Thomistic Note: T.C. O’Brien on “The Actual Grace of Christ”

Thomas Chrysostom O’Brien, O.P., wrote his 1951 S.T.Lr. (“Lectorate”) dissertation on The Actual Grace of Christ.1 Running ninety-five pages in length, T.C. O’Brien’s The Actual Grace of Christ is divided into three parts. The first part (titled “Principles and the Problem”) investigates the theological principles relevant to grace vis-à-vis the reality of Christ’s humanity. The second part (titled “Investigation”) is divided into three main sections: (1) “The Presence of Actual Grace in Christ—the Fact,” (2) “The Modes of the Presence of Actual Grace in Christ,” and (3) “The Excellence of Actual Grace in Christ.” The third part is a summary of the preceding analysis and O’Brien’s theological conclusions.

O’Brien observes that STh III, q. 7 examines the created grace of Christ. There Aquinas investigates the habitual grace of Christ not only under its “strict signification” as an entitative habitus, but also in its “broader sense” as the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, Aquinas also examines the gratia gratis data of Christ. In sum, “all the perfections of grace which Christ had as permanent adornments of His sacred humanity thus fall within the scope of St. Thomas’ discussion of the grace of Christ.”2

O’Brien points out that when considered in light of Aquinas’s rich doctrine of grace, an examination of actual grace vis-à-vis the humanity of Christ is interestingly absent from the question.3 The ratio behind this ostensible absence is the focus of the dissertation: “To determine whether actual grace can be attributed to Christ, and if so, how it is to be so attributed.”4 The theological methodology O’Brien employs is unsurprising: “the procedure ultimately resolves itself into a comparison of the doctrine concerning actual grace with that concerning the permanent perfections of Christ’s humanity.”5

In O’Brien’s articulation of the problem of actual grace vis-à-vis the humanity of Christ, O’Brien cites Aquinas’s use of the Anselmian maxim: “We ought to attribute to Christ’s soul all spiritual perfection which can be attributed to it.”6 O’Brien states that “this principle is not only a principle of extension; it is a principle also of limitation.” (The reference to the principles of “extension” and “limitation” is something which also appears in O’Brien’s other writings.7) He explains that “as a principle of extension, it is of course designed to credit the soul of Christ with a nobility befitting the dignity of that nature which is the organ [i.e., instrument] of [the] Divinity.”8 Thus, the principle of extension suggests that actual grace—as a legitimate perfection—may be applicable even to the humanity of Christ. On the other hand, “as a principle of limitation, it is designed to prevent the predication of spiritual perfections which, while in themselves true gifts of God, are also imperfect since they are proportioned to the limitations of the needy of the Kingdom of God.”9 Thus, under the aspects of extension and limitation, these principles specify the precise proportionality of the unique grace of Christ: “On the one hand as grace, actual grace is a spiritual perfection; on the other its presence in Christ must be viewed in relation to the other spiritual perfections whose eminent presence in Christ is already established.”10

Clearly, actual grace’s claim to perfection makes it a reality one would expect to be easily consonant with the reality of Christ’s human nature. Even though actual grace is perfective, however, the fact that it is received by a human subject as a motion is an initial difficulty the theologian faces when attempting to include actual graces among the graces of Christ. The reason for this is simple: “motion bespeaks imperfection in its subject, in that which is moved.”11 The perfective quality of actual grace, as perfective, depends upon the imperfect nature of the passive subject. Something can only be moved insofar as it is in potency to act. Act is the principle of perfection. Potency is the principle of (perfectible) imperfection. Moreover, motion is the act of a being that is in potency to an act and insofar as it is in potency to an act.12 Thus, motion is the act of “imperfect being.”13 Hence the difficulty is this: “the reconciliation of the potentiality it [the supernatural motion of actual grace] implies with His [Christ’s] perfection.”14

O’Brien cites the following quotation from Aquinas as essential to the remainder of O’Brien’s argument:

The closer any nature is to God, so much the more expressly is the similitude of the divine dignity found in it. But it pertains to the divine dignity to move, incline and direct all other things, itself being moved or inclined or directed by no other. Wherefore the closer any nature is to God, so much the less is it inclined by another and the more does it belong to it to incline itself.15

In light of this statement from Aquinas, the difficulty is clear. While all creatures require actual grace in order to undergo a supernatural operation (because of the potencies intrinsic to their very nature). The humanity of Christ, however, would seem not to require actual grace because “Christ as man is the most excellent among all intellectual creatures,” and thus one expects that he possesses a “power of self-motion in the supernatural order” which exclusively and preeminently belong to him.16 Moreover, if actual grace can be accurately attributed to Christ, the theologian would expect that Christ would possess it to a “special degree of perfection.” O’Brien believes that according to the principles laid out by Aquinas, actual grace is accurately attributed to the humanity of Christ and that he did possess it to the highest degree of perfection. This is O’Brien’s thesis.

