Teleology and the Natural Law—Part I: Natural Intention, Inclination, and Per se Determination

In the intricate prooemium to his commentary on Saint John’s Gospel, Aquinas adumbrates the way some attain “a knowledge of God himself through authority”:

Some people arrived at a knowledge of God himself through authority, and this is the most efficacious way. For we see natural things [ea quae sunt in rebus naturalibus] acting on account of an end, and attaining useful and certain ends. And since they lack understanding, they are not able to direct themselves, but must be directed and moved through understanding [per intellectum] by another director. And hence it is that the motion of natural things to a certain end indicates the existence of something higher by which natural things are directed to an end and governed. And therefore, since the whole course of nature proceeds and is directed to an end in an orderly manner, we must posit something higher which directs and governs these things as Lord: and this is God.¹

A consideration of teleology mediates this approach to divine knowledge: “For we see things in nature acting on account of an end.” Aquinas even claims that the observation and analysis of teleological order is the “most efficacious way” to theological cognition. The overarching influence of end is here considered under two aspects. First, Aquinas considers end vis-à-vis the creature. Secondly, he considers the end vis-à-vis God. Aquinas notes that a fundamentally teleological orientation governs even those beings that “lack understanding.” An absence of native active intelligence manifests itself (and results) in the inability of self-direction. Nonetheless, the presence of an end implies a certain intrinsic orientation and (even in the absence of self-direction) a directedness towards an end. In other words, the nature of an end still necessitates the contemporaneous presence of intellectuality in some form. The de facto orientation of non-self-directed-beings to an end attests to the existence of “something higher which directs and governs” even non-self-directed-beings. This “something higher” is God, the source both of contingent being and of its concurrent teleological orientation.

The importance of teleology even in natural beings (in rebus naturalibus) is difficult to overestimate.² The end is one of the first principles of intelligibility in the orders of both being and action. If there were no final causality, there would be no active and formal principle.³ Every act is only possible and intelligible vis-à-vis an end. Moreover, “in acting, every agent intends an end.”⁴ The Dominican commentator Sylvester Ferrariensis, in his commentary on ScG III, c. 2, no. 1, explains the logic behind this conclusion:

The impetus [impetus] of every agent tends to something certain: sometimes to an action itself, sometimes to something done through the action. Therefore, every agent in acting intends an end—either the action [itself] when the action does not terminate in something done, or something done through the action, if something is effected through it.⁵

“Impetus” is the “actual inclination and motion of the agent,” and this inclination terminates either in the action itself as end or in something effected through the action as end.⁶ Acts only occur for the sake of an end, and acts arise from and manifest the nature of the agens. As the causa causarum, the final cause exercises an influence upon contingent beings (at least) insofar as it shapes and directs their fundamental orientation and specifies their potency for natural fulfillment.⁷

Moreover, as Aquinas says in the prooemium to his commentary on Saint John’s Gospel, the existence of order—even in the ontological constitution of natural beings—profoundly testifies to the presence of divine intelligence and the order it imparts in all created being: “Since the whole course of nature proceeds and is directed to an end in an orderly manner, we must posit something higher which directs and governs these things as Lord: and this is God.”⁸ Teleological order permeates all being. “Things that know their end are ordered to the end in the same way as things which do not know it.”⁹ God creates every contingent being (rational and non-rational).¹⁰ God’s providence extends to all of the beings he creates—he creates them exactly as providentially governed beings.¹¹ God’s providence is per se teleological.¹² And God’s providential teleology extends even to the intrinsic ontological constitution of the beings he creates. Aquinas is adamant about this point, and he criticizes those who do not appreciate its truth and importance:

He [Aristotle] rejects an external mover which would move these bodies per se after they obtained their specific form [postquam sunt formam specificam sotita]. For light things are indeed moved upward, and heavy bodies downward, by the generator inasmuch as it gives them the form upon which such motion follows, but they are moved per accidens, and not per se, by whatever removes an obstacle to their motion. However, some have claimed that after bodies of this kind have received their form, they need to be moved per se by something extrinsic. It is this claim that the Philosopher rejects here.¹³

Motion follows from the intrinsic principle of being: form. The educed form specifically constituting a natural being is its active and ordering principle. This motional order is rooted in the very nature of the being itself. Thus, the natural being is ordered to an end per se—through its nature and essence. And all of this arises from God’s universal causality.

