Reginald Schultes, Introduction to the History of Dogmas: Introduction and Articles 1–3 (The Notion of Dogma; The Catholic Notion of Dogma; Erroneous Conceptions of Dogma and of the History of Dogmas)

Apr 17

Translator’s Introduction

In a number of my academic articles and texts, I have referenced the course lecture written by Fr. Reginald Schultes, OP, who taught at the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Angelicum) at the turn of the 20^th century, alongside Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange. In 2023, I sketched out a translation of his lectures gathered together in the Latin volume Introductio ad historiam dogmatum (Paris: Lethielleux, 1922). While working on the translation, I realized that it, perhaps was not something that I would bring to press directly, only because the text is marked by its era in the very style of writing. However, it remains a very important volume for several reasons. I think, most importantly, it shows how a faithful and relatively conservative Thomist nonetheless accounts for the importance of the history of dogmas. It therefore provides an insertion point into which one can connect into a more traditional Thomism our more refined sensibilities concerning historical matters today. (I have many thoughts about this broader project, but this is not the place for me to unpack that.) Secondly, Schultes’ volume also helped to articulate some important points regarding the history of the scholastic notion of dogmatic development. This can be found in other authors from his era (including but not limited to Marín-Sola), but he provides a very important background for what we find in someone like Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, alongside whom he taught, seemingly as a close colleague. Thirdly, the volume contains his very important critique of Marín-Sola’s theory of dogmatic development, particularly as relates to the question of the De fide definability of proper theological conclusions. Although many (if not most) Thomists have seemed to take Marín-Sola’s account as fully authoritative, nonetheless, Frs. Schultes, Garrigou-Lagrange, Marie-Michel Labourdette, and William Wallace all registered very important critiques which, at this time (April, 2024), I still believe to be strong arguments against Marín-Sola’s account.

Thus, I will be presenting Schultes’s text here on To Be a Thomist, in non-finalized, but reviewed, draft form, for the sake of opening up discussions related to these issues, which are very live even today, especially as regards dogmatic and doctrinal development. These article-chapters (nineteen in number) will appear over the course of the next month or two, depending on my other work needs.

Translations from Denzinger are partly taken from Ignatius’s 43^rd edition, though I have sometimes altered these or have been more direct. On occasion, my texts of Aquinas have used the online English Dominican Fathers’ Summa Theologiae text as a basis, though edited. Official ecclesiastical documents have been generally taken from the Vatican sources.

Finally, I wish to thank most warmly and appreciatively Mr. Mitchell Kengor, without whom I would never have finished this labor. Mr. Kengor helped to even out the vexing references in the volume, which are often incomplete in their documentary details. The reader will see that we found it necessary to use brackets on many occasions, due to uncertainty that we had regarding editions being referred to by Fr. Schultes. Given the draft nature of this translation, we chose to leave these references in this form. Nonetheless, Mr. Kengor’s work should suffice for helping a researcher to track down the texts cited.

Author’s Preface

In this volume, we are presenting the introductory lectures on the history of dogmas that we delivered at the Angelicum in Rome, starting in 1911. According to the statutes of our college, theological students in their fourth year of studies, as well as students in the upper-level course of theological studies, must take a specific course presenting a general introduction to the history of dogmas in addition to their course in the history of dogmas. From the time that this task was entrusted to us in 1911, all of our labors have been devoted to explaining the progress or development of dogmas so as to thereby set forth the foundation, force, and very notion [ratio] of the history of dogmas.

Our treatise is an introductory treatise. In general, it is an introduction to dogmatic and moral theology, which is itself is founded upon on dogmatic development and holds, proves, explains, and defends the fruit of this development, namely the dogmas of the Church. However, it is specifically an introductory treatise to the history of dogmas, for while the history of dogmas itself establishes the particular facts and properly historical laws of the development of dogmas, our introduction establishes and explains the nature and general laws of both the history and development of dogmas. In contrast to the history of dogmas, which deploys a strictly historical methodology, our introduction uses the methodology proper to dogmatics, though with due respect to the facts of history.

Therefore, the intended fruit of these labors is to provide the reader with an understanding of the nature, conditions, and laws of both the history and the development of dogma, though also those of the facts of the history of dogmas. Thus, in this sense (and with all due modesty) we place here at the head of this work the words of the wise man so as to express, at once, the ultimate end of the development of dogmas and of our work: “Not only have I labored for myself but for all who seek the truth” (Sirach 24:47).

Introduction

Among the questions of faith most discussed in our days, it is quite certain that neither the last nor the least is that concerning the development and history of dogmas.¹ In fact, the adversaries of the faith, especially Protestants and Modernists, strive to fabricate as many arguments as possible against the truth of the Catholic faith on the basis of the history and development of dogmas. However, on the other hand, historians and theologians themselves still have not articulated a clear and distinct doctrine that would be complete and sufficient for modern needs. This is understandable, for this is a new discipline, one that was less expressly treated by the Fathers of the Church and scholastic theologians. Nor is this state of affairs surprising, for as long as the unity of faith prevailed and the historical facts of the development of dogmas were less well known, there was less need for a distinct teaching concerning these matters; now, however, with the insurgence of adversaries to the faith and historical facts placed in full light, a more distinct and complete teaching is required.

The question concerning the development of dogmas is twofold, at once historical and theological in nature: historically it is concerned with historical facts, and theologically with the nature and laws of dogmatic development. The former question pertains to the history of dogmas, and the latter to dogmatic theology. Indeed, for both those who confess the faith and for those who oppose it, the matter is concerned with a properly, immediately, and formally dogmatic reality. Therefore, the [First] Vatican Council defined certain general principles regarding dogmatic progress. Then, Pius X, in his Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists, added further determinations concerning dogmatic progress and the history of dogmas. And, for their part, theologians generally strive to explain the development of dogmas in their treatises De fide, De Ecclesia, and De revelatione.