Interestingly, O’Brien makes the bold claim that “the fact that actual grace convenes to Christ [i.e., that it befits Him], most perfect in the spiritual order though He is, is not difficult to prove.”17 For Thomistic textual support, O’Brien cites Aquinas’s commentary on St. Paul’s letter to the Ephesians:

The Apostle touches upon the help given him [Christ] for the fulfillment of his ministry. This help was twofold. One was the very faculty for exercising his ministry the other was the very operation of actuality of this exercise. God bestows the faculty by infusing virtue suited to operate; but He confers the very operation insofar as He works in us interiorly, moving and inspiring us to good.18

O’Brien then explains that in both the natural and the supernatural orders God is the prime mover. Natural and supernatural motiones, however, do not proceed from God as from an intrinsic principles (he explains that this “would be repugnant to His transcendence and simplicity”).19 Rather, God imparts the grace of the virtues and the gifts as the principles of supernatural motion. In addition to the impartation of the grace of the virtues and the gifts, however, God also “moves man through the effect of His activity.” “This effect in man,” O’Brien explains, “is actual grace, supernatural motion, for the act of the mover in the moved is motion.” Thus, one can summarize that actual grace as “that gratuitous effect by which the soul of man is moved by God to know or to will or to do anything.”20 What makes actual grace distinct from habitual grace is that actual grace is received as a motion. Habitual graces are more permanent principles of supernatural activity. “But by actual grace God moves man to the actual use of these [habitual virtues and gifts] in supernatural operation.” O’Brien’s interpretation of the Thomistic teaching is uncontroversial: “since the activity of the mover in that which is moved is motion, actual grace is received as supernatural motion.”21

Again, the question of actual grace vis-à-vis the humanity of Christ is focused upon the specific question of the potency of Christ’s humanity.22 O’Brien explains that there is a twofold need for actual grace when habitual grace is present in a graced subject. The first reason is general and is related to the per se transcendence of supernatural act. The second reason is specific and is founded upon the postlapsarian negative qualification of human nature (e.g., original sin and its effects). Citing STh I, q. 54, a. 1 (“no matter how perfect a corporal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God”), O’Brien explains that every contingent being (by metaphysical necessity) is composed of potency and act. This potency and act division extends not only to the being of the creature but also to the operations of the creature. “Potentiality, perfectibility, and therefore dependence upon the divine motion, is part of the very nature of every creature.”23

Additionally, there is a second general principle “conjoined” to this latter point. This second general principle points to “the necessity of actual grace for operations which are precisely supernatural.” The reason for this second, conjoined principle is clear: “supernatural operation as such, actual grace as motion which is precisely supernatural is necessary because the order of ends corresponds to the order of agents [STh I-II, q. 109, a. 6].”24 Supernatural operations have God himself as their end. Thus, “the operation of any creature can only attain to God Himself, insofar as He makes this possible by bestowing motion proportionate to such operations, a supernatural motion.”25 In other words, even when a supernatural capacity is conferred through the impartation of habitual grace, a discrete, supernatural motion arising from God is required in order for the supernatural potency to be actualized. In short: “Because God is the First Mover, and because supernatural operations tend towards God Himself, actual grace is necessary for all such operations by any created agent.”26

Applying this to the humanity of Christ, O’Brien constructs a syllogism according to the following pattern:

All men require actual grace for supernatural operations.

Christ is truly a man; and the hypostatic union does not take away the distinction of natures.

Therefore, Christ required actual grace for His supernatural operations.27

O’Brien observes that the second reason for the necessity of actual grace in any supernatural operation is not applicable to the human nature of Christ. Christ’s humanity possesses no “positive obstacles” to divine operations. Christ’s humanity is sinless and perfect, whole and intact. Thus, the putative necessity of actual grace vis-à-vis the humanity of Christ is grounded only in the intrinsic limitations proper to any human nature because of its composite (potency and act) nature. Unlike the nature of other men, there are no moral impediments to supernatural operations within the humanity of Christ. “In Him there are no such obstacles to supernatural operations.”28 All of Christ’s human operations are perfectly ordered by his intellect and will. There are no disorders or unruly passions encumbering the full supernatural act of Christ’s human nature.

O’Brien summarizes his speculative analysis thus:

In response therefore to the question, whether actual grace can be attributed to Christ, the response from the arguments presented is:

  • On the grounds of the universal reason for the need of actual grace, based upon the potentiality of all creatures and transcendence of supernatural operations, the response is affirmative.

  • On the grounds of the reason based on the condition of fallen nature, the response is negative.29

In a word, “the principle guiding the investigation of the presence of actual grace in Christ states that all spiritual perfections which can be attributed to the soul of Christ are to be so attributed.”30 Because Christ’s humanity (as truly human) is composed of potency and act, it is proper to attribute to it receptivity to actual graces. Nonetheless, O’Brien certainly recognizes that “there is less potentiality to supernatural operation in Christ as Man than in other men.”31 Thus, he affirms that Our Lord “while retaining the fundamental need of the Divine Motion for His operations, under that motion enjoys to a superior degree the power of self-motion.” In other words, Christ “recedes more from the condition of being merely moved, to the condition of also being a mover in eliciting His own supernatural operations.”32

What is interesting here is that the motiones of actual graces in the humanity of Christ, for the most part, must be designated as cooperating graces. “Christ moved Himself in eliciting operations which in others are the effects of operating grace; namely the first motion of His free will towards God and the operations of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.”33 Because of the exclusive presence of only one theological virtue in the humanity of Christ (i.e., charity), O’Brien concludes that there is only one supernatural operation “which in a certain sense can be designated the effect of operating grace.” This supernatural operation “is that aspect of His act of charity which is the exercise of the act as it terminates in the Divine Goodness, loved in and for Itself.”34 The actual grace involved in this aspect of Christ’s act of charity may, “in an improper sense,” be termed “operating grace” to show that “Christ did not move Himself to elicit the act of charity in the first instant of its aspect of fruition.”35 All other and subsequent operations are, properly speaking, cooperations within the humanity of Christ.

This renders the perfection of “actual grace” vis-à-vis the humanity of Christ a unique and sublime perfection. Actual grace pertains to the humanity of Christ. Such grace pertains to him, however, in “a most excellent degree.” Christ’s actual graces are always efficacious graces. Because of (1) his perfect human nature, and (2) God’s infinite love for Christ, Christ’s actual graces are never merely sufficient graces.36 The infinite love of God for Christ and the complete lack of any imperfections—physical or moral—in the humanity of Christ makes it impossible for any actual grace of Christ to be merely sufficient. Moreover, in light of the Hypostatic Union, all supernatural operations of Christ according to his human nature are, properly speaking, cooperative because of the conjoined instrumentality of his humanity to his divinity.37 “In His supernatural operations, Christ was moved by actual grace in such a way that He also moved Himself to elicit them.”38 Because Christ’s humanity is not morally but hypostatically united to his divinity, his humanity possesses the sublime dignity of “instrumental self-motion” to a superior degree. This is the foundation for the efficacious role the humanity of Christ plays in all aspects of salvation and redemption—past, present, and future: “For the grace of each of these is derived from the influence of Christ’s humanity, operating instrumentally, contacting souls through Faith.”39


  1. Thomas Chrysostom O’Brien, O.P., The Actual Grace of Christ: A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Dominican House of Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Lector of Sacred Theology (Washington, D.C.: Dominican House of Studies, 1951). O’Brien (as far as I can discern) never published this dissertation, and it is only found in bound manuscript format within the theses archives of the Dominican House of Studies Library (Washington, D.C.). The New York Times obituary which outlines the contours O’Brien’s life can be found in the publication’s online archives: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/23/obituaries/thomas-o-brien-67-authority-on-aquinas.html. Fr. John Vidmar, O.P.’s Fr. Fenwick’s “Little American Province”: 200 Years of the Dominican Friars in the United States (Dominican Province of St. Joseph, 2005) contains an interpretive summary of O’Brien’s collaboration with Thomas Gilby, O.P., on the “McGraw-Hill Summa Theologiae” (Vidmar, 129-30).↩︎

  2. O’Brien, 1.↩︎

  3. O’Brien offers a possible reason for the absence of actual grace in Aquinas’s examination of Christological grace: “Probably it is because actual grace is not a permanent perfection, but rather a transient modification of the faculty into which it is received, that St. Thomas did not devote an ex professo treatment to it, when considering the perfection coassumed by Christ. Nevertheless, as grace, actual grace is a perfection, and the general doctrine concerning it offers some problems when applied to Christ” (O’Brien, 2).↩︎

  4. O’Brien, 2.↩︎

  5. O’Brien, 2.↩︎

  6. O’Brien, 20. The reference to Aquinas is from III Sent., d. 18, q. a. 2: “Christo debemus attribuere secundum animam omnem spiritualem pefectionem quae sibi potest attribuere.” See Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, c. 13.↩︎

  7. See Thomas C. O’Brien, O.P., Metaphysics and the Existence of God, ed. Cajetan Cuddy, O.P. (Providence, RI: Cluny Media, 2017).↩︎

  8. O’Brien, 20.↩︎

  9. O’Brien, 20-21.↩︎

  10. O’Brien, 21.↩︎

  11. O’Brien, 21.↩︎

  12. See Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Physics, III, lect. 2.↩︎

  13. O’Brien, 22.↩︎

  14. O’Brien, 22.↩︎

  15. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 22, a. 4. (This translations appears to be O’Brien’s own from the Marietti edition, p. 178).↩︎

  16. O’Brien, 23.↩︎

  17. O’Brien, 25.↩︎

  18. Thomas Aquinas, In Ephes., c. 3, lect. 2.↩︎

  19. O’Brien, 25.↩︎

  20. O’Brien, 25.↩︎

  21. O’Brien, 26. See STh I-II q. 110, a. 2 for Aquinas’s exact phraseology.↩︎

  22. “To determine theologically that actual grace can be attributed to Christ amounts to investigating whether the arguments for the necessity of actual grace for supernatural operation have any force as far as He is concerned. Since actual grace is motion, it implies that its recipient is in potency. When, therefore, its presence is verified, it is because God has bestowed it in answer to some need on the part of its subject” (O’Brien, 28).↩︎

  23. O’Brien, 29. See STh I, q. 54, a. 1↩︎

  24. O’Brien, 29. Emphasis original.↩︎

  25. O’Brien, 30.↩︎

  26. O’Brien, 30.↩︎

  27. O’Brien, 30. This phraseology is reproduced here exactly. However, it is clear in the text that O’Brien is referring to Christ’s human nature and not his Divine Personhood when he says that “Christ is truly a man.”↩︎

  28. O’Brien, 32.↩︎

  29. O’Brien, 33.↩︎

  30. O’Brien, 34.↩︎

  31. O’Brien, 92.↩︎

  32. O’Brien, 92.↩︎

  33. O’Brien, 93.↩︎

  34. O’Brien, 93. “In the first instant, therefore, Christ moved Himself to elicit His act of charity as it is free in its exercise, terminating in the Divine Goodness as the reason for loving all else, because He elicited the act under this aspect in virtue of the prior (by nature) exercise of the act as it terminates in the Divine Goodness loved in and for Itself” (O’Brien, 65).↩︎

  35. In the dissertation, O’Brien emphasizes that “restriction has been placed upon such a use of the term operating grace, however, to preclude any inference that Christ as Man ever lacked the ultimate perfection of grace perfect beatitude” (O’Brien, 93).↩︎

  36. See O’Brien, 77-91. See STh I, q. 20, a. 4, ad 1; ad 2.↩︎

  37. Of course, this refers to every operation but that unique aspect of the act of charity alluded to earlier.↩︎

  38. O’Brien, 74.↩︎

  39. See O’Brien, 91.↩︎

Fr. Cajetan Cuddy, O.P.

Fr. Cuddy teaches dogmatic and moral theology at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, D.C. He serves as the general editor of the Thomist Tradition Series, and he is co-author of Thomas and the Thomists: The Achievement of St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters (Fortress Press, 2017). Fr. Cuddy has written for numerous publications on the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Thomist Tradition. 

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