From Unity to Distinction to Unity: A Recovery of the Vocabulary of Various Mental Distinctions
Although man, angel, and God are all intellectual beings, human intellectuality is marked by the particular condition of our being embodied-spiritual knowers. In order to emphasize this distinct character of human intellection, it is traditional to refer to human nature as “rational” (in a sense that is thereby specifically different from “intelligent” or “intellectual”) or as “discursive”. Technically, the latter is an imperfect designation, for the “rational” character of our intellect marks not only our discursive, syllogizing mode of cognizing, but also the complex nature of our judgments, as well as the composite character of the definitions that we form concerning realities. This strictly rational character of our knowing is reflected in the way that we “objectify” realities. In another series of postings on To Be a Thomist, I sketched out a number of relevant aspects of this process while considering the noetics and metaphysics of second intentions, the subject of logic. Presently, I would like to consider the topic of distinctions.
I find that many scholastic presentations of the metaphysics and logic of distinction tend to become very technical and difficult. Moreover, I have found that various accounts differ in important ways, often not necessarily overlapping in terminology. Doubtlessly, part of this has to do with the history of how these discussions developed in later scholasticism, with various schools often cross pollinating each other, if only by way of reaction.1
I have learned in my years of tutelage as a Thomistthat it is useful to listen to voices that are trusted sources. Dialectically, this is the safest and correct way to approach a topic. Extrinsic certainty is not the same as demonstration. Nonetheless, the extrinsic certainty of a trusted authority does suffice for grounding solid and probable certainty.2 And, moreover, such authorities enable us to work backwards into a tradition, so that we avoid becoming somewhat lost reconstructing the past on our own when there have indeed been interpreters of human thought for centuries intervening between our day and the past. For this reason, I personally have found in both philosophy and theology some version of the “regressive method” spoken of by Gardeil to be an important and essential methodology for human knowing in general.3
Therefore, based on the authority of the status that Austin Woodbury, S.M., has reached for me, I have chosen to follow him in crafting this pedagogical presentation of the Thomist philosophical4 apparatus of distinctions, with particular attention given to those which are formed by the human mind knowing reality. Although Woodbury is not at all a figure who is universally known, I have personally experienced sufficient confirmation of the solidity of his thought and exposition of the Thomist tradition so as to give him initial credence regarding a topic of great complexity. That being said, it may well be the case that other schemas treating this matter provide certain precisions that are lacking in his presentation. Nonetheless, I believe that there is a kind of clear solidity to his development of the scholasticism of his day, meriting consideration in via inventionis. I can only invite the reader into the trust that I have gained for Fr. Woodbury, whose works—though variously derivative from scholastic manuals of his day5—are marked by his own particular synthetic genius. To the advanced reader, who has made it this far, my choice here might be frustrating, for perhaps such a reader would prefer a more baroque account, or one that does enter into some of the thornier details about sub-distinctions within the kinds of distinction that I lay out here, or perhaps merely a textual study gathering everything Thomas said about distinction. However, it is my desire, by representing an account inspired by Woodbury, to provide an entry into this topic in a way that is not merely the repetition of this or that tradition or text but, rather, a real manuducatio, perhaps pedagogical but also as a kind of living representation of a tradition.
***
When addressing matters like the current theme, I often find that I must stress the distinction between “thing” and “object.” It is one of those distinctions that is often overlooked, despite the fact that it may well be quoad nos the most important philosophical distinction to make (even if quoad se the most important distinction in reality is the real distinction between act and potency, especially the signal case of existence and essence in finite beings).6 For the purposes of this text, it is merely important to recall the following.
It is possible to consider a given reality in a merely “material way,” setting out of consideration how that reality might be formally considered by a given knower. A classic, but very clear example of this would be to speak of God Himself. The very expression itself requires us to go further and ask: but under what aspect? From what perspective? For God can be known: by God Himself comprehensively as Triune Deity; by the blessed non-comprehensively but immediately as Triune Deity; by the metaphysician as First Cause of Being, inferentially known under the light of metaphysics (being as being); by the natural philosopher as First Cause of Motion, inferentially known under the light of natural philosophy (being as mobile); etc. All of these latter aspects or perspectives refer to God as an object. And, indeed, God can also become the object of the will under different aspects as well (e.g., theological hope or charity). In all of these cases, one thing (or “reality,” res) has multiple objectifications.
This will suffice for our purposes. The human intellect must manifoldly objectify the realities precisely because the human intellect is that lowest of all intellects. God does not know by way of distinctions, but we do. The simplicity of realities must be manifoldly objectified if we are to define, judge, and reason about reality.
Let us consider the act of definition, which I have discussed elsewhere in greater detail on To Be a Thomist.7 When we strive to define something, the intellect forms a hierarchy of genera and species. Thus, when we consider something like contacts or eye-glasses, we can also work out8 the genus corrective lens. Or, to choose from among natural beings: a red maple is a tree and a living thing.