The recognition of divinely imparted teleological orientation in all contingent beings is the foundation for Aquinas’s consideration of the natural law in the Summa theologiae. Although Aquinas’s articulation of natural law doctrine is well-known, explicit considerations of the natural law occur infrequently in the Thomistic corpus.¹⁴ Aquinas’s formal discussion of the natural law in the Summa theologiae is quite discrete.¹⁵ However, “natural law” as a per se teleological principle has a universally applicable, transcendental relevance to all of created reality in general and human nature in particular. Considered under this formal aspect, the natural law (insofar as it is founded in the eternal law) is a sine qua non of Aquinas’s theology. And to the extent that the science of theology is concerned with all beings (under theology’s proper formal object), it is essentially and necessarily teleological.¹⁶ Because all being is per se subject to the eternal law, all being is teleologically constituted.¹⁷ There are no “end-less” beings. Because all beings have a nature, they have a concurrent end. Thus, in a real intrinsic-natural sense, we can speak of all being (even non-rational, inanimate, natural beings) as possessing final intentionality. Of course, the use of “intention” is analogical. James A. Weisheipl, O.P., explains:

This is not to say that inanimate beings have consciousness or knowledge of their aim. While it is true to say that such terms as “aim,” “desire,” “appetite,” “intentionality,” etc. are primarily used in the context of human activity, the analogical use of these terms with regard to inanimate movement does not mean to imply consciousness of aim in the bodies themselves. However, this aim does imply Supreme Intelligence which directs natural things.¹⁸

He refers to this inherent ontological directedness as a being’s “intrinsic intentionality of purpose.”¹⁹ “Every agent, both natural and voluntary, intends an end [intendit finem], though it does not follow that every agent knows the end [cognoscat finem] or deliberates about the end [vel diliberet de fine].”²⁰ Hence, properly speaking, intention is “pre-cognitive” and “pre-deliberative.” The existence of a nature and the existence of an end are per se concurrent. Weisheipl adds: “‘Nature’ cannot be the source of mere activity, but it must primarily aim at some achievement acquired through movement.” In other words, “just as all movement implies some ‘aim,’ the spontaneous source of movement necessarily has some aim in view.”²¹ Nature as “the spontaneous source of movement” is necessarily and essentially ordered to an end, even before it gives rise to actions ordered to an end.²²

