The Unifying Power of Truth: Academic Discourse and Speculative Disagreements
All academics desire to have friends and admirers. In other words, all of those who engage in the academic life desire to be sociable. No one wishes to be completely at odds with everyone at all times. It is human to live in community. And this inclination to community takes the form of appreciation and mutual respect within the academic context.
The desire for community and for communication within academia, then, is something that is present even in the philosophical and theological disciplines. An unavoidable phenomenon of academic discourse, however, is disagreement and critique. How is one to reconcile these two—seemingly mutually opposed tendencies—in the academic world? How are we to interpret the critiques that academics issue and those that they receive?
The only way to categorize and process such disagreements is within the context of the ultimate purpose of academic discourse. Academic discourse, it would seem upon first glance, is ordered to the acquisition and clarification of the truth. Discourse is not the end of philosophical and theological discourse. Such discourse is ordered to the acquisition, the clarification, and the promotion of truth. The truth serves as the final cause of all speculative inquiries. Consequently, the quest for truth specifies and directs the speculative inquiries that we undertake.
Consequently, the search for truth is always ordered to and culminates in a dicendum quod est. The real distinction between being and non-being is the ultimate foundation for all knowledge. And the cognitive appropriation of this real distinction with regard to specific and particular topics, subjects, and objects requires a dicendum quod est. The human mind requires distinctions in order to advance in knowledge. The contingent nature of the human person—standing, as it were, “between” being and non-being—proceeds in light of distinctions in general and the fundamental distinction between being and non-being in particular. (See the early essay: “Thomistic Note: The Multiplication of Distinctions.”)
The human habitus of understanding (intellectus), science (scientia), and wisdom (scientia) operate within the dynamics of contingency. Motion and change (i.e., development) are among the most evident dynamics that characterize contingent being. And each of these three habitus situate human cognition in relation to being as knowable—even as human cognition is contingent.
The reality of contingency and the possibility of actual, certain, and even sapiential knowledge about real things does not undermine or marginalize the utility and fundamental goodness of speculative discourse. Indeed, speculative discourse aids the progression of the human intellect’s grasp of real things. The foundation for this utility, however, is a shared commitment to know the way things are. To grasp the truth. In order for a discourse among philosophers and theologians to serve (in a formal and per se manner) one’s acquisition of truth, all of the philosophers and theologians who participate in a given discourse must share the same end and objective.
This consecration to reality, thus, serves as a unifying principle of speculative discourse and academic discussion. The most profound dialogues in via veritatis are precisely those undertaken by participants on the way of truth. Within the cognitional process of discovery, discursion, and resolution, the object is the dictator. This phrase comes from Charles De Koninck’s famed 1935 letter to Mortimer Adler. In this letter, De Koninck contrasts the modus operandi of classical/perennial philosophy with that of modernity: “In perennial philosophy, the object is the dictator. In modern philosophy, the philosopher is the dictator. Intellectual dictatorship is the very essence of modern philosophy.” All persons can share the same known object. Objects, by their very nature, specify and unify a scientia. They also coordinate and integrate different thinkers in their shared quest to know. Objectivity activates, specifies, and unifies.
Within this context of a shared quest for knowledge, then, any questions or critiques leveled against a philosopher or a theologian’s articulation of the truth serve the very quest for truth itself. Objectively speaking, there is no such thing as a “violent” or “destructive” critique of an argument or position. Everything in via veritatis serves the quest for the acquisition of knowledge within the philosopher and the theologian—whether within the one who is critiqued (through benefitting from the greater clarity that the critique inspires) or even in the one who critiques (through realizing that the critique does not actually apply to the position critiqued).
Hence, if someone critiques one of my philosophical or theological ideas, I or they can benefit. I can benefit insofar as I realize that the objector’s critique is valid. This inspires me to refine my thought, rendering it in deeper conformity to the way things are. Conversely, the objector can benefit insofar as he or she can recognize through our exchange that their original critique is not actually valid. This enables them to refine their thought and to come to a more accurate conformity with the way things are.
A shared consecration to the truth renders all speculative engagement—even critical engagement—to be objectively useful precisely because of the shared objective of the discourse: to know the way things are.
The power of consecration to the truth is such that a realist can even benefit from the critiques of those who do not share this objective orientation to the truth. The example of Aristotle is illustrative here. Even the Sophists, Aristotle shows, can serve a per accidens utility for those in pursuit of truth. The utility of the Sophists is per accidens insofar as the Sophist project is not, per se, ordered to the truth itself. Nonetheless, insofar as the Sophists identify points of incoherence within a realist’s pursuit of truth, these critiques serve the realist’s own pursuit of truth. Even the critiques of the Sophists can contribute to the purification of one’s quest to know the way things are.
The utility of objections and critiques in via veritatis contributed to the structures of scholasticism in general and of Aquinas’s writings in particular. It is often tempting to skim (or even to skip) the objections that lead an article of the Summa theologiae (STh), for example. These objections, we know, represent the “wrong answers” in Aquinas’s mind. These objections, thus, appear to be obstacles that Aquinas must overcome in the articles of the STh. The care and attention that he has devoted to the whole of the STh, however, renders untenable such a characterization of the objections. As we know from the General Prologue of the STh, Aquinas has ordered the entirety of the STh according to an ordo disciplinae formality. Thus, he does not envision any wasted space or imprecise ordering to the STh. Unlike his other writings (e.g., the Disputed Questions), Aquinas is also the author of the objections themselves—not just the sed contra, the respondeo, and the replies to the objections. Every part of the STh serves the pursuit of sacred truth. Even the objections.
The objections also, then, serve the quest to know the way things are. They are an integral part of the STh’s order and method. And each respective objection is carefully envisioned and precisely executed to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge of the truth. (For example, see STh I, q. 1, a. 1: “The ‘Problem’ of Sacra Doctrina.”)
Likewise, the is always appreciative for objections and critiques to his or her work. Whether such critiques arise from those who share the quest for truth or not, the Thomist recognizes that any legitimately conceived objection is potentially useful in the quest to know the way things are. Within the Thomist Tradition, one recalls the frequent references that Cajetan makes to Scotus’ critiques of Aquinas’s thought. In many ways, Scotus (for example) did the Thomist Tradition a great service by inspiring Thomists to clarify, refine, and extend the principles that inform Aquinas’s thought.
Thomists are grateful for all legitimate criticisms and critics. For those consecrated to the truth, nothing stands outside of the quest for truth. The quest for truth is ultimately not about persons. Philosophy is ultimately not about philosophers; likewise, theology is not about theologians. Both philosophy and theology seek to know the way things are (within their respective formal objects). Thus, all persons who can help advance (or be helped in their own advancement toward) the quest for truth are welcome.
For Thomism, truth is the end. The object is dictator. Hence, all legitimate objections and critiques are sincerely appreciated.