Different metaphysical accounts will explain the way that such genera and species are (and are not) distinct. Are they distinct mind-independently, so that there would be ontological “strata” in the nature of red maple, such that there would be not only tree but even, for example, bodily substance—long before any mind ever considered such things, indeed even if no mind ever considered such things? To those who are well-informed of the history of scholasticism, an issue such as this had important ramifications during the period of condemnations surrounding the positions held by various “arts” masters and, in several cases, Thomas himself. And, moreover, this sort of matter—as well as other issues—would lead someone like Bl. Duns Scotus to exposit a kind of halfway house between real and non-real distinctions, known as a “formal” distinction. In this account, however, I cannot give a fair representation of Scotus’s position (or that of his school, which was perhaps more historically important than his own exact thought), though his “formal distinction” is important in the historical development of these topics.9
Returning to the main thread, however, let us consider very quickly what is required for a real distinction. Such a distinction requires that a given set of objects designate realities which are indeed completely distinct prior to human cognition. Such a real distinction can occur either: between two realities which are so distinct that neither is a “manner” or “mode” of the other (such as man and horse, house and tractor, oak and elm, oak and temperance, Fr. Ivan and Fr. Vasyl, etc.); or between two realities that are ontologically distinct, although one is a “mode” of the other and therefore involving some reference thereto (a line and its curvedness,10 a human substance and the intellect,11 etc.). The first such real distinction is known as real-real, the second real-modal.12
Human intellection, however, can consider objects which themselves are multiple and different, despite the fact that the reality (res) is one and the same.13 Now, such distinctions can take place in two very different ways. At some point in the history of the Western scholastic tradition, one came to speak of “distinction of reasoning reason” (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis) and “distinction of reasoned reason” (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae).14 I must admit that I have often found this Latinate language to be obfuscatory, like an intellectual incantation. However, for the person who thinks in Latin sufficiently, it is illuminating.15 A distinction of reasoning reason is a very weak distinction, formed precisely because reason has been reasoning, but it is not intrinsically founded in reality. Wallace cites the example of man and rational animal16 though, for reasons to be mentioned below, it would be better to say the distinction between Tully and Cicero. And, its contrasted correlate, distinction of reasoned reason, can be said to “have a reason” in reality, an intrinsic foundation upon reality, not being something that merely and solely arises from human reasoning. A classic example is drawn from the Porphyrian tree (body, living, animal, man).17
I find it interesting, however, that Woodbury—who most certainly knows of this division—does not structurally18 utilize this language but, rather, distinguishes against “real” distinctions those which are mental, sub-distinguishing the latter into conceptual and nominal. To a degree, this division does parallel reasoned reason and reason reasoning, but I hesitate to say that they are completely the same (although the division is quite close seeming). We will begin by considering conceptual distinctions and then move onto nominal ones.
From the start, an important observation must be registered regarding conceptual distinctions. Often, these distinctions will be referred to as “virtual.” This is not completely incorrect, but the term “virtual” does imply a slight perspective shift. Whereas conceptual refers to the noetic distinction among objective concepts,19 virtual refers to the metaphysical foundation for this distinction. The latter is summarized well by Woodbury thus: “A virtual distinction is in the intrinsic eminence of a given thing (or reality). While the reality in question remains the same in itself, it offers—through a simple containment of perfections—the intellect a foundation for distinguishing one of these perfections from one another.”20 That is: we speak of a virtual foundation to refer to the reality in question serving as a foundation for the distinction in question, a distinction which remains only on the objective-conceptual side. Thus, in the real reality which serves as a foundation for the virtual distinction, this distinction is not actual (somewhat like the “formal distinction” of the Scotists) but, rather, is only virtual, in the sense that the reality in question serves as a cause of distinction, having “a distinguibility and foundation for an actual distinction, which is actualized only in [and by] the intellect.”21
In other words: the one thing (or one reality) offers the intellect many objects, which are grasped and coordinated by the knower through the various operations of the intellect. This is so important that it bears repeating: a conceptual distinction (which is founded upon a virtual distinction, in the reality in question) takes place, because a given reality is far too rich in its being for us to grasp in a single concept or, to put it another way, to “objectify” it in a single way. The one reality must be objectified in many ways, whether through various genera and species, or according to various objective concepts that all apply to one and the same reality.22
We will first consider the greater or “more distinct distinction” among the conceptual distinctions, namely the major conceptual distinction. We use this distinction all the time in our reasoning; it exists between a genus and its species. Thus, one and the same reality of red maple can be referred to as a plant, so too can we say a ladle is a utensil, and a church is a building. In all of these cases, whether we are considering a concrete red oak, ladle, or church or merely the general notion thereof, our mind is presented with a species that belongs to a given genus (plant, utensil, building). According to the broader Thomistic metaphysical account, this does not require there to be different “strata” within one and the same being, such that red oak would formally and actually also be—prior to the intellect’s consideration—tree, plant, etc. Rather, this generic structure is intellectually sought out as we attempt to define reality by way of the activity of the first operation of the intellect.23
It is not as though the human mind completely fabricates this distinction. Although there is not an actual and formal foundation in reality for the distinction of genus-species notions, there is a virtual foundation, which suffices to ground human apprehension.
