Réginald Schultes, The Causes of Dogmatic Progress (a. 15)

Brief Translation Introduction

This translation is presented as a relatively stable sketch of this chapter from Reginald Schultes’s Introductio in historiam dogmatum. The text has been edited and reviewed, though it is not in the kind of final form of review that I would do for a published translation. My translation of this book ended up becoming one of the various important background texts used for a pedagogical essay that I am just now finishing concerning Dogmatic Development. I am posting the text here on To Be a Thomist for those who might be interested in referring to an English draft.

I would like to thank Mr. Mitchell Kengor for his help filling out the details of footnote references.

Article 15: The Causes of Dogmatic Progress

In light of what we have said, the causes of dogmatic progress can easily be determined (namely, as regards its efficient, final, material, and formal causes).¹

I. The primary cause of dogmatic progress is the Holy Spirit.—When the Incarnate Word departed from this earth after manifesting the Father, He abandoned neither the Apostles nor the revealed doctrine, but instead, sent the Holy Spirit, as He had foretold: “When that Spirit of truth comes, He will teach you all truth... He will glorify me, because He will receive from me and declare it to you” (John 16: 13–14). Thus, just as in the Old Testament the prophets spoke under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in order to complete and explain revelation, so too in the New Testament, following upon the fullness of revelation, the same Holy Spirit assists the Church in explaining the revealed truths by His illumination and continued urging. For since the revealed truth is a divine reality and property, he communicated the Holy Spirit to men, in order to protect this reality that belongs to him and to make it bear fruit. Thus, the revealed truth, in the same light from which the truth had proceeded, by working in the minds of men, continues on, is explained, and develops, so that end of the revelation be obtained to the fullest. Thus, the illustrious Schäzler correctly notes the fundamental difference between the Catholic and Protestant concepts of the interpretation of revealed truths, namely, that according to Catholic teaching, God Himself explicates revelation through an instrument that He himself has instituted, whereas, according to Protestants, revelation remains a more or less hidden treasure, left to the research of human reason.²

II. The second and proximate efficient cause is the Teaching Church.—Although God is the first moving cause in dogmatic progress, He nevertheless works through secondary causes, among which the Teaching Church holds the first place. For when dogmas are properly formed through an authoritative statement and definitive explanation by the ecclesiastical magisterium, then neither by new revelation nor by inspiration, but by a judgment properly exercised by the Church, though with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the proximate and proper cause of dogmatic progress is the teaching Church,³ namely, the universal Teaching Church, the Councils, and the Pope, to all of whom infallibility has been promised for this purpose. In a special way, the Pope is the cause of dogmatic progress. This is historically obvious.

In fact, all the most important questions were immediately or mediately determined and resolved by the Popes, so that the history of dogmas would, properly speaking, be a history of the Papal magisterium.⁴ In the questions concerning the Most Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, the councils approved the doctrine of the Popes. The teaching of St. Augustine concerning original sin, grace, and predestination was definitively sanctioned by the Popes. As regards the question of primacy, the part played by the Apostolic See is clear. The same is clear, however, as regards other particular dogmas. For the function of the Roman Pontiff consists not only in attending to the preaching of the Gospel, but even more so to the “holy safe-keeping and faithful exposition” of the revealed truth, and such guarding and exposition by its very nature involves dogmatic progress. Now, that “holy safe-keeping” is included both the continuous, unchanged proposing of the revealed truths, in the same sense and the same judgment, as well as the condemnation of any error opposed to it, as well as the approval and defining of the doctrine of truth. And “faithful interpretation and exposition” expressly designates the explanation of what has been revealed, whether by way of simple clarification, dogmatic approval, or the definition of dogmatic formulas. In this matter, if one pays close attention to the history of dogmas, one will hardly fail to realize that the Popes in general not only approved doctrines that had already been elaborated earlier, but, furthermore, positively and as part of their own office gave (or at least perfected) a definite resolutions of matters and formulations. Indeed, sometimes the Roman See recalls anew a given doctrine that has been, as it were, latently hidden in the Church. Thus, for example, Pius X’s decree concerning daily communion (although this is not a question of dogmatic definition) recalls and declares the decree of the Council of Trent; similarly, the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists applies the doctrine of the [First] Vatican Council. “Now this charism of truth and of never-failing faith was conferred upon Peter and his successors in this (Roman) chair in order that they might perform their supreme office for the salvation of all; that by them the whole flock of Christ might be kept away from the poisonous bait of error and be nourished by the food of heavenly doctrine; that, the occasion of schism being removed, the whole Church might be preserved as one and, resting on her foundation, might stand firm against the gates of hell.”⁵

