurely and implicitly. Here, you have the beginning of the distinction between immediate (explicit and implicit) revelation and mediate revelation (that of conclusions). Likewise, the question is thus raised concerning how conclusions relate to faith (which we will discuss below).¹⁷⁵

Following in the footsteps of Melchior Cano, Suarez, although in a different sense, distinguishes revelation into immediate (formal) and mediate or virtual:

Something can be understood to fall under divine revelation in two ways: in one way, formally and according to itself, because it is clearly what God formally declares, and we call this formal and immediate revelation... In another way, something is contained under divine revelation, because although it is not declared in itself, it is included in the thing said... and we call this virtual, or even mediate, revelation.¹⁷⁶

For the sake of explanation, he adds:

Note well that solely virtual revelation is one thing, whereas (so to speak) vague revelation is another. For revelation can be formal without everything that is formally contained therein being known distinctly. This happens in two ways. First, when general distributive revelation takes place... For all particulars are formally contained in that universal [truth], though vaguely. This happens in another way in a definition and its parts in relation to that which is defined: for the knowledge of that which is defined is vague with respect to the definition and, nonetheless, the parts of the definition are formally contained in that which is defined. Thus, when it is revealed to us that Christ is a man, it is formally enough revealed that he is a rational animal, or that he has a human body and soul, even though this is not explicitly declared. But virtual revelation is concerned with a property that is in no way contained formally in the reality spoken of but is only there as in its root (radice).

40. Heinrich Kilber proposes this distinction with great clarity:

That which is formally revealed is what is signified by the utterance itself, or what is said by the speaker in virtue of the signification of terms, in accord with the sense intended by the speaker and his manifest intention. We add last point because even God in His speaking uses customary metaphors, whose sense must therefore must be heeded. Something is said to be formally-explicitly revealed if the very terms of the utterance clearly and expressly to it. Something is said to be formally-implicitly revealed if it is formally contained in, or formally the same as, what is explicitly revealed. A definition is so contained in what is defined, the essential physical parts in the whole, a particular proposition in the universal, and a conclusion in its premises. However, these things are said to be implicitly revealed because, although they are formally contained in what is explicitly revealed, nonetheless they do not immediately appear when revelation is proposed; instead, the sense of the revelation must be explicated by another proposition, and revelation must be applied in order for one to assent to them.

Thus, when it was explicitly revealed that Christ is a man..., it was implicitly revealed that Christ is a rational animal and composed of a body and soul... However, something is said to be virtually revealed in something else if that thing is only really the same as the other, formally revealed truths. Such things included properties—even metaphysical ones—in relation to an essence…

Just as formal revelation is usually said to be immediate, so too virtual revealed is said to be mediate on the side of the object, where something is not, in itself, formally contained in another explicitly revealed truth but, instead, is only virtually contained in another truth as in a cause and root, or connected with it such that it would be deduced from it, in a necessary manner, by means of a legitimate inference.¹⁷⁷

Based on Suarez’s authority, the aforementioned distinction was soon received broadly, principally among Jesuit theologians.

41. The Thomists also embraced the new distinction. Thus, we can find it being accepted by John of St. Thomas,¹⁷⁸ the Salmanticenses,¹⁷⁹ Gonet,¹⁸⁰ Contenson,¹⁸¹ Billuart,¹⁸² and others.

42. Although the distinction of revelation into explicit, implicit, and mediate (or virtual) seems to be very simple and obvious, nonetheless, it soon found itself tied up in various confusions. The main confusions were threefold. First, implicit and virtual (or mediate) revelation were confused. Secondly, theological conclusions, even in the broad sense, were confused with virtually revealed truth and vice versa. Thirdly and finally, a common terminology was lacking. However, the general reason for the confusion was a failure to sufficiently distinguish between the division of revelation itself (i.e., on the part of revelation itself) and the division of the various kinds of knowledge we have of revealed truths (i.e., on the part of our knowledge).¹⁸³

43. Thus, already Suarez himself distinguishes two ways in which a given proposition would be mediately revealed:

In one way, as in a reality that would be entirely the same as that [which is immediately revealed], or at least as a part contained therein, though vaguely (confuse), according to our way of conceiving; in another way, as something distinct, or as an effect in a cause. Speaking in the first way... even though, from our perspective and according to our vague manner of conceiving (nostrum modum concipiendi confuse), that proposition is said to be mediately revealed, nonetheless, in reality revelation falls or extends to it immediately.

However, a proposition revealed in a second way is said, without qualification, to be mediately revealed.¹⁸⁴

44. Claude Montaigne’s De censuris seu notis theologicis et de sensu propositionum¹⁸⁵ shows the confusion that arose from this. Montaigne makes the following distinctions and explanations. First:

There is (1) formal immediate, clear, distinct, and explicit revelation by which, without a doubt, a reality is clearly and distinctly revealed immediately in itself. Then, we have (2) formal and immediate revelation which, however, is obscure and quasi-implicit, by which, even if something is not immediately revealed in a way that is clear and distinct in itself, nonetheless is immediately revealed obscurely and vaguely. Finally, there is (3) virtual revelation, which is mediate and truly implicit, by which the reality is revealed neither clearly nor obscurely in an immediate manner, but rather, only mediately as in a root (in radice).¹⁸⁶

Secondly, he teaches that a given doctrine can be contained in revelation:

a) implicitly in itself, namely insofar as it is contained in another proposition which in itself is immediately revealed, as a conclusion in principle or a property in essence..., b) implicitly from our perspective, namely precisely insofar as it is indeed immediately revealed in itself, but it lies hidden in a very obscure way in Sacred Scripture, such that the Church’s declaration is necessary in order for it to be known with certainty that it has been revealed. (And he adds:) It would be better to say that this kind of proposition is in itself explicitly revealed, though implicitly revealed from our perspective. c) Finally, a proposition can be said to be explicitly revealed in itself as well from our perspective, namely, when it was revealed by God in such a way that, moreover, either by his own designation in the sacred words of scripture or over the course of time and through a public decree by the Church it is openly proposed for our belief. ¹⁸⁷

Thirdly,¹⁸⁸ he teaches that one proposition can be contained in another a) immediately, indeed, though obscurely and vaguely (confuse): “such are the propositions that are not found in the Scriptures in their plain terms but, rather, in formally equivalent terms. Or they can be so contained, b) only mediately, that is, as conclusions, or c) virtually. He explains this point as follows. One proposition can be contained in another either identically or formally or virtually.¹⁸⁹ Regarding what is formally so contained: “something is formally contained in another when it has the same concept as it, even though both are expressed in different words” (i.e., depending on formal or conceptual identity, which can be total or partial); thus, in the explicit truth there is contained formally adequately, even if vaguely, what is grammatically implicit in the terms or at least as regards the sense expressed by equivalent terms (sensum aequivalentibus expressum).” Finally, conclusions properly so called (i.e., those that are virtually contained) are contained in revealed truths only by way of an illative or causative equivalence. They are defined thus by Montaigne, along with Antonius de Panormo: “One proposition is said to be illatively equivalent to another when it does not formally express the same objective concept as the other but, instead, another formally different one.”¹⁹⁰ And he adds that two formally identical propositions express the same concept in different terms, whereas two virtually identical propositions express two different concepts which can signify two really distinct realities (such as cause and effect) which are nevertheless united in one formality, as a cause and effects in causality or properties in an essence.

45. As a rule, the Thomists distinguish two kinds of virtual revelation. Thus, John of St. Thomas distinguishes between the virtual-illative and the virtual-implicit. Virtually-illatively revealed truths are theological conclusions properly so-called, virtually-implicite ones are those “that in themselves are revealed and intended by the Holy Spirit, though they are hidden from our perspective and therefore arrived at by discourse."¹⁹¹ The Salmanticenses distinguish between, on the one hand, a virtual revelation that is equivalent to formal and express revelation or which coincides with it, as “the virtual (revelation) of a particular proposition included in an expressly revealed universal,” and, on the other hand, “the virtual revelation of some truth in its adequate or inadequate cause.”¹⁹²

Billuart first distinguishes between the formally and immediately revealed and the virtually and mediately revealed, “inasmuch as it is contained in some formally and immediately revealed truth, either as an effect in a cause or as a property in an essence or in some other way by which it is deduced through discourse in virtue of [the] natural light [of reason or faith-illuminated reason in theological science].”¹⁹³ He then teaches that a conclusion can be contained in the premises in two ways: 1˚ by reason of natural connection, that is, either as a property in essence or as an effect in a cause; 2° by reason of signification, that is, either as a part in the whole, as a particular in a universal, or as the implicit in the explicit, expressed in equivalent terms. Based on this, he distinguishes between a conclusion that explains the meaning of a signification and a conclusion virtually contained in its premises.¹⁹⁴ As is clear, the Thomists’ distinction is not, properly speaking, a distinction of virtual revelation but, instead, a distinction of the conclusions that theologians draw from revealed truths, or a distinction of the way by which the implicitly and virtually revealed are known by us on the basis of revelation. Thus, they delineate the distinction between implicitly and virtually revealed very well, although indirectly, and at the same time, they pave the way for resolving the question concerning the definability of theological conclusions.

46. It cannot be surprising that, under the influence of these explanations, the distinction first expressed by Cano and Suarez soon was also formulated in various ways. Thus, many would no longer distinguish between immediate or formal revelation (whether explicit or implicit) and virtual or mediate revelation, distinguishing instead, first explicit revelation from implicit revelation then distinguishing implicit revelation into quasi-implicit and truly implicit or formally implicit and virtually implicit (cf. Montaigne). Or some would contrast explicit revelation to virtual revelation, subdividing virtual revelation into implicit revelation and properly virtual revelation (cf. John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart). This gave rise to no small confusion in terminology, which has created led to great difficulties, especially in the question regarding the definability of theological conclusions. Unfortunately, such confusion revived at the time of the restoration of scholastic theology a century ago and, indeed, became even greater. Thus, Mazzella contrasts formal-explicit revelation to implicit revelation, which he subdistinguishes into the formally-implicit and the virtually-implicit.¹⁹⁵ Schiffini distinguishes that which is implicit in act (actu-implicita) (i.e., in the meaning of the words) and connected[-implicit], either through identity, as properties, or as consequences.

Cardinal Billot distinguishes between that which is explicitly revealed (i.e., expressly or in equivalent words) and what is implicitly revealed (i.e., as contained in some reason) and then subdivides the implicitly revealed into the generally implicit, virtually implicit, and formally implicit.¹⁹⁶ Others do so in this or that way. Among others, the old formula is held by Hurter,¹⁹⁷ Pesch,¹⁹⁸ De Groot,¹⁹⁹ and Parthenius Minges.²⁰⁰

The various distinctions of revelation can be schematically represented as follows:

47. Notwithstanding this difference in terminology and explanation, after the Council of Trent, the threefold division of revelation and, above all, the distinction between formal (or immediate) and virtual (or mediate) revelation is regarded as a generally accepted and recognized thesis, and it paved the way for resolving the question concerning the definability of theological conclusions and for further determining the question concerning the development of dogmas.

Indeed, the distinction we have set forth enables us to provide further determination concerning the teaching regarding the explication of faith, revelation, or the credibilia. For the explication of faith or dogmatic progress will be twofold: either through the determination of the sense of revelation through equivalent terms or concepts, or through conclusions deduced from revealed truths as from principles: by determining the meaning of the terms of revelation, or by explaining those things that are contained in revelation only as in a principle or in a cause; by determining those things that are either contained in revelation or are only connected with them; by explaining what is contained in revelation, either formally or virtually; by deducing something from revealed truths by either an explanatory or an illative deduction; finally, by knowing what is contained in revelation either by reason of its signification or by reason of a natural connection.

However, from the distinction between these two modes of explicating revealed truths or the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question necessarily arose concerning whether both kinds of explication, whether all such conclusions drawn therefrom, are the object of faith, at least after the Church defines them. Nay, it was primarily in order to resolve this question that the threefold distinction of revelation was proposed. Thus, we now come to the question concerning the definability of theological conclusions; for it was under this title that the controversy was generally discussed.

III. On the Definability of Theological Conclusions

48.²⁰¹ As we saw above (no. 12), from the 14^th century onward the general teaching had strengthened, holding that not only those things that are expressly had from Holy Scripture or tradition but, also, those good and necessary consequences which are deduced therefrom all belong to faith. Even in the 16^th century, this claim remained the common and received position. Thus, for example, Peter Soto teaches: “Everything that is handed down in Sacred Scripture is to be believed, as well as those things that clearly follow from therefrom; likewise, everything that the Church received from the Apostles is to be believed... and finally, everything that the Church has brought forward and declared from Scripture and the traditions of the Fathers must be believed.”²⁰² Similarly, Cajetan holds that not only explicitly revealed truths but also implicitly revealed ones pertain to faith, though “ingenuity, exertion, reason, and understanding are needed in order for them to be manifested.”²⁰³ As we just saw, Melchior Cano teaches that conclusions belong to faith, like those things that in themselves were revealed by God.²⁰⁴ Hence, he writes: “If either the Church, a Council, the Apostolic See, or even the Saints, with one mind and one voice, have come to a given theological conclusion and prescribed it to the faithful, this Catholic truth will be considered as though it had been revealed by Christ.”²⁰⁵ And so too Cardinal Francisco de Toledo writes: “You might say: What is said to be a Catholic proposition? I say, in response, that term ‘Catholic assertion’ or ‘Catholic proposition’ are used in two ways: immediately, namely, that which is held straight away from the rule of faith; mediately, that is, what is derived validly (optime) and clearly as an inference from a previous proposition.”²⁰⁶ And Molina reports: “For it is customarily said that those things that follow from the articles are De fide.”²⁰⁷

49. However, the distinction between what is implicitly revealed and what is only virtually revealed, especially as introduced by Suarez, became a banner for the debate among theologians, and to this day this controversy has not come to an end.