However, the question concerning the development and history of dogma unquestionably requires a specific treatise on its own, for this matter is concerned with a specific and distinct dogma that requires as much explanation and defense as possible, at once on account of the intrinsic difficulties that it involves, the multiple errors that have arisen regarding these matters, and assaults by the adversaries of the faith, as well as the various problems that the history of dogmas itself proposes as matters standing in need of resolution. Therefore, as questions concerning revelation, the Church, and the inspiration of Sacred Scripture are in need of their own specific treatises, so too the doctrine concerning the development and history of dogmas seems to deserve such treatment set apart, so that the whole complex of questions can be considered and explained systematically and according to their proper formality [sub ratione propria].

Now, as we will show, both pre-Tridentine and post-Tridentine scholastic theologians had indeed sufficiently determined the theological principles of dogmatic progress. However, their teaching is not well known and, for the most part, stands in need of explanation and, in particular, application to historical facts that are today better known as well as to more recent questions. A number of modern theologians articulate positions concerning the development of dogmas. However, in general, these works fall short in various ways. Some only consider one or another part of the problem (such as, for example, the question concerning the definability of theological conclusions). Others write in a way that is more apologetic than systematic. And some even propose a teaching that is too severe [sobria]. Finally, in the case of historians, a [fully articulated and explicit] teaching, properly so-called, is even completely wanting.

Thus, our intention is to systematically address the whole complex of questions involved in this matter (especially those questions that are proposed by the history of dogmas), to explain the principles of faith regarding dogmatic development and apply them to more recent questions, and to explain and apply the proven teaching of the scholastics. For we do not stand in need of new teachings but, rather, must strive to more perfectly understand and scientifically apply the traditional teaching concerning dogmatic progress, especially that of the [First] Vatican Council and of scholastic theologians.

The division of this work follows from the nature of the question itself. The history of dogmas has for its object the development of dogmas, and the development of dogmas follows the nature of dogmas. Therefore, we shall treat our topics as follows:

the concept and nature of dogma (part 1)

the development of dogmas (part 2),

the history of dogmas (part 3).

In the first part, we will treat the following three articles in sequence:

1° the historical use of the term dogma;

2° the Catholic notion of dogma;

3° erroneous conceptions of dogma (and of the history of dogmas) in Protestant, Modernist, and Guntherian writings.

Chapter 1: The Notion of Dogma

Article 1: The Historical Use of the Term Dogma

The word dogma² is taken from the Greek language (δοκέω). Originally, it signified a convention, decree, or statute. Thus, in the Septuagint “dogma” refers to a royal decree (Esther 3:9; Daniel 2:13 and 6:8); Luke 2:1 (the edict of Caesar); Acts 17:7 (Decree of Caesar); Acts 16:4 (decrees of the Apostles and elders or the Council of Jerusalem). In the Greek philosophers, “dogma” means fundamental principles or doctrines, as Latins use the term decree. Thus Cicero: "Wisdom must neither doubt itself nor its decrees, which the philosophers call dogmas... When a decree is issued, the law of truth and justice is issued.”³

With this double meaning indicating both doctrine and decree, the word dogma was used by the Greeks to designate the precepts of Christian doctrine. Thus in the Didache (11:3): “According to the decree (δόγμα) of the Gospel do thus”; Letter of Barnabas (1:6): “Therefore there are three dogmas of the Lord: the hope of life, which is the beginning and the end of our faith; righteousness, which is the beginning and end of judgment; and charity expressed with gladness and joy, which is the testimony of the works of righteousness” (cf. ibid., 10.1; 9.10; 9.7). St. Ignatius of Antioch (in the Letter to the Magnesians 13:1): “Strive to be confirmed in the doctrines (ἐν δογμασιν) of the Lord and the Apostles.” Later on, dogma took on a meaning that more directly signified a doctrine, so that it was used to signify the doctrine of faith, although sometimes it was used to refer to a human opinion⁴ and to heretical doctrines.⁵

And in Origen: according to our dogma, that is, according to the faith of the Church.⁶ St. Cyril of Jerusalem distinguishes between pious dogmas and good actions: “The reason for divine worship clearly stands in these two things: pious dogmas and good actions. Doctrine without good works is not acceptable to God, nor does God respect works separated from religious dogmas.”⁷ Among the Latins, the term dogma seems to have been introduced in particular by St. Augustine and Gennadius Massiliensis. In his Commonitorium, Vincentius of Lerinus calls the doctrine of faith, “the dogma of the Christian religion” (23.9), “heavenly dogma” (21); “if, separating ourselves from the ancient truth of the universal dogma, we follow the newly devised error of one particular man (Augustine?), we do so at the utmost peril to our eternal salvation” (28.8);“The Church of Christ is a diligent and careful guardian of the dogmas deposited to her care” (23.16; cf. 23.4; 24.4 and elsewhere). And Gennadius of Massilia wrote his Liber ecclesiasticorum dogmatum.

The scholastics⁸ made less of the specific term dogma, using instead, as equivalent terms: doctrine of faith, truth of faith, rule of faith, doctrine of Christ or doctrine of the Church, articles of faith, and so forth. It was only after the time of the Reformation, especially on the occasion of the question of Jansenism, that the term “dogma” began to be commonly used to refer to the revealed doctrine to be believed in. ⁹ It was sanctioned by the [First] Vatican Council.¹⁰

Therefore, we must consider what is the proper notion and nature of dogma.

Article 2: The Catholic Notion of Dogma

I. The notion of dogma must be sought out in the Catholic Church. —Protestant authors find no small difficulty in determining the idea and nature of dogma. For given that Protestantism knows of no dogma truly so called, each person establishes different definitions of dogmas and, in accord with them, variously determines the matter belonging to the history of dogmas.¹¹ Thus, even the concept of the history of dogmas varies greatly among them, and they do not yet have a common conception of the history of dogmas.¹² This difficulty, however, is easily resolved by making recourse to the Catholic notion of dogma. Nay, the history of dogmas must necessarily begin with the Catholic notion of dogma.

Indeed, only in the Catholic Church is there to be found dogma in the proper sense and a universally received concept of dogma. Hence Catholic authors rightly proceed from the Catholic concept of dogma and determine therefrom the material that belongs to the history of dogmas. Similarly, however, Protestant authors (or others) cannot but admit that there are no dogmas except in the Catholic Church (or dogmas received from her, as in schismatic churches) and that dogmas are de facto and historically received and held according to the norm of the Catholic conception. Indeed, whoever speaks of dogma, if he speaks properly, has the Catholic conception in mind, even if perhaps he understands it only in a confused or even false way. Granted, non-Catholic authors do not admit the objective truth of the Catholic conception, namely that Catholic doctrines are really what they are affirmed and believed to be. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the dogmas were conceived in this way or that they were admitted in the Church in that sense. Hence even Protestant authors necessarily must make recourse to the Catholic conception of dogmas, at least to determine the matter belonging to the history of dogmas.¹³ For the same reason, nothing prevents us from accepting the conception of dogmas as it exists today in the Church, that is, as expressed in the form now found after a long development, for in fact such a conception prevails in the Church.

II. Dogmatic definition of dogma.— The notion and nature of dogma in the Catholic Church is not solely determined by theologians but exists in the form of a dogmatic definition. Indeed, it is twofold, with one, however, being the explanation of the other. Thus, the [First] Vatican Council defined in Dei filius, ch. 2: “All those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith that are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and which by the Church, either in solemn judgment or through her ordinary and universal teaching office, are proposed for belief as having been divinely revealed.”¹⁴ In this definition, the word dogma is indeed missing, yet no one doubts that all and only those things which are to be believed by Divine and Catholic Faith are to be called dogmas. Also, thereafter, the Council itself, as the same constitution continues on, speaks of the “dogmas of faith”¹⁵ and calls the definition of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff a “divinely revealed dogma.”¹⁶ Another definition is found in the definition of Papal infallibility: “We…teach and define that it is a dogma revealed by God: that the Roman pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, acting in the office of shepherd and teacher of all Christians, he defines, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, possesses through the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter the infallibility [with which the Divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed in defining the doctrine concerning faith or morals: and that such definitions of the Roman pontiff are therefore irreformable of themselves, not because of the consent of the Church.]”¹⁷

Therefore, dogma is defined: a revealed doctrine concerning faith or morals which is contained in the word of God, whether written or handed down, and defined by the Church, either by a solemn judgment or through her ordinary and universal magisterium, as divinely revealed (as proposed to be believed by all).

Or more briefly: Dogma is revealed doctrine, defined and proposed by the Church to be believed by all.

III. Explication of this definition.¹⁸— In this definition four conditions are assigned to dogmas. A dogma must be: a) a doctrine; b) a doctrine revealed either in Sacred Scripture or divine tradition; c) a doctrine concerning matters of faith or morals; d) a doctrine defined by the Church as revealed and proposed to all for believe.

a) Dogma designates a teaching / doctrine. Doctrine signifies knowledge or truth for the purpose of teaching or instruction.¹⁹ From this, it follows that dogmas contain an intellectual judgment and are expressed in the form of propositions. For truth is the object of the intellect²⁰ and the human intellect knows truth by combining and dividing, that is, by affirming or denying what is said about the subject of that proposition,²¹ with the expression of such judgment being found in the proposition.²² Hence dogmas as such are the object of the intellect or of intellectual knowledge and have an objective value,²³ namely insofar as the truth of knowledge consists in the conformity of the intellect to the realities [res] understood.²⁴

Therefore, a distinction must be drawn between the realities about which there are dogmas and the dogmas themselves. The realities about which there are dogmas are utterly varied, whether created or uncreated, whether bodily or spiritual, whether simple or composite; however, the dogmas themselves are truths or judgments, enunciated by way of proposition.²⁵

However, nothing prevents dogmas from expressing truths, whether theoretical or practical, such as precepts, laws, counsels, nor, likewise from expressing such truths either in doctrinal form or in a practical form which is equivalent to the express doctrine, as when, for example, the Church orders that the sacraments are validly administered in a given, determinate manner. For in both doctrine and in precepts or counsels something is affirmed or denied, namely, what is to be done or omitted, or what is good or evil. And likewise, through practice (with all due conditions being maintained) one establishes what is to be done or is true according to faith. Therefore, the first condition of dogma only indicates that a judgment or assertion be stated, in whatever particular way this may be done. Hence, the Modernists, as it were, err at the very threshold, conceiving dogmas fundamentally as the object of a kind of blind religious sentiment but not as the object of the intellect and a truth properly so called.

b) Dogma designates a revealed teaching. The second condition of dogma is that it is a revealed truth that is contained in the written or handed down word of God. For the “dogmas” of the philosophers are distinguished from the dogmas of the Church in that the former propose the opinion of human genius, whereas the latter propose the revealed truth. As is clear, “Revelation,” must be understood in the Christian sense, namely, as a supernatural revelation,²⁶ not as a natural revelation by God that is made by means of the creation [sic] of things or by means of the intellectual power of men or angels. And thus, once again, the Modernists are gravely mistaken in understanding revelation to be a manifestation of the subconscious,²⁷ even if they add that God manifests Himself [there]. Therefore, the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists defines the faith that is faith in dogmas as “True assent of the intellect to the truth received by hearing from an external source. By this assent… we believe to be true that which has been revealed and attested to by the personal God, our Creator and Lord.”

It is, however, indifferent to the nature of dogma, whether the revealed truth is knowable by natural reason or by revelation alone. For revelation contains both natural and supernatural truths, or mysteries, which neither before nor after revelation has been made could be demonstrated by the natural powers of the created intellect²⁸. However, because revelation principally and per se is concerned with the [supernatural] mysteries, with the other revealed truths being directed to them—nay, because even those truths or doctrines that are knowable by reason are revealed only in connection with some supernatural truth—dogma principally refers to mysteries.²⁹

However, it is not just any kind of revelation whatsoever, even of God, that suffices for establishing a dogma; rather, such revelation must be public, namely, in the sense that this revelation is delivered to the Church as a public society. For dogmas have never been considered to be a private affair, but instead, have always been regarded to be a public matter, one that is social and ecclesial, for dogmas protect the faith of the Church and the foundation of ecclesiastical and religious life. Hence the notion of dogma implies that a revealed doctrine has been handed on to the Church and committed to her so that it might, in a certain way, be her own [eius proprietas]. Therefore, the revelation that is required for the notion of dogma must be public, being intended and given for the whole of the faithful.³⁰ Thus, private revelations are excluded from the notion of dogma, just as in fact the Church has never issued any definition concerning any private revelation but, instead, only judges concerning how they are conformed to the public revelation entrusted to her.

Finally, such revealed doctrine has been consigned to the Church: either by means of divinely inspired Sacred Scripture or by means of oral tradition. Hence, the [First] Vatican Council says: “(The revealed doctrines) that are contained in the Word of God, written or handed down…”³¹ The modernist concept of dogma is therefore ruled out, as though only those doctrines that live in public consciousness are suitable for establishing dogmas, especially if one understands the notion of public consciousness in the modernist sense.³²

Thus, revelation is defined as:

The free and essentially supernatural divine action by which God, speaking to us through the prophets and, at last, through Christ (and His apostles), has revealed, with a kind of obscurity, supernatural mysteries and natural religious truths (deposited either in inspired Sacred Scripture or in the Church’s tradition), so that they might thereafter be infallibly proposed by the Church without any change in meaning (i.e. truth), until the end of the world.³³

c) Dogma refers to a revealed doctrine concerning faith and morals. Although all dogmas refer to revealed doctrine, nonetheless, not all revealed truths are suited for being dogmas, but rather, only those that by themselves or by reason of themselves direct us to God or to salvation.

Medieval scholastics distinguished between those truths that are credibilia per se and those that are such in relation to other truths. Thus St. Thomas, in ST II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1 distinguishes:

Some credibilia are proposed of themselves for the assent of faith, while others are of faith not in themselves but only in relation to others… Those truths are of themselves of faith are those that order us directly to eternal life, such as the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God, the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation, and other truths of this sort. In this way are the articles of faith distinguished. On the other hand, certain things in Sacred Scripture are proposed for our belief not principally for their own sake but, rather, for the manifestation of the aforementioned truths—for example, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again upon being touched by Elisha’s bones, and other such things that are written of in Sacred Scripture for the sake of manifesting the Divine majesty or the Incarnation of Christ. And these sorts of truths do not require distinct articles.

Thus, only those truths that are per se revealed or per se credibilia (namely, those which of themselves or by reason of themselves orient us to God) constitute the articles of faith and, for the same reason, dogmas or the “deposit of faith.”

More recent writers express the same teaching in another way by calling those things that are per se credibilia doctrines “concerning things of faith and morals.” See for example the Council of Trent’s Decree on the Vulgate Edition of the Bible and the Manner of Interpreting Sacred Scripture,³⁴ and, in a more express form, the [First] Vatican Council’s declaration “In matters of faith and morals, affecting the building up of Christian doctrine, that is to be held as the true sense of Holy Scripture which Holy Mother Church has held and holds, to whom it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. Therefore no one is allowed to interpret the same Sacred Scripture contrary to this sense or contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.”³⁵

“Matters of faith and morals” are nothing other than per se revealed truths or per se credibilia.” “They affect the building up of Christian doctrine,” because they properly constitute it and distinguish it from other doctrines (e.g. that of Pagans). Matters of faith and morals are distinguished inasmuch as “matters of faith” are to be believed, though not to be done (e.g., the Trinity of divine persons), whereas “matters of morals” are indeed both to be believed and to be done (e. g. revealed precepts). Doctrine concerning matters of faith is speculative or theoretical, whereas that concerning matters of morals is practical doctrine, such as, “Do this in remembrance of me.”