While an end is a prerequisite for teleological cognition and deliberation, teleological cognition and deliberation are emphatically not a prerequisite for the actual existence of a natural end. The end is first, simpliciter. If there is a nature there is a natural end. Period. This is an essential point within Aquinas’s doctrine: teleology does not per se require cognition or deliberation.²³ Teleological cognition and deliberation is appropriate to beings “whose actions are not determined” to specific ends (i.e. voluntary agents), because it is exactly through teleological cognition and deliberation that they determine their actions vis-à-vis an end. The end is, per se and by definition, the motional term. It determines the action. However, in the case of purely “natural agents” (non-volitional), their actions are determined (actiones determinatae). Thus, “it is not necessary [for them] to choose [eligere] the things which are for the end [i.e. the “means to the end,” ea quae sunt ad finem].”²⁴ Their teleological order to specific ends is naturally predetermined. Moreover, exactly as naturally determined towards certain ends, in the case of natural agency there are no possible varied means to the end. Because the nature of a natural being is concurrently constituted with a per se orientation to a determinate end, the means are naturally predetermined. The constitution of a natural being with a specific nature and its per se order to a determined end is the cause of the predetermination of the means. Such natural agency is per se ordered to an end. Such per se order is, by nature, non-variable and therefore non-deliberative. This non-deliberative teleological orientation arises because the nature itself is inner-determined to its end and its actions.²⁵ Aquinas defends the intrinsic orientation of non-deliberative (i.e. natural) agency as authentically teleological by comparing it to voluntary agency: “since the voluntary agent, not the natural agent, deliberates, it can be argued that if a voluntary agent sometimes acts without deliberation then a fortiori the natural agent can act for an end without deliberation.”²⁶ He also maintains that the teleological orientation of non-deliberative agency is authentically (albeit, analogically) intentional: “this intending [hoc intendere, i.e. the ‘intending’ of natural beings] is nothing other than the natural inclination [naturalem inclinationem] to something.”²⁷ Here, Aquinas explicitly expresses natural intention as inclination. Inclination is foundationally a creature’s per se (essential, pre-cognitional) intentional order to an end. “To say that a natural agent intends an end is simply to say that it has a natural inclination to perform the activities by which that end can be achieved.”²⁸ We might also describe this “natural intention” or “natural inclination” as “physical intention” or “physical inclination” (insofar as the intention or inclination proceeds per se from the nature [physis] of the natural being).²⁹

This distinction between the teleologies of natural agency and voluntary agency stems from the differing principles of their respective actions. “Every agent acts through nature [i.e. a natural agent] or through intellect [i.e. a voluntary agent].”³⁰ Both act for the sake of an end but in different ways: the voluntary agent’s actions are not predetermined vis-à-vis the end (and therefore deliberation about action is required), while the natural agent’s actions are predetermined vis-à-vis the end (by its very nature, and therefore no deliberation is possible).

Intellectual agents act for the sake of an end: they preconceive in their intellects that which occurs through the action; and they act from such preconception; this is to act through intellect. Just as the entire likeness of an effect [tota similitudo effectus] achieved by the actions of an intelligent agent exists in the intellect that preconceives it, so, too, does the likeness of a natural effect [similitudo naturalis effectus] pre-exist in the natural agent; and from this [ex qua] the action is determined to a definite effect [ad hunc effectum determinatur]. For fire generates [generat] fire, and an olive an olive. Therefore, as a [volitional] agent through intellect tends [tendit] to a determined end through his action, so does a [natural] agent through its nature [tend to a determined end]. Therefore, every agent acts for an end.³¹

The essential difference between volitional agents and natural agents is seen in the intellectual preconception (in intellectu praeconcipiente) of the “entire likeness of the [action’s] effect” in the intellect of the former, and in the natural preexistence of the “likeness of the natural effect” (praeexistit similitudo naturalis effectus) in the nature of the latter (in agente naturali). Natural agents are per se determined and ordered to their effects. Thus, fire generates fire and not a cat; and an olive generates an olive and not a stone. Volitional agents are not per se ordered, and their determination is intellectual in origin—it is reached per intellectum; preconceiving the action and its effects vis-à-vis the end. The essential difference between volitional agency and natural agency is predicated upon this formal difference. The actional form of the volitional agent is an intellectually preconceived similitude of order to an end. The actional form of the natural agent, however, is the inclination of the natural form itself to an end. Sylvester Ferrariensis explains the formal origin of the difference between intellectual intention and physical inclination:

The end [ultimum] that the natural agent intends through its action is the likeness of form through which it acts; as the end [ultimum] that an agent [i.e. i.e. a volitional agent] intends through the intellect is that to which he is assimilated through his preconception. The impetus of an agent [i.e. a natural agent] follows the inclination of the form through which it operates.³²

Their intrinsic teleological constitution explains why natural beings are ordered to their end per se. An intellectual preconception of an actional form is not a necessary precondition for the execution of their proper actions. Rather, their natural form is itself the preexistent principle of their proper action. The actional effect flows directly and essentially from its nature. Thus, natural agents are per se determined and ordered to their effects.