50. However, the new Jesuit school and the old school of the Thomists advanced along different paths. For the Jesuits, pressing the distinction between immediate and mediate revelation, principally and directly asked whether truths that are only mediately revealed belong to the faith. On the other hand, the Dominicans directly and principally asked whether conclusions are the object of faith. Thus, they disputed about the same matter, though from different angles, and thus not without confusion on multiple points. Hence, the greatest of care must be taken when setting forth this history, as well as in rendering judgments concerning this teaching.

51. Therefore, the first question was: whether solely mediately or virtually revealed truths are, properly speaking, objects of faith. In the name of nearly all thinkers, Suarez proposed a twofold thesis: 1˚ “formal revelation, even if it is vague (confusa), suffices for the formal object of faith,” that is, not only explicitly revealed truths, but also (formally) implicitly revealed ones pertain to faith; 2˚ “revelation that is only virtual or mediate does not suffice for the formal object of faith.”²⁰⁸ Suarez proves the first thesis as follows: although when God reveals he declares many things with one word and thus manifests a given thing in a vague (confuso) way, nonetheless, he has a distinct, not a vague, knowledge concerning the revelation that was made, so that if such revelation comes to be sufficiently explicated, revelation of itself suffices for the assent of faith. However, he rightly appoints two conditions, namely: it is certain that the explicated sense is contained (vaguely, confuse) in what is explicitly or expressly revealed; such assent is not given in virtue of the deduction but, instead, the discourse is received only in order to explicate and propose what is contained under divine revelation. Suarez thus proves the other thesis: assent to what is virtually revealed cannot be had solely on the strength or direct knowledge (intuitu solius) of revelation alone, but also and properly is made on the strength and insight of discursive knowledge arrived at by way of deduction (intuitu deductionis). Thereafter, nearly all theologians, even the Thomists, followed Suarez’s twofold thesis, with the exception of Vasquez, who held that theological deduction constitutes the object of faith (at least for theologians). However, he also adds that this kind of assent is “a kind of middle assent” between divine and human faith. This position is founded on Vasquez’s teaching that the assent of faith is the effect of a syllogism. Moreover, Vasquez does not distinguish between conclusions which in themselves are conclusions (conclusiones quoad se) and those that are conclusions only from our perspective (conclusiones quoad nos).²⁰⁹

52. Through the distinction between implicitly and virtually revealed truths, Suarez had brought the hitherto prevailing doctrine back to the path of truth, or rather had rightly determined its properly intended meaning. Nonetheless, Suarez, perhaps moved through the authority of the old doctrine, whose origin he does not seem to properly know, while at the same time relying on his own teaching that the Church’s judgment has the strength of God’s speech, adds a third thesis: “A theological conclusion that previously was contained only virtually (tantum virtute) in revealed things, after it is defined by the Church is formally and with utter propriety De fide, not only mediately, but immediately: because that truth is no longer held virtually and mediately, but as revealed formally and in itself (in se).”²¹⁰

Suarez offers two main arguments for this.²¹¹ First, propositions defined by the Church are De fide. Secondly:

Through the Church, God testifies to what the Church defines. However, the Church defines a given truth in itself and formally. Therefore, God already testifies to it in itself and formally. Thus, by that fact, it is sufficiently constituted under the formal object of faith. For the divine testimony is the same and equally certain, whether God renders it through himself, through the Church, or through another minister.

As is clear, the first argument presupposes that the Church has sometimes defined as De fide doctrines that are only virtually revealed, or the argument confuses the Church's infallible judgment concerning theological conclusions with the case of dogmatic definitions of formally revealed doctrines. Another argument presupposes the Suarezian teaching that the Church’s magisterium has “equal power” (aequivalere) to divine revelation or divine speech, or that it “brings it to completion” (consummare). Similarly, once again, the certainty of the Church’s infallible judgment is confused with revelation. Finally, Suarez here seems to understand the terms “mediately” or “virtually revealed” in a wider sense, namely as referring to everything that in any way is “contained” in a given expressly revealed truth. Hence, in a further proof, he no longer distinguishes between doctrines that are implicitly (or vaguely) revealed and those that are only virtually revealed. Indeed, he argues thus: “Although the Church may be said not to teach a new faith, because she always explains the ancient faith, nonetheless, by her act of defining, she makes it be the case that something that hitherto had not been explicitly and formally De fide would now be such.” Similarly, Suarez adds that the Church’s definitions, for example concerning the infinity of God, “Are revealed immediately enough in Scripture, if not in the same terms, at least in equivalent ones.” The same must be said concerning the teaching of Cardinal Juan De Lugo,²¹² who greatly supported this Suarezian position. Indeed, even though he asserted, “In the councils, the Church only develops those revelations that had been previously made and infallibly proposes their true sense through the assistance of the Holy Spirit,”²¹³ nonetheless, he still holds that the Church’s magisterium itself has the force of a “mediated” revelation or expression by God.²¹⁴

53. Through the third thesis just presented, Suarez had brought into the schools the question concerning the definability of virtually revealed truths or theological conclusions. However, there was no lack of opposition. Suarez himself attacked Luis de Molina with the greatest vehemence. The latter had taught that a truth that is only virtually revealed could not be raised by the Church to the dignity of being a truth of faith; rather, according to him, the Church could only determine that a given truth could be deduced from the principles of faith. Among the companions of Suarez, Kilber best refutes him,²¹⁵ relying especially on the argument: a doctrine that is only virtually revealed cannot be held exclusively on account of the authority God who reveals, because revelation “Only conveys to us the essential concept of the reality signified by it.”²¹⁶ To the objection that God knows everything that pertains to the reality concerning which such revelation was made, he responds: without a doubt, this is certain, though God does not reveal or manifest all His knowledge concerning that reality but, instead, only what is signified by the terms of revelation. Against Suarez teaches: “We must hold De fide: the Church proposes nothing except what is at least implicitly revealed in the written or handed down word of God. However, the Church can propose as something theologically certain that which is virtually contained in a revealed truth.”²¹⁷

54. The Thomists, as has already been noted, immediately and properly are concerned with a different question: namely, whether theological conclusions pertain to faith and (with Suarez) whether they are definable. When considering this question, one must pay attention to the fact that the term “conclusion” is understood in a broad and generic sense, that is, for any teaching that is known by theologians through deduction from revealed truths. The Thomists’ teaching involves these three theses: 1˚ Theological conclusions as conclusions do not pertain to faith; 2˚ conclusions as teachings pertain to faith and are definable; 3˚ however, conclusions that are concerned with teachings that are mediately or only virtually revealed cannot be defined as pertaining to faith, nor have they ever been defined as such, but only formally-explicitly or formally-implicitly revealed teachings can be so defined. Thus, the Thomists make a distinction concerning the classic (veterem) thesis stating that good and necessary consequences pertain to Catholic doctrine: a) a conclusion is definable, not inasmuch as it is a conclusion but, rather, inasmuch as it is formally revealed; b) conclusions concerning teachings that are only virtually revealed are not definable, but only conclusions concerning teachings that are at least implicitly revealed are so definable. In this way, both the classic teaching and Suarez’s position are corrected and brought back to the way of truth.

55. Thus, John of St. Thomas,²¹⁸ with Navaret and M. Gonzalez, declares that the common position among the Thomists is that conclusions pertain to faith.²¹⁹ However, he explains what this means. Indeed, a conclusion, precisely as a conclusion, cannot be De fide, because one’s assent to it does not depend solely on revelation but, at the same time, also depends upon the deduction, because such a doctrine is held to be revealed only “by connection and as a logical consequence.”²²⁰ However, the fact that the Church can define such a conclusion is evident both factually and by reasoning: for in defining a given conclusion, the Church defines neither the discourse nor the deduction as such but, instead, immediately defines the revealed doctrine, that is, by a declarative definition.²²¹ “The Church, in defining truths, passes from the discourse and discussion by which she investigates whether this is contained in Scripture or God’s revelation to immediate testification of the faith, because, as she says, this has been seen to be from the Holy Spirit, not because it has been debated”²²²—that is, because the teaching in itself was revealed, although it had been hidden and implicit for us, until it was declared by the Church.²²³ He explains the third thesis (that the Church defines only immediately revealed truths, not ones that are only virtually revealed) in response to the objections (as is his general practice):

(I deny) that the propositions defined by the Church would not immediately be revealed by God, even though that revelation would be implicit and hidden for us and, therefore, is reached through discourse.²²⁴

But, if certain things are in no way immediately revealed, either implicitly or explicitly, the Church never proposes them as being De fide...: However, with the Holy Spirit’s assistance, the Church can declare as being De fide those things that are immediately revealed, though heretofore hidden and reached only through discourse,²²⁵ (not through) revelation but, instead, through a new manifestation of the revelation that was already made, for which the Church has the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit.²²⁶

(Thus, he responds that) the Church did not fashion (condere) Scripture but, rather, explains that already fashioned Scripture, doing so with the divine authority and assistance. Nor are we saying that the Church renders De fide everything that she declares but, rather, only that which she declares as pertaining to faith.²²⁷

Thus, John of St. Thomas, who speaks of the conclusions as being “virtually” revealed, distinguishes two kinds of virtually revealed truth, namely, virtually-implicitly and virtually-illatively, as we set forth above in no. 45.

56. The Salmanticenses hold the same teaching, in the same form.²²⁸ For they ask whether “virtual revelation constitutes the formal object (ratio) of theological faith.”²²⁹ They answer, first: particular propositions included in universal formally revealed truths are themselves De fide. They prove it thus: because a virtual revelation equivalent to formal revelation, or coinciding with it, constitutes the revealed truth, and the virtual revelation of a particular proposition included in a universal, expressly revealed truth is equivalent to the express and formal revelation of the same particular. Hence, it can also be defined by the Church. And the Salmanticenses note:

It is one thing for God to formally and expressly reveal some truth, but it is a different affair for us to distinctly understand the meaning of the said revelation.

For the former is frequently found without the latter, as is evident in a number of things revealed in Sacred Scripture, through which God intends to explicitly manifest to us a given truth that, however, we do not at first distinctly perceive because we do not adequately understand the full meaning of the divine utterance. However, we do perceive it explicitly if it has ever been declared by the Church. And when she defines that something is to be expressly believed, she does not fashion or propose a new revelation from God but, instead, clarifies the meaning of what is found in Sacred Scripture itself.²³⁰

And the validity of this argument is obviously not limited solely to cases of particular propositions. Therefore, in another place, the Salmanticenses themselves note that many things are expressly but vaguely contained in Sacred Scripture, for example that the Eucharist contains, together with the body of Christ, His blood and His soul.²³¹ And in response to the objection stating that the implicit sense is known by means of syllogistic reasoning, they respond by distinguishing between a proper syllogism and an improper one, that is, between an illative syllogism and one that is explicative.²³²

Secondly, the Salmanticenses teach that the virtual revelation of a given truth solely in its own cause (whether adequate or inadequate) does not suffice for something to be understood in accord with the formal object (ratio sub qua) of the habitus of faith and, therefore, that such a truth is not De fide but, instead is a theological conclusion.²³³ They wholly (simpliciter) reject Suarez’s argument stating that, on many occasions, the Church has defined as matters to be believed De fidei a number of truths that have not been formally revealed. After first rejecting Vasquez’s explanation, they respond to Suarez’s teaching as follows:

He is mistaken when he says that this is the common position of theologians, for scarcely anyone subscribes to it. For even if all grant that what the Church defines as dogmas are properly De fide, nonetheless no one asserts that this is because God, through the Church’s act of defining reveals something new to us. In point of fact, this way of speaking is rejected by all. And rightly so, for the Church has no authority to make something be De fide in second act, for us (quoad nos), which was not De fide in first act and in itself. Otherwise, she could define numerous things independent of Sacred Scripture and divine traditions, which cannot be. Nor does the Holy Spirit assist her to establish completely new dogmas but, instead, only to faithfully explain, without danger of error, the meaning of Sacred Scriptures and, therefore, to declare whether something has been revealed by God.²³⁴

Then, after rejecting Lugo’s position as not, as it were, resolving the difficulty and not pertinent to the matter at hand, the Salmanticenses conclude: “The Church never defines as a dogma something that does not have, as a presupposition for that definition, a truth that is formally revealed in the sacred writings, at least vaguely and implicitly.” That is, the Church defines as dogmas of faith only truths that are formally revealed (even though they are only vague and implicit).

57. Finally, Billuart resolves this question in a similar way. He distinguishes a proposition of faith from a theological conclusion as follows:

A proposition of faith is that which is formally and directly revealed in the written or handed down word of God and is proposed by the Catholic Church as having been revealed… A theological conclusion is that which is deduced through natural discourse,²³⁵ either from two De fide premises or from one that is De fide and the other that is naturally certain, in both of which that conclusion is virtually contained, and for that reason is only virtually revealed.²³⁶

However, he again distinguishes these kinds of conclusions as follows:

A conclusion can be virtually contained in its premises in two ways: 1˚ by reason of a natural connection, that is, as a property in its essence or as an effect in a cause;… 2˚ by reason of its signification, that is, either as a part in a whole, as a particular in a universal, or as the implicit in the explicit, expressed in equivalent terms… A conclusion of the latter kind is not properly and strictly a conclusion… but, instead, an explication of the meaning of the premises and immediately revealed and, therefore, is certain with the certainty of faith and pertains to faith.

