Theological Science, Subalternation, and Obediential Potency: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and Thomas de Vio Cajetan

This essay will briefly explore the teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas on the necessity and scientific nature of the sacra doctrina vis-à-vis the objection offered to it by Blessed John Duns Scotus and the defense given for it by Thomas de Vio Cardinal Cajetan. Specifically, the essay will argue that Cajetan’s emphasis upon subalternation and obediential potency (contra Scotus) is significant to the contemplative nature of theological science.

This essay will thus proceed in four main parts. First, the essay will briefly summarize Aquinas’s teaching on the necessity and the scientific nature of theology by examining the first two articles of his Summa theologiae. Secondly, it will examine several of Scotus’s key criticisms of Aquinas’s view of the scientific status of sacra doctrina, paying particular attention to the Subtle Doctor’s rejection of sacra doctrina as a scientia subalternata. Thirdly, the essay will summarize a portion of Cajetan’s commentary on Summa theologiae I, q. 1, aa. 1-2. It will argue that there is a significant complementarity between the subalternate character of the sacra doctrina and the obedientially potent nature of those who receive the sacra doctrina.

A Brief Summary of Aquinas on Sacra Doctrina as Necessary and Scientific (STh I, q. 1, aa. 1-2).

Saint Thomas Aquinas explains the necessity of sacra doctrina in the first article of the opening question of the Summa theologiae. He explains that sacra doctrina is necessary in order 1) to know supernatural truths which exceeds the grasp of human reason, and 2) to know with certainty even those truths which human reason can grasp unaided by faith. The explanation Aquinas offers for the former is teleological in nature: man is ordered to God as to an end whose comprehension exceeds the native power of human reason. The second is grounded in the fact that some truths apprehendable by unaided human reason are only attained with great difficulty and with many imperfections.¹ Rudi te Velde offers a helpful summary of this article:

Thomas begins by stating that man is directed to God as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason. It is the common presupposition of classical as well as of medieval thought that the human being attains his ultimate perfection in becoming somehow united with the divine. To this Thomas adds a sharp sense of the mystery of God, who is inaccessible to the natural faculties of man. God exceeds the grasp of human reason. But human beings cannot live their lives in ignorance of the ultimate meaning of life. They should have some foreknowledge of the ultimate end of life in order to direct their intentions and actions toward it.²

In the second article of question one, Aquinas explains that this necessary sacra doctrina is also a sacra scientia. He explains that there are two kinds of science: 1) those sciences which proceed from the light of natural understanding, and 2) those which proceed from the principles of a superior science. The examples Aquinas offers of this latter science are 1) “perspectives” (i.e., the science of optics) which proceeds from principles known through geometry, and 2) music which is known through the principles of arithmetic. He concludes that “this is the way sacra doctrina is a science [et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia], because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a superior science which is the science of God and of the Blessed [scientia Dei et beatorum].”³ Thus, “as music believes the principles handed on to it by arithmetic, so sacra doctrina believes the principles revealed to it by God.”⁴ In his response to the first objection of question one, Aquinas explains that the principles of a science are either known per se or they are reducible to the knowledge of a superior science. This relationship between a lower science and a higher science is known as subalternation.⁵ It is in this latter manner that sacra doctrina claims scientific status.

Saint Thomas continues in the third article of the first question to explain the nature of sacra doctrina et scientia by investigating its unified scientific identity: “Sacra doctrina is one science.” However, for the sake of space, we will not investigate the remaining articles of the first question.⁶

Scotus’s Criticisms of Saint Thomas’s (and the Thomistic) Account of Sacred Science

John Duns Scotus has a slightly different approach to the foundation of the scientific nature of sacra doctrina. Some students of the Subtle Doctor claim that “the teaching of Duns Scotus on the relation between philosophy and theology does not differ so widely from that of Thomas as has sometimes been supposed.”⁷ This evaluation, certainly, warrants thoughtful examination. However, all students of Scotus and Aquinas would affirm that their teachings are not identical. Scotus does indeed demur from Aquinas’s teaching. One point of particular disagreement is the doctrine of scientific subalternation.⁸ The Toulousian Dominican, Emmanuel Perrier, O.P., offers a recent and helpful summary of the Subtle Doctor’s objections to the Thomistic view of subalternation:

The refutation by Scotus of the Thomist account of subalternation involves a clarification. Subalternation is when a science contains the principles of another. On the basis of this, Scotus makes a distinction: theology in itself, i.e., the knowledge that God has of himself and of all things, is a total knowledge, it is the unique knowledge of all and, consequently, is neither subalternate nor, above all, subalternating because it cannot be subalternate itself (Lect. Prol. §119-121). But this is not the situation with our theology, which is a theology of viatores. On the one hand, it is human knowledge, dependent on the singular and the sensible; on the other hand, it is supernatural knowledge, which implies that “no theological property whatsoever is demonstrable in this science by the principles of being or by reasons drawn from the concept of being” (Ord. Prol. §214). Our theology is truly ours, without depending on our natural knowledge [scientia] to be a science. In return, our natural knowledge receives confirmation of its value and autonomy in relation to theology, on the sole condition that they can render an account of the possibility of theology and to secure prolegomena.⁹

Scotus’s chief objection to Thomas’s account of the sacra doctrina is its ostensible fluidity. God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge are simply not as interchangeable (at best) and as interconnected (at worst) as Thomas appears to suggest.

In his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (In Metaph. 6 q. 1, nn. 43-6), “Scotus holds that there are exactly three real theoretical sciences, pursued for their own sake, that are open to us in our present life: metaphysics, mathematics, and physics.”¹⁰ Theology is not included in this list. Scotus also hesitates to refer to God’s own knowledge as a “science” because his knowledge (while perfect) lacks the discursive quality proper to scientific knowledge.¹¹ Although a comprehensive consideration of Scotus’s view of sacra doctrina would require an extensive comparison of the Subtle Doctor’s consideration of sacra doctrina vis-à-vis natural theology, it is sufficient for the purposes of this essay to consider his “supernatural knowledge of God.”¹² Unsurprisingly, Scotus does not believe that a natural knowledge of God is sufficient: “we humans need to have our natural knowledge of divinity supplemented with supernatural knowledge.”¹³ “Theology, then, is a practical science, because the end of man is not only to know God, but to love him. Those who have classed theology as a speculative science have ignored this fact.”¹⁴

The Thomistic account of theological subalternation troubles the Subtle Doctor because it, ultimately, betrays the truth that “knowledge does not depend essentially (i.e., as the effect depends upon its cause) on any other factors except those which constitute its actual cause, namely, the knowing faculty and its object.”¹⁵ In other words, “to say that theology is a science, dependent on the knowledge of the beatified, is like saying that I know the science of geometry, because John knows geometry, and I believe that he knows it.”¹⁶ The epistemic continuity that Aquinas believes runs through the scientia Dei et beatorum and the putative “science” of the wayfarer is simply unsustainable. “The parallelism between harmony and arithmetic does not hold, for theology is not a science in the same sense of the term in which arithmetic and harmony are sciences.”¹⁷ Rather, “theology is a practical science because it not only teaches us what God is, but also commands us to love Him and shows us those actions by which He is pleased to be worshipped and served.”¹⁸

Subalternation and Obediential Potency: Explorations in Cajetan’s Approach to the Sacra Doctrina

In his preliminary remarks on Aquinas’s prologue to the Summa theologiae, (the then Father) Thomas de Vio Cajetan admits that upon first glance his commentatorial efforts may appear to be superfluous additions to a text of sublime simplicity.¹⁹ However, Cajetan encourages his readers to look closely at the nature of the Summa theologiae in order to see with greater clarity the need for his own expositional work. As one journeys through the “very beautiful order” discovered by beginners who approach the Summa theologiae, he soon discovers that “every theological difficulty is here distinctly treated in a manner proper to it.”²⁰

The future Cardinal then proceeds on the very next page to address one of the most discussed questions of the Summa theologiae. Question 1: “Concerning Sacred Teaching: Its Nature and Extent.” In recent times the Cajetanian treatment of the opening question of the Summa theologiae has received notice and reference by theologians and Thomists of a variety of backgrounds.²¹ However, up until this point, Thomists have yet to engage a central component of the Cardinal’s treatment of the nature of sacra doctrina: obediential potency in general and its distinction from the Scotistic notion of neutral potency in particular.²²