The per se determination and order of natural agency is essentially foundational to Aquinas’s account of teleology. Metaphysically, it is the most basic and fundamental instance of teleological order in contingent reality. The entirety of his teleological doctrine is dependent upon this most fundamental increment of being: the per se order and determination of natural agency.

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1. “Quidam enim per auctoritatem Dei in ipsius cognitionem pervenerunt; et haec est via efficacissima. Videmus enim ea quae sunt in rebus naturalibus, propter finem agere, et consequi utiles et certos fines; et cum intellectu careant, se ipsa dirigere non possunt, nisi ab aliquo dirigente per intellectum dirigantur et moveantur. Et hinc est quod ipse motus rerum naturalium in finem certum, indicat esse aliquid altius, quo naturales res diriguntur in finem et gubernantur. Et ideo cum totus cursus naturae ordinate in finem procedat et dirigatur, de necessitate oportet nos ponere aliquid altius, quod dirigat ista et sicut dominus gubernet: et hic est Deus” (Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura, no. 3). My translation.↩︎

2. The universality of teleology—which extends even to natural beings—is a reoccurring theme in Aquinas’s thought. For example, he makes the following comment in the second question of the Summa Theologiae: “For we see that anything which lacks cognition, namely, natural bodies, operate on account of an end” (“Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem” [STh I q. 2, a. 3]).↩︎

3. See ScG III, c. 2, especially no. 3. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from the five-volume English translation of the Summa contra Gentiles published by the University of Notre Dame Press in 1975 and translated with an introduction and notes by Anton C. Pegis, F.R.S.C., James F. Anderson, Charles J. O’Neill, and Vernon J. Bourke.↩︎

4. “Omne agens in agendo intendit aliquem finem” (ScG III, c. 2, no. 1). Emphasis added.↩︎

5. Commentary on ScG III, c. 2, no. 1: “Omnis agentis impetus ad aliquid certum tendit: quandoque qidem ad actionem ipsam; quandoque vero ad aliquid factum per actionum. Ergo omne agens in agendo intendit finem: aut actionem, quando actio non terminator ad aliquod factum; aut operatum per ipsam, si aliquid per ipsam efficiatur.”↩︎

6. “Impetus, idest actualis inclinatio et motio, agentis” (ibid.). Emphasis original.↩︎

7. “Nature as an active principle is a spontaneous source of purposeful activities, determined characteristics which are for the fulfillment of the individual” (James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages, ed. William E. Carroll [Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985], 25).↩︎

8. Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura, no. 3.↩︎

9. ScG III, c. 2, no. 4.↩︎

10. “Every being in any way existing is from God” (STh I, q. 44, a. 1).↩︎

11. “For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government… As there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government” (STh I, q. 103, a. 5).↩︎

12. “It is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing’s ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern” (STh I, q. 103, a. 1). “In fact, to order to the end, to direct, is the very ratio of divine providence” (Oscar J. Brown, Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1981], 8).↩︎

13. In I De caelo, 18, no. 1. Emphasis added. Moreover, in his commentary on the Physics, Aquinas says: “In like manner, the one who casts down the pillar did not give the heavy object resting upon it the impetus or inclination to be downward, for it had that from the first generator, which gave it the form upon which that inclination follows” (In VIII Phys., 8, no. 7). Emphasis added. Weisheipl concludes from these two passages of Aquinas’s commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus that “the important point is that once a particular body is in existence, there is no need for an agent constantly acting upon it to account for its activity. The body itself acts” (Nature and Motion, 20). Emphasis original.↩︎

14. “Although Thomas Aquinas is rightly looked to as a major proponent of natural law… it is oddly true that there is only one place in the vast body of his writings where he engages in an extended and formal discussion of law and its various kinds” (Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, rev. ed. [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997], 40).↩︎