58. Therefore, the Thomists directly dealt with the question concerning whether theological conclusions belong to Catholic doctrine or to faith, and resolved the matter by using the distinction between mediate and immediate revelation, distinguishing between, on the one hand, conclusions that contain formally revealed doctrine and only explicate and delimit the implicit meaning of revelation or express it through other concepts²³⁷ (explanatory syllogism, deduction by reason of the meaning of terms, [a truth that is] virtual-implicit) and, on the other hand, conclusions that contain a teaching that is only mediately revealed which can be deduced from revealed teaching because it is contained in revelation as in its principles or cause (a proper or illative syllogism, deduction by reason of natural connection, [a truth that is] virtual-inductive). According to the principles concerning the nature and object of faith, the Thomists thus hold: only truths that are formally revealed, even if only in an equivalent form, can be De fide; at the same time, they reject Suarez’s and Lugo’s teaching concerning the completion of revelation by the Church’s magisterium. Thus, the Thomist’s doctrine concerning the definability of theological conclusions is in complete agreement with their doctrine concerning the development of dogmas or the explication of faith.

59. At the end of the 18^th century, Claude Montaigne disengaged as follows the “exceedingly difficult and complicated question” concerning whether theological conclusions are De fide:²³⁸ 1˚ theological conclusions, formally understood (i.e., precisely as conclusions and inasmuch as they are deduced) are not De fide. 2˚ Theological conclusions, materially understood (i.e., as propositions, and without dependence on deduction) that in themselves are immediately revealed, even though they may be legitimately deduced from other De fide sources, or that are mere expositions of revealed truths, are themselves De fide. 3° Theological conclusions, materially considered, that are not clearly and distinctly in themselves immediately revealed but nonetheless are revealed in a vague and obscure fashion are themselves De fide, namely if the implication is clear. 4° Theological conclusions drawn from two immediately revealed premises are, materially considered, De fide. 5° Merely and truly theological conclusions drawn, by means of an evident and clear deduction, from two premises, one of which is De fide and the other known by the natural light of reason, are not De fide because they are not believed by us being revealed and testified to by God (see no. 44 above).

60. In the Augustinian school, Giovanni Lorenzo Berti taught:

We can speak about matters and propositions of faith in two ways: absolutely in themselves; or in relation to us. Considered the first way, the only things that are De fide are those that have been revealed by God: either immediately because they were explicitly handed down by Him; or mediately because they are evidently gathered from those which He Himself handed down. However, if we speak in the second way, then those things are De fide which also have been revealed by God, with it being clear to us, by means of some reason, that they were revealed by God. Now, there are four reasons that can make us certain about this: Sacred Scripture; the tradition of the Apostles; the definitions by Councils and Popes; the evidence of reason, inferring one thing from another... Such propositions which are evidently collected from De fide propositions are also to be judged to be De fide. This is clear, because they have been revealed by God, at least mediately… For since a De fide proposition is something that is expressly contained in Sacred Scripture, in the traditions received by the Church, or in the Church’s decrees and definitions, or is deduced therefrom by a certain, clear, and utterly firm connection, one must judge that a proposition is heretical when it is diametrically contrary to one of them.²³⁹

61. We would go on at great length, though not to much use, were we to catalogue the positions held by other theologians. Therefore, we will only here add some general observations.

First: Historically speaking, theologians commonly fight against two opinions: that of Vasquez and that of Molina. Against Vasquez they teach that conclusions, as conclusions, are not to be held De fide. Against Molina they defend that defined conclusions are De fide. This is especially the case among the Thomist, who, moreover, attack the third thesis articulated by Suarez.

Secondly: Many theologians do not proceed further and do not determine the question any further than this. Hence, most theologians simply declare that conclusions are definable.

Thirdly: The greatest of attention must be paid to the terminological diversity involved regarding these matters. Thus, as we have noted several times, Thomists generally say that conclusions are “virtually” revealed. Hence, most Thomists defend (against Molina) the definability of “virtually” revealed doctrines. Similarly, the term “conclusion” and, especially, the terms “proper conclusion” and “improper conclusion” are understood in various ways by various authors. Some use the term “conclusion” without qualification for teaching had by way of deduction; others use the term to refer to a teaching that is only virtually revealed (namely, as the virtually revealed is distinguished from the implicitly revealed). Similarly, speak of “proper” conclusions as those that are concerned with a teaching that is only virtually revealed doctrine (in the sense just noted). Others, by contrast, call a conclusion of this kind “improper,” namely, which pertains to theology only in an improper sense. Consequently, others say that a conclusion is ”improper” when it only explains the meaning of revealed truths, whereas others call the same thing “proper,” as constituting the proper object of theology.

More recent works of theology understand the term “theological conclusion” and, consequently, “theological conclusion properly so-called” as a technical term properly designating teachings that are deduced from [other] truths, with such conclusions being neither explicitly nor implicitly (i.e., equivalently) in revelation but, instead, only properly as contained in their principle or cause. And it is specific sense that contemporary theological books discuss the question concerning the definability of theological conclusions.

Fourthly: Regarding this question, Post-Tridentine theology led a number of theologians, indeed precisely those of a greater name, to indeed admit the definability of theological conclusions broadly or improperly so-called, namely those by which revealed truths are explicated, delimited, and expressed in scientific formulas, though they denied the definability of properly and strictly-so-called theological conclusions, namely, consequences deduced from revealed truths themselves.

Hence, even after the restoration of scholastic theology, this doctrine remained altogether the more commonly held position. Thus, among contemporary authors, the following hold that only formally or immediately revealed truths can be defined, but not virtually revealed ones: Hurter,²⁴⁰ Pesch,²⁴¹ Mazzella,²⁴² Billot,²⁴³ Groot,²⁴⁴ Van Noort,²⁴⁵ Huarte,²⁴⁶ Franzelin,²⁴⁷ Palmieri,²⁴⁸ Hugon,²⁴⁹ Diekamp,²⁵⁰ Heinrich,²⁵¹ Scheeben,²⁵² Tanquerey.²⁵³ Among the Scotists, Minges²⁵⁴ holds the contrary position, namely that conclusions are without qualification definable, and thus he judged that the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary had been defined, even though that definition declares it to be a “divinely revealed” teaching. Among the Thomists, M. Tuyerts holds that everything connected to revelation can be defined De fide as though it were revealed.²⁵⁵

Ambroise Gardeil and Francisco Marín-Sola hold a kind of middle way. According to Fr. Gardeil, conclusions as such are not definable; nonetheless, truths deduced by way of conclusion (i.e., theological conclusions) are De fide, not indeed as deduced by way of dialectic, but as directly seen (ut intuitae) in the deposit of faith through the supernatural understanding of the Church.²⁵⁶ Fr. Marín-Sola distinguishes two types of virtually revealed truths: virtually-inclusive (when it is a question of the same reality) and virtually-connected (when it is a question of a distinct reality). According to him, a properly so-called theological conclusion is had regarding truths that are virtually-inclusively revealed; and since such truths would be identical with what is revealed (having “homogeneity”), they are definable. Concerning truths that are only virtually-connectively revealed, we cannot have theological certainty properly so called but, rather, only certainty belonging to the physico-moral order. Therefore, such a conclusion is not definable and pertains to theology only in a secondary fashion.²⁵⁷

62. Therefore, by means of the distinction between immediate and mediate revelation and between implicit and virtual revelation, scholastic theology greatly articulated the doctrine concerning the explication of revealed truths. Hence, dogmatic progress is properly and formally the explication of revealed doctrine itself, whether merely through the exposition of the terms or meaning of revelation, or through the determination and formulation of the revealed doctrine by means of objectively equivalent terms and concepts; however, there is nothing to prevent this kind of exposition, interpretation, or determination of revealed doctrine from being brought about through syllogistic deduction on our part, by means of natural cognitions [sic], namely, so that the doctrines as defined as dogmas by the Church would be deduced from revealed truths by way of conclusion, so long as the defined doctrine would, objectively speaking, be formally revealed, though in an equivalent way.

63. And in this question or teaching the continuity of the scholastic doctrine appears with great clarity. For the older scholastics in the 13^th century only admit revealed truths as being credibilia, though together with their explanation, explication, and determination. The nominalists do indeed seem to admit the conclusions, simply speaking, as truths of faith, though they use the term “conclusion” to refer to the explication or determination of revealed truths themselves. However, post-Tridentine scholastics, distinguishing between mediately and immediately revealed conclusions, provide a more precise and truer determination for the nominalist position and thus return to the teaching of the high scholastics.

64. Thus, the doctrine that we have set forth concerning the explication of revealed truths and dogmatic progress should be judged, in its substance, to be the common position of the whole of scholastic theology. The remaining difficulties and controversies arise from differences in terminology and from confusion concerning the various ways of distinguishing revelation. Finally, it may be noted that the doctrine set forth neither was, nor is, properly speaking, as regards the very reality itself, the object of controversy between the Thomistic school and Jesuit school, although on account of terminological differences and other confusions a number of disputations and various positions can be found over the course of history.

65. Finally, questions concerning the development of faith and, especially, concerning the faith-status²⁵⁸ and definability of theological conclusions brought other fruits as well. Indeed, first of all, it led to the exact notion of dogma itself. Recall Billuart’s own definition: “A proposition of faith is that which is formally and directly revealed in the written or handed down word of God and is proposed by the Catholic Church as having been revealed,”²⁵⁹ or Montaigne’s definition: “A proposition is De fide when it is revealed either in express forms and concepts or in synonymous terms (i.e., explicitly) or at least in [forms that are] equivalent as regards their meaning (i.e., implicitly).²⁶⁰

In this matter, three things in particular have been more clearly determined. First, the notion of dogma requires that the teaching in question be formally revealed. Secondly, for the notion of dogma (in so far as it is distinguished from revealed doctrine) requires that the Church expressly and determinately propose the truth to be believed, and it does not suffice that there be a general or implicit statement that is found proposed in Sacred Scripture as the inspired Word of God or as proposed in the divine tradition existing in the Church. Thirdly, in order for a given doctrine to be proposed by the Church for belief, an infallible proposition is required (i.e. [sic], definition ex cathedra).

Hence, the second fruit of the doctrine concerning the explication of faith is greater knowledge and determination concerning Papal Infallibility, indeed, in two respects: first, it leads to a more explicit and certain knowledge and acknowledgment of Papal Infallibility; second, a distinction was made between the Pope’s infallibility concerning revealed truths themselves and concerning those that follow from the revealed truths or are connected with them. However, the exposition of this point of dogmatic development is not our task here, and moreover would be lengthy.

The third fruit was the doctrine concerning ecclesiastical faith.²⁶¹ For those things that are contained in revelation only as in their principle or cause, like conclusions concerning truths that are only virtually revealed, or that are in some other way connected with revealed truths, such as dogmatic facts, the approval of religious orders, and the canonization of saints cannot indeed be the object of theological faith, although they are the (secondary) object of the infallibility of the Church and the Roman Pontiff. Hence, definitive judgments by the Church concerning such things must be held on account of the Church’s infallible authority.

Thus, assent to such declarations by the Church is called ecclesiastical faith: faith inasmuch as the infallibility of the Church is established by divine revelation; ecclesiastical faith inasmuch as the immediate reason for such assent is the Church’s infallible authority. Among more recent authors, the notion of ecclesiastical faith is admitted by, for example, Pesch,²⁶² Simar,²⁶³ Scheeben,²⁶⁴ Billot,²⁶⁵ Van Noort,²⁶⁶Diekamp,²⁶⁷ and Huarte.²⁶⁸ It is denied by Glossner,²⁶⁹ Schiffini,²⁷⁰ Gardeil,²⁷¹ Tuyaerts,²⁷² and Marín-Sola.²⁷³

And thus, during this period the teaching concerning the development of dogmas has been explained sufficiently enough, indeed with great effort, though not always in a direct way, nor definitively in all cases. However, the principal portions of pre-Tridentine and post-Tridentine scholastic teaching concerning these matters received a definitive and infallible approval from the [First] Vatican Council.

Appendix: St. Thomas’s Position Concerning the Definability of Theological Conclusions

1. The scholastics of the 13^th century did not ex professo treat the question concerning the definability of theological conclusions as this topic is discussed today. Nonetheless, in their writings there are certain main points of teaching that are connected with this question. Given that such teachings, especially those of St. Thomas, are brought forward by theologians as evidence of both affirmative and negative opinions, we will explain, by way of an appendix, how St. Thomas’s teaching is related to this question.

2. Four of St. Thomas’s teachings are connected to our question:

1. his teaching concerning the division of credibilia into articles, with their antecedents and consequences;

2. his teaching concerning the explication of revealed truths;

3. his teaching which distinguishes between those things that directly pertain to faith and those that indirectly so pertain;

4. his teaching concerning the proper object of theology.

3. The first of these teachings of St. Thomas (and other 13^th century scholastics), which divides the credibilia into articles, antecedents, and consequences, is only nominally the same as the question concerning theological conclusions. For as we saw above (no. 10), that division is a division of credibilia, that is, of revealed truths themselves, and those doctrines that are called consequences or corollaries are explicitly revealed doctrines, such as, for example, the doctrine of the Eucharist. They are called consequences inasmuch as they are particular doctrines by which a given general doctrine is determined, indeed by a new revelation, as we explained at sufficient length above. Thus, the word “consequence” has a completely different meaning than the term “conclusion,” in speaking about the question concerning the definability of theological conclusions.

4. The second of St. Thomas’s teachings (as well as of 13^th century scholastics) related to this question concerning theological conclusions is what he teaches concerning the explication of revealed truths. For as we saw above (no. 11), St. Thomas establishes that revealed truths are the object of faith, though as such truths are proposed, explicated, expounded, and defined by the Church (as he ex professo explains in ST II-II, q. 1, a. 6–10).

From what he teaches regarding this matter, it follows that those theological conclusions that are definable and to be held by divine faith after they have been defined by the Church are those that are explications, determinations, or precise expressions of revealed truths (through dogmatic formulas). However, nothing follows from this concerning the definability of conclusions properly so called, namely those that are consequences that are deductively inferred from revealed truths themselves.

In fact, that “explication of the things that are to be believed” by theologians takes place through the mediation of discourse, and the conclusion drawn is the very explication of revelation. From this we have the conclusion defined by the Church and to be held by divine faith. However, this kind of deduced doctrine is only an explication and determination of the revealed doctrine itself and does not contain a new doctrine but, rather, “the same one, more explicitly set forth (magis expositam)” (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 10, ad 2). And precisely for this reason, once the Church defines this “explication,” it must be held by divine faith.