Although this paring of issues (i.e., the consideration of obediential potency within a consideration of the nature of sacra doctrina) may be puzzling upon first glance, the conjunction of these two theological topics was something that Étienne Gilson noticed. It is no secret to historians of twentieth-century Catholic thought that Gilson was no admirer of Thomas de Vio Cajetan.²³ However, what has not been developed is exactly where Gilson located the source and origin of the ostensible Cajetanian error(s). In a word, Gilson believed that Thomas de Vio Cajetan’s theological problems began at the root, in principio—at the very beginning of his commentary on the Summa. In Gilson’s mind, the Cardinal made a grave error in the very opening pages: everything went wrong from Cajetan’s remarks on the first article of the first question of the first part of Saint. Thomas’s magnum opus. In a letter to his colleague and friend, Henri de Lubac, S.J., dated 21 June 1965, Gilson makes the following remarks:

“It seems to me that Cajetan is done for… I am fully aware that sometimes I go too far in my remarks, but after due reflection and in all objectivity, I think I would still label it a corruptorium. For two reasons. His commentary on the first article of the Summa Theologiae gets the whole book on the wrong track from the very outset; then, professing to interpret the meaning of the work, he misleads Saint Thomas’ readers. It took me years to figure that out. When I finally did and said something about it, fearfully, as if it were something new, I was astonished that I got no reaction at all. I did not know that everybody already knew this but wanted to keep the skeleton in the closet. Thanks to you, I get the picture.”²⁴

What is so corruptus about Cajetan’s commentary on the opening article of the Summa theologiae? The answer is not difficult to recognize: Cajetan’s treatment of the relationship between nature and grace in general and the notion of obediential potency in particular.²⁵This is significant. In the question and article dealing with the necessity of sacra doctrina, the Italian Dominican invokes the distinction between natural potency, violent potency, and obediential potency.²⁶Because of its more theological-anthropological nature, one would reasonably expect obediential potency to be treated in Cajetan’s commentary on Aquinas’s treatise on man. However, such is not the case. Compounding the intrigue surrounding the early appearance of obediential potency in the Cajetanian commentary are two additional observations. First, contrary to what one might expect, the phrase potentia obedientialis does not occur very often in Cajetan’s commentary on the Prima pars. In fact, according to my count, this is his sole use of the term in the first part of the Summa.²⁷ Granted, one must be wary of the word-thing fallacy, but it is significant to observe that “obediential potency,” at least on face value, is not a phrase used heavily throughout Cajetan’s writings. In fact, it is employed rather infrequently.

The second observation runs in conjunction with the first: Cajetan’s commentary on the first article of the Summa theologiae is the occasion for something of an “appendix” that is included in his opuscula which were published separately.²⁸The Scotistic objection to the Thomistic conception of potency (obediential and otherwise) was significant enough in Cajetan’s mind to warrant a separate opusculum refuting the Subtle Doctor’s position on “neutral potency” (i.e., a view deriving from Scotistic notions of the relation between potency and act and their non-real distinction—a view denying that act exclusively specifies potency). Obediential potency mattered to Cajetan, even if it appears in select locations of his Summa commentary.

Subalternation is something to which the Thomistic commentators paid a lot of attention.²⁹ Some twentieth-century thinkers did not like it.³⁰ Many were unaware of it. Indeed, one scholar makes the following observation regarding the attention given to subalteration by contemporary Thomists:

In the philosophy of science few notions are more basic than that of subalternation… And yet it is a notion to which modern Thomists have given only slight attention. One looks in vain in contemporary Thomistic literature for even an attempt toward an adequate analysis of its significance. Indeed, there has been so much loose and ambiguous handling of the term that the clear and sharp outlines it possessed in the minds of the earlier Thomists have to a large existent been lost.³¹

Although the Dominican commentators have traditionally defended the scientific nature of sacra doctrina through the Aristotelian notion of subalternation, Guy Mansini, O.S.B. observes that, technically, “Saint Thomas does not call theology a subalternated science in the Summa [Theologiae].”³² Moreover, Mansini suggests, “maintaining that theology is a subalternated science is not without difficulty,” because “a [subalternated] science not only receives some of its principles by faith, but ordinarily also has a different subject matter than the subalternating science.”³³ The supposed subalternation of sacra doctrina does not fit this model.³⁴ The scientia Dei et beatorum (the supposedly subalternating science) is, in fact, identical in subject matter with the sacra doctrina (the supposedly subalternated science): “they are both of God and of all things in relation to God.”³⁵ The classic examples of subalternation invoked by defenders of its applicability to sacra doctrina are arithmetic-music and geometry-perspective.³⁶ Mansini is not impressed. Indeed, to his mind, “the only similarity of theology to, for example, perspective… is that they both take principles on some kind of faith, and even here the similarity is not perfect.”³⁷

Mansini briefly summarizes the position of Cajetan and John Capreolus: “For both Capreolus and Cajetan, therefore, the divine science, to which the first principles of sacred doctrine are ‘led back,’ is a necessary knowledge, and in this way the requirement of the Posterior Analytics can be seen to be met.”³⁸ Nonetheless, “some may not be moved by this defense.”³⁹ Mansini among them: “the necessity that Aristotle requires for science is de re necessity, and the reply of Capreolus and Cajetan seems to offer us nothing more than de dicto necessity, or the necessity of the consequent.”⁴⁰ The necessity upon which Aristotelian science is based is not mere suppositional or de dicto necessity. The stronger, “de re necessity” is required.