However, the Church brings about dogmatic progress not only through definitions, condemnations, or declarations by the extraordinary magisterium, but also through the preaching, instruction, explanation, and application of the faith in the exercise of the ordinary magisterium. Moreover, although the power of magisterium properly belongs to the bishops alone, nevertheless, the bishops work through the mediation of other instruments of the Church, especially through theologians, inasmuch as they develop theological doctrine in accord with the Church’s ordering, instruction, and direction. Hence, also, her entire control over theological studies influences dogmatic progress. Finally, the act by which the Church expresses a certain dogma presupposes many preparatory acts, as can be seen in the history of almost all dogmas.⁶

III. The dispositive cause of dogmatic progress is the Church Fathers, Doctors of the Church, theologians, and also enlightened believers. Because the Church is a society, she expresses dogmas by means of a social organism, i. e. through the cooperation of head and members. Such cooperation can be seen with particular clarity in the Fathers, Doctors, and theologians, for the Holy Spirit promised to the Church also enlightens teachers and theologians, and even faithful of good will. However, this influence by the Holy Spirit over the Fathers and theologians is only ministerial, instrumental, and preparatory: ministerial because, as ministers of the Church and for the good of the Church, the Fathers and theologians explain revealed doctrine; instrumental, because they receive doctrine, authority, and enlightenment through the Church’s own mediation Church; preparatory, because the teaching of the Fathers and theologians does not create or establish dogma, except insofar as it involves the approval and definition of the Church. Hence the Fathers and theologians are properly called witnesses of doctrine of the teaching and believing Church. Nonetheless, their work exercises a real and proper causality in dogmatic progress, inasmuch as they prepare the material to be defined, fashion formulas to be defined, and in a way urge the ecclesiastical authority to a definition. Thus, in point of fact, no dogma has been defined unless the Fathers or the theologians have dispositively prepared and determined the doctrine and formula to be defined (thus giving the matter its final previous disposition).⁷

In fact, the history of dogmas shows bears witness to such an effective influence exercised by the Fathers and theologians on the development of dogmas that the history of dogmas seems to be nothing more than the history of the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians. And the main work of historians consists in investigating the doctrine of the Fathers.

However, three facts must be noted.⁸

First, the Fathers and theologians, on occasion of heresies and other errors, provided a greater explanation and judgement concerning a particular doctrine, fashioned new formulas to be set in opposition to false explanations, and thereby prepared for the definitive explication of the fundamental dogmas and authoritative condemnations of heresies. Thus, the Greek Fathers above all explained the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation, as contained in the Apostle’s Creed. On the occasion of the Pelagian heresy, St. Augustine determined and explicated the doctrine of tradition and Sacred Scripture concerning the necessity and gratuity of grace and also concerning original sin. The theologians of the Middle Ages prepared, against the Greeks,⁹ the definition of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son and similarly explicated what would become the dogmas related to transubstantiation, the fact that the soul is the form of the body, and the beatific vision. On the occasion of the heresy of Protestantism, post-Tridentine theologians explicated the doctrines concerning the Church, the Pope, and faith itself. Against Rationalism, they set forth the doctrines of faith and reason, revelation, and the supernatural order. And against Materialism, they explicated the dogmas concerning the existence and knowability of God the Creator, so that the definitions of the [First] Vatican Council might truly be the fruit and approval of the labors exercised by scholastic theologians.

Second, both the Fathers and theologians out of their desire to exposit and determine the doctrine of the faith, lest they should be [solely] aroused to this by heresies, even prepared for the condemnation of future heresies and errors, such as Protestantism, Materialism, Pantheism, Idealism, Rationalism, and even Gallicanism and Febronianism.

Thirdly and additionally, theologians resolved controversial questions raised by Catholics, doing so in such a way that they would become ripe for definition, such as questions concerning: the number of sacraments, the sacramental character, the intention required in the administration of the sacraments, the effect of absolution, the sufficiency of attrition in confession, the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the Pope’s infallibility and fullness of power.