Therefore, St. Thomas teaches that the theological conclusions by which a revealed doctrine itself is explicated and determined can be, and indeed have been, defined by the Church as dogmas. However, he says nothing concerning the doctrines deduced from revealed truths specifically by way of [objectively illative] inference. Nor does the definability of such conclusions follow from what he here teaches; rather the opposite does, for the whole reason why improper conclusions can be defined is the fact that they are identical to the revealed doctrine, something that does not hold for the case of consequences properly so called.

5. The third of St. Thomas’s teachings (not held by the theologians of his time) to be considered here is the distinction between those things that directly pertain to faith and those that indirectly pertain thereto.

Indeed, this teaching does not state the definability of conclusions properly so called; however, since it is explained in different ways by different people, it needs a special exposition.

6. In ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2—I am here beginning with the main passage where St. Thomas treats the question ex professo—he asks, “Whether, properly speaking, heresy is concerned with the things of faith.” This article is an appendix and supplement to the one that precedes it (“Whether heresy is a species of unbelief”). Thus, the concern is with determining the specific notion of heresy. In q. 10, St. Thomas had determined what “unbelief” is. He answers: “The sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith” (q. 10, a. 5). There are several species of such unbelief, among which is numbered heresy, which “resists the (manifest) Christian faith” (q. 10, a. 5). Thus, in q. 11 a. 1, heresy is defined as a deviation from rectitude in Christian faith “by the fact that (someone) in fact intends to assent to Christ but falls short in his choice concerning those things by which he assents to Christ. For because he does not choose those things that are truly handed down by Christ but, rather, those that his own mind suggests to him. And, therefore, heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who profess the Christian faith (fidem Christi), though they corrupt its dogmas.”

7. This matter is determined in greater detail in the next article. For when heresy is defined as “to deviate from the rectitude in Christian faith,” as a rejection of those things that have been “handed down by Christ,” as a corruption of “Christ’s dogmas” (a. 1) or “a corruption of the Christian faith (fidei Christianae)” (a. 2), one may furthermore ask, “Whether, properly speaking, heresy is concerned with the things of faith” (a. 2). This specific question must be asked, on the one hand, because heresy seems to be concerned with other things than those that are to be believed (objections 1 and 2), and, on the other hand, because not every dissent from revealed truths constitutes heresy (objection 3). Therefore, what is being asked is whether heresy is strictly and exclusively constituted by the denial of the truth of the faith, [that is,]whether the only heretics are those who deny or corrupt some truth of faith.

Thus, St. Thomas responds:

We are now speaking about heresy inasmuch as it denotes the corruption of the Christian faith. Now, a corruption of the Christian faith is not involved if a man has a false opinion concerning matters that are not of faith, for example, in questions of geometry and other such things, which cannot in any way belong to the faith. Rather, it only takes place when someone has a false opinion concerning things belonging to the faith (ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2).

Therefore, this is St. Thomas’s first, and indeed, principal conclusion: heresy takes place only when a truth of faith—that is, a truth that has been revealed (and proposed by the Church)— is denied or corrupted. And thus, St. Thomas agrees with the dictum drawn from St. Augustine, cited in the “sed contra” to this article, namely, that only positions that are opposed to the dogmas of faith are heretical.

8. However, this first conclusion does not yet perfectly respond to the question that was posed, and especially not the objections. Therefore, St. Thomas continues:

Now, as was stated earlier [ST I, q. 32, a. 4; I-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1; I-II, q. 2, a. 5], something pertains to the faith in two ways: in one way, directly and principally, as are the articles of faith; in another way, indirectly and secondarily, as are those things that cannot be denied lest the corruption of a given article take place. Thus, heresy might take place in either of these ways, just as there can be faith in these two ways.

St. Thomas also proposes the same teaching on other occasion[s], as he expressly notes in the quoted passage: “as was stated earlier.”

9. One series of texts is found on the occasion of the question: Whether one is permitted to have contrary opinions concerning the (Trinitarian) notions. Thus, in ST I, q. 32, a. 4, the Holy Doctor teaches:

There are two ways for something to pertain to faith. In one way, they can directly pertain thereto, as do those things that we have received principally as divinely taught, such as that God is three and One, that the Son of God has become incarnate, and so forth. Concerning such truths, a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if it be held obstinately. On the other hand, something is indirectly of faith if something contrary to faith follows the denial of such a truth. For example, if anyone were to say that Samuel was not the son of Elkanah, it would follow that Sacred Scripture would be false. Therefore, someone may have a false opinion concerning such things without danger of heresy before the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences contrary to the faith, particularly if no obstinacy be shown in holding this position. However, when it is manifest, especially if the Church has decided that consequences follow contrary to the faith, then such an error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason, many things that once upon a time were not so considered are now considered such, given that their consequences are now more manifest.

The Holy Doctor teaches the same thing in In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 5. There, he distinguishes between those things “that are expressly contained in the articles of faith” and those “from which something unfitting or contrary to faith follows.” Heresy is committed in the latter sense, “once the truth has been thoroughly examined and the consequences have been seen,” for then “the same kind of judgment is had concerning these and those that have been determined as being in faith, because the one follows on the other.”

10. Another series of texts is found on the occasion of the question concerning the material object of faith; and, in these texts, St. Thomas ex professo determines the matter. Thus, in ST II-II, q. 1, the Holy Doctor expressly distinguishes all the credibilia into those that are per accidens revealed and those that are per se revealed, subdividing the per se revealed into articles and those that are included in the articles or pertain to them, ultimately adding a distinction between those things that are of faith and their determination or exposition by the Church or the Pope (cf. a. 6c and ad 1; a. 8–10, with the exposition given above, no. 10, 11). Thus, faith is “principally” concerned with the articles and secondarily concerned with per accidens revealed truths, or secondary credibilia that are contained in the articles.

In ST II-II, q. 2, a. 5, the Holy Doctor makes the same distinction, teaching: “the per se object of faith is that through which man is made blessed” (these are the “first credibilia” or “articles of faith”); “however, per accidens or secondarily, everything that is contained in divinely handed down Sacred Scripture pertains to the object of faith” (these are per accidens revealed and particular revealed truths).

Thus, finally, in q. 11, a. 2, St. Thomas refers to the teaching set forth above.

11. With these texts in mind, we can easily settle the question, “Which truths directly pertain to faith and which indirectly?”

Concerning those things that directly pertain to faith, St. Thomas offers a consistent response: the articles of faith directly and principally pertain to faith (ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2; q. 2, a. 5; q. 1, a. 6, ad 1; a. 8). However, the articles directly, primarily, principally, and per se pertain to faith because they are the principal and organic parts of per se revealed truths (q. 1, a. 6), namely those that “directly ordain us to eternal life” (q. 1, a. 6, ad 1). In fact, “those truths the vision of which we shall fully enjoy in eternal life and by which we shall be led to eternal life per se pertain to the faith” (q. 1, a. 8).

From this, it is clear that the “articles of faith,” which are said to pertain principally and per se to faith, are articles strictly speaking, that is, as St. Thomas understands this, the articles of the Apostles’ Creed, inasmuch as the articles are distinguished from those truths that are revealed per accidens and from those things that are contained in the articles (i.e., corollaries or consequences of articles).

However, revealed truths or secondary credibilia (per accidens credibilia) are said to pertain to faith indirectly or secondarily. Such things include, for example, purely historical facts set forth in Sacred Scripture, particular revealed truths that pertain to one article (cf. a. 6), and finally, explications or determinations of revealed truths (“such as those things from the denial of which there follows the corruption of some article”).

12. Therefore, St. Thomas’s distinction between those things that directly and principally pertain to faith and those that indirectly and secondarily so pertain is a distinction of credibilium into articles ([first or]primary credibilia) and revealed truths contained in articles or ordered to them (secondary credibilia).

Thus, too, St. Thomas’s teaching, set forth by means of this distinction, is clear.

In ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2, he concludes the article with these words: “Thus, heresy might take place in either of these ways, just as there can be faith in these two ways.” For just as faith has the articles as its primary and per se object (q. 1, a. 6, 8, 9; q. 2, a. 5), but as its accidental or secondary object “everything that is divinely transmitted in Sacred Scripture” (q. 2, a. 5) or that are contained in articles, from the denial of which the corruption of some article follows (q. 11, a. 2), so too heresy is directly and principally concerned with the articles and indirectly and secondarily with those things that are contained in the articles or ordered by them.

Similarly, in the question concerning the Trinitarian notions (cf. ST I, q. 34), St. Thomas concludes:

Concerning such truths (which are principally divinely handed on), a false opinion of itself involves heresy… Concerning (those things that indirectly pertain to the faith), someone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy before the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences contrary to faith (i.e., corruption of an article of faith)… However, when it is manifest, especially if the Church has decided that consequences follow contrary to the faith (i.e., corruption of an article of faith), then such an error cannot be free from heresy (ST I, q. 32, a. 4).

Likewise, the doctrine proposed in In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 5 is clear. For, having distinguished between those things that are “expressly contained in the articles of faith” and “from which something contrary to faith follows,” that is, contrary to the articles of faith, he teaches that, “once the truth has been thoroughly examined,” this kind of assertion is heretical because “the same kind of judgment is had concerning these (connected truths) and those that have been determined as being in faith.” That is, just as the direct denial of an article involves the commission of heresy, inasmuch as it is the denial of a revealed doctrine proposed by the Church as something to be believed (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 9), so too the denial of those things that are contained in the articles, after they have been defined by the Church, involves the commission of heresy, because by denying this given doctrine an article of faith is itself (indirectly) denied, for the one follows from the other.

Finally, in In III Sent., d. 13, q. 2, a. 1 ad 6 St. Thomas writes:

Because there are certain things that are contained implicitly in the Church’s faith, like conclusions in principles, therefore various opinions are supported concerning these matters until the Church determines that some among them is opposed to the Church’s faith because something directly contrary to faith would follow from holding such a position.

For as we have already seen (no. 10), according to the teaching of St. Thomas, “All the articles are implicitly contained in some first credibilia,” and in a similar way, “Some of the other, subsequent articles are contained in others” (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7), and other particular revealed truths are included in the articles themselves (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 8). According to this division, then, faith and heresy are directly concerned with the articles and indirectly with those things that are “included” in the articles or are indirectly opposed to them.

13. Thus, distinguishing between those things that pertain directly and indirectly to faith, St. Thomas merely makes an application of his teaching concerning the articles of faith: namely, the articles contain all the per se credibilia and are explicated and determined by the Church’s magisterium (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 6–10). For thus, faith is directly, per se, and principally concerned with the articles, and indirectly and secondarily concerned with what is implicitly contained in them, namely inasmuch as they are determined or defined by the Church. However, from this it follows that both those things that directly pertain to the faith, as well as those that indirectly so pertain, are properly speaking revealed, nay even explicitly, though inasmuch they are explained by the Church.

The truth of this interpretation will be even clearer if we consider what St. Thomas proposes in particular as indirectly pertaining to faith.

14. St. Thomas indicates three things concerning which faith or heresy could indirectly take place: per accidens revealed truths; expositions of Sacred Scripture; and determinations by the Church concerning matters pertaining to faith.

First: per accidens credibilia. If these kinds of things or doctrines are considered in themselves, they do not constitute the object of faith. For the fact that Samuel was the son of Elkanah, considered in itself, is something that is naturally knowable. However, such things become credibilia in so far as “they are divinely handed on in Sacred Scripture,” for the sake of manifesting “those truths that are principally revealed” (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1). Therefore, per accidens credibilia indirectly belong to faith, namely as proposed for faith by reason of the manifestation of the articles and as connected to the dogma concerning the inspiration of Sacred Scripture. Heresy takes place in regard to them inasmuch as someone, by denying such a thing, denies the truth of Sacred Scripture. St. Thomas regularly cites per accidens credibilia as an example (see ST I, q. 32, a. 4; II-I, q. 2, a. 5; In I Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 5).

Second: expositions of Sacred Scripture. Regarding these, St. Thomas explains himself thus: “Someone is said to expound Sacred Scripture in a way that differs from how the Holy Spirit requires if such a person so distorts his exposition of Sacred Scriptures that it would be opposed to what has been revealed by the Holy Spirit… namely, through false expositions” (ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2, ad 2). Similarly: “Also, one professes one’s faith through the words that one utters… And therefore, if one speaks in inordinate words concerning those things that are of faith, the corruption of faith can follow therefrom” (ibid.). Therefore, the exposition of Sacred Scripture (i. e. the explication and determination of the truths of faith), as well as the words that one uses concerning matters of faith (i. e. one’s terms and formulas) indirectly pertain to faith as the expression and explication of faith. Similarly, heresy takes place indirectly in them, inasmuch as the truth of the faith that is one is attempting to explicate or express is denied through a false exposition or an erroneous formula. In both ways, theological expositions and dogmatic formulas are connected with the articles.

Third: The determinations of the Church concerning matters of faith. In ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2, ad 3, St. Thomas admits that some teachers disagreed... “in certain things pertaining to the faith which had not yet been determined by the Church,” without, however, them being heretics. And he adds: “After they were determined by the universal authority of the Church, if anyone persistently opposed what had been thus set in order, such a person would then be considered a heretic.” The same can be seen in ST I, q. 32, a. 4 and parallel texts. St. Thomas here speaks of secondary revealed truths, namely those that are contained in the articles, to which explications of the articles can also be reduced. Such truths or doctrines pertain to faith as revealed truths defined by the Church. However, they are said to pertain indirectly to faith inasmuch as they are the determinations of the articles (ST II-I, q. 1, a. 10) and explications by the Church concerning the articles. Similarly, heresy takes place regarding such truths: directly insofar as the revealed truth defined by the Church is denied; indirectly insofar as one denies a given article and, at the same time, the infallible authority of the Church.