Granted, subalternation is something of an elusive topic. Although much more could be said in response to the details of Mansini’s penetrating analysis, the point still stands even in the face of his insightful objections: subalternation is essential in the Thomist commentatorial tradition’s establishment of sacra doctrina as scientia. If subalternation cannot withstand rigorous scrutiny, the scientific status of the sacra doctrina is endangered (at least, in the mind of the Thomist commentator). And, subsequently, the remaining resolutions of the whole Summa theologiae are seemingly reduced to something approaching mere dialectical probability. If we cannot arrive at scientia, we cannot be led to contemplation. Subalternation, in this particular context, is the foundation for the discursive resolution of the science of theology as well as its contemplative essence.⁴¹ We now turn to Cajetan’s explanation of the subalternate character of the sacra doctrina to further consider this relationship between subalternation and contemplation.

Cajetan articulates three kinds of scientific subalternation in his commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 2. However, he begins by noting that there are two types of science: subalternating and subalternated. The former proceeds from propositions [propositionibus] known per se. The latter proceeds from principles known not per se but by the light of a superior science [lumine superioris scientiae]. Thus, the essential difference between subalternating and subalternated sciences is that in subalternating sciences the conclusions are provable from (and are perceivable in) the principles immediately—i.e., without a mediating habitus. The conclusions of subalternated sciences, on the other hand, are provable from and in the principles known mediately—i.e., with the mediation of the scientific habit of the subalternating science. This distinction is the essential difference between subalternating and subalternated sciences, and it is critical for Cajetan’s analysis of the scientific status of sacra doctrina.⁴² He thinks that “all difficulties” related to recognizing the scientific status of the sacra doctrina will be solved if this distinction is recognized as the essential difference.⁴³ Cajetan explains that “it is essential to every science (i.e., discursive [cognition]), properly speaking, to have arrived at its recognizable conclusions not in and from itself but in and from another.”⁴⁴

The subalternate form of the sacra doctrina is the formal link between theology and contemplation. The sacra doctrina is fundamentally contemplative.⁴⁵ Contemplation—because of its foundation upon the rational faculties of intellect and will—presupposes the “density” of nature preserved by obediential potency.⁴⁶ The sacred subalternation that occurs in the case of the sacra doctrina in relation to the knowledge of God and the blessed is fundamentally and essentially contemplative. The cognitional perfection to which the theologian—i.e., the subalternated knower—aims is rooted in the first principle of the Subalternating Knower, namely God himself. The fact that the blessed participate in the knowledge of the Subalternating Knower gives one hope that such knowledge is possible. Thus, the subalternation of sacred science is fundamentally contemplative both in its nature and in its terminus. Obediential potency is a point of continuity between the theologian as wayfarer and the theologian as beatified. Human nature with its rational, obediential potency, is the foundation for both the contemplation of the sacra doctrina in its terrestrial form and in the contemplative consummation of the sacra doctrina in Heaven. Aquinas himself offers support for this understanding:

The one who possesses a subalternate science does not perfectly reach/achieve the character [ratio] of scientific knowing unless his knowledge is in some way in continuation with the knowledge of the one who has the subalternating science. Nonetheless, the subalternated knower [inferior sciens] is not said to have scientific knowledge about those things which he supposes, but [rather] about the conclusions which necessarily follow from the supposed principles. And thus even one who believes can be said to possess scientific knowledge about those things which follow from the articles of faith.⁴⁷

This is why the Thomistic account of obediential potency is so significant for Aquinas’s teaching on the nature of sacra doctrina. The habitus of continuity which is the linking reality between the levels of subalternating and subalternated is impossible without some admission of the rational potencies located in human nature. The habitus of continuity is not a “sky hook,” it is a metaphysical reality firmly grounded in human nature. This point is significant because in the absence of the rational potencies of human nature, there would be no single subject activated in this life and the life hereafter. There would be no continuity in knowledge if there is no continuity in knower (i.e., knowing power within the knower).

If the theologian denies the reality and significance of the obediential potency of human nature, he risks compromising the foundation of the sacra doctrina and of theology in general. Only a rational human nature which is open to receiving supernatural elevation (albeit in a way nonetheless consonant with that same rational human nature) can secure the unity of the theological knowledge of the wayfarer and of the blessed in Heaven.

Conclusion

This essay has briefly considered Saint Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of the necessity and scientific nature of the sacra doctrina vis-à-vis the teachings of Blessed John Duns Scotus and Thomas de Vio Cardinal Cajetan. It proceeded in four main parts. First, the essay summarized Aquinas’s teaching on the first two articles of the Summa theologiae. Secondly, it summarized the speculative motivations for Scotus’s rejection of sacra doctrina as a scientia subalternata. Thirdly, the essay argued that there is a significant complementarity between the subalternate character of the sacra doctrina and the obedientially potent nature of those who receive the sacra doctrina.

In sum: the importance of the teleological necessity (article 1) and the scientific status (article 2) of the sacra doctrina in the first question of the prima pars runs throughout the entire Summa theologiae. Arguably, Aquinas is merely developing in the other two parts of his magnum opus what is virtually contained in the opening question of the first part. Because of this, (again, arguably) obediential potency also remains significant throughout the whole of theology. Indeed, obediential potency and the subalternate nature of the sacra doctrina are mutually dependent. The sacra doctrina, as a contemplative gift, is received from and is ordered to the knowledge of God and the blessed; and this contemplative gift can only be given to (and received by) creatures of a rational nature.

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1. See STh I, q. 1, a. 1.↩︎

2. Rudi te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 20. Interestingly, te Velde also highlights the “practical” dimensions to this necessary sacra doctrina: “The necessity of a revealed doctrine about God appears to be mainly of a moral and practical nature. In order to direct their intentions and actions towards God, human beings should have some foreknowledge of God” (ibid.). Nonetheless, ultimately “the speculative aspect of sacred doctrine” holds a certain “primacy,” “as it is primarily concerned with ‘divine things’ (de rebus divinis)” (ibid., 21).↩︎

3. STh I, q. 1, a. 2. Unless otherwise noted, all of the Latin translations in this essay are my own.↩︎

4. Ibid.↩︎

5. William A. Wallace, O.P., offers a helpful summary of the Thomistic understanding of subalternation vis-à-vis sacra doctrina: “To designate the logical character of such a limited science [i.e., the wayfarer’s grasp of the sacra doctrina], St. Thomas likens it to a similar situation in human knowledge where a superior science can give a propter quid explanation, not exceeding the limits of a created intellect, for something which—otherwise unknown in an inferior science—can be known quia fashion in that science, provided it accept on faith principles proved in the superior science. Using this special relationship, on the model of optical science with reference to geometry, he subalternates sacred theology to a superior science which he designates as “scientia Dei et beatorum,” and thus places it within the genus of subalternated science” (The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology [Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1962], 39-40).↩︎

6. Interestingly, some contemporary students of Aquinas have questioned the strict scientific status of sacra doctrina. “If one does not want to be entirely mistaken, it is best to clarify two things about this particular kind of knowledge right away. First, sacred doctrine is not really ‘science’ because of its total subordination by faith to the knowledge of that it receives from God. (Thomas speaks here of ‘subalternation’). Outside the relationship of dependence to faith, which establishes that about which it speaks and gives to it both its relevance and love, not only would theology have no justification, but it would literally have no object. Second, more than ‘science,’ which is merely knowledge about proximate causes, sacred doctrine is ‘wisdom,’ that is, knowledge by the supreme cause. Seen from this perspective, the reciprocal relationships between the truths of the faith are organized into a body of knowledge that has God as its keystone. We can sense immediately the strength and intention of this approach: God presents himself as the first subject of theology, and it is with respect to him that all of the rest is situated, not in the sense of being juxtaposed to him, but rather dependent on him and explained by him” (Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Aquinas’s Summa: Background, Structure and Reception [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005], 20). Te Velde helpfully addresses this type of objection in his Aquinas on God, 23-28.↩︎

7. C.R.S. Harris, Duns Scotus—Volume I: The Place of Duns Scots in Medieval Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 84. He continues: “While criticizing the Angelic Doctor on certain points of detail, he agrees with him on the main issues, and his own theory is little more than an extension in their application to particular aspects of the problem of the principles already laid down by his great predecessor” (ibid.). Later, Harris explains that “a closer examination [of their doctrine] will serve to show how nearly Scotus approaches to the Thomistic conception. The resemblance between the teaching of the two schoolmen is far greater than has generally been supposed. Their main difference lies in this: while Thomas lays emphasis chiefly on the ‘necessary’ element of the divine revelation, the truths concerning the divine being in its intrinsic nature, Scotus accentuates the contingent aspect of theology, the relationship of God to the world, which depends wholly on the free act of the divine will and is therefore not amenable speculative treatment. And in the last resort this difference proceeds from a diversity between their psychological conceptions” (ibid., 94).↩︎

8. Harris himself—although he wishes to emphasizes the fundamental unity between of Scotus and Aquinas—points to subalternation as the fundamental point of the division between the two theologians: “There is one point, however, where he [Scotus] departs decidedly from the Thomist position. He refuses to concede that our theology is subordinate to the theology of the beatified, or that it derives its principles from it” (ibid., 98).↩︎

9. Emmanuel Perrier, O.P., “Duns Scotus Facing Reality: Between Absolute Contingency and Unquestionable Consistency” in Modern Theology 21:4 (2005), 628.↩︎

10. Peter King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, 15. He goes on: “Each qualification [‘real,’ ‘theoretical,’ ‘pursued for their own sake’] is important. The requirement that such sciences be ‘real’—that is, concerned with things in the world rather than our concepts of them—excludes logic, which is the normative science of how we are to think about things, and thus concerned with concepts. The requirement that such sciences be pursued for their own sake excludes ethics, whose primary goal is to direct and regulate the will. The requirement that we can attain such knowledge in the condition of our present life, where we can only know things through sense perception and hence have no direct epistemic access to principles or to immaterial things, rules out theology in the strict sense as well as a properly axiomatic metaphysics; we can however construct a ‘natural’ theology and metaphysics within our limitations” (ibid., 15-16). See B.M. Bonansea, Man and His Approach to God in John Duns Scotus (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 37-38.↩︎

11. See Scotus, In Metaph. I, q. 1, n. 135.↩︎

12. William E. Mann offers a helpful summary of the Scotistic account of this relationship in his “Duns Scotus on Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, 238-262.↩︎

13. Mann, 252.↩︎

14. Harris, 91-92. He cites Scotus: “Ponunt theologiam esse speculativam, non obstante quod extendatur ad dilectionem finis” (Opus Oxoniense, Prol., q. 4, n. 23).↩︎

15. Harris, 98.↩︎

16. Ibid. This is Harris’s summary of Scotus’s own position in Opus Oxoniense, Liber III, dist. 24, q. 1/unica, n. 4.↩︎

17. Ibid, 99.↩︎

18. Ibid., 103. This is a key point which is often misunderstood. For Scotus, the practical nature of theological science does not act as a limiting principle to the material extension of theological scientist’s knowledge. Rather, the practical nature of theological science acts as a formally specifying because of the imperative nature of scientific praxis: “For just as the truths of morals, no less than those of metaphysics, furnish us with an expansion of our field of knowledge and in their own sphere are no less certain and necessary than the first principles of speculative thought, so the truths of theology not only teach us facts about the nature of God, but also provide us with norms by which to regulate our actions to bring them into conformity with His will.” Thus, “by using the term scientia practica he [Scotus] means to imply that theology, as well as furnishing us with knowledge of the divine persons, also carries with it an imperative, giving us, like the principles of ethics, not only truth of fact but also norms for our conduct” (ibid.).↩︎

19. “Intentio divi Thomae in hoc Prooemio, manifestata et ex parte officii doctoris et ex parte novitiorum, adversari videtur prima fronte intentioni meae, dum textus novitiis constructus, a me doctorum subtilitatibus resplendus creditur.”↩︎

20. Ibid.↩︎

21. A recent example of this is the thought-provoking article by Guy Mansini, O.S.B. entitled “Are the Principles of Sacra doctrina per se nota?” The Thomist 74 (2010): 407-435. See also Hieromonk Gregory Hrynkiw. Cajetan on Sacred Doctrine. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2020).↩︎

22. Cajetan wrote a brief treatise included in his philosophical-theological opuscula in response to the Scotistic position: “De potentia neutra, et de natura potentiae receptivae in duas quaestinoes divisus,” in Opusculua omnia Thomae de Vio Caietani Cardinalis tituli Sancti Sixti (Lyon, 1587, 206-207). For wonderful recent articulations of the traditional Thomistic understanding of obediential potency see Steven A. Long, “Obediential Potency, Human Knowledge, and the Natural Desire for God,” International Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1997): 45-63; and Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2010).↩︎

23. Gilson’s letters to Henri de Lubac, S.J., are particularly candid: Étienne Gilson, Letters of Etienne Gilson to Henri de Lubac (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988).↩︎

24. Cited in Henri de Lubac, At the Service of the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances that Occasioned His Writings (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 125. The following is the full quote in French: “Cajetan me semble avoir son compte. Il nous faudra bientôt le défendre, et vous commencez déjà. En toute conscience de ce qu'il y a parfois d'excessif en mes propos, je crois que, réflexion faite et de sangfroid, je maintiendrais corruptorium. Pour deux raisons. Le commentaire du premier article de la Somme de théologie déraille dès le départ l'oeuvre tout entière; ensuite, se donnant pour interpréter le sens de l'oeuvre, il trompe les lecteurs de saint thomas. Il m'a fallu des années pour m'en apercevoir. Quand je l'ai vu et dit, avec crainte comme si c’était une nouveauté, j'ai été bien étonné de ne provoquer aucune réaction. Je ne savais pas que tout le monde le savait, mais qu'on voulait laisser ce skeleton in the cupboard! Grâce à vous, je suis renseigné.” (Étienne Gilson and Henri de Lubac, Lettres de m. Étienne Gilson adressées au P. Henri de Lubac et commentées par celui-ci [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1986], 74. Emphasis original). De Lubac indicates in his footnote commentary that he had tried to persuade Gilson to soften his Cajetanian epithet “corruptorium Thomae,” but to no avail. Of particular note are de Lubac’s remarks about Gilson’s disgust with Cajetan’s disinterest in matters historical (“Mais il avait remarqué que dans son fameux commentaire Cajetan ne cédait << à aucune curiosité historique désintéressée >> (chez lui, pas de scrupule << historiciste >> !)” (ibid., 80, fn. 3).↩︎

25. See Ralph McInerny, Praeambula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 39-68.↩︎

26. Cajetan, Commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1, no. 10.↩︎

27. Verified via electronic word search.↩︎

28. See footnote 22 above.↩︎

29. See The commentaries on the prima pars by commentators like Domingo Bañez and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. John of St. Thomas also treats it in his Cursus theologicus.↩︎

30. See Etienne Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 287, fn. 21: “This text (ST, I, q.1, a.2) has given rise to the notion that theology as a science ‘sub-alternated’ to the science of God, since it borrows from its own principles. Cajetan considers the theologia secundum se est vere scientia simpliciter subalternata (ad loc). Bañez does not agree: Sic nostra theologia non est proprie subalternata, sed solum se habet ut imperfectum et perfectum intra eandem speciem (ad loc., I, 22). Thomas himself has spoken of a quasi subalternation only: Est ergo theologia scientia quasi subalternata divinae scientiae a qua accipit principia sua (In Sent., Prologus, q. 1, art. 3). In the Summa Theologiae (so far as we have been able to ascertain), Thomas did not even make use of the formula. It is found again, however, and without the quasi, in the questions EBT, q. II, a.2, ad 5. – In fact, even when Thomas does not write it, the quasi is necessarily implied. In a true subalternation, the inferior science sees in the same light as the higher sciences from which it receives it principles; but theology sees truth in the faith of the theologian in the word of God, not in the light of the divine essence itself, which is one with God, and is the very esse of God. Between our theology and the divine science, there is a relationship of imperfect to perfect, of effect to cause and, consequently, of order, but there is discontinuity in the very essence of intelligible light… As is so often the case, the commentators have attributed to what was as simple comparison an importance out of proportion with its actual place in Thomas’ doctrine” (emphasis original).↩︎

31. Bernard Mullahy, C.S.C. “Subalternation and Mathematical Physics” in Laval Théologique et Philosophique, II (1946): 89.↩︎

32. Though he admits that “the idea [of subalternation] is there and he employs the language elsewhere, notably in his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate” (Mansini, 407). This point is not an original observation. Doctoral student of Garrigou-Lagrange and theology professor at Catholic University of America, Joseph Clifford Fenton (1906-1969), makes this same observation: “Sacred theology is qualified by St. Thomas Aquinas and by those writers who constitute the Thomistic school as a subalternate science. The term itself is not particularly important. St. Thomas himself did not use it in the article in which he establishes and demonstrates the scientific character of sacred theology. But the idea conveyed in the term is absolutely essential for any proper understanding of the science” (The Concept of Sacred Theology [Milwaukee, WI: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1941], 170 [emphasis original]).↩︎

33. Mansini, 408.↩︎

34. Interestingly, M.V. Dougherty shares Mansini’s conviction that sacra doctrina is not a subalternated science, albeit for different reasons (M.V. Dougherty, “On the Alleged Subalternate Character of Sacra Doctrina in Aquinas,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 77 [2003], 101-110).↩︎

35. Mansini, 408.↩︎

36. See Cajetan’s commentary on STh I q. 1, a. 1: “scientia est duplex, subalternans et subalternata, ex 1 Poster. Differentia inter has est, quod subalternans procedit ex propositionibus per se notis: subalternata vero ex principiis notis, non per se, sed lumine superioris scientiae: ut patet in arithmetica et musica, geometria et perspectiva” (no. 2, emphasis original).↩︎

37. Mansini, 408. He explains: “For while an expert in perspective could, if he wished, become an expert also in geometry, we cannot in this life come to the knowledge of the articles of faith such as God has of them. We can only hope to attain to seeing the articles of faith as God sees them only eschatologically” (ibid., 408-409).↩︎

38. Ibid., 412.↩︎

39. Ibid.↩︎

40. Ibid.↩︎

41. See Mullahy, 89-107. Of particular importance for the contemplative aspect in relation to discursive movement is the distinction of the Commentators between the “objective continuity” and the “subjective continuity” between subalternating and subalternated sciences. “When the subalternating science does not coexist in the same intellect with the subalternated science, these conclusions are taken on faith. But this does not mean that the principles of the subalternating science are taken on faith. For the intellect which possesses the subalternated science may possess the principles of the subalternating science by means of the habitus of understanding, without possessing the habitus of the subalternating science itself” (ibid., 96). Also: “When a subalternated science is in its perfect state, there is subjective as well as objective continuity. But when it is in an imperfect state, subjective continuity may be lacking. And here it must be pointed out that when Thomists raise the question about whether or not a certain subalternated science is in continuity with the subalternating science, it is to subjective continuity that they are referring, for, obviously, there can be no question about objective continuity” (97). Cajetan makes related points in his commentary on the secunda secundae of the Summa theologiae: “Secundo, quia theologia nostra, licet secundum suam speciem sit scientia, non tamen est in statu scientiae: habet enim imperfectum statum. Sicut perspectiva non-geometrae secundum suam speciem est scientia subalternata, sed non pervenit adhuc ad perfectum statum scientiae; et propterea non facit scire nisi inchoative et imperfect: quia ut dicitur I Poster., non sciet carens resolutione usque ad principia evidentia sibi. Theologia ergo nobis viatoribus est secundum se vere scientia subalternata: non tamen in statu scientiae, quousque continuetur cum evidentia principiorum illius. Et propterea, dato quod sit de creditis, non sequitur aliqua contradictio, nec quod fides et scientia sint de eodem: quia hoc, scilicet quod scientia et fides non possunt esse de eodem, intelligitur de scientia in statu scientiae, et non de scientia in statu imperfecto” (Commentary on STh II-II, q. 1, a. 5, n. 2).↩︎

42. Cajetan think that this is essential because the ratio of every science—subalternating and subalternated—is to have conclusions reachable from principles; and thus neither type of science has verification of its principles in itself, but is always with the aid of a habitus of the principles.↩︎

43. “et ex his oportet omnes difficultates solvi, si doctrina vera est” (no. 3).↩︎

44. Ibid. And discursion of a very precise point: resolution of conclusions into necessary principles.↩︎

45. See Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003).↩︎

46. For an engaging summary of the importance of nature’s natural “density,” see Steven A. Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 1-9.↩︎

47. De veritate, q. 14, a. 9, ad 3. ”Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui habet scientiam subalternatam, non perfecte attingit ad rationem sciendi, nisi in quantum eius cognitio continuatur quodammodo cum cognitione eius qui habet scientiam subalternantem. Nihilominus tamen inferior sciens non dicitur de his quae supponit habere scientiam, sed de conclusionibus, quae ex principiis suppositis de necessitate concluduntur. Et sic etiam fidelis potest dici habere scientiam de his quae concluduntur ex articulis fidei.”↩︎