15. STh I-II, q. 94.↩︎

16. Here we are considering the teleological nature of the sacra doctrina vis-à-vis the teleological nature of all beings as they considerable under the light of faith—the teleological order of natural beings is preserved even in their consideration within the sacra doctrina. However, it is worth noting that Aquinas also articulates the very form and origin (quoad nos) of the sacra doctrina in teleological terms: “It was necessary for man’s salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God [doctrinam quandam secundum revelationem divinam]… because man is directed to God, as to an end [sicut ad quendam finem]” (STh I, q. 1, a. 1). The sacra doctrina arises out of a supernatural teleological orientation and this teleological orientation is the form that specifies the science (see STh I, q. 1, a. 2). Theology is formally teleological. See Thomas de Vio Cajetan’s commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1.↩︎

17. STh I-II, q. 93, a. 1.↩︎

18. Nature and Motion, 22 fn. 95. Emphasis original.↩︎

19. Ibid., 26.↩︎

20. On the Principles of Nature, c. 3. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from On the Principles of Nature are taken from Ralph McInerny’s translation in Saint Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 18-29. In this instance, however, McInerny’s translation has been adjusted to reflect the literal sense of Aquinas’s Latin.↩︎

21. Weisheipl, Natura and Motion, 22.↩︎

22. Weisheipl uses the word “spontaneous” to mean intrinsic order of nature to an end (see ibid., 9-10).↩︎

23. Of course, here we are speaking of the cognition proper to contingent beings, not the ratio of God’s eternal law.↩︎

24. On the Principles of Nature, c. 3.↩︎

25. In his helpful commentary on Aquinas’s On the Principles of Nature, Joseph Bobik summarizes Aquinas’s teaching on this point: “A natural agent neither selects its end, nor chooses the means thereto. The actions of a natural agent are set or determined by its nature, just as, and because, the ends which it pursues are determined by that same nature” (Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the De principiis naturae and the De mixtione elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998], 38). Emphasis added.↩︎

26. On the Principles of Nature, c. 3.↩︎

27. Ibid.↩︎

28. “It is possible for a natural agent to intend an end without deliberating either about that end or about the means thereto” (Bobik, Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements, 39).↩︎

29. While Aquinas’s exact terminology is generally preferable, we will occasionally employ the terms “physical intention” and “physical inclination” rather than “natural intention” or “natural inclination” in these essays in order to maintain consistent clarity regarding the subject of our terms: the per se teleological order stemming from a natural being’s nature (physis) and not “natural” as opposed to “supernatural” or “graced.” The significance of this clarity will become evident as our analysis proceeds.↩︎

30. “Omne agens vel agit per naturam, vel per intellectum” (ScG III, c. 2, no. 6). My translation (emphasis added). Of course, because the will is the rational appetite, the “intellectual agent” and the “volitional agent” are secundum res identical and will be regarded as synonymous for the purposes of this analysis.↩︎

31. “De agentibus autem per intellectum non est dubium quin agant propter finem: agunt enim praeconcipientes in intellectu id quod per actionem consequuntur, et ex tali praeconceptione agunt; hoc enim est agere per intellectum. Sicut autem in intellectu praeconcipiente existit tota similitudo effectus ad quem per actiones intelligentis pervenitur, ita in agente naturali praeexistit similitudo naturalis effectus, ex qua actio ad hunc effectum determinatur: nam ignis generat ignem, et oliva olivam. Sicut igitur agens per intellectum tendit in finem determinatum per suam actionem, ita agens per naturam. Omne igitur agens agit propter finem” (ScG III, c. 2, no. 6). My translation (emphasis added).↩︎

32. “Ultimum enim quod per suam actionem intendit agens naturale, est similitudo formae per quam agit; sicut ultimum quod intendit agens per intellectum, est id cui per suam praeconceptionem assimilatur: impetus enim agentis sequitur inclinationem formae per quam operatur” (Commentary on ScG III, c. 2, no. 5). Emphasis added.↩︎