15. Thus, according to St. Thomas’s teaching, the following are said to pertain to faith:

• Generally, what is revealed or at least divinely proposed through Sacred Scripture: the credibilia

• the articles directly pertain to faith: truths that are principally revealed;

• indirectly or secondarily, truths that are secondarily or less principally revealed or proposed for belief: such secondarily revealed truths or credibilia are, in particular, per accidens credibilia, expositions and determinations of revealed truths, and definitions by the Church or particular dogmas.

Thus, we believe that we have sufficiently set forth the sense of St. Thomas’s teaching. However, in confirmation of this exposition, it may still be permitted refer to some texts drawn from his contemporaries, namely, St. Bonaventure, Bl. Innocent V., and [St.] Albert the Great.

16. For St. Bonaventure proposes a similar distinction. In In I Sent., d. 17, pt. 1, q. unica, a. 4, he distinguishes [the truths of faith] thus:

In those things that concern the teaching of religion... some are concerned with the needs of faith (i.e., the articles), some with the certainty of the Sacred Scriptures, some are connected to these, like those things that make for the explication of faith (i.e., secondary revealed doctrines or corollaries) and the exposition of the Scriptures.

And he applies this distinction as follows:

Regarding those things which are necessary for faith, it is simply speaking a sin to hold contrary opinions... In those things which are concerned with the needs of Scripture... if (someone) defends (the contrary), he is judged a heretic because he contradicts Sacred Scripture... In those things that are connected to faith or Scripture... if one follows the opposite position… even though it is permissible to hold a contrary opinion prior to the full discussion of the matter, nonetheless, after such discussion, this is not allowed, as in those things which are determined through faith and Scripture (ibid.)

Similarly, Peter of Tarantaise [later, Bl. Innocent V] teaches (in In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1):

There are two ways to hold a contrary opinion regarding something: either it is or is not concerned with things that necessarily belong to the religion of faith and morals... If it is concerned with those things that pertain to religion, it can be either directly and evidently opposed to the articles of faith or the precepts of morals; or it could fail to be directly opposed, though it remains so by reduction.

[St.] Albert the Great, on the occasion of the question concerning the Trinitarian notions, remarks: “The number of [Trinitarian] notions is ultimately derived from (refertur) the number of persons and therefore does not have a special article. Thus, there is not as much danger involved here as in the other [matter] which was expressly determined by the Fathers” (namely, in the Trinity of Persons)

As is clear, Bonaventure, Peter of Tarantaise, Albert the Great, and Thomas hold the same position, though St. Thomas determines the matter more exactly and, likewise provides a better explanation for it.²⁷⁴

17. I have gone on at length in expounding St. Thomas’s third teaching relevant to the question concerning the definability of theological conclusions. However, this was necessary in order to determine his position concerning theological conclusions, which we can now move toward discussing. The corollaries are as follows.

First corollary: According to St. Thomas’s opinion and manner of speaking, some conclusions indirectly pertain to faith. This is what Bañez correctly holds in his commentary on ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2. Indeed, however, the expositions of Holy Scripture or of any revealed truths, together with the scientific formulas by which revealed doctrines are expressed by theologians, as well as the Church’s dogmatic definitions, are known by theologians precisely as conclusions (per modum conclusionis).

Second corollary: According to St. Thomas’s opinion and manner of speaking, improper conclusions pertain indirectly to faith, but not proper conclusions. There is no difficulty involved as regards improper conclusions, for they are express explications and determinations of revealed truths. However, conclusions properly so-called thus do not belong to matters of faith, because they pertain neither to the per accidens credibilia, nor to the expositions or determinations of per se credibilia (for the exposition of a doctrine is one thing and conclusions drawn from that doctrine another), nor to determinations made by the Church (for what the Church defines are either truths that are secondary, but nonetheless intrinsically, in se, revealed, or explications of revealed truths). Therefore, theological conclusions properly so-called do not belong to any species of those things that are said to belong indirectly to faith. Finally, generally speaking, consequences are not, properly-speaking, revealed but, instead, are consequences drawn from revealed truths.

It can be objected that such proper conclusions are connected to the articles. But, we can say in response: not, however, in the same way in which those things that indirectly pertain to faith are supposed by St. Thomas to be connected to the articles (namely, as secondarily revealed truths are connected to principally revealed truths).

One can insist: but even properly so-called conclusions belong to those things “from the denial of which the corruption of an article of faith follows”; for a principle is denied not only through a false explication but also by a false consequence. And this cannot be denied. However, the intended point (namely that such conclusions indirectly pertain to faith) does not follow from this. For it is one thing to say that De fide principles are indirectly denied through false consequences, and another to say that all those things that indirectly involve the denial of De fide principles therefore indirectly pertain to faith. For in order for something to at least indirectly pertain to faith, it is indeed necessary that the denial of a De fide principle would follow from the denial of that other truth; however, moreover, it is necessary that it be intrinsically (in se) revealed. Now, the latter condition does indeed hold for the case of explications of revealed truths, but not for consequences deduced from revealed truths.

Finally, if someone insists, “However, according to St. Thomas, things that indirectly pertain to faith are indirectly revealed,” we can say in response: they are indirectly revealed, as less principal revealed truths and as determinations of some general revelation; however, they are not indirectly revealed, as those things that are only consequences of per se revealed truths. By contrast, those things that indirectly pertain to faith are intrinsically (in se) revealed, but not solely as in a principle. Nay, a large portion of them are explicitly revealed or at least divinely given in Sacred Scripture, as are all per accidens credibilia and secondary revealed truths (e.g., the Eucharist). The rest were at least implicitly revealed, like particular dogmas defined by the Church.

Third corollary: The question concerning what conclusions are definable as dogmas cannot be determined properly from the fact that they are connected with a given intrinsically (in se) revealed truth but, instead, must be simultaneously resolved in light of another teaching of St. Thomas: merely being connected to a given revealed truth does not render a given doctrine definable as an object of faith.

Nor does St. Thomas suggest the contrary. Certainly, he holds that expositions of revealed doctrine and dogmatic formulas are definable as dogmas. Indeed, the fact that these kinds of expositions and formulas are definable and de facto defined is not merely or precisely because they are connected with a dogma or because the denial of dogma follows from the denial of such connected truths, but such definability is, at the same time, due to the fact that they are expositions or determinate expressions of a revealed doctrine.

18. Finally, as regards this third doctrine of St. Thomas, we must note the difference between St. Thomas's terminology and the terminology in use today. First of all, St. Thomas distinguishes between credibilia into those that directly pertain to faith and those that indirectly do; modern theology, however, setting aside this distinction, considers all the credibilia or revealed truths uniformly from the perspective of being doctrines that are revealed or to be believed. This is the manner of speaking used by the [First] Vatican Council, where it defines: “all those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith that are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and which by the Church...are proposed for belief as having been divinely revealed.”²⁷⁵ Likewise, the [1917] Code of Canon Law, in canon 1325§2 declares that someone is a heretic when “After having received baptism and retaining the name Christian, one obstinately denies any of the truths that are to be believed by divine and Catholic faith, or thus doubts them.” Hence, although the terminology used by St. Thomas and other scholastics is true and the best, nonetheless, the new way of speaking cannot legitimately be accused of being less true or less good.

Secondly: St. Thomas's distinction between those things that directly pertain to faith and those that indirectly so pertain should not be confused with the more recent distinction between the truths of faith and doctrines connected with the truths of faith. For St. Thomas’s distinction is concerned with the revealed truths themselves, inasmuch as they are more or less principally revealed; by contrast, the distinction used in modern theology is concerned with distinguishing revealed truths from their consequences or applications. Indeed, given that St. Thomas was chiefly occupied with the doctrine of faith itself, he was less concerned with considering the consequences and applications of revealed truths. Modern theology, however, on account of new questions and difficulties that have arisen, distinguishes more carefully between the doctrines of faith and their consequences. But let us pass on to consider St. Thomas’s fourth teaching relevant to this question concerning the definability of theological conclusions.

19. Finally, the fourth teaching we must consider is that of St. Thomas and the Thomists concerning the object of theology.

According to St. Thomas, Capreolus, Cajetan, and other Thomists, the proper object of theology, as it is science, are conclusions drawn from revealed truths—as St. Thomas says, “revelabilia” or as the Thomists commonly say, “mediately” or “virtually revealed.”²⁷⁶

Nonetheless, even this teaching of St. Thomas declares nothing concerning the definability of theological conclusions; instead, the question must, yet again, be determined by drawing from another heading of St. Thomas’s teaching. Now, from revealed truths, theology discursively draws (deducit) either some given revealed doctrine, or an explication of a revealed doctrine, or a further doctrine that is revealed only in its principle. And, indeed, theology discursively draws doctrines that are revealed elsewhere, inasmuch as, by means of positive arguments, it shows that a given doctrine is contained in the deposit of faith and is defined by the Church, or inasmuch as it discursively draws one revealed doctrine from another revealed doctrine, by way of a theological conclusion. Then, in the form of a conclusion, theology proves that a given doctrine is a legitimate and true explication or a precise expression of a given revealed doctrine (for example, the formula of transubstantiation). Thirdly and finally, theology discursively draws further doctrines from the revealed truths themselves (e.g., as from the revealed doctrine concerning the Eucharist it deduces the teaching concerning the real distinction between accidents and substance).

Now, however, according to St. Thomas’s teaching, nothing prevents conclusions that of themselves are revealed truths from being defined even though they are discursively articulated (deducantur) by theologians by way of conclusion. Likewise, nothing prevents explications of revealed truths from being defined, for they do not declare a new doctrine but, instead, the revealed doctrine itself in a more fully expounded form. However, St. Thomas neither asserts that consequences drawn from revealed truths would be definable, nor does this follow from his teaching concerning the object of theology. Thus, we can establish a final conclusion.

20. Conclusion: According to St. Thomas’s position, conclusions are indeed definable when they are expositions, explications, or determinations of revealed truths themselves, but not conclusions that draw (deducunt) from the revealed truths consequences that are contained in revelation only as in their principle or cause. In other words: according to St. Thomas’s position, theological conclusions improperly so-called (according to our terminology) which are implicitly revealed are definable; however, theological conclusions properly so-called which are (again, according to our terminology) only mediately or virtually revealed are not definable. This conclusion will be clear from what we will say in the following remarks.

First: In ST II-II, q. 1, a. 1, St. Thomas establishes as the exclusive object of faith those things that are revealed by God: “For nobody assents to the faith we are speaking about except because it has been revealed by God.” Now, the exposition of revealed truths is indeed identical with revealed truths themselves, inasmuch as “it is not a new faith but, instead, the same faith more explicitly set forth (magis expositam)” (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 10, ad 2). However, conclusions properly drawn (deductae) from revealed truths are not identical with the revealed truths (even if, perhaps, they are concerned with the same thing in reality, de eadem re). Therefore, improper conclusions can indeed be the object of faith (namely, if they are defined by the Church), proper conclusions cannot (see the first teaching above).

Second: In ST II-II, q. 1, a. 6–10, by ex professo determining more clearly the material object of faith, St. Thomas establishes the articles of faith as the object of belief (objectum credendum). Now, the articles of faith are revealed truths that have been proposed, explicated, determined, and defined by the Church. Therefore, St. Thomas does indeed number among the credibilia explications and determinations of revealed truths that have been defined by the truth, but not consequences or deductions properly so-called drawn from the revealed truths themselves (see the second teaching above).

Third: By distinguishing between those things that directly pertain to faith and those that indirectly so pertain (see ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2; I, q. 32, a. 4; In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 5), St. Thomas holds that those things that indirectly pertain to faith can be defined as dogmas, and in fact, many such things have been thus determined. Now, secondarily revealed truths (as distinguished from principally revealed truths) are said to indirectly pertain to faith; among such secondarily revealed truths there belong those particular revelations by which a general article is determined and explications or determinations of particular revealed truths, but not consequences drawn from revealed truths. Therefore, improper conclusions are definable, but not proper ones (see the exposition of the third teaching above).

Fourth: In ST I, q. 32, a. 4 (and parallel texts), in relation to the Trinitarian notions, St. Thomas teaches that before the Church defined them, some people erred without thereby falling into heresy, but after the definition was declared, such a position would be a heresy. Now, the Trinitarian notions are nothing other than precise explications, expressions, or dogmatic formulas concerning the revealed doctrine of the Trinity. Hence, St. Thomas only teaches that improper conclusions are definable.

21. Thus, St. Thomas teaches the same thing as the [First] Vatican Council teaches when the latter states: “the Holy Spirit was...promised to the successors of Peter...that, with his assistance, they might reverently guard and faithfully explain the revelation or deposit of faith that was handed down through the apostles.”²⁷⁷

What we have said here suffices regarding St. Thomas’s position. We will take up the matter itself below (a. 9).

[First] Vatican Council and the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists

[Returning to the main sequence] 66. The [First] Vatican Council needed to deal directly with the question concerning the development of dogmas, on account of the teachings of Hermes, Guenther, the Protestants, and Rationalists. In opposition to these errors, the Council simply expressed the Church’s constant tradition and the scholastic explication of the matter. Thus, the teaching of the scholastics (both before and after the Council of Trent), which the innovators directly attacked, was approved and defined by the [First] Vatican Council as the legitimate interpretation of the development of dogmas. However, the Council did not decide questions that remained disputed among the scholastics, for the common and certain doctrine sufficed for refuting the errors of the time. The Council only indirectly (namely, by approving and by pointing out the firm principles) indicated the way for settling these controversies.