Fourthly, even without intervening controversy theologians have explained certain points of Christian doctrine in such a way that either the definition came later on (such as the teaching of St. Anselm concerning the satisfaction of Christ) or so that everything would be ready at hand for definition, if necessity were to urge it or expediency suggest it, as is clear for a great number of the teachings held by scholastic theologians.

IV. The instrumental cause of dogmatic progress is human reason, enlightened by faith.¹⁰—The explication of revealed truths takes place by the exercise of men’s intellects (and wills). For the Church, by means of human reason, grasps and determines the sense of revealed doctrines, explains their implicit senses, explains their implicit meanings, and expresses traditional doctrines in new formulas, whether this is done through a kind of direct intuition or through logical operations, especially syllogistic ones, as we set forth earlier in articles 7 and 11.

Thus, the intellectual powers of the Church are the instrumental causes of dogmatic progress. This, however, must be understood as referring to reason that is enlightened by faith,¹¹ and above all as reason is illuminated by the gifts of the Holy Spirit, is directed by the Church’s magisterium, and works under the command of a truly good will. Hence there will be greater or lesser dogmatic progress in the Church to the degree that human reason is more or less subject to the Church’s magisterium and the inspirations of the Holy Spirit.¹² By contrast, among those who have fallen away from the Church through heresy or schism, we see no progress in knowing revealed truths but, rather, there find a darkening and corruption of the faith, as one sees among the Greeks and Protestants.¹³ Therefore, dogmatic progress depends both on illumination by God, whose Spirit breathes wherever and whenever He wills, and on the free cooperation of men.

Finally, the causality of human reason is properly speaking instrumental. This is sufficiently clear from what we said concerning the notion of dogma, the explication of revelation, and especially concerning dogmatic formulas. For human reason does not add a new objective doctrine to the deposit of faith but, rather, solely explicates, formulates, and delineates revealed doctrine or even draws conclusions therefrom. Therefore, the doctrines that reason uses to explain and formulate revealed truth, properly speaking, have the character of being a medium or instrument. Nevertheless, this is a true kind of causality. For although human reason is not permitted to add anything to the deposit of faith, it nevertheless truly and effectively exercises an influence upon the explication of the deposit of faith. And thus, human reason is really and truly the instrumental cause of dogmatic progress. The history of dogmatic development is explained, as much as is possible, from this causality.

Indeed, it follows that dogmatic development is determined not only by the general laws of human knowledge but also by the historical conditions of times, nations, and even humanity itself. Therefore, the explication of revealed truths not only takes place successively, but it also is reminiscent of the spirit and intellectual conditions of those whose work it is. Thus, the definitions of the early Councils savor of the Greek spirit, both as regards the matter defined and the way that these truths are formulated; the teaching of St. Augustine no less betrays a Latin mentality; the canons of the Council of Trent are full of scholastic formulas; and, similarly, the [First] Vatican Council manifests the spirit of more recent theology. Nor is the use and influence of reason in dogmatic progress confined to philosophy or theology alone, but in general, whatever has been developed by reason or belongs to its culture can (and in general does) exercise an influence on dogmatic development: for example, popular ideas, the moral condition [of the era], the character of the language (terminology) and even the teachings and worship of other religions. However, as we have said, all of this exercises its influence exclusively as means and instruments of revelation.¹⁴ This is especially evident in regard to heresies.

V. Heresies are the occasional cause of dogmas.— Among the elaborated works of reason that have had an influence on the development of dogmas, we must, without a doubt, also number hereses (either the heretical doctrines themselves or the whole activity of heretics). Clearly, however, the heresies themselves are not the positive and direct cause of dogmatic progress, for as far as they are concerned, they do not produce new dogmas, nor do they advance the explication of revealed truths. On the contrary, heretics themselves pervert or hinder the explication of revealed truth. Nonetheless, it would be ridiculous to deny heresies all true causality in the development of dogmas, for they are, properly speaking, the occasional causes for most definitions, as Arianism was the cause for the definition of the consubstantiality of the Word, Nestorianism and Monophysitism for the dogma of the Hypostatic Union in the two of natures of Christ, Pelagianism for the dogmas of grace and original sin, Donatism for the dogmas concerning the Church and of the Sacraments, Protestantism for the definitions set forth by the Council of Trent, Rationalism and Liberalism for the dogmas articulated by the [First] Vatican Council, and so forth. St. Augustine provides an excellent description for how this causality is exercised: “So that many (articles of faith) might be defended against (heretics), might be more thoroughly explained and understood greater clarity and preached with greater urgency, and the question raised by adversaries might provide opportunity for learning.”¹⁵

For the heretics arouse and oblige the Church to explicitly propose, defend, and define revealed doctrines, as St. Thomas says: “Because twisted men pervert the Apostolic teaching and other doctrines and scriptures to their own ruin, therefore, the explanation of the faith against the uprising of errors was necessary with the passing of time.”¹⁶ Thus, heresies are, properly speaking, the motive for applying the Church’s dogmatic authority; they determine the material to be defined and likewise the direction of the development of dogmas. However, the active force for bringing forth dogmas and the explication of revealed truths and dogmas stands on the side of the Church.¹⁷ Heretics bring about dogmas just as the persecutors of the Church made martyrs or as in the World War [bello europeo] the declaration of war [by the Central powers] was the cause of the [Allied] victory.

VI. Conclusion: As regards the efficient cause of dogmatic progress, the primary cause is the Holy Spirit, through His motion and assistance; the secondary and proximate cause is the Teaching Church, principally the Pope; the Fathers, Doctors, and theologians are the preparatory or disposing causes, as also, indeed, is the piety of the faithful; the instrumental cause is human reason, enlightened by faith; finally, the heresies are an the occasions stirring up such progress.

VII. The laws of dogmatic progress.—Based on what has been determined concerning the efficient causes of dogmatic progress, its laws follow by way of corollary. The most general law is: Dogmatic progress takes place through the cooperation of God and men.¹⁸ Such a law corresponds to the universal order of salvation, according to which God leads men to acquire supernatural goods by means of human cooperation, so that it is fit both to God and to man: something that should greatly stir up in men the desire to tirelessly devote themselves to the study of theology.¹⁹

According to this most general law, dogmatic progress is subject to the general laws of the order of grace and of human activity. As for the supernatural order, dogmatic progress depends on the general laws of the distribution of grace (illumination, antecedent grace, consequent grace, etc.) and the laws of the causality of grace; and its particular law is found in the Holy Spirit’s promised assistance in preserving, proposing, explaining, and defending the deposit of faith. As far as human activity is concerned, dogmatic progress is subject to the general laws of human knowledge, with the exception of fallibility in preserving and defining the deposit of faith, on account of the Holy Spirit’s assistance. Hence it is not necessary to inquire into special laws for dogmatic progress, but to apply the common laws of human knowledge, obviously, however, as applied to the unique object that is divine revelation. In addition to these laws, properly so called, whether general or particular, we can also establish laws improperly so called of dogmatic development or even historical laws thereof. These kinds of laws must be taken from the history of dogmas, so that dogmatic development sometimes depends on heresies, sometimes is the fruit of controversies among theologians or results from the requirements of the Christian life, and so forth.²⁰ However, they cannot, properly speaking, be called laws, because instead they express certain general facts of dogmatic progress . However, the laws, properly so-called, follow the nature of the causes and dogmatic progress.

Hence, at the same time, deeper theological explanation of both divine and human causality in dogmatic development varies, depending on different explanations offered concerning how divine causality is exercised upon human the understanding and will, and also depending on the different concepts of first (or even principal) causality and the second (and instrumental) causality. According to St. Thomas’s teaching concerning the perfect subordination of a second cause under the first cause (and likewise of an instrumental cause under the principal cause) the whole effect comes from both causes. Thus, the whole development of dogmas is both from the Church and from God, though from the Church by virtue of the power communicated to her by God. Thus, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, the development of dogmas fully and completely constitutes a human and historical fact, as will be explained in more detail below (a. 17). According to the Molinist system, part of the dogmatic evolution would be the effect of God and part the effect of men.

VIII. Final or motive causes. Generally speaking, there are two motives involved dogmatic progress: the honor of God and the salvation of souls. Thus God Himself intends a greater manifestation of the divine truth, fuller knowledge of God or of the divine mysteries, and the salvation of men. For the sake of the salvation of men, He successively explains revelation, “Just as how a teacher who knows his entire art does not immediately deliver it to the pupil from the start (for the latter could not grasp it yet) but, instead, does so step-by-step, lowering himself to his student’s capacity, so too for this reason have men have advanced in the knowledge of the faith through the passing of the ages.”²¹ For men would not have been able to bear revelation if from the start it had been proposed in fully explicated form. Similarly, the Church defined the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary “For the honor of the Holy and Indivisible Trinity, for the adornment and ornament of the God-bearing Virgin, for the exaltation of the Catholic faith, and for the increase of the Christian religion,”²² and defined Papal infallibility “to the glory of God our Savior, the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and the salvation of the Christian people”²³: this is similarly the case in other definitions. And similar such words can be found in other definitions as well.

In particular, the following motives are noted: a) The preservation of the purity of the faith. For through heresy and unbelief the work of God would be rendered void and ineffective; thus, the Popes in particular defended the purity of the faith with the utmost zeal and constancy in the midst of every danger against the faith, not out of self-love or from a desire to dominate but, rather, in order to satisfy a weighty obligation.²⁴

b) The perfection of divine worship. Worship is the practical application and execution of what we believe; hence a mutual connection exists between the explication of worship and of faith itself. Sometimes the development of faith precedes the perfection of worship, and sometimes practice precedes the development of faith.—For the perfection of worship either presupposes or bears with itself a kind of explication of doctrine, just as, on the other hand, the development of faith promotes the explication of worship. Since Christian worship is primarily sacramental, the perfection of worship had a particular, though not exclusive, influence on the explication of sacramental doctrine. Thus, there arose questions concerning the baptism by heretics, the pardonability of capital sins, and so forth, up to the decree concerning daily communion. Undoubtedly, the needs of worship were a most effective stimulus for the explicating of faith, both because most things concerning worship were only implicitly revealed and, also, because the needs of worship were practical and subject to sense experience. However, modernists²⁵ and more recent Protestants wrongly claim that the primitive faith was altered or disfigured through forms of worship borrowed from other religions or introduced solely on account of certain subjective needs, for the whole of the dogmatic explication that took place on account of [the Church’s] worship is only the determination of the pre-existing faith.

c) The execution of the duties and power of the Church hierarchy.—Since the Church is divinely instituted to provide for the salvation of souls, it must necessarily exercise its duty and apply the power given to it. And, once again, this cannot be done without her explicating the Church’s doctrine. However, in such explication, practice necessarily had to come first in some way. That is, the Church first had to explain herself in practice, before the doctrine became more definite. For no definite doctrine concerning General Councils could exist before such Councils had taken place. Similarly, the explicit doctrine concerning Papal power and infallibility presupposes the effective exercise of such power and infallible magisterium. And this explains the history of dogmas concerning the Church and especially concerning the Pope. The Popes did not successively exercise their power out of a desire to dominate or to imitate the Roman Empire, but rather, did so in obedience to the command of Christ, fulfilling the duty entrusted to them. By no means did the theological and dogmatic doctrine sanction a purely historical fact as being divinely instituted, but instead, recognized the power and action of the Pope as being the legitimate execution of the divine command, and in the light of the facts, better recognized the divine command itself, the nature of Papal primacy. Nor can it be surprising that, from the early days of the Church to the present day, the explication of the dogma concerning the power of the hierarchy and Papal primacy has aroused so many difficulties and controversies, for ecclesiastical dogma presents difficulties not only to the intellect, but also to the will, since the will does not gladly submit to the governance of others over one’s intimate affairs.

d.) The promotion of Christian holiness.—The proper end of revelation is not only that might come to believe but, moreover, that it might be a path that guides man to salvation; hence the explanation of reveled truths must, in a special way, serve in the promoting of the Christian life, especially since Christian holiness is easily endangered by erroneous doctrines. Therefore, this kind of motivation will promote in particular the development of moral doctrine, such as that concerning religion, duties, virtues and sins, states of life—e. g. concerning marriage—the conditions for receiving the sacraments, and similarly will motivate the resolving of moral questions caused by new economic, political, social conditions or by the practical customs of life. Thus, you have a whole series of declarations by the Church, beginning with decrees of the “council” of Jerusalem up to the recent Papal encyclicals. For although the moral life depends mainly on good will or intention, on zeal and constancy, yet it is no less the case that certain, true, and objective norms are required, the knowledge of which is indispensable, especially for the ecclesiastical community. Even the smallest mistake can introduce the greatest danger to holiness and morality. How such footsteps should frighten us! By contrast, a more perfect explanation of revealed doctrine paves a safer and easier way for holiness, and thus provides for greater tranquility of souls. Indeed, “holy simplicity” is good, but according to the ordinary laws [of human existence] only those who have more perfect knowledge of the ways and means of sanctification will reach a loftier perfection.²⁶ Therefore, by reason and merit of a fuller explication of revealed doctrine, the faithful today are able to carry on the work of salvation and sanctification more easily and more securely—as in fact can be seen in the lives of the saints.²⁷

e. Finally, this very progress in knowledge of revealed truths constitutes an exceptionally important spiritual good, not at all to be neglected by the Church. Indeed, no few people, even among Catholics—nay, even among theologians—abhor the idea of new dogmas. However, they are wrong in this estimation. Indeed, in the nature of dogmatic definitions two things must be considered: 1˚, the obligation of faith imposed; 2˚ the explanation of revelation or the progress of faith and knowledge of revealed truths. Indeed, those who abhor the idea of new definitions seem to consider them only as involving a new obligation. However, the obligation to profess faith is imposed precisely to perfect one’s understanding and to direct and advance man along the way of salvation. If these ends are kept in mind, then dogmas will appear not so much as being heavy burdens as, rather, precious gifts. Just as new scientific doctrines, conclusions, and indeed all such progress is received with the applause of all, so too in matters of faith, that greatest form of progress which is found in dogmatic definitions can hardly be appreciated as much as it deserves. Finally, I do not see why those who have true faith in God and profess the infallibility of the Pope should abhor the idea of new definitions. Nevertheless, the Church, sparing the weakness of the majority, does not define new dogmas without necessity or great benefit.

IX. Conclusion—Therefore, the motives for promoting dogmatic progress are clearly and essentially religious, namely, so that revealed religion might be preserved, perfected, and bear fruit. For the deposit of faith was not entrusted to the Church as a talent to be wrapped up and hidden in a cloth, but rather, as a seed to be sown and a light to be shone, so that all might benefit from it. Therefore Leo XIII rightly teaches: “To reject dogma is simply to deny Christianity.”²⁸ Thus, guided by these reasons, the Church has condemned errors, resolved doubts, promoted explication, and defined dogmas by her own authority. Therefore, the most important concern for the salvation of souls was the cause of most of the definitions, i. e. the faithfulness of the Church in the execution of the divine mandate: “Teach them to observe all that I have commanded you” (Matthew 28:20). And the words of Jeremiah’s Lamentations cannot be applied to the Church: “Little ones ask for bread, and there is no one to break it for them” (Lamentations 4:4).

X. The formal cause of dogmatic development is the authority and the approval of the Church’s infallible magisterium.— The formal cause of dogmatic development is easily known based on the nature of dogmas themselves. For since dogmas are formally constituted by the definitions and propositions set forth by the ecclesiastical magisterium, the very coming-into-being of dogmas also formally depends on the Church’s magisterium, whose ultimate act is that of setting forth dogmatic definitions. Thus, a given doctrine must be considered to have progressed through the course of dogmatic development to the same extent that it has been approved by ecclesiastical authority. Thus, a given doctrine may indeed be very clearly understood in terms of scientific speculation while still being far from the point of definition, and by contrast, another doctrine might be close to a definition without having received sufficiently scientific explanation. Therefore, the historian of dogmas will pay particular attention to the Church’s declarations, since they indicate the various stages in the development of dogma.

XI. The revealed truths themselves are the material cause of dogmatic development.—The material of dogmatic progress is quite clearly those doctrines that can constitute it as explained, formulated, and defined dogmas. All the revealed doctrines, and indeed only them, are what can constitute this body of truths. However, other doctrines that exercise an influence on the development of dogmas are considered, rather, as being in the line of a kind of efficient causality [potius ut agentia quadam considerantur]. Revealed truths have the character of being the matter of such progress insofar as dogmas are potentially contained in these truths, or insofar as dogmas are fashioned from revealed truths.²⁹

XII. Conclusion.—From what has been said, it is clear that dogmatic progress is extremely complex, even as regards its causes. Hence, for the history of dogmas, there evidently follows the duty to consider its individual causes, at least to the degree that this is possible. In our own days, many historians consider mainly, indeed almost exclusively, the influence of ideas that are extraneous to revelation, such as the influence of contemporary philosophy, pagan religions, or even Judaism. Although such matters do involve true objects of the history of dogmas, they are, nonetheless, certainly neither the main nor the only objects thereof, and therefore, such a restricted outlook makes it hardly possible for one to render a definitive and correct judgment concerning dogmatic progress.³⁰

---

1. See Aurelio Palmieri, II progresso dommatico nel concetto cattolico, 2^nd ed., (Florence: Libreria editrice fiorentina, 1910), p. 91-130; [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 2^nd ed., vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann. (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), col. 1611–1619; [Henri] Pinard [De La Boullaye], “Dogme” in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique: contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines, [5th ed.], ed. Adhémar D’Alès, (Paris: G. Beauchesne, [1924-1931]), col. 1164ff; Matthias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, trans. Michael J. Miller (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019), vol. 1.1, 376ff. [Tr. note: This seems to be the Scheeben reference he has in mind, though the German pagination (201ff) here does not quite match what one would expect, based on the earlier citations. That would correspond to 292ff in the current English.]↩︎

2. See Constantin von Schäzler, Die Bedeutung der Dogmengeschichte vom katholischen Standpunkt aus erörtert, ed. Thomas Esser (Regensburg: Manz, 1884), p. 32; cf. idem., Introductio in S. Theologiam dogmaticam ad mentem D. Thomae Aquinatis, ed. Thomas Esser (Regensburg: Manz, 1882), p. 146-153.↩︎

3. See what is said above in ch. 1. Also, see Francisco Marín-Sola, “La Homogeneidad De La Doctrina Católica,” in La Ciencia thomista 10, no. 29 (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1914), p. 177ff.↩︎

4. [Trans. note: As an Eastern Catholic sensitive to papal maximalism, I note that while inspired by the correct desire to emphasize the role of the papacy in the definitive proposal of the truths of the faith for the whole Church, such language is also marked by the maximalism of the era when Schultes’ writing.]↩︎

5. [First] Vatican Council, Pastor Aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3071 [1837]).↩︎

6. See Francisco Marín-Sola, “La infalibilidad de la Iglesia y sus relaciones con la revelación, la fe y la teología,” in La Ciencia Tomista 14, no. 40 (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1917), p. 5–36.↩︎

7. See Ambroise Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie [2^nd ed., (Paris: [Librairie Victor Lecoffre J. Gabalda & C^ie], 1910)], p. 180ff.↩︎

8. See the excellent remarks in [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 2^nd ed., vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann. (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), col. 1611–19.↩︎

9. [Tr. note: I am merely here noting, as a matter of “Byzantine Catholic conscience,” the slight pugnacity of Fr. Schultes, though I recognize the developments regarding the filioque, while also recognizing the Byzantine Catholic and Orthodox practice of Creedally emphasizing the ultimate principle of the persons being in the Father, from whom both proceed, though the Spirit as also opposed to the Son, who is from the Father.]↩︎

10. See Francisco Marín-Sola, “Raciocinio y progreso dogmático,” in La Ciencia Tomista 18, no. 54, (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1918), p. 267-280; 19, no. 55, (Madrid: Dominicos Españoles, 1919), p. 34-48; 21, no. 62, (Madrid, Dominicos Españoles, 1920), p. 164-175.↩︎

11. See [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3016 [1796]).↩︎

12. See Giovanni Battista Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2^nd ed., (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta: 1875), th. 25.↩︎

13. However, we do not wish to deny the merit of works written by Protestant authors in literary and historical studies concerning the Sacred Scripture and teaching of the Fathers. [Tr. note: One would think that Fr. Schultes would also extend this sentiment to the Orthodox, with whom he was likely less likely to interact. While personally noting the problems that do exist even for our separated Orthodox brethren in regard to the living universal magisterium, I would personally soften Fr. Schultes’ language in some of the places above, though I note here his gestures in a magnanimous direction, especially for his day and as a conservative Roman professor.]↩︎

14. See what is said concerning the rationalist theory concerning the influence of historical conditions and “popular impulse” in [Henri] Pinard [De La Boullaye], “Dogme” in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique: contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines, [5th ed.], ed. Adhémar D’Alès, (Paris: G. Beauchesne, [1924-1931]), col. 1165.↩︎

15. St. Augustine, De civitate dei, bk. 16, ch. 2. Cf. In Ps. 54, no. 22 and In Ps. 67, no. 39.↩︎

16. ST II-II, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1; cf. II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 2; I, q. 29, a. 3; I, q. 36, a. 2, ad 1 and 2.↩︎

17. Cf. See Alexis-Henri-Marie Lépicier, De stabilitate et progressu dogmatis, 2^nd ed. (Rome: Desclée et Socii, 1910), p. 177ff and 279ff; Bernhard Dorholt, Über die entwicklung des dogma und den fortschritt in der theologie. Habilitationsrede (Münster: Aschendorffsche buchhandlung, 1892), p.25 ff; Cardinal Billot rightly notes that heretics did not initiate dogmas [Cardinal Louis Billot, De immutabilitate traditionis contra modernam haeresïm evolutionismi, 2nd ed. (Rome: Pontificia Instituti Pii IX, 1907), p. 43]. For we must distinguish between controversies in the Church herself and heresies. Even before the Council of Nicaea, the Arian doctrine was a heresy, since it was contrary to explicit faith in the divinity of Christ; no less was the Protestant doctrine clearly opposed to those that had already explicitly been proposed for belief by the Church’s magisterium, whether solemnly or ordinarily, such as that the Pope is the divinely established head of the Church, that Christ is really present in the Eucharist, and so forth. (cf. Bañez, In ST II-II, q. 1 a. 7). Therefore, heresies presuppose a given, already complete dogmatic explication and are merely an occasion for the doctrine already proposed to be so solemnly defined and given greater determination. Cf. Joseph Kleutgen, Die Théologie der Vorzeit, 2nd ed., (Münster: Theissing, 1874), vol. 5, 421ff, 622ff.↩︎

18. See Constantin von Schäzler, Die Bedeutung der Dogmengeschichte vom katholischen Standpunkt aus erörtert, ed. Thomas Esser (Regensburg: Manz, 1884), 158ff; idem., Introductio in S. Theologiam dogmaticam ad mentem D. Thomae Aquinatis, ed. Thomas Esser (Regensburg: Manz, 1882); Giovanni Battista Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura, 2^nd ed. (Rome: Ex typographia Polyglotta: 1875); Arnoldus Rademacher, Der Entwicklungsgedanke in Religion und Dogma (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1914), 63, 77, 87.↩︎

19. Arnoldus Rademacher, Der Entwicklungsgedanke in Religion und Dogma (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1914), 87.↩︎

20. See [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 2^nd ed., vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann. (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924). [Tr. note: No exact page numbers are cited by Fr. Schultes.]↩︎

21. ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7, ad 2. Although St. Thomas is here speaking immediately about new revelations, nonetheless the reason set forth also holds true for a dogmatic explication.↩︎

22. See Pius IX, Ineffabilis Deus (Denzinger, no. 2803 [1641])↩︎

23. See [First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3073 [1839]).↩︎

24. See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 9.↩︎

25. See the Decree Lamentabili, props. 39–51; Alfred Loisy, The Gospel and the Church, trans. [Christopher Home] (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988) [p. 175ff in the original Évangile et église.]↩︎

26. See Albert Maria Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, 5^th ed., vol. 5 ([Freiburg: Herder, 1907-1922]), pt. 3.↩︎

27. See Christian Pesch, Theologische Zeitfragen 4: Folge, Glaube, Dogmen und geschichtliche Tatsachen: eine Untersuchung über den Modernismus, (Fribourg: Herder, 1908), 193: “Dogma causes… perpetual increase in holiness in the Church.”↩︎

28. Leo XII, Tametsi, no. 9.↩︎

29. Take care not to confuse the matter of dogmatic progress with the matter of the history of dogmas. For the matter of the history of dogmas includes everything that in any way concurs in the explication of revealed truths, whether they are revealed truths themselves, or heresies, or popular ideas, or philosophical and religious systems.↩︎

30. Harnack notes the following causes of dogmatic progress (in Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3^rd ed. (Freiburg: Mohr, [1894-1897]), 13):

    The concept and demarcation of the canonical books;

    the doctrinal tradition of an earlier period that is no longer understood;

    the needs of worship and right order [constitutionis];

    the desire to reconcile the teachings of religion (or religious doctrine) with prevailing scientific teachings

    political and social conditions

    different conceptions of a perfect moral life;

    “so-called” logical consequences, that is, the analogy of dogmas;

    the will to reconcile the different “directions” and oppositions that exist within the Church;

    the intention to reject doctrines that are considered erroneous;

    “the sacrosanct force of blind custom.”↩︎