However, we should note a first important observation: the reality plant can be found in many different beings: maple, oak, tomato, goldenrod, grass, parsley, etc. Because of the nature of the genus-species relation, the genus (plant) can be found in many other realities than merely in the species red oak. In other words, the two objective concepts (plant and red oak), although not existing separately in the reality that is red oak, are separated conceptually and metaphysically by a very great gulf. This is one of the marks of a major conceptual distinction.
To push further into the reason for this, we can say that, in such cases, something found in the inferior, specific concept is not contained, objectively and actually, in the superior generic concept. The standard example that is used is that between animal and man, such that the latter is specified by the specific distinction “rational.” However, the examples given in the previous paragraph are equally susceptible to the same point, given the nature of the genus-species relation involved in each. This conceptual distinction is founded on the fact that when we intellectually isolate a genus, we express objective precision regarding that concept: “inadequately” conceiving the reality by not regarding all of its predicates but, rather, simply omitting some of them.24
This process of providing “objective precision” marks the superior (generic) objective concept in an important way: the species is in act what the genus is in potency. In other words, the specific difference added to the genus can be said to, in a way, actualize the objective content of the genus. Therefore, the relationship between genus and species is one of potency and act (in the order of formal causality).
This brings us, therefore, to the case in which there is no such potency-act relationship, and thus we come to the “tighter” or “less distinct” sort of conceptual distinction, namely the minor conceptual distinction.
Recall again the example concerning the relationship between plant and maple, oak, tomato, goldenrod, grass, parsley, etc. I noted the fact that plant can be found in tomato, in parsley, in oak, etc. This indicates a kind of “loose-ish” bond between genus and its species. Do we know of a “tighter” objective bond between notions and realities? Indeed we do: between a given reality and its properties. As is well known to those who have studied logic, a property (in the strictest sense) is a predicable designating that something belongs only, necessarily, and always to a given species and its members. For example, to be political or to be religious are properties of the species man.25 To be political (like to be rational or, as is often said, to be capable of laughter) is a reality that can only be predicated of man, that necessarily belong to man, and that always belong to him (at least radically).
Thus, because of the tight coupling between political and man, we stand in need of a different kind of distinction, one that is not so great or “major” as the major conceptual distinction found between genus and species. Therefore, we speak of the aforementioned minor conceptual distinction. Thus, for example, between a given reality, and its metaphysical properties26 there is only a minor distinction of this kind. The same is the case for the relationship between what is to be defined and its definition (for the definition explicitly and distinctly expresses what is implicitly and confusedly contained in the “definitum”).27 Traditionally it has been said that this relationship involves no objective precision (as was the case for genus-species) relations but, rather, only formal precision, meaning that each of the objective concepts in question confusedly and implicitly attains the others. Thus, man confusedly and implicitly contains what is defined by rational animal, political animal confusedly and implicitly contains what is defined by rational animal (and vice-versa), religious animal confusedly and implicitly contains what is defined by cultural animal (and vice-versa), etc.28
Among the divine names, many of them are only distinct in this way. (We will briefly see below how certain divine names are only nominally distinct.) Thus, between the notions of Uncreated29 Mercy and Uncreated Beauty, there is only a minor conceptual distinction, for none of the divine names can be considered as involving some sort of potency in relation to the others. That is: when the divine names enable us to formally-eminently30 (and hence analogically) attain God, they cannot attain Him through an analogical notion that would intrinsically designate some kind of potency in a relationship to other notions.
But there is an important aspect to be remembered, perhaps not foregrounded by Woodbury in a clear enough way here:31 among the various divine names, there is a kind of ordering. Thus, we presuppose the notion of Deity, as the super-eminent name of God. Uncreated Being is presupposed for Uncreated Truth and Uncreated and Ever-Actual Knowledge. The Divine Willing is presupposed for our knowledge of God’s Science of Approbation, but it is not presupposed for our knowledge of His Science of Simple Intelligence concerning all possible realities. Moreover, there are some divine names that presuppose God’s activity in creation and the economy of salvation: Creator, Uncreatedly Provident One, Uncreated Judge of all Things, Uncreated Savior-God, etc. These names very clearly presuppose all of the divine names that are true of God even were He never to have created anything (e.g., Uncreated Goodness, Uncreated Truth, Uncreated Beauty, etc.).32
Something similar can be said for the case of the transcendentals as well. Classically, the transcendentals are said to have a minor conceptual distinction among them (although, as we will see below, certain transcendentals are perhaps only distinct by way of nominal distinction). Thus, although being and truth are not related to each other as genus and species, nonetheless there is a real sense in which being has preeminence among the various transcendentals, although something would, indeed be missing from our grasp of being, if we did not explicate the others: truth as being-as-intelligible, goodness as being-as-appetible (i.e., as terminating any desire, whether natural or elicited33), etc. And, moreover, we grasp something more about the other transcendentals when we focus back upon the others, thus we can consider: truth as manifesting a formality such that it can “goodly” terminate desire, goodness as being unified as specifying an end, etc.