First, the Council (like the scholastics) considers and discusses the question concerning the development of dogmas as a properly and immediately dogmatic question, not one pertaining to history alone, and therefore, as a matter that must be resolved on the basis of revealed principles and, indeed, on that of the revealed doctrines concerning the nature of faith, revelation, the Church’s teaching authority, especially that of the pope, and finally, concerning the relation of reason to faith.²⁷⁸ Secondly, the Council condemns the rationalist theory of the development of dogmas, as though dogmas were philosophical fabrications that could be changed or perfected by human reason depending on the state of science at a given time. In opposition to this error, the Council declared the traditional teaching that dogmas are revealed doctrines that have been proposed by the Church for belief and, therefore, must forever be understood and retained in a way that preserves their meaning (eodem semper sensu):

“All those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith that are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and which by the Church...are proposed for belief as having been divinely revealed.”²⁷⁹

“If anyone says that, as science progresses, at times a sense is to be given to dogmas proposed by the Church different from the one that the Church has understood and understands, let him be anathema.”²⁸⁰

“For the doctrine of faith that God has revealed has not been proposed like a philosophical system to be perfected by human ingenuity; rather, it has been committed to the spouse of Christ as a divine trust to be faithfully kept and infallibly declared. Hence also that meaning of the sacred dogmas is perpetually to be retained which our Holy Mother Church has once declared, and there must never be a deviation from that meaning on the specious ground and title of a more profound understanding.”²⁸¹

Thirdly, the Council explains the development of dogmas by speaking of the fact that the Church “faithfully keeps and infallibly declares”²⁸² or “reverently guards and faithfully explains”²⁸³ the deposit of faith, namely by condemning the corruption of faith by heresies and by proposing new dogmas as declarations and expositions of the meaning of the revealed doctrine, not by means of new revelations received from God but by her own infallible judgment, which receives such infallibility from the Holy Spirit’s assistance, an infallibility especially and fundamentally found in the Pope.²⁸⁴ Finally, the Council provides an excellent summary of its teaching, and that of the Scholastics, by citing the words of Vincent of Lerins: “Therefore, let there be growth and abundant progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom, in each and all, in individuals and in the whole Church, at all times and in the progress of ages, but only within the proper limits, i.e., within the same dogma, the same meaning, the same judgment.”²⁸⁵ Thus, the [First] Vatican Council approved and defined the doctrine of the scholastics, especially of the Thomists, concerning the explication of revealed truths and dogmatic progress, doing so in such a way that it expressed the principles and doctrine of the scholastics in a new way and with wonderful clarity and, at the same time, indirectly (namely, by insisting upon the common principles) corrected certain excesses, such as the teaching concerning the definability of truths that are only virtually revealed, or the [Suarezian] position claiming that revelation would be completed by the Church’s act of definition.

67. The Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists applies and upholds what was defined by the [First] Vatican Council. It declare that “the doctrine of faith was transmitted from the Apostles through the orthodox Fathers in the same sense and with the same constant judgment up to us,” and rejects the heretical fabrication concerning the development of dogmas, as though it involved passage from one meaning to another, as well as the error that the divine deposit of faith could be sufficiently explained as being a kind of philosophical discovery or the creation of the human consciousness, gradually fashioned through human efforts and subject to indefinite progress in the future (see the first part of prop. 4), such that nothing would remain [of revelation] but a bare historical fact (see second part of prop. 5). At the same time, however, the rationalistic methodology in dogmatic history is also judged.

68. In light of the historical overview that we have provided, it is clear that in the writings of the scholastics there is an explicit teaching concerning the development of dogmas, and that it was approved by the [First] Vatican Council. Nor can there be any doubt that this kind of teaching suffices for explaining all the main parts of the problem and that it furnishes the principles for resolving the questions raised in more recent times. Thus, in the articles that follow, we will apply the teaching of the scholastics to such matters and, as far as is necessary, will explain and defend it. Thus, we will propose:

First: The Catholic teaching concerning the development of dogmas;

Second: [A] scholastic explication of both the essence and properties of the development of dogma.

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1. See a. 17 below.↩︎

2. See our historical investigation into the theological teaching concerning explicit and implicit faith (from Hugh of St. Victor to the Council of Trent) in Reginald Schultes, Fides implicita: Geschichte der Lehre von der fides impli¬cita und explicita in der katholischen Théologie, vol. 1, (Regensburg: Pustet, 1920).↩︎

3. See Matthew 5:19ff, 13:17, 23:10, 24:14 and 35; Mark 13:10, 16:15ff; Luke 24:44ff; John 1:17 and 18, 3:15–21, 5:24, 15:1ff, etc.↩︎

4. See Matthew 28:18–20; Mark 13:10, 16:15–20; Luke 24:47; John 17.↩︎

5. First letter of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians, ch. 42.↩︎

6. See a. 13 below.↩︎

7. Indiculus (“De Gratia Dei”), (Denzinger, no. 248 [141]).↩︎

8. Fifteenth (or Sixteenth) Synod of Carthage, (418 AD), canon 2 (Denzinger, no. 223 [102]).↩︎

9. Simplicius, Quantum presbyterorum, (Denzinger, no. 343 [159]).↩︎

10. Ibid. (Emphasis Schultes’).↩︎

11. See Prefatory comments at II Constantinople (533), Denzinger, no. [212].↩︎

12. See Lateran Council of 649, canon 1 (Denzinger, no. 501[254]); III Constantinople (681) (Denzinger, no. 559 [293]); II Nicaea (787) (Denzinger, no. 600 [302]).↩︎

13. See Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Smyrnaeans, 1; Letter to the Trallians, 9.↩︎

14. See Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Ephesians, 16; Letter to the Trallians 6; Letter to the Philadelphians, 3.↩︎

15. See Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Ephesians, 16 and 17.↩︎

16. Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Philadelphians, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1., eds. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0108.htm>, 3.↩︎

17. See Polycarp, Letter to the Philadelphians, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1., eds. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0136.htm>, 3.↩︎

18. See Ibid., 4.↩︎

19. See ibid., 1.↩︎

20. See ibid., 7.↩︎

21. See ibid. 6.↩︎

22. See ibid. 7.↩︎

23. See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 3.3–5, 3.24, 4.26, 5.20.↩︎

24. See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1.10; Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, 6.↩︎

25. See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1.9.4, 1.22.1, 2.27.2, 2.28.1, 3.2.1, and 3.12.6.↩︎

26. See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 4.33.7.↩︎

27. Origen, De principiis, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 4., eds. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. Frederick Crombie, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885.), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/04120.htm>, preface, no. 2.↩︎

28. Ibid.↩︎

29. Ibid., no. 3 (slightly altered).↩︎

30. Ibid., no. 4.↩︎

31. Athanasius, De decretis, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, vol. 4. eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, trans. John Henry Newman, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1892), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2809.htm>, 20.↩︎

32. Ibid., 21.↩︎

33. Athanasius, De sententia Dionysii, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, vol. 4, eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, trans. Archibald Robertson, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1892), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2810.htm>, 20.↩︎

34. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 31 (5^th theological oration), in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, vol. 7. eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, trans. Charles Gordon Browne and James Edward Swallow, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1894), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/310231.htm>, 23.↩︎

35. Ibid., 24.↩︎

36. Augustine, Sermon to Catechumens on the Creed, 1.6.14.↩︎

37. Letter 186, 1.3.↩︎

38. Ennarrationes in psalmis, 30.8.↩︎

39. Enchiridion, 114.↩︎

40. Augustine, Against Julian, 1.6.22.↩︎

41. Augustine, Sermon 294.↩︎

42. Augustine, City of God, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 2, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Marcus Dods, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120116.htm>, 16.2.↩︎

43. Augustine, On Baptism, Against the Donatists, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 4., ed. Philip Schaff, trans. J.R. King, rev. Chester D. Hartranft. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/14082.htm>, 2.4.5.↩︎

44. Vincent of Lerins, Commonitorium, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, vol. 11, eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, trans. C.A. Heurtley, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1894,), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3506.htm>, ch. 2.↩︎

45. Ibid.↩︎

46. Ibid, ch. 9.↩︎

47. Ibid., ch. 23.↩︎

48. Ibid.↩︎

49. Ibid.↩︎

50. Ibid., 21 (trans. slightly altered).↩︎

51. Epiphanius, Exposition of the Faith, ch. 2 (PG 42, 778).↩︎

52. Epiphanius, Panarion (Adversus Haereses)↩︎

53. Augustine, Letter 157.3.4. See idem., Super Iohannem, 45.9; On the Catechizing of the Uninstructed, 17.28. [Trans. note: Fr. Schultes cites Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, 1.21. However, the text seems to be a version of the letter cited above.]↩︎

54. Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 4., ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Richard Stothert, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/140619.htm>, 19.14.↩︎

55. Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 5, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, rev. Benjamin B. Warfield, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15091.htm>, 1.39[21]. See idem., On the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin, 2.24; Sermon 264.5; Ennarations on the Psalms, 104.10; Letter 102.↩︎

56. Augustine, On the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 5, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, rev. Benjamin B. Warfield, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15062.htm>, 2.24 (alt.). See idem., On Rebuke and Grace, 7.11; The City of God, 18.47.↩︎

57. Letter 89.3. See idem., Sermon 11.3 and in the texts cited in (a) above.↩︎

58. Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, 19.14 (trans. Minerd).↩︎

59. Augustine, Enchiridion, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 3, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. J.F. Shaw, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1302.htm>, 118 (alt.).↩︎

60. Ibid., 114.↩︎

61. Augustine, Sermon 119 (De tempore).↩︎

62. [Augustine, “De symbolo” in] Tractatus sive sermones inediti: ex codice Guelferbytano 4096, [ed. Germain Morin,] ([Compoduni et Monaci]: Ex Typographia Koeseliana, 1917), p. 2.↩︎

63. See Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, vol. 2, (Freiburg im Breisgau, Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1909-1911), 279.↩︎

64. See Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis christianae fidei PL 176, 332ff.↩︎

65. Like St. Bernard of Clairvaux already (see Tractatus de baptismo, PL 182, 1040ff), Hugh of St. Victor here is fighting against Abelard’s opposed teaching. See Abelard, Theologia christiana, bk. 4 (PL 178, 1285) and Introductio ad theologiam b. 2, ch. 6 bk. 1, ch. 15. Cf. Raymond-M. Martin, “La nécessité de croire au mystère de l’incarnation: témoignages et documents en partie inédites du XII^e siècle,” Revue Thomiste New Series 3, no. 9 (Jan.-Mar., 1920): 273–280 (here, 276).↩︎

66. Grabmann, Geschicte der scholastischen Methode, vol. 2, 277ff.↩︎

67. See In III Sent., d. 25, q. unica, ultimo. [Tr. note: Fr. Schultes cites Scotus in this dated form, which does not recognize the various editions of his commentaries on the Sentences. Therefore, his remarks concerning Scotus should be read more so as being how Scotism had been received in later scholasticism, not as historically what Bl. Duns Scotus exactly held.]↩︎

68. See St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14, a. 12.↩︎

69. See Schultes, Fide implicita, bk. 1, 27ff.↩︎

70. See Heinrich Denifle and Albert Maria Weiss, Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Entwickelung, vol. 1, ([Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1904]), p. 93.↩︎

71. We find it thus used in in Innocent III, De Officio missae and in Innocent IV, Apparatus quinque librorum decretalium (1554) which determines what each explicitly believe. See Schultes, Fides implicita, vol. 1, 34ff. Guillermus Altissiodorensis first expressly discusses the topic “De fide implicita et explicita” in Summa aurea, bk. 3, tr. 3, ch. 1, q. 5. See Schultes, Fides implicita, vol. 1, 24ff.↩︎

72. [Tr. note: The ascription of the Summa theologica to Alexander of Hales is now questioned and is believed to have been composed by his disciples.]↩︎

73. [Tr. note: See remarks in note 67 above.]↩︎

74. See Gregory the Great, Homily 16 on Ezekiel, ch. 12; others cite, Homilies, bk. 2, hom. 4 (PL 76, 980ff).↩︎

75. Also see ad 1. Cf. Reginald Schultes, “Dogmenentwicklung oder Entwicklung der Offenbarung,” Theologie und Glaube 11 (1919): 192–201.↩︎

76. See Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 25, a. 1; Peter of Tarantaise (Innocent V), In III Sent., d. 25, q. 5, a. 2.↩︎

77. See p. 13ff in the original Latin.↩︎

78. On the scholastics’ distinction between explicit and implicit faith (and revelation), see no. XXIX below, as well as articles 6 and 7.↩︎

79. See Schultes, Fides implicita, vol. 1, 139–199.↩︎

80. See Jean Gerson, De fide et Ecclesia in Opera Omnia : Novo ordine digesta, & in V. Tomos distributa ; Ad Manuscriptos Codices quamplurimos collata, & innumeris in locis emendata ; quaedam etiam nunc primum edita: Quius accessere Henrici De Hassia, Petri De Alliaco, Joannis Brevicoxae, Joannis De Varenis Scriptorum coaetaneorum, ac insuper Jacobi Almaïni & Joannis Majoris Tractatus, partim editi partim inediti ; Necnon Monumenta omnia ad Causam Joannis Parvi pertinentia / 1 Continens Opera Dogmatica de Religione & Fide, vol. 1, (Antwerp: Sumptibus Societatis, 1706), 812.↩︎

81. Gabriel Biel, In III Sent., d. 23, q. 3; John of Bassolis, In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1; Francisco Lychetus, In III, d. 23, q. unica.↩︎

82. See [Albrecht Kunne], Dialogus inter discipulum et magistrum de ruina populi Christiani et victoria Turcorum, ([Memmingen: Albrecht Kunne], 1494), pt. 1, bk. 2, ch. 1.↩︎

83. Ibid., pt. 1, bk. 2, ch. 2.↩︎

84. See ibid., pt. 1, bk. 2, ch. 14.↩︎

85. See ibid, pt. 1, bk. 1, bk. 11.↩︎

86. See ibid., pt. 1, bk. 2, ch. 12.↩︎

87. See Jean Gerson, Quae credenda sunt de necessitate salutis in Opera Omnia : Novo ordine digesta, & in V. Tomos distributa ; Ad Manuscriptos Codices quamplurimos collata, & innumeris in locis emendata ; quaedam etiam nunc primum edita: Quius accessere Henrici De Hassia, Petri De Alliaco, Joannis Brevicoxae, Joannis De Varenis Scriptorum coaetaneorum, ac insuper Jacobi Almaïni & Joannis Majoris Tractatus, partim editi partim inediti ; Necnon Monumenta omnia ad Causam Joannis Parvi pertinentia / 1 Continens Opera Dogmatica de Religione & Fide, vol. 1, (Antwerp: Sumptibus Societatis, 1706), 22.↩︎

88. Ibid., 22ff.↩︎

89. Ibid., 27.↩︎

90. See ibid., 829-831.↩︎

91. Petrus Aureolus, Commentariorum in primum ( -quartum) librum sententiarum [of Petrus Lombardus] pars prima ( -quarta). (Quodlibeta sexdecim.), (Rome: Ex typographia Vaticana; A. Zannetti, 1596-1605), p. 11.↩︎

92. See Johannes de Turrecremata, Summa de Ecclesia (Venice: 1561), pt. 2, bk. 4, ch. 8.↩︎

93. See ibid., pt. 2, ck. 4, ch. 9.↩︎

94. See Ioannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, vol. 1. eds. Ceslaus Paban and Thomas Pègues, ([Turonibus: Cattier, 1907-1908), Prologus, q. 4, a. 2, ad arg. contra 5 et 6, concl., p. 58.↩︎

95. Ibid., prol., q. 1, a. 1, concl. 5.↩︎

96. Capreolus also provides an excellent response to the nominalist teaching concerning the analysis of the act of faith and the distinction between infused and acquired faith. See his articles connected to Sentences III, d. 23, 24. Nay, insisting upon St. Thomas’s analysis of faith, he sharply defends the distinction between credibilia and theological conclusions. He does write, “From the contents of the Bible that stand as principles in (theological) science, the saints have demonstratively inferred conclusions that are the concern of theology, by arguing against heretics from the principles of theology…. However, all these were implicitly contained in the Bible” (Defensiones, In I Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 2). However, what he teaches is that through their argumentation theologians explain the implicit sense of Scripture; he does not teach that consequences drawn from revealed truths are to be believed [by supernatural faith].↩︎

97. [Tr. note: Regarding the text of Scotus being used here, see note 67 above.]↩︎

98. Council of Trent, Decree on the Reception of the Sacred Books and Traditions (April 8, 1546) (Denzinger, no. 1501 [783]) and Council of Trent, Decree on the Vulgate Edition of the Bible and on the Manner of Interpreting Sacred Scripture (Denzinger, no. 1507 [786]).↩︎

99. [Tr. note: It does not seem that Fr. Schultes here means “credibility” in the technical sense of “rational credibility.”↩︎

100. See Peter de Soto, Institutiones christianae (Augustae Vindelicorum: 1548), bk. 1, ch. 2. Also, see Domingo de Soto, In IV Sent., d. 5, q. unica, a. 2.↩︎

101. See, in his excellent commentary on the Summa theologiae, ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7 and 10.↩︎

102. The term “article” is not here used in the same strict sense as it was by St. Thomas, as we explained above on page 64 but, rather, merely refers to the doctrine of faith.↩︎

103. See John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, De fide, disp. 6, a. 2. In a. 1, he sets forth Bañez’s teaching concerning how the articles are contained, as in a principle, in the truths concerning God’s existence and providence.↩︎

104. Ibid., no. 18.↩︎

105. Ibid., no. 20.↩︎

106. Ibid., no. 6.↩︎

107. Ibid., no. 14.↩︎

108. See Vincenzo Lodovico Gotti, Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica juxta mentem Divi Thomae Aquinatis, ([Venice, Ex Typographia Balleoniana, 1793]), De fide, q. 1, dub. 9.↩︎

109. Ibid., § 2, no. 7.↩︎

110. Ibid. no. 9.↩︎

111. Ibid., § 3, no. 13.↩︎

112. Ibid., §2, no. 9.↩︎

113. Ibid., §3, no. 11.↩︎

114. Contenson, De fide, bk. 7, diss. 2, ch. 1, spec. 3.↩︎

115. Cf. St. Thomas, ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7, ad 2 and 3.↩︎

116. Therefore, those who think that the Gospel contains only certain general ideas which are preserved in the midst of dogmatic development (such that the faith would thus remain unchanged) have strayed very far from the scholastic teaching regarding these matters (though, also, from the Church’s own teaching).↩︎

117. Gregory of Valencia, Commentaria theologica, De fide, disp. 1, q. 1, puncto 6.↩︎

118. See Francisco Suárez, [De legibus (quatuor ultimi libri)], De fide, ([Paris: Apud editores, 1841]), diss. 2, sect. 6.↩︎

119. See ibid., no. 4 and 5.↩︎

120. See ibid., no. 6.↩︎

121. See p. 68 in the original Latin.↩︎

122. See Suarez, De fide, diss. 2, sect. 6, no. 13.↩︎

123. Ibid., no. 14.↩︎

124. See, ibid., no. 16.↩︎

125. Ibid.↩︎

126. [Tr. note: I have here provided an object for a preposition “de” which is lacking one in the original Latin.]↩︎

127. Ibid., no. 18.↩︎

128. Ibid.↩︎

129. See Juan de Lugo, Tractatus de Fide, Spe, et Charitate Adm. R.P. Joannis de Lugo Soc. Jesu, De fide, ([Handschriftlich]), disp. 1, s. 7, no. 116­–130; cf. Christoph Haunold, Theologiae Speculativae Scholasticis Praelectionibvs Et Exercitiis Accomodatae Libri IV. Partibvs Svmmae D. Thomae Respondentes: Quibus Selecta Recentiorvm Theologorvm Placita, Ad Praecipuas Difficultates Expediendas Assumpta, Controvertuntur, (Ingolstadt: Knab, 1670), bk. 3, tr. 1 (De fide), ch. 1, contr. 5. In nos. 93ff, the latter establishes revelation, the Church, and the motives of credibility as partial motives of faith. On similar grounds, Miguel de Medina, O.F.M. ultimately resolved faith into the authority of the Church. See Miguel de Medina, Christianae paraenesis sive de recta in Deum fide libri septem, (Venice: Ziletti, 1564), bk. 5, ch. 11.↩︎

130. Haunold, Theologiae speculativae, bk. 3, tr. 1, ch. 1, no. 153.↩︎

131. Haunold, loc. cit.↩︎

132. Wirceburgenses, [Theologia dogmatica, polemica, scholastica, et moralis, 3^rd ed., vol. 6, (Paris: Berche et Tralian, 1879-1880)], 489.↩︎

133. Ibid., 492.↩︎

134. See Migne, Cursus theologicus, 1852.↩︎

135. Ibid., no. 8, col. 1125.↩︎

136. Louis Habert, D. Ludovici Habert, Sacrae Facultatis Parisiensis Doctoris...Theologia dogmatica et moralis: ad usum Seminarii Catalaunensis, planissima, critica, & solidissima methodo conscripta, nunc vero ad usum totius orbis litterarii: post plures editiones Parisienses & Venetas in Germania etiam secundis curis recusa, in VIII. tomos divisa, et a plurimis mendis sollicite purgata, (Augsburg: Vindel, 1771), De fide, III, 426, 427, 429.↩︎

137. It would take too long were we to quote all the scholastic authors [of this era]; therefore, we have exposited only the teachings and texts of the leading figures.↩︎

138. See no. 15 above.↩︎

139. Domingo Bañez, In ST II-II, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2.↩︎

140. Gregory of Valencia, Comment. Theol., De fide, disp. 1, q. 2, punct. 3.↩︎

141. Suarez, De fide, disp. 2, s. 6, no. 2.↩︎

142. See Domingo Bañez, In ST II-II, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2.↩︎

143. John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, De fide, d. 4, a. 1.↩︎

144. Suarez, De fide, disp. 12, s. 3, no. 1.↩︎

145. Ibid., disp., 2, ch. 6, no. 2.↩︎

146. Ibid., disp. 12, s. 3, no. 1↩︎

147. However, Benjamin Elbel (1690–1756) still distinguishes the various degrees of explicit faith: “For one is confused, another is distinct, one is also more confused than the other, and one is more distinct than the other” (Conf. 1, no. 15). Cf. [Pedro] Hurtado (1578–1651), De fide, disp. 43, s. 67, §33.↩︎

148. Similarly, see Babenstueber, Ethica supernaturalis Salisburgensis sive Cursus theologiae moralis [Georg Schlüter and Martin Happach, 1718], De fide, tr. 5, d. 1, a. 2, §2.↩︎

149. Sylvius, In ST II-II, q. 2, a. 6.↩︎

150. Gotti, Theologia scholastico-dogmatica, In ST II-II, q. 2, dub. 3, §1.↩︎

151. Petri Maria Gazzaniga, [Praelectiones theologiae: in usum suorum auditorum], De fide, ([Vienna: Typis Joannis Thomae de Trattner, 1763-1766]), diss. 4, no. 3.↩︎

152. See Paul Layman (bk. 2, tr. 1, ch. 8, no. 1), Paul Gabriel Antoine (pt. 1, ch. 1), Reifenstuel (tr. 4, d. 2, q. 2, no. 1), Elbel (Conf., 1, no. 15), Hermann Busenbaum (bk. 2, tr. 1, ch. 1) whom St. Alphonsus follows, Ioh. Cardenas (Crisis theol., diss. 14, ch. 1 , no. 1), Domenico Viva (Trutina theologica damnatarum thesium, in prop. 22 Innoc. XI).↩︎

153. See Bañez, In ST II-II, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2.↩︎

154. Gregory of Valencia, Comment., theol., De fide, disp. 1, q. 2.↩︎

155. Fulgenzio Cuniliati, Universæ theologiæ moralis accurata complexio instituendis canditatis accommodata [Blas Roman, 1773–74], tr. 4, ch. 1.↩︎

156. See Daniele Concina, Theologia Christiana dogmatico-moralis (1794), vol. 1, 94.↩︎

157. See Gotti, Theologia scholastico-dogmatica, De fide, q. 2, a. 3, §3.↩︎

158. Calvin, Institutes, bk. 3, ch. 2, §1.↩︎

159. See Schultes, Fides implicita, vol. 1, 10ff.↩︎

160. Thus, See G. Hoffmann, Die Lehre von der fides implicita innerhalb der katholischen Kirche (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906); Albrecht Ritschl and Otto Ritschl, Fides implicita: eine Untersuchung über Köhlerglauben, Wissen und Glauben, Glauben und Kirche,(Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1890); as well as Harnack, Seeberg, and others. Cf. Schultes, Fides implicita, vol. 1, 1–20 (and throughout).↩︎

161. Francisco de Toledo, [In Summam theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis enarratio: ex autographo in bibliotheca collegii Romani asservato, (Rome: Typis S. Congregationis de Propaganda Fide, 1869-1870]), II-II, q. 2, a. 5.↩︎

162. Gregory of Valencia, loc. cit.↩︎

163. Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, De fide, disp. 6, no. 109.↩︎

164. Gazzaniga, Praelectiones theologicae, De fide, diss. 4, no. 3. Thus, in his work, “What must be believed in order for one to be saved (Quae credenda sunt de necessitate salutis),” Gerson had already challenged the opinion of those who said: “The Church’s faith suffices for me; it suffices that I be saved in my parents faith of my parents; it suffices that I say, ‘I believe in God’” (Gerson, Opera omnia, vol. 1, 30). See Schultes, Fides implicita, vol. 1, 157ff.↩︎

165. We have refrained from referring to the teaching of modern theologians, given that theologians writing after the [First] Vatican Council generally follow one or another of the post-Tridentine authors, such that the teaching concerning this matter has hardly progressed. See Camillus Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis praelectiones scholastic-dogmaticae, [2nd ed.], (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1879), p. 224, 324; Sancto Schiffini, Tractatus De virtutibus infusis, (Fribourg: Herder, 1904), p. 302; Hugo Hurter, Medulla theologiae dogmaticae, 8^th ed., ([Innsburck: Wagneriana, 1908]), n. 9, 914; Giovanni Battista Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2^nd ed., (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta: 1875), sect. 4; Johann Baptist Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, 2^nd ed., vol. 2, (Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, [1881-1904]), bk. 2, §7; Matthias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, trans. Michael J. Miller (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019), vol. 1.1, 216 [also see 278–283].↩︎

166. See Cajetan, In ST I, q. 1, a. 1.↩︎

167. See Melchior Cano, De locis theologicis, bk. 6, ch. 8, ad 10 (no. 17); cf. bk. 5, ch. 5, no. 24.↩︎

168. See ibid., bk. 12, ch. 2, 5, 6; cf. bk. 5, ch. 5.↩︎

169. Ibid., ch. 12, ch. 5, no. 2.↩︎

170. Ibid.; cf. bk. 5, ch. 5.↩︎

171. See ibid., bk. 12, ch. 5, no. 2.↩︎

172. Ibid., no. 4.↩︎

173. See ibid., no. 5 and 8.↩︎

174. See ibid., no. 3.↩︎

175. Concerning Melchior Cano’s teaching, see Francisco Marin-Sola, “Melchior Cano et la conclusion théologique,” Revue thomiste 25 (1920), 1–13 .↩︎

176. See Suarez, De fide, disp. 3, ch. 11, no. 1.↩︎

177. See Kilbert, De fide, pt. 1, ch. 1, a. 2.↩︎

178. See John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, vol. 1, q. 1, disp. 2.↩︎

179. See Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, De fide, disp., 1, dub. 4, nos. 117, 118, and 146.↩︎

180. See Jean-Baptiste Gonet, Clypeus theologiae thomisticae, disp. Prooemialis, a. 3, §1, no. 22.↩︎

181. See Vincent Contenson, Theologia mentis et cordis, De fide, bk. 7, diss. 2, ch. 1.↩︎

182. See Charles-René Billuart, Summa sancti Thomae, prooem., a. 5 and 7.↩︎

183. See a. 7 below.↩︎

184. Suarez, De fide, disp. 19, ch. 2, no. 10.↩︎

185. See Migne, Cursus theologicus completus, vol. 1, col. 1111ff.↩︎

186. Ibid., 1131ff.↩︎

187. Ibid., 1127ff.↩︎

188. Ibid., 1130ff.↩︎

189. See ibid., 1133ff.↩︎

190. Johannes Antonius de Panormo, Scrutinium doctrinarum qualificandis assertionibus, thesibus, atque libris conducentium: exemplis propositionum à conciliis oecumenicis, vel ab Apostolica Sede reprobatarum ditatum, ac plerisque miscellaneis resolutionibus dogmatico-moralibus ad uberiorem censurarum theologicarum notitiam collimantibus refertum, (Rome: Bernabò, 1709), ch. 3, a. 5.↩︎

191. John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, vol. 1, q. 1, disp. 2, a. 1, no. 4.↩︎

192. See Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, De fide, disp., 1, dub. 4, nos. 117 and 124.↩︎

193. Billuart, Summa sancti Thomae, diss. prooem., a. 5.↩︎

194. See ibid., a. 7.↩︎

195. Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis, prop. 25.↩︎

196. See Louis Billot, De virtutibus infusis, 2^nd ed., vol. 1, (Rome: [Ex Typographia Iuvenum Opificum a S. Ioseph], 1905), thesis 8.↩︎

197. See Hurter, De virtutibus infusis (Rome: 1901), p. 253ff.↩︎

198. See Christiano Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, vol. 8, [4^th and 5^th ed.], ([Freiburg: Herder and Co.], [1912-1922]), prop. 15.↩︎

199. See [Johannes Vincentius] De Groot, Summa apologetica de ecclesia Catholicae: ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis, 3^rd ed. (Regensburg: Institutum Librarium Pridem G. J. Manz, 1906), q. 9, a. 1, 2.↩︎

200. See Parthenius Minges, Compendium theologiae [dogmaticae generalis, (Munich: Lentner, 1902)], 240–42.↩︎

201. He have already published part of what follows in Reginald Schultes, “De definibilitate conclusionum theologicarum,” Ciencia Tomista 23 (1921): 305–333.—For Fr. Marin-Sola’s objections to my position, see “Respuesta a un estudio histórico sobre la conclusión teológica,” Ciencia Tomista 24 (1921): 165–194; for my response, see “Responsio ad ‘Respuesta a un estudio histórico,’”Ciencia Tomista 25 (1922): 168–176.↩︎

202. Peter Soto, Institut. Christ., bk. 1, ch. 2.↩︎

203. Cajetan, Opusculum de Immaculato conception, ch. 1.↩︎

204. See Cano, De locis theologicis, bk. 12, ch. 5, no. 2.↩︎

205. Ibid., bk. 12, ch. 9, no. 13. Also see ibid., no. 14 (eight precept).↩︎

206. Francisco de Toledo, In ST II-II, q. 5, a. 3.↩︎

207. Luis de Molina, In ST I, q. 1, a. 2, disp. 1.↩︎

208. See Suarez, De fide, disp. 3, ch. 11, nos. 6 and 7.↩︎

209. See Vasquez, Commentaria In ST I, disp. 5, ch. 3.↩︎

210. Suarez, De fide, disp. 3, ch. 11, no. 11.↩︎

211. See ibid.↩︎

212. See De Lugo, De fide, disp. 1, ch. 13.↩︎

213. Ibid., no. 270.↩︎

214. See ibid., no. 273.↩︎

215. See Kilber, De fide, pt. 1, ch. 1, a. 2.↩︎

216. Ibid. (Migne, Cursus, vol. 6, 455).↩︎

217. Ibid (p. 458).↩︎

218. See John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus, In ST I, q. 1, disp. 2, a. 4.↩︎

219. See ibid., no. 3.↩︎

220. Ibid., concl. 1 (against Vasquez).↩︎

221. See ibid., concl. 2 (against Molina)↩︎

222. Ibid., no. 6.↩︎

223. See ibid., no. 8.↩︎

224. Ibid, no. 10.↩︎

225. Ibid., 13.↩︎

226. Ibid., no. 15.↩︎

227. Ibid. no. 12.↩︎

228. Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, De fide, disp. 1, dub. 4.↩︎

229. Ibid, no. 116.↩︎

230. Ibid., no. 117.↩︎

231. Ibid., no. 146.↩︎

232. Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, De fide, disp. 1, dub. 4, no. 122: “Discourse is twofold, namely, proper and improper. The former involves the movement of the intellect, from principles to effects, or from an effect to its principles, for it is a kind of progress from what is known to what is not known. The latter, however, does not include this kind of movement, but remaining, as it were, upon the same point, only explains in an inference, something that was not so clearly signified in the premises. For this reason, that inference is not called illative and property of butt, rather, only explicative. And rightly so, because it is not naturally suited to generate knowledge that is specifically different from the knowledge one has of the premises, which seems to be a property of discourse, but instead only perfects and illuminates the premises. Although the notion of discourse thus is found in such reasoning from the perspective of form, nonetheless it lacks a true case of illation or proof of a conclusion…” See Suarez, De fide, disp. 3, ch. 11, no. 6; Pesch, Praelectiones, vol. 8, no. 263; Francisco Marín-Sola, “La Homogeneidad De La Doctrina Católica,” in Ciencia Tomista 4 (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1911): p. 49ff.↩︎

233. See Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, De fide, disp. 1, dub. 4, no. 124.↩︎

234. Ibid., no. 144. The [First] Vatican Council uses nearly the same words.↩︎

235. [Tr. note: Involving the light of faith, but “natural” as regards the discursive activity.]↩︎

236. Billuart, Summa sanctae Thomae, vol. 1, Diss. Proaemial., a. 7 (cf. a. 5).↩︎

237. [Tr. note: As will be said later, this refers to different subjective concepts, not different objective concepts. See * below.↩︎

238. Montaigne, De censuris, a. 2, §1 (Migne, vol. 1, 1134ff).↩︎

239. Giovanni Lorenzo Berti, Opus de theologicis disciplinis: accedit in hac nova editione eiusdem auctoris Refutatio librorum, quorum titulis Bajanismus & Jansenismus redivivi, (Venice: Apud Joannem Baptistam Recurti, 1750), prologus, ch. 5, no. 5.↩︎

240. Hugo Hurter, Medulla theologiae dogmaticae, 8^th ed., ([Innsburck: Wagneriana, 1908]), no. 402.↩︎

241. Christiano Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, [4th and 5^th ed.], vol. 8, ([Freiburg: Herder and Co.], [1912-1922]), prop. 15.↩︎

242. Camillus Mazzella, De virtutibus infusis praelectiones scholastic-dogmaticae, [2nd ed.], (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1879), props. 18–20.↩︎

243. Louis Billot, De virtutibus infusis, 2^nd ed., vol. 1, (Rome: [Ex Typographia Iuvenum Opificum a S. Ioseph], 1905), 255ff.↩︎

244. [Johannes Vincentius] De Groot, Summa apologetica de ecclesia Catholicae: ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis, 3^rd ed. (Regensburg: Institutum Librarium Pridem G. J. Manz, 1906), q. 10, a. 6.↩︎

245. Gerard Van Noort, De fontibus revelationis, 3^rd ed., (Bussum: P. Brand, 1920), no. 197.↩︎

246. Gabriel Huarte, Synopsis de virtutibus infusis, [2nd ed.], (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, [1921]), thesis 8.↩︎

247. Giovanni Battista Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2^nd ed., (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta: 1875), 318.↩︎

248. Domenico Palmieri, Tractatus de Romano Pontifice: cum prolegomeno de ecclesia, 3rd ed., (Prati: Giachetti, 1902), p. 225.↩︎

249. See Édouard Hugon, Tractatus dogmatici, [5^th ed.], vol. 1 (De deo uno, etc.), ([Paris: Lethielleux, 1927]), 13ff.↩︎

250. Franz Diekamp, Katholische Dogmatik nach den Grundsätzen des hl. Thomas: zum Gebrauche bei Vorlesungen und zum Selbstunterricht, 3rd ed., vol. 1, (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1921), §6.↩︎

251. Johann Baptist Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, 2^nd ed., vol. 1, (Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, [1881-1904]), 544ff.↩︎

252. Matthias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, trans. Michael J. Miller (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019), vol. 1.1, §49.↩︎

253. Adolf Tanquerey, [Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae specialis, 14^th ed, vol. 1, (Rome: Typis Societatis Sancti Joannis Evangelistae, 1913)], no. 193 (which, however, wrongly imputes the opposed position to the Thomists).↩︎

254. Minges, Compendium theologiae, 240–42↩︎

255. See M. Tuyaerts, L’évolution du dogme (Louvain: Imprimerie Nova Vetera, 1919). See the criticism raised by Ambroise Gardeil, “Introduction á la Théologie,” in Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 9 ([Paris]: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1920), p. 648-665, see p. 653–658.↩︎

256. See Ambroise Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie, [2^nd ed., (Paris: [Librairie Victor Lecoffre J. Gabalda & C^ie], 1910)], 171–185.↩︎

257. See his articles “La homogeneidad de la doctrina catolica” from Ciencia Tomista from 1911 to 1920 (to be cited below at the end of this article.”. Also, see his “Melchior Cano et la conclusion théologique,” Revue thomiste 25 (1920): 1–13. [Tr. note: Also see, in the same year of the Revue Thomiste, 101–115.]. A similar thesis is held by Daniel Sola, SJ who says that it is “in fact, the most common” and “much more probable” position. See Daniel Sola, De gratia Christi et virtutibus infusis (Cuesta: Vallisoleti, 1919), nos. 619–20.↩︎

258. [Tr. note: I am taking “credibilitas” as not being used in the technical sense of “rational credibility.”]↩︎

259. Billuart, Summa sancti Thomae, vol. 1, dissert. Proem., a. 5.↩︎

260. Montaigne, De censuris, Migne, Cursus theologicus completus, vol. 1, 1138.↩︎

261. See Francisco Marín-Sola, “Origen y Naturaleza de la Moderna Fe Eclesiastica,” in La Ciencia tomista no. 68 (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1921): 160–173. The term, “fides ecclesiastica” seems to have been used in [its] new sense for the first time in 1644 by the Archbishop Péréfixe of Paris. See Tournely, De ecclesia, q. 5, a. 5.↩︎

262. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, vol. 8, no. 256; cf. Christiano Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, 4^th ed., vol. 1, ([Freiburg: Herder and Co.], 1915), no. 554.↩︎

263. Theophil Hubert Simar, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, [4^th ed.], vol. 1, [(Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1899)], §14.↩︎

264. Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, vol. 1, 301ff.↩︎

265. Billot, De virtutibus infusis, vol. 1, 265.↩︎

266. Van Noort, De fontibus revelationis, no. 246.↩︎

267. Diekamp, Katholische Dogmatik, §6.↩︎

268. Huarte, Synopsis de virtutibus infusis, thesis 8.↩︎

269. Michael Glossner, Lehrbuch der katholischen Dogmatik nach den Grundsätzen des heiligen Thomas: zum Gebrauche bei Vorsesungen und zum Selbststudium, vol. 1, (Regensburg: G.J. Manz, 1874), 132.↩︎

270. Schiffini, Tractatus De virtutibus infusis, 213–230.↩︎

271. Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie, 186.↩︎

272. Tuyaerts, L’évolution du dogme, 122.↩︎

273. “La Llamada “Fe Eclesiastica” Segun la Doctrina de Santo Tomas”, in La Ciencia Tomista no. 73, (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1922), p. 39-63.↩︎

274. Appealing to the teaching of St. Thomas just set forth, Nicholas Eymerich, in Directorium Inquisitorum, pt. 2, q. 2, nos. 1–4, states that a given statement is heretical “for one of three causes and reasons”: 1° “because it is opposed to a certain article”; 2° “because it is opposed to the determination of the Church in general as something made De fide (contra Ecclesiae generalis determinationem ut de fide factam)"; 3° “because it is opposed to the Sacred Scripture approved by the Church.” Similarly, his commentator Francisco Peña says that three things pertain to faith: a) directly, the articles; b) indirectly, “those things which, when denied, lead to the denial of an article of faith”; c) “those things deduced and defined by the Church.” Nichoas Eymerich and Francisco Peña, Directorium inquisitorum f. Nicolai Eymerici ordinis Praedicatorum, cum commentariis Francisci Pegņe, (Venice: Apud Marcum Antonium Zalterium, 1607), 82. [Tr. note: reading “Pegua as Pegna, as Francisco Peña is most often cited in Latin.]↩︎

275. [First] Vatican Council, De filius, ch. 3 (Denzinger, no. 3011 [1792]).↩︎

276. See ST I, q. 1, a. 2, 3, and 8, as well as parallel texts. The best exposition of this teaching can be found in Domenico de Marinis, Expositio commentaria in totam primam partem doctoris angelici (Lyon: 1662), q. 1, a. 3, ch. 3. Also see Raymond Martin, “L’objet integral de la théologie: d’après Saint Thomas et les scholastiques,” Revue thomiste 20 (1912): 12–21.↩︎

277. See [First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3070 [1836]).↩︎

278. See [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4.↩︎

279. ibid., ch. 3 (Denzinger, no. 3011 [1792]).↩︎

280. ibid., ch. 4, can. 3 (Denzinger, no. 3043 [1818]).↩︎

281. ibid., ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3020 [1800]).↩︎

282. ibid.↩︎

283. [First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3070 [1836]).↩︎

284. See ibid., ch. 4.↩︎

285. [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3020 [1800]).↩︎