Thomistic Note: The Role of Charity in Sacred Theology

I. Charity: Basic Thomistic Principles

St. Thomas Aquinas analyzes charity throughout his theological corpus. However, the extended treatment of charity in the Summa theologiae (II-II, qq. 23-7) is among Aquinas’s most succinct and mature treatments of this topic. He begins his analysis with the question: “Whether charity is a friendship?”¹ As distinct from love that is a “kind of concupiscence,” Aquinas concludes that charity is indeed a kind of friendship. “Since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication… The love which is based on this communication, is charity.” ² Here Aquinas grounds the union between charity and friendship in their shared relation to the benevolent communication (communicatio benevolentiae) that exists between God and man.³ God communicates his divine happiness to us, and thus “it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.”⁴ In a word and at its heart, Aquinas identifies charity as something akin to divine friendship.⁵

Once he has identified charity as divine friendship, Aquinas then proceeds to investigate charity’s subject: “whether charity is something created in the soul?” The answer is affirmative. Aquinas further specifies that “charity is in the will as its subject.”⁶ This is evident because “the object of charity is not a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect alone” and thus is proper to the rational appetite.⁷ He explains that the will is both the principle of charitable motion and the efficient cause of the charitable act. Aquinas also maintains, however, that “the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that… unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform.”⁸ The basic principles of philosophy contribute to the veracity of this conclusion. The “perfect act” of an active potency requires that the act be connatural to the active potency.⁹ The connaturality of the act is established by the presence of an accidental form within the active power that serves as a principle of the (in this case, charitable) act. While this line of reasoning might appear pedantic and even tautological, it is the foundation for Aquinas’s conclusion: “it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity.” Moreover, Aquinas adds that, like all perfectly virtuous acts, a truly charitable act occurs “with ease and pleasure.”¹⁰ Throughout his analysis Aquinas considers charity to be a created habitus residing in the soul that serves as something akin to “the life of the soul” (and, subsequently, albeit indirectly, of the body).¹¹ The presence of the created habitus in the soul enables the charitable act to be connatural to the volitional power.

Although charity’s range exceeds the standard rational mean which informs all of the moral virtues, charity is nonetheless a true virtue because it truly “attains God” (attingit Deum) and actually “unites us to God” (coniungit nos Deo).¹² While the nature of moral virtue is located in its accordance with “right reason,” authentic virtue is also defined in light of its ultimate order to God.¹³ This is supremely so in the case of charity. Charity’s establishment of friendship with God makes charity the most excellent of all the virtues. Thus, charity is supremely worthy to be classified as a “virtue.” ¹⁴

Aquinas observes that “God is the principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God’s sake.”¹⁵ God is the object and end of charity (all moral objects are specified by their ends). The unity of charity’s primary objectivity (i.e., for God’s sake) and charity’s unifying communion “on which friendship is based” are both derived from the unified finality of charity (i.e., God himself, in His supernatural Goodness). Charity’s unified finality and unified objectivity establish charity’s specific virtuous integrity.¹⁶ Although acts of charity may be materially varied and diverse, charity possesses a single virtuous form. In light of the real distinction between intellection and volition vis-à-vis their specific objects, Aquinas concludes, “the love of the things that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge of such things.”¹⁷

II. The Sacra Doctrina: Basic Thomistic Principles

In the first article of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas establishes the absolute necessity of the sacra doctrina upon the fact that man is ordered to God as to an end.

Man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason… But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation.¹⁸

Because God is the end of the human person, and the end must be foreknown before the rational agent can order his actions to that end, the sacra doctrina is necessary. Here one recognizes the salvific foundation of the sacra doctrina. The sacra doctrina resists classification as an exclusively abstract-speculative enterprise. Aquinas articulates the necessity of the sacra doctrina within the context of beatitude teleologically considered. God is the ultimate end of the human person.¹⁹ Thus, the human person is ordered to God. Therefore, the rational power which holds absolute priority within the soul (i.e., the intellect) must receive the shaping formality of principles in order for the rational creature to be able to order his life towards God.

Aquinas proceeds to consider the scientific nature of the sacra doctrina in the second article of the Summa. Although Aquinas admits that the sacra doctrina is quite unique, he vigorously maintains its scientific essence and identity. “Sacred doctrine is a science… because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed.”²⁰ While the principles of philosophical scientiae are self-evident and per se nota, this divine science begins from principles that are not per se nota (quoad nos). God must reveal the first principles of this divine science to human persons. Human persons possess no natural access to these first principles apart from divine revelation (these principles are per se nota to God). Thus, the sacra doctrina is a science subalternated to the scientia Dei et beatorum.²¹ This subalternated formality of the sacra doctrina carries many implications.²² Elsewhere, Aquinas explains that “this [sacred] doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else.”²³ Considered within this context, it is unsurprising that Aquinas emphasizes the role of authority in the argumentation proper to the sacra doctrina.²⁴ Divine revelation (as eminently authoritative and reliable) is the source of all further discursive movement within the science. “Sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine.”²⁵

In the third article of the first question of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas defends the scientific unity of the sacra doctrina by way of its unified object. “The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object.”²⁶ Aquinas explains that the unified objectivity of the sacra doctrina is recognizable in the fact that the holy teaching has been “divinely revealed” (divinitus revelata). Thus, “whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science.”²⁷ This formal objectivity (both quo and quod) is to be clearly distinguished from the disparate material objects that the theologian can consider under sacra doctrina’s unifying aspect.²⁸

Aquinas also considers what kind of science the sacra doctrina is. He states that while the sacra doctrina is practical as well as speculative, it is more speculative than practical.²⁹ This must be true because “it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss.”³⁰ This conviction reemerges within the next article where Aquinas says that while “this science is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical.”³¹ Herein is grounded the sublime nobility of the sacra doctrina above all other types of scientiae. It is nobler than other speculative sciences (e.g., physics and metaphysics) because (1) the formal object of the sacra doctrina affords a greater certitude than all of the other speculative sciences; and (2) because of “the higher worth of its subject-matter… this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason.”³² Moreover, its dignity exceeds that of the other practical sciences (e.g., ethics and politics) because “the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed.”³³ Thomas states with great conviction, that “from every standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences.”³⁴

The sublimity of the sacra doctrina is further specified as a holy wisdom. “Wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14)” and thus “sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.”³⁵ Aquinas explains the nature of wisdom and of the office of the wise man: “it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge… he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principles in that order.” Moreover, “he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all called wise.” ³⁶ The sapiential order discernible within the sacra doctrina is grounded in the sacra doctrina’s divine objectivity. Once again, Aquinas states that “God is the object of this science.”³⁷ Within this divine science, “all things are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end.” Therefore, “it follows that God is, in very truth, the object of this science.”³⁸ Thus, all of the considerations proper to the sacra doctrina find their speculative center within God. While not all of the topics subject to sacra doctrina’s consideration are not necessarily “divine” per se, the consideration is still properly theological because they are all considered under sacra doctrina’s unifying divine objectivity. Moreover, as properly theological considerations, they are subject to the divine ordering proper to the highest wisdom. Because “it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge… he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principles in that order.”³⁹ There is no principle higher than God.

III. Thomistic Parallels Between Charity and Theology

Aquinas’s account of sacred theology has intrigued his readers for centuries. It is an intricate topic. The sacra doctrina is described as a psychologically beatitudinal (i.e., perfecting in a consummative sense) act vis-à-vis God. The sacra doctrina is also described as a scientific whole possessing its own integrity that can be abstracted from individual theologians.

Nonetheless, there is convergence between charity and theology insofar as both are teleological in orientation. Aquinas explains: “Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above. Now the good is chiefly an end, for things directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the end.”⁴⁰ This is significant because “the ultimate and principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps. 72:28: ‘It is good for me to adhere to God,’ and to this good man is ordered by charity.”⁴¹ This passage from Aquinas’s treatise on charity shares many of the speculative principles relevant to Aquinas’s treatment of the necessity of the sacra doctrina in the opening article of the Summa theologiae. It is clear that any consideration of the end is per se related to the concept of the good. An end is only an end insofar as it is considered under the aspect of desirable. And something is only desirable insofar as it is perceived as being good. Granted, one must maintain a genuine distinction between apparent (or relative) goodness and authentic (or absolute) goodness. Nonetheless, this distinction does not undermine the good-imbued-nature of ends because apparent goods and authentic goods both share the common ratio of goodness. A “good-less” end is a philosophical (and, indeed, a theological) impossibility. An object is only an end insofar as it is (at least conceived as being) good.

Moreover, the desire (universal) goodness elicits within the rational agent is formally located within the will. The nature of an appetite—rational or not—is one which tends towards a thing under a specific objectivity of goodness. Only the rational appetite tends towards the good as such.⁴² Thus, any consideration of ends is necessarily related to the consideration of the exercise of the will. Unlike the intellect which receives its objects (under an intelligible form) within itself, the will moves out from the rational agent towards a particular good perceived and, subsequently, desired. The act of intending an end is a volitional act moving towards a good thing not yet possessed but which is (at least secundum quid) obtainable.

This analysis relates to Aquinas’s consideration of the sacra doctrina in several ways. First, Aquinas explicitly states that the sacra doctrina is necessary because God is an end that exceeds the natural faculties and powers of the human person. Aquinas frames his treatment of the sacra doctrina within his consideration of God as end. Because God is an end, he must be considered under the aspect of goodness. Moreover, the goodness which is identifiable as (and in) God is a goodness which is beyond the reach of the rational agent (naturally considered). This is why the sacra doctrina is necessary. It is the prerequisite for any movement towards God as end and, subsequently, as good. Secondly, this teleological articulation of the sacra doctrina renders its value and importance as far exceeding any mere intellectual exercise or endeavor. The purpose of the sacra doctrina arises from the goodness of God—a goodness which exceeds our natural grasp.

One also observes an analogous theological orientation between the speculative structures of the sacra doctrina and the affective structures of authentic charity. Aquinas teaches that that the sacra doctrina is distinct from other scientiae—and is unified in its very distinctiveness—because of the fundamental unity of its formal object. Thus, God is the primary object of the sacra doctrina, and the sacra doctrina considers all things in relation to God and under a divine aspect. God is both the specifying and unifying object of the sacra doctrina. Interestingly, God is also the specifying and unifying object of charity as well. Charity is a special form of friendship (i.e., divine friendship) that necessitates a unique form of communication (i.e., the communicatio benevolentiae). This benevolent communication is directed first and foremost to God himself. The charitable person loves God above all things. However, the charitable person also loves other persons insofar as they are related to God (i.e., loved by God). The sacra doctrina and charity both share this essential theocentricity (albeit, according to their own proper formalities). Thus, we can perceive a parallel between the intellective movements and unity of the sacra doctrina vis-à-vis God, and the affective movements and unity of charity vis-à-vis God.

Moreover, there is a certain shared sapiential pattern perceivable within both theology and charity as well. Wisdom pertains to the perception and administration of proper order. The sacra doctrina is supremely sapiential because it places all other intelligible objects and considerations within their proper reference and relation to God. Charity can, perhaps, also be called “sapiential” because it places all other affective objects and desires within their proper reference and relation to God. Hence, the sacra doctrina possesses an eminent sapiential dignity because of its contemplative structure. This renders the sacra doctrina higher than all of the other scientiae (speculative and practical). Similarly, charity possesses an eminent sapiential dignity because of its affective structures. This renders charity higher than all of the other virtutes (both cardinal and theological).

No one would deny, of course, that there are legitimate differences between the sacra doctrina and charity. Some of the most significant differences emerge when one considers that theological scientia proceeds from principles revealed by God, and that charity proceeds towards the Good. Although there is a parallel observable between the speculative procession of sacred theology and the affective procession of charity, the fact remains that the processions are, fundamentally, of reverse directional order. Aquinas points to this distinction himself:

Since the end is in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by charity.⁴³

Although sacred theology and charity both proceed, they proceed in opposite directions. Sacred theology proceeds from the principles revealed by God. Charity proceeds towards God as the good end. This is a fundamental and essential difference in the processional movements of the discursion of sacred theology and appetition of charity.

Conclusion: What is the Role of Charity in Theology?

In the opening question of the Summa theologiae, Saint Thomas Aquinas makes the following statement regarding the two ways of wise judgment:

Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: ‘The spiritual man judgeth all things’ (1 Cor. 2:15)… The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.⁴⁴

The beautiful passage from Aquinas’s pen offers, in germ form, an answer to the question: “what is the role of charity in theology?” There is a real distinction between sacred theology and charity. This is indisputable. The former is located in the intellect, the latter is located in the will. Moreover, theological science proceeds from principles which have been divinely revealed, while charity proceeds towards the Highest Good as ultimate end. Charity does not exercise an influence upon theological inquiry if theology is considered in the abstract as a speculative whole. Theological inquiry, however, does not subsist as purely abstract form. Theological contemplation does not occur in a psychological vacuum. It exists in the mind of the theologian (and in saints in Heaven). Furthermore, the intellect and the will—while really distinct—share a synergistic relationship. Charity (as a habitual disposition residing in the will) does influence the theologian and, subsequently, it exercises a real influence on the theologian’s theological judgments. Aquinas clearly believes that the inclination of affection can lead to an act of wise judgment (wisdom, as a gift of the Holy Spirit, is clearly relevant here). Theology and charity share the same end: God. They relate to God, however, in essentially different ways. Nonetheless, there is a judgmental congruence between the appetitive inclination of charity and the intellective judgment of theology. Both are sapientially centered around God, and both exercise a teleological influence within the human person who is called to know and to love the eternal God who is Truth and Goodness.

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1. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 1.↩︎

2. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 1.↩︎

3. For a fuller treatment of the Thomistic theme of the communicatio benevolentiae in relation to charity, see Romanus Cessario, O.P., The Virtues, or, The Examined Life (New York: Continuum, 2002), 90ff.↩︎

4. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 1. “Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum.”↩︎

5. See also STh II-II, q. 23, a. 5. For a more thorough consideration of this important Thomistic theme, see: Jerome Wilms, O.P., Divine Friendship According to St. Thomas (Dubuque, IA: The Priory Press, 1958); and Daniel Schwartz, Aquinas on Friendship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).↩︎

6. STh II-II, q. 24, a. 1, sed contra.↩︎

7. Ibid.↩︎

8. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 2.↩︎

9. Ibid.↩︎

10. Ibid.↩︎

11. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2.↩︎

12. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 3.↩︎

13. Ibid.↩︎

14. “Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues" (STh II-II, q. 23, a. 6).↩︎

15. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 5, ad 1.↩︎

16. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 5.↩︎

17. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 6, ad 1.↩︎

18. STh I, q. 1, a. 1.↩︎

19. Obviously, the question of how God is the end of the human person requires careful nuance vis-à-vis the dynamics of (and interplay between) nature and of grace.↩︎

20. STh I, q. 1, a. 2.↩︎

21. Ibid.↩︎

22. For a fuller examination of the subalternated nature of the sacra doctrina, see M.V. Dougherty, “On the Alleged Subalternate Character of Sacra Doctrina in Aquinas,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 77 (2003), 101-110; and Guy Mansini, O.S.B., “Are the Principles of Sacra doctrina per se nota?” The Thomist 74 (2010): 407-435. For a helpful introduction to the classical Thomistic engagement with subalternation in the sciences, see Bernard Mullahy, C.S.C., “Subalternation and Mathematical Physics,” Laval théologique et philosophique 2, no. 2 (1946): 89–107.↩︎

23. STh I, q. 1, a. 8. This is echoed in the first response: “Although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths” (ad 1).↩︎

24. STh I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.↩︎

25. Ibid.↩︎

26. STh I, q. 1, a. 3.↩︎

27. Ibid.↩︎

28. See STh I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.↩︎

29. Of course, Cajetan’s commentary on these matters in the opening pages of the Prima pars remain indispensable.↩︎

30. STh I, q. 1, a. 4.↩︎

31. STh I, q. 1, a. 5.↩︎

32. Ibid. Emphasis added.↩︎

33. Ibid.↩︎

34. Ibid.↩︎

35. STh I, q. 1, a. 6.↩︎

36. Ibid.↩︎

37. STh I, q. 1, a. 7.↩︎

38. Ibid.↩︎

39. STh I, q. 1, a. 6.↩︎

40. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 7.↩︎

41. Ibid.↩︎

42. Of course, there is a real distinction between sensible goods (the proper object of the sense appetites) and universal goodness (the proper object of the will), but this distinction is not directly applicable to the current inquiry because God—the object of both charity and theology—is not a sensible good.↩︎

43. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 7, ad 2.↩︎

44. STh I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3.↩︎