Protestants have perverted this ancient teaching inasmuch as they restrict dogmas or beliefs to “doctrines of salvation,” by which they understand only those statements that immediately express our salvation or certify for us the salvation that has been acquired (e.g., that Christ has saved us). Hence, they say that doctrines concerning God the Creator or concerning the facts of our Savior’s life (such as the fact that He was crucified) do not belong to the domain of dogmas or to the faith that saves but, instead, to philosophy or history (historical faith).³⁶ Clearly, this teaching is nothing other than a kind of corruption and false interpretation of the doctrine of the medieval scholastics (as commonly happens in the doctrines of the Protestants) and is based exclusively on the Protestant doctrine concerning the nature of faith and justification. For if faith is an act of trust, it can only be based upon motives of trust in salvation to be acquired or which has been acquired. In the same way, if justification were to be had by the fact that one believes with certainty that he is justified, the object of faith would be restricted to this.³⁷ On this basis, Harnack reduces the entire doctrine of faith to the principle that there is a loving [benigno] Father in heaven who wishes us well for us.³⁸

However, according to the teaching of the scholastics, the Council of Trent, and the [First] Vatican Council—nay, according to the Apostle’s Creed—those things that have an order for salvation pertain to the body of matters of faith and morals. Thus, the doctrine concerning God the Creator has a connection to our salvation or happiness, for from it follows man’s dependence upon God, the necessity of worship of, and obedience to, God, and indeed, that God Himself is the object of our happiness and our end. The Trinity of Persons in God determines the object of hope. The Incarnate God is the way to salvation. The things accomplished during the Redeemer’s life are not merely historical facts; rather, as various theologians show, each one of them contributes in a special way to our salvation. Created realities can belong to things of faith and morals “inasmuch as man is aided by given effects of the Godhead in tending towards divine beatitude.”³⁹ Along the same lines, according to the Catholic conception thereof, dogmas are called doctrines of salvation or religious truths.⁴⁰

d) Dogma refers to a (revealed) doctrine that has been defined and proposed by the Church for belief, as something that has been revealed. The final condition of dogma is that it is a doctrine defined by the Church and proposed for belief. The previous conditions articulated the material part of dogmas (its genus), whereas in this final part we have the formal part of dogmas, as dogmas (the species or specific difference).

The notion of proposition indicates the judgment of the Church by which a given doctrine is declared as being divinely revealed and the precept by which all the faithful are obliged in conscience and under the risk of losing eternal salvation to believe in their hearts this truth as being divinely revealed and to confess it with their mouths. This is certainly not to be understood as though the Church proposes as being revealed some doctrine that has not really been revealed, nor as though the Church were to receive new revelations. As the [First] Vatican Council expressly declares in Pastor Aeternus: “For the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter that they might disclose a new doctrine by his revelation, but rather that, with his assistance, they might reverently guard and faithfully explain the revelation or deposit of faith that was handed down through the apostles.”⁴¹ In general, definition refers to the same thing as proposing; it only indicates more expressively that the Church’s judgment is final and definitive, irreformable or irrevocable. Thus, Pius IX “defined” the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the [First] Vatican Council defined the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff.

Such a proposal is made either in the form of a solemn judgment or by the universal and ordinary magisterium of the Church. Through the ordinary and universal magisterium those proposed doctrines that are found in the whole Church as being divinely revealed are declared: they are believed, preached, taught in religious instruction (in catechisms), publicly declared by the bishops scattered throughout the world, and testified to by the unanimous consent of the Fathers of the Church or Catholic theologians testify.⁴²

However, a solemn proposition is had when the Pope or a General Council declares and defines in a special and expressed statement, by his [or its] supreme authority, a given doctrine as being revealed and to be believed. Such a definition is not said to be solemn because of some external solemnity involved in its declaration but, rather, because the special judgment itself and the statement expressed in such a serious matter by its very nature clothe it with solemnity. Obviously, solemnly defined dogmas and dogmas proposed by the ordinary magisterium of the Church are equally dogmas. For the fundamental and principal truths of the faith were at first set forth by the ordinary magisterium and only thereafter were to be determined and defined more precisely by the solemn magisterium. Thus, in the Apostle’s Creed, the divinity of Jesus Christ was proposed by the ordinary magisterium, later being defined by the Council of Niceaea as consubstantiality. However, it is true that even in later times a number of truths of the faith were proposed as dogmas by the ordinary magisterium, as can be seen among works of dogmatic theology.

Proposal by way of solemn judgment belongs to General or Ecumenical Councils and to the Popes. Solemn definition by the Pope is referred to using a technical and special term, namely “definition ex cathedra.” Concerning the latter, the [First] Vatican Council determined⁴³ two things: α) the conditions required for the proposing of a doctrine to be a definition ex cathedra (which, acordingly, would constitute a dogma); β) the infallibility of a definition ex cathedra.

α) A definition ex cathedra is had “when (the Roman Pontiff) acting in the office of shepherd and teacher of all Christians…defines, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church.”⁴⁴ Therefore, a dogma is promulgated when a Pope proposes some teaching as a private teacher (e.g., in some work of scientific theology) or even when he indeed does propose it precisely as the Pope, though not by authority, as though he were merely insinuating or persuading it (e.g., Leo XIII in very many of his Encyclicals), or when the doctrine is not proposed as something to be held De fide (as in a number of condemnations in which the opposed doctrine is indeed rejected, though not as heretical) or when, in short, the judgment is not proposed as absolute and definitive, as, for example, the doctrine concerning the bodily assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary [at the time of the writing of this text in the 1920s]. On the other hand, a dogma is constituted when the Pope “defines” (i.e., proposes it by means of a definitive and final judgment) a given teaching concerning faith or morals,⁴⁵ “acting in the office of shepherd and teacher of all Christians,” that is, as the Pope, “by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority,” that is, utilizing that authority, as something to be believed “[to be held] by the universal Church.”

Just as the establishing of a dogma by the Pope requires that his proposing must be from authority and binding on faith, the same is true for the decrees of general councils. Therefore, the principal thing to heeded is whether a given judgment is being proposed as something revealed and to be held by faith (and not merely as doctrine).⁴⁶ Finally and similarly, no doctrine proposed by the ordinary magisterium of the Church is to be considered as dogma unless it is believed, preached, and asserted as being revealed and to be believed.