This difference of implication-explicitation, seems to indicate that there are two different sorts34 of such explication. Normally, I reserve the relationship of implication and explication for the case of definition, where the definitum (e.g., man) is more distinctly expressed by the definition (e.g., rational animal). And generally, this seems to be the best way to express this point, in order to avoid confusing together such definitional explication, on the one hand, and objectively illative reasoning, on the other.
However, the case of metaphysical properties is interesting because metaphysical properties are not related to the essence OR to each other in a genus-species sort of way. They are tightly connected to the essence in question, and also to each other, because they are all proper in their relationship to this one central reality. Thus, “culturalness,” “religiosity,” “embodied intellectuality,” “political agency,” etc., all kind of “re-echo” on each other in a way that is different from the genus-species relationship of the major conceptual distinction. But—and this is key—we can only spell out this implication by way of inferential reasoning.35 Therefore, there is a difference of object in the case of metaphysical properties,36 whereas there is no formal difference in object in the case an explication of a definition, though it still is not a merely nominal distinction, for the object becomes intrinsically more distinct and explicit.37
In light of this, we might speak (and here it is my own voice38) of a definitionally-explicated minor conceptual distinction (a definitum-definition explication, with only objective clarification, and if represented illatively only so represented in an explicative syllogism through subjective illation) and an illatively-explicated minor conceptual distinction (an explication through truly—i.e., objectively—inferential reasoning, between a reality and its properties, as well as among the properties themselves).
Thus, whether in the case of “metaphysical”39 properties, the divine names, the transcendentals, or definitions we have a minor conceptual distinction. The relationship of implicitness and explicitness has some variability, as noted above.40 Nonetheless, in such cases, we find something to be gained by considering each of the various objective concepts which are related to each other in this way. Thus, one could counsel, like Maritain41 the need to undertake a kind of series of “elevations” every time that we consider one divine name, recalling its relationship with all the others and their relationships with it. Something similar could be said for all cases of minor conceptual distinction.
We must move onto the final kind of mental distinction, namely that which has no foundation in reality itself, not even a merely “virtual” one: a nominal distinction.42 And here as well, we must make several further sub-distinctions.
The most absolute case of a merely nominal distinction is a purely conventional distinction. Just as it is difficult to ascertain a case of pure equivocity (which is completely non-metaphorical), so too, within a given language family, it can be difficult to ascertain a case of pure convention that involves no etymological foundation. However, examples given by Woodbury work well enough: “mouth” and “bouche” both refer to one in the same reality, only differing in name; so too for “horse” and “cheval” and “man” and “homme.” (Perhaps, it will be argued, that such words—due to the resonances within the overall semiotics of language—nonetheless somewhat inflect the mind in slightly different ways. I think that is important, but we should at least recognize that there is something very nominal about such conventional distinctions of names, wherever they are found, if only as a limit case.)
The other type of nominal distinction is a synonymous distinction. Such a distinction is had when there is no intrinsic virtual foundation even if there is some sort of non-intrinsic (hence “extrinsic”) foundation for a difference of naming.43 In such cases, the reality is the same, as is the objective concept (or ratio).44 But such synonymy can take place in two different ways, giving rise to either a minor synonymous distinction or a major synonymous distinction.
In the case of a minor synonymous distinction, the object in question contains various notes which, without reaching the level of properties, nonetheless really attain some aspect of that reality and deserve the mind’s attention. Thus, to follow the examples given by Woodbury: we can speak of a house’s foundation either as a foundation or as the base for construction, with the former, drawing our attention to its aptitude to give support to the structure and the latter drawing attention to the fact that it can be stepped upon (or, I would add, can have things placed upon it, such as a sill plate). Similarly, he uses the example of a lightbulb (or even a hand lamp) being referred to as a lamp-globe or a lamp bulb, with the former drawing attention to its globe shape, and the latter drawing attention to its similarity to a plant bulb.45
Instead, I wish to note here the fact that in the domain of the transcendentals, there is a minor synonymous distinction as well, namely between being and thing.46 This latter transcendental comes from the Avicennian tradition (and reflected in the classic list found in Aquinas’s De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1) and usually receives little attention.47 However, it is distinguished from being in so far as being focuses on existence, whereas thing focuses on essence. One can style this along the same lines as Woodbury: being focuses on the is (“that which IS” or “what is”); thing focuses on that which is (“THAT WHICH is” or “WHAT is").
In short, such minor synonymous distinctions have a foundation—not in the reality in question, nor merely in free convention, but rather, in the fact that each such term “by priority signifies, one reason or character or aspect of the reality in question, whereas the other name by priority signifies, another reason or character or aspect of the same thing, although each name signifies both reasons or characters or aspects, such that there is no diversity of objective concept” but only diversity of emphasis.48 Thus, foundation and base both indicate the same objective concept regarding the structure of the building, but with different emphases; lamp-bulb and lamp-globe both indicate something about the shape of a lamp; and thing and being both require one to think of “what is”, but with different emphases on what or is.
And this brings us now to our final kind of distinction, namely, a major synonymous distinction, also called an equivalential distinction. Here too, the reality and the objective concept is the same for each term so distinguished (for otherwise we would have a case of real distinction or conceptual distinction). However, unlike the cases above, in this case “one simple thing is equivalent to diverse perfections in other things.”49 The example that is given by Woodbury50 is that of being said of God. In the case of Uncreated Being (or, as he says, “Subsistent Be”51 or Subsistent Existence), we consider one notion52 that can be named diversely—as Subsistent Existence or Subsistent Essence—although such a distinction is only drawn in relation to creatures, where essence and existence are distinct, and for no other reason than this. (Thus, the case of equivalential distinction remains different from a minor conceptual distinction in so far as the latter involves the presentation of a different object to the mind, as is the case in Uncreated Mercy and Uncreated Beauty, or even from a minor synonymous-nominal distinction.)
***
We come now to the end of our re-presentation of these distinctions. I believe it is most helpful to close by presenting, in outline form, a redacted presentation of Woodbury’s own schema of these distinctions, with the one proposed update to the minor conceptual distinction:53
Distinction or lack of identity is—
Either real, that is, existing in reality itself, prior to any engagement by human cognition. And such real distinction is either…
Real-real, when it is a distinction between two realities, such that one reality is not a mode that is dependent upon another that it in some way “modalizes” or “mannerizes” (e.g., oak and termite, or between two individuals).
Or Real-modal, when the distinction is between realities, where one reality is a mode of the other (e.g., quantity and substance).54
Or mental, that is, not actually-formally existing in reality, but instead requiring some sort of condition of knowing. Such distinctions can be either…
Conceptual, when one reality serves as the (eminent and) virtual foundation for the articulation of many diverse objective concepts. Such a conceptual distinction can be either…
a major conceptual distinction, in which case the objective concepts in question are separated by objective precision, such that the diversity involves a relationship of potentiality and actuality (e.g., plant in relation to red oak and goldenrod.
Or, a minor conceptual distinction, in which case the objective concepts differ by way of implicitness and explicitness, either as…
definitionally-explicated minor conceptual distinction, in which case the definitum is only objectively clarified and made objectively more distinct.
Or illatively-explicated minor conceptual distinction, in which case objective illation is necessary to lay out the relations among properties (as between metaphysical properties, divine names, and some transcendentals55).
Or Nominal, in which case the objective concept in question remains intrinsically one, although knowledge thereof can be “inflected” by way of a nominal diversity established as…
Synonymous, when objective distinction occurs only through the name used, but as differently signified…
in a major (or equivalential) synonymous-nominal distinction, when such distinction occurs only by way of equivalence to diverse perfections in something that is not the subject of attribution (e.g., as the Divine Being—which notion of being involves both essence and existence—is said to be Uncreated or Subsistent Essence and Subsistent Existence, although such separation is only found in finite creatures).
Or, in a minor synonymous-nominal distinction, which although within one objective concept nonetheless involves priority of signification drawing attention to one aspect, or another of the notion in question (e.g., as base and foundation, lamp-globe and lamp-bulb, or as being focuses the mind on what-IS whereas thing focuses the mind on WHAT-is.
Or, merely conventional, when only the name is diverse (e.g., “horse” and “cheval”), without any diversity by way of priority of signification or connotation of extrinsic equivalence.
Drawing to a close, I feel that I should comment on this seemingly overly rational desire for distinction among notions. Should we distinguish in order to unite (à la Maritain) or not, rather, as some have said, unite in order to distinguish, thereby appreciating reality in its wholeness so as to thereby see the distinctions? I suppose in the end it’s a question of two very different epistemologies. The latter would perhaps propose the notion of a pre-propositional and pre-notional grasp of reality, at the source of our later constructions, a kind of intuition (whether Bergsonnian or otherwise) that we would then describe at second hand, life thereby being, in some way, disfigured or at least adulterated by our static and isolated concepts.
I choose, for my part, the path of Maritain—“to distinguish in order to unite”— for there is no other way than the poverty of human knowing for us to attain reality. Reality will, yes, always be more than our concepts, but it will not be hidden behind the screen of them. We manifoldly “objectify” reality by way of many distinctions ultimately in order to reunite these objects and, indeed, assert that they are united in reality. Such adequating union—whether achieved immediately or mediately—is the work of our intellectual capacity’s speculative labor, won at the great cost necessary for human knowing, which must quasi-move in order to articulate and know reality.56 Certainly, it is quite possible that one should add to this schema a very important account of the preconceptual encounter with reality as the potentially intelligible dawns as actually intelligible, and also the fringe of “mystery” that always is on the edge of our cognition, drawing us onward to further exploration. If this project is possible,57 one can indeed, I think, incorporate what is best in the accounts of those who speak of “uniting in order to distinguish.”58 However, such an account can never do away with the fact that, so long as our knowledge functions according to embodied human modalities, our speculative cognition will forever need to return to unified reality by means of the path of distinction, by which we attempt to return to unity, having in some way mastered the multiplicity which is our condition as human knowers. Until the dawning of the vision of God,59 many will be the objects by which we return to unified reality.
For an example of this, see the various thinkers recounted in Claus A. Andersen, “Javelli and the Reception of the Scotist System of Distinctions in Renaissance Thomism,” Chrysostomus Javelli: Pagan Philosophy and Christian Thought in the Renaissance, ed. Tommaso De Robertis & Luca Burzelli (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2023), 143–167.↩︎
See part 1 of the study on probable certainty by Gardeil, translated here on To Be a Thomist (at “Causative factors of Probability”).↩︎
On the “regressive method” of historical study and knowledge of a tradition of doctrine, see the texts cited in Andrew Meszaros, “The Regressive Method of Ambrose Gardeil and the Role of Phronesis and Scientia in Positive and Speculative Theologies,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 89 (2013): 279–321 (here at 209–305). Doubtlessly, elements of these insides can be supplemented by the philosophical discussions of narrative and tradition connected with someone like MacIntyre and others. Meszaros draws on Congar, Newman, and Lonergan.↩︎
With important theological implications, of course.↩︎
For instance, in philosophy, from the works of Maquart. In theology, often from the works of Jean-Marie Hervé. Throughout everything, too, Garrigou-Lagrange, Maritain, John of St. Thomas directly, and others.↩︎
This is a point hinted at in Maritain’s introduction to philosophy, as interpreted by Cahalan and Deely.↩︎
See A Prolegomenon Concerning the Objectivity of Second Intentions, Part 3 (The First Act of the Intellect in its Speculative Operation).↩︎
By means of the logic discussed, for example, in the Topics of Aristotle.↩︎
The development of Scotus’s position on the formal distinction (and its epistemic-metaphysical implications), up through his final Parisian lectures, is a point of debate in the literature. For some discussion of this, see Stephen Dumont, “Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction,” Vivarium 43, no. 1 (Jan. 2005): 7–62.↩︎
This is the standard example given.↩︎
This example is my own, though I believe it coheres from what I have encountered in this tradition regarding real-modal distinctions↩︎
Woodbury, Ostensive Metaphysics, no. 884. Fr. William Wallace also notes such a real-modal distinction among the various “modes” of a given thing. Another example, too, that he provides is the distinction between an essence and its subsistence.
A faint echo of this scholastic language can be found in many classic works of modern philosophy, where they discus “modes” of things. Moreover, readers who are familiar with the debates over the real distinction of essence and existence in various figures from the 13th century onward will be already aware of the many topics that hide just under the surface of this account.↩︎
This point concerning “thing” and “object” is actually of pivotal importance regarding the nature of distinction. No doubt, it was partially due to a difference in understanding of this matter that separated Schultes, Garrigou-Lagrange, and Labourdette, on one side, and Marín-Sola, at least as regards aspects of the latter’s explanation of the definability of theological conclusions. (This is very clear in Garrigou-Lagrange’s repeated critiques, and it can be found in both Schultes and Labourdette as well.)↩︎
The language is already sedimented sufficiently by the time of Descartes for him to use it as a standard term. And echoes can be found throughout classical modernity.↩︎
Although, I do think that it is less than helpful in English. Thomist technical vocabulary is already quite obscure. We needn’t make it needlessly obscure.↩︎
See William A. Wallace, O.P., The Elements of Philosophy (New York: Alba House, 1977), p. 32↩︎
Ibid., p. 33.↩︎
I say “does not structurally” because it is not, to my knowledge, the general approach in his various accounts, even if perhaps the language can be found somewhere in his notes.↩︎
For a clear overview concerning the notion of “objective concept,” see John F. Peifer, The Concept in Thomism, ch. 6, pt. B. Peifer’s text is soon to be included in the Thomist Tradition Series and republished by Cluny Media.
An important observation (pursuant upon a very thought-provoking conversation with Mitchell Kengor): this distinction of concept is perhaps subject to a sub-distinction in the case of a minor conceptual distinction, depending upon whether or not the distinction is a definitionally-explicated minor conceptual distinction or an illatively-explicated minor conceptual distinction. The latter (which is had among metaphysical properties—whether considered generally or in specific cases such as the divine names or the transcendentals) does involve a difference in objective concept. (This is obvious if one considers the objective difference among the divine names or the transcendentals.) However, in the former case, it is arguable that there is no difference of objective concept but only a more distinct grasp of the same concept. (An open question remains: when Schultes says that there is no difference of objective concept in definitional explication but only that of formal concept does he, in fact, mean something closer to what Woodbury means in distinguishing between objective and formal precision? Even if so, Woodbury seems to combine the cases of definitionally-explicated minor conceptual distinction and illatively-explicated minor conceptual distinction.)↩︎
Woodbury, Ostensive Metaphysics, no. 885Cb1. In this article, I will alter Woodbury’s text slightly for readability. Sometimes his text reads like Latin in English, leading to the somewhat strange experience of needing to translate English into English.↩︎
Ibid., no. 885Cb2↩︎
In fact, as I write this essay, I feel the edges of an important further issue regarding the relationship between the different objective concepts that we form in each of the various sciences and various other formal perspectives. I must set that out of consideration, as this question does not figure into the exposition in someone like Woodbury, whom I am trying to recover here. It seems, however, like a worthy labor for a philosophical mind to undertake.↩︎
On this activity, see the text cited in note 6 above.↩︎
See Woodbury, Ostensive Metaphysics, no. 885Da2; cf. Logic, 110C. The distinction between objective and formal precision merits further research.↩︎
I have taken this last sentence from the lexicon of the Encyclopedia of Catholic Theology. One can find such descriptions of property in Porphyry, some Fathers, later scholastics, and modern scholastic logic textbooks (e.g., Vincent Smith, or the logic section of Wallace’s Elements of Philosophy)↩︎
In order to distinguish such properties from proper accidents, scholastic logic eventually came to refer to such properties as metaphysical properties. A bit of digging needs to be done to ascertain the exact dating of this. I believe that it can be traced at least back to the time of Gonet. To see the point however, we should contrast the “physical” property of will (a quality) with the “metaphysical” properties capable of laughter or cultural or religious. The latter do not designate some sort of separate faculty but, instead, indicate something regarding the very nature of man.↩︎
Cf. Woodbury, Logic, no. 110a–b.↩︎
See Woodbury, Ostensive Metaphysics, no. 885Db3b and 885E; Logic, no. 110Cb2a. I suspect that some further work needs to be done regarding the very nature of this implication. The reader who is familiar with the debates related to Marín-Sola will know the importance of these questions in matters of dogmatic development, and more generally, the development of human knowledge. Garrigou-Lagrange, in On Divine Revelation, trans. Matthew K. Minerd (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic Press, 2022), vol. 1, 325, notes that the explication of being, truth, goodness, life, intelligence, etc. can take place through new though non-extrinsic notions. He has in mind here the way that revelation develops prior to Christ. Note that there is an error in the translation (which I have noted in errata on my professional website), where the text reads “extrinsic” in the penultimate paragraph, it should read “non-extrinsic”.↩︎
One could say Infinite, Subsistent, etc.↩︎
For a good summary, see Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, “On the Eminence of the Deity: In What Sense the Divine Perfections Are ‘Formally and Eminently’ in God,” in Philosophizing in Faith: Essays on the Beginning and End of Wisdom, trans. Matthew K. Minerd (Providence, RI: Cluny Media, 2019), 341–360.↩︎
However, I would not be surprised if perhaps in another text we see an echo of the point made in this paragraph, as he clearly has integrated elements from Garrigou-Lagrange’s God: His Existence and His Nature, where the latter does mention elements of what I have in mind here.↩︎
Concerning these sub-distinctions among the divine names, see Garrigou-Lagrange, “On the Eminence of the Deity,” 349n6.
This is a reason why I have a very strong reaction when God is referred to as “Creator” by some as though to thereby designate what is most intimate concerning Him. No. It only touches the outer fringes of His uncreated mystery, even so far as that mystery can be known negatively and relatively by unaided human reason.↩︎
It should be noted that such termination of desire finds its superior case in the spontaneity of the self-diffusivity of the good.↩︎
I avoid “kinds,” as I am not sure whether or not we think of this as a question of multiple species of distinction. This paragraph, as well as its relevant section in the final summary are the fruit of a long conversation I had with my research assistant, Mr. Mitchell Kengor. We've been talking about these matters for years, and he's been reading variously on the topic due to his interest in questions, related to logic and dogmatic development. While I was explaining to him my general sense concerning this matter, we both coalesced around the exposition that has been put together here, as a kind of development of Woodbury. The current presentation is just an incipient unfolding of this insight, but we do believe it marks an important point of distinction within a tradition that seems, in Woodbury (and his antecedents) to be most solid path among the Thomist presentations.↩︎
And such reasoning will be scientific to the degree that this takes place in a way that shows the proper causal structure among them.↩︎
See the citation from Garrigou-Lagrange in note 28 above. This seems to be aiming at the same point.↩︎
This point is of immense importance in questions of dogmatic development and perhaps marks the very point of difference between Garrigou (and Schultes and Labourdette) and Marín-Sola. Further research needs to be done, but it would seem to come down to this: only truths that have predicates that differ by a definitional minor conceptual distinction are truths that are the same. This is not the same as a nominal distinction. (In his Logic, Woodbury is not quite clear enough on this point, because he seems slightly uneven due to the influence of a position taken by Maquart, who is usually solid. I need, however, to revisit this in detail.)↩︎
And, to the degree that he agrees, Mr. Kengor.↩︎
See note 25 above.↩︎
This is important in matters related, for example, to dogmatic development. (In fact, it is at the heart of the disagreements that some registered in relation to certain delimited but important aspects of Marín-Sola’s exposition regarding the definability of theological conclusions and the unity and distinction of revealed truths.) Aspects of these variations in implicit-explicit containment can be found in a posting by a “Scholasticus,” who presents an account of distinctions that is not wholly unlike what is presented here, though his language is marked by certain other terminologies taken from sources such as Louis de Raeymaeker (see https://scholasticus.medium.com/on-the-various-kinds-of-distinctions-d537edd40192). I suspect that to speak of the relationship among transcendentals or divine names (or even metaphysical properties) in terms of “whole” and “part”—even if only a “formal whole”—introduces some element that is at variance with what is found in Woodbury, who seems solidly founded in his division. Nonetheless, these further precisions do point in the direction of the important developments that need to be made, within logic and metaphysics, regarding the various relations of explicitness-implicitness.↩︎
See Jacques Maritain, “Reflections on Theological Knowledge,” in Untrammeled Approaches, trans. Bernard Doering (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 243–71 (here, 249–50):
↩︎We know that the distinctions of reason that we use in this case are not only distinctions of reason founded in re, they are founded in a reality so much more real and rich with life than all created realities, that even seeming to treat them as if there were question of real distinctions is just a rather feeble way of paying homage to God’s transcendence. Still, it is necessary that our thinking activity never let itself be caught in this trap of ‘seeming.’ And it should never be forgotten that the One about Whom the theologian speaks is not a mosaic of different perfections glued to the wall of aseity, but the living God in His sovereign and transcendent unity, the same Being, subsisting in itself, in which we are obliged by our human means to consider separately each of the perfections in question, each of which is in reality His very esse and His very life, and cannot be truly known by us except by our taking account of all His other perfections. This would require, it seems to me, that in the teaching of theology the study of each divine perfection be completed by the consideration of its relation to some other perfection, as by ‘elevations’ in which the mind would be made aware again and again of the infinite transcendence of the Uncreated.
See Woodbury, Ostensive Metaphysics, no. 886.↩︎
And, thus, when speaking of the foundation for the distinction, one will speak of an “extrinsic virtuality”.↩︎
Cf. Aquinas, ST I, q. 13, a. 4, ad 1.↩︎
See Woodbury, Ostensive Metaphysics, no. 886Cb2a2.↩︎
See ibid., no. 886Cb2a2c. Cf. ibid., no. 849Ab1a↩︎
Though, see Joseph Owens, Aquinas on Being and Thing (Niagra, NY: Niagara University Press, 1981). While writing this essay, I was not able to reconsult this small volume in detail but recalled its presence on my shelf and thought I should mention it, given the insightfulness (and historical grounding) Owens often brings to the topics he discusses.↩︎
Woodbury, Ostensive Metaphysics, no. 886Cb2a3.↩︎
Ibid., no. 886Cb2b.↩︎
Echoed also in an important series of distinctions it can be found in Garrigou-Lagrange (himself drawing on the later Thomist tradition). For a summary see the text already cited, Garrigou-Lagrange, “The Eminence of the Deity,” 349n6. It should be noted, though, that there are interesting developments that can be taken here also as regards the relationship not only between essence and existence (as noted here) but also between these and intelligence and intellection. Doubtlessly, this has significant repercussions in relation to the scholastic debates over the “formal constitutive” of the divine nature.↩︎
“Be” is his customary way of expressing esse in English.↩︎
I wouldn’t say “concept” as he does, except in the broad sense of anything presented to the mind by a verbum uttered by any of the acts of the intellect.↩︎
See Woodbury, Ostensive Metaphysics, no. 887.↩︎
And, according to Wallace, also between two modes of one and the same thing.↩︎
And the divine names and transcendentals are perhaps specific cases of metaphysical properties, to the degree that this is appropriate to say, of God and of being.↩︎
Obviously, there will be all sorts of nuances, depending on the nature of the objects in question, whether supernatural or natural, whether purely speculative or speculatively practical, etc.↩︎
And Maritain has many texts where he shows the fecundity of such a perspective.↩︎
And, perhaps also, the phenomenological analyses of those who, in the line of Marion, speak of saturated phenomena.↩︎
Indeed, even our mystical experience here-below are always conditioned by wayfaring faith, which passes through the revealed truths, which attain the unified divine reality through manifold notions. I note, of course, that this question involves debated points regarding the “psychology” of mystical experience (cf. the debates surrounding aspects of Gardeil’s La structure).
I must again here stress the importance of my interactions with Mitchell Kengor as we talked through the issues surrounding minor conceptual distinctions. He has been a close reader of Woodbury for sometime, and he and I have spoken about dogmatic development topics on and off for years. The precisions that I have expressed here are my own, but they would not have been possible without a very important conversation I had with him just prior to posting this essay.↩︎