A sign of a definite judgment can be seen in the punishments that are inflicted on those who hold different positions (e.g., in anathemas), or in an express formula (e.g., “we define,” “we define as a dogma,” “we define as a revealed doctrine”), or in the obligation to profess a given doctrine (as in the ancient Creeds, the profession of faith of the Council of Trent, or in certain propositions in the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists), or in the declaration that those who hold other positions are heretics, alienated from the faith, or separated from Church unity. Sometimes, however, the judgment can only be drawn from the circumstances or from tradition (from the position held by theologians) or from a later declaration by the Church. Therefore, take care not to confuse these signs of dogmatic definition with the definition itself.

β) The infallibility of a definition. The infallibility of the proposing [authority] is required in order for the definitive proposing of a dogma. For dogmas are proposed for belief, indeed to be believed by divine faith. However, the assent of the theological virtue of faith excludes both the fact and the possibility of error in the doctrine to be believed. Therefore, unless the possibility of error is excluded from the authority proposing the dogma to be believed, the assent of faith would be rendered impossible. From this fact, the question of infallibility arose in the Church, namely, concerning the subject of infallibility. Indeed, there had never been a controversy in the Church concerning the infallibility of the universal Church in believing and in teaching, for it had always been accepted as a rule that what the Church believes or teaches must simply be accepted as the true faith, and thus, that the Church is infallible. However, this infallibility of the Church would come to be more clearly known with the passing of time. The same is true concerning the definitions expressed by the general councils. A more difficult question was concerned with the infallibility of the Pope. Among the various reasons for the definition of Papal infallibility, the main one was that according to Sacred Scripture and the entire tradition of the Roman See, he had the right and duty to define controversial questions concerning faith, so that the whole Church was obliged to accept such definitions as De fide or as dogmas. Thus, the definition of the infallibility of the Pope follows from his power to define dogmas.⁴⁷ For he who, by divine institution, has the right and duty to determine the faith of the whole Church cannot err in this determination. Hence the [First] Vatican Council expressly includes the statement that nothing new was established through the definition of Papal Infallibility. For already prior to the [First] Vatican Council’s definition their infallibility was implicitly believed and admitted in the very fact that the Popes determined, in an ultimate and final manner, questions concerning arising concerning matters of faith. Faith of this kind was only able be obscured by the whirlwinds amid the Western schism and Jansenistic sophisms, to the point that explicit definition was necessary.

It is not our task here to present a full exposition of the doctrine of infallibility. We here only need to briefly state those things that pertain to the notion of dogma (indeed, in particular relation to the history of dogma).

Infallibility itself is not understood as a natural quality or the authority belonging solely to the juridical order, but rather, as a supernatural gift or charisma, promised and conferred by Christ the Lord of the Church, by which the Church or the Pope is preserved from error by the assistance of the Holy Spirit when proposing revealed truths. For by this assistance the Church and the Pope can suitably and effectively exercise the office of being a teaching authority.

The subject of infallibility is: the universal Church, whether believing or teaching, General Councils, and the Pope.

The direct or primary object of infallibility is the revealed truths themselves, indeed per se revealed truths, or the deposit of faith, or the doctrine concerning faith and morals. And as regards this object, the infallibility of the Pope (and of general councils and of the universal Church herself) is a defined dogma. In fact, the [First] Vatican Council defined that [the] Pope [possesses] “the infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed in defining the doctrine concerning faith or morals.”⁴⁸

However, (per se) revealed doctrine or the deposit of faith is not only the object of infallibility in the sense that one simply knows what has been revealed, but at the same time, so that the deposit of faith might be “reverently guarded and faithfully explained.”⁴⁹ Therefore, the Church first of all infallibly knows what has been revealed. Secondly, she guards the deposit, namely by preserving the revealed doctrine itself, and proposes it through the subsequent ages, indeed, doing so in the same sense and judgment as when it was first revealed. She likewise condemns the errors by which the revealed doctrine is directly or indirectly denied or corrupted. Thirdly, the Church faithfully “explains” the doctrine originally revealed, that is, she correctly and truly determines its meaning, interprets it, or expresses it in dogmatic formulas.

The secondary or indirect object of the Church’s infallibility is all those things that are connected with per se revealed truths (that is, with the deposit of faith) and in so far as they are connected thereto. Granted, this kind of infallibility of the Church (i.e., about its secondary object) is not defined de fide, though it is theologically certain and, indeed, at least as regards theological conclusions, is a Catholic truth. Then, among those things which have a connection with per se revealed truths, they were first revealed per accidens. For the Church infallibly judges regarding them inasmuch as they have a connection with the fact and dogma of the inspiration and truth of Holy Scripture, either directly or indirectly.⁵⁰ Another secondary object of infallibility are those things that are deduced from revealed truths themselves by way of conclusion (virtually revealed truths, that is, theological conclusions strictly speaking). We will take up this specific issue later. Next, the Church is infallible as regards those things that in some other way have a connection with per se revealed truths, such as dogmatic facts, disciplinary decrees that are not purely disciplinary, the canonization of saints and the approval of religious orders, namely inasmuch as all these involve the truth of a revealed doctrine or the truth of the proposition itself being indirectly come into question.⁵¹

Two primary properties of dogmas flow from the nature of dogma as set forth above.

IV. Properties of Dogma.—a) The absolute truth of dogma. The first property of dogma is its absolute and immutable truth. For this follows from both elements of dogma: 1˚ from the fact that it contains divinely revealed truth; 2˚ from the fact that it is infallibly proposed. Indeed, this absolute truth and immutability is directly and per se the meaning or teaching of the dogma, whereas it is indirectly the terms or formulas by which the doctrine is expressed, namely, in that the terms or formulas are true in the signification in which they are received in the definition or proposition.⁵² However, it is not defined (unless this is expressly stated) that a given term or formula is a fitting expression of the revealed doctrine, or that the doctrine cannot be formulated in any other way. Hence, the term or formula can sometimes be changed without thereby involving a change in meaning or doctrine. However, since definitions usually use terms in their natural and obvious sense, this is rarely the case. Similarly, the suitability of the term should be assumed as much as possible. Hence, the [First] Vatican Council defined against Hermes, Günther, and others: “that meaning of the sacred dogmas is perpetually to be retained which our Holy Mother Church has once declared, and there must never be a deviation from that meaning on the specious ground and title of a more profound understanding.”⁵³ Certainly, this absolute truth or immutability applies only to dogmatic definitions properly so called, though not to the decrees of particular Councils,⁵⁴ nor to the pronouncements or even non-definitive decrees of general Councils or Popes or those that are not “ex cathedra.”

b) Dogmas must be believed through Catholic and divine faith. Secondly, it is clear by what reason the dogmas are identical with those things that are to be believed through divine and Catholic faith—that is, how the dogmas are to be so believed. For dogmas, as revealed doctrines, must be believed by divine faith, namely because of the authority of God Himself who reveals. However, as they are proposed by the Church to be believed, they must be believed by the Catholic faith—not as though Catholic faith were some other faith than divine faith but, rather, inasmuch as all the faithful (the whole Church) are bound to the divine faith concerning defined truth and likewise because they are now believed by all through divine faith.⁵⁵

c) Finally, the distinction between material and formal dogmas is clear from the very nature of dogma. Material dogmas are the very revealed doctrines, as such, which is the material of the dogma or the doctrine that can become a dogma; formal dogmas are the revealed doctrine as defined by the Church and proposed for belief, namely, inasmuch as revealed doctrine is properly and formally established as a dogma by the Church’s activity of defining. Older theologians commonly use the term dogma (or the doctrine of faith) for both the revealed doctrine itself and the Church’s definitions; however, more recent theologians use the term dogma solely to refer only to defined doctrines, that is, those proposed for belief. This will also be our own usage in this work—a point that must be most carefully noted by the reader.⁵⁶

V. Corollaries.—a) The Catholic teaching concerning the nature of dogma is itself a dogma properly so called. As is clear from the foregoing, the Catholic concept of dogma, or the doctrine concerning the nature and conditions of dogma, is itself a dogma properly so called. Indeed, the doctrine concerning revelation, the authority of the Church in proposing dogmas, the infallibility of the Church, and finally, concerning the notion [ratione] of faith are all revealed truths. Likewise, the concept of dogma has been formally proposed by the Church to be believed, although not expressly, in the form of a proper definition of the term dogma. Certainly, the concept of dogma, like other dogmas, underwent a process of development or explication in the Church, not such that the concept of dogma is different today than it was in earlier times but, rather, so that it is now more determinate and developed. For always that which was proposed by the Church for belief was to be accepted and believed by all as something to be believed.

Indeed, the first disciples of the Lord immediately believed the words of the Savior. The Apostles preached what they had seen and heard (1 John, 1:1). Thus, those who immediately heard the Apostles believed in the “Gospel” they preached (i. e. which they proposed for belief), indeed under the form of anathema (Gal 1:6ff). In the same way, later Christians believed what was proposed to them by the Church’s pastors in preparation for baptism and in liturgical preaching. Already even in the Apostle’s Creed the substance of the credibilia and the “rule of faith” against those attempting to corrupt the faith had been proposed and defined.⁵⁷ This rule of faith was elaborated and determined in later times by the definitions formulated by the ecumenical councils. Thus, in practice the principle was observed that what was preached, believed, and determined by the Church was believed.

In the Middle Ages, the Scholastics formulated in certain express principles the practice and doctrine of the earlier Church.⁵⁸ Thus they established that: 1° the credibilia are contained in the articles of the Apostle’s Creed, with their presuppositions and consequences (i.e. with all that was contained in each article, as, for example in the article on the “Holy Church”); 2˚ all are obligated to have explicit faith concerning the explication of the articles (with their presuppositions and consequences) inasmuch as they are proposed to all by the Church through her celebration of the feasts and general preaching; 3˚ all are bound to believe that the Church’s faith is true, and to be ready to believe all that he knows to be the faith of the Church, and not to fail to have faith in any article, either directly or indirectly, and finally to follow the Church as a rule of faith. This teaching, held by the greater scholastics of the thirteenth century, received further elaboration by later scholastics (the Nominalists), seeking to determine which truths are “Catholic truths,” that is, those to be believed by all Christians.

After the Council of Trent, in addition to the question concerning what is to be believed explicitly with a necessity of means and what to be believed with a necessity of precept, three main questions were raised. The first question was: what kind of revelation was required (explicit, implicit, or virtual) in order to have the object of faith? Or in another form: are theological conclusions an object of faith, either before or at least after the Church stated her definition? (This question has not yet been defined, nor is it resolved by all theologians in the same way.) The second question was: which doctrines (objectively speaking) must be believed? As far as this was concerned, all theologians unanimously decided that all those things are to be believed (objectively speaking) which are revealed and have been proposed for belief by the Church as revealed. And thus did the [First] Vatican Council define the matter.⁵⁹ The third question was: is the Pope infallible in the definition and proposition of revealed truths, such that he can define a doctrine as something to be held De fide as a dogma? And this question likewise received a definition at the [First] Vatican Council. Therefore, you have the explication and determination of the concept of dogma, though without it changing. Likewise, however, there was explication of the teaching concerning dogmatic progress, as we will discuss in a. 4.

Therefore, Weizsäcker was wrong in saying that the formal concept of dogma is continually evolving (i. e. changing).⁶⁰ As was Harnack in saying: “The question concerning the nature of dogma is no longer clearly determined in the Church.”⁶¹ Nay, his very assertion that dogmatic books do not explain the true state of affairs regarding this question is insultingly wrong.⁶² However, it must be conceded to Harnack⁶³ (although in a different sense than he intended) that the origin and history of the concept of dogma is of the greatest importance for the history of dogmas. For among the various dogmas of the Catholic Church, the dogma concerning dogma itself is certainly not the least important.⁶⁴

b) The doctrine concerning the development and history of dogmas is an object of theology and the Church’s magisterium. For a thing’s development clearly follows the nature of the very thing that is developing. Hence, the nature of such development cannot properly be known except from the nature of the thing in question. Therefore, since the nature of dogma is a matter of faith and theology, the doctrine concerning both the nature and development of dogma properly and per se belongs to theology, indeed dogmatic theology. Similarly, the doctrine concerning the development and history of dogmas is an object of the Church’s magisterium—directly in the case of the doctrine concerning such development (from which we have the definition expressed by the [First] Vatican Council⁶⁵), indirectly in the case of the doctrine concerning the history of dogmas. Hence, there are the propositions found in the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists (to be discussed later).

Finally, since the entire doctrine of faith and of theology belongs to a main heading of faith or is founded upon some fundamental principle, we must ask to which heading or principle of faith the development of dogmas pertains, to which it should consequently be reduced and from which it must receive its proper explanation. However, since dogma is, by its very nature, related to revelation, faith, and the Church’s magisterium, it is easy to see that the doctrine concerning the development of dogmas must be explained from these heads or principles. Thus, in fact, as we will see below, older scholastics already handed down, in their treatises on faith, at least some teaching concerning this matter. Nor is it a problem that the development of dogmas would be the object of history. For in the development of dogmas we must distinguish between historical facts (which are properly the object of history) and the very nature of development (which is the object considered by the dogmatic theologian).

However, if someone objects, saying that it falls to history to establish and investigate the laws and causes of [such] development, we may answer: this is true as regards certain extrinsic and accidental laws or causes, but not as regards its substantial and intrinsic laws and causes. Thus, history can indeed show that the development of dogmas took place in response to given heresies and by means of theological progress, according to the terminology used in a given era; however, it cannot show how the terminology used by heretics or theologians pertains to the constitution of the new dogma in question.

c) Catholic theologians are more apt to grasp the development of dogma. It is clear that everyone is better able to investigate and understand the history of something to the degree that he has better knowledge concerning the nature and condition of that thing. Thus, a friend is better able to grasp the life story of a friend than could a stranger. Similarly, the Catholic theologian—who has the best possible knowledge concerning the nature of revelation, faith, and the Church’s magisterium—all things equal, will be much more apt than others for investigating, determining, and explaining the development of a given dogma. If some Catholic authors have erred in the history of dogmas, either as regards theory or history, this has generally been due to some deficiency or error in a dogmatic matter. Protestants, by contrast, appear to be incapable of uncovering the true history of dogmas, for they are hindered by certain prejudices, perhaps without even noticing this fact. For they are mistaken not only formally concerning the very nature of dogma, faith, and the Church’s magisterium, but also err materially and concerning the meaning of the defined dogma as well as concerning many other things.

Article 3: Erroneous Conceptions of Dogma (and of the History of Dogmas)

I. In our exposition of the Catholic notion of dogma, we already touched upon some of the errors of Protestants and Modernists. However, because of the great importance of this matter in articulating the nature of the development and history of dogmas, we will still expressly, though briefly, review erroneous conceptions of the nature of dogma, together with the connected false idea concerning the nature and offices of the history of dogmas. Thus, we will discuss the positions held by: 1˚ Protestants; 2˚ Modernists; and 3˚ Günther.⁶⁶

I. The Protestant Conception of Dogma

II. Now, if we understand the term “Protestantism” broadly, as the Protestants themselves do to, we can distinguish three classes of concepts concerning the nature of dogma and the history of dogmas.

1˚ Rationalists deny that there can be any kind of revelation properly so called. Therefore, the “dogmas” that exist or are held in the Church are nothing but developments in more or less perfect human cognition or in the idea of religion or Christianity. It will therefore be the duty of the history of dogmas to scientifically explain such development.

2˚ The so-called “mediation-theory” (“Vermittlungs-theorie”) posits that through Christ a new knowledge and a new life were introduced and that it developed in various ways in various individuals and ages. Therefore, it will be the duty of the history of dogmas to explain, in a historically-critical manner, such various dogmatic theories and to historically unfold the origins and alterations of such various Christian systems, among which dogmas are the most important headings.

3˚ Protestant theology, in the forms referred to as orthodox or confessional, admits that Christian doctrine has a kind of divinely revealed (and, therefore, immutably true) foundation. At the same time, however, it holds that this foundation was partially obscured⁶⁷ and altered under the influence of external influences over the course of the centuries.⁶⁸

III. In particular, it seems that nearly each theologian and historian presents a different conception of the nature of dogma and, consequently, also of the history of dogmas. Thus, the Berlin professor Reinhold Seeberg posits three conditions involved when a given doctrine is called a dogma, namely: that it be recognized by a given church; that it expresses the faith of that church; and, finally, that it be a doctrine concerning salvation. Dogma as such is defined as the expression of religious life or a religious impulse [tendentiae].

According to Seeberg, the formulas in which a dogma is expressed do not pertain to faith, since they are purely human and fortuitous. Therefore, the history of dogmas explains how dogmas find their origins in religious life and, vice versa, how dogmas exercise an influence upon religious life.⁶⁹ According to Loofs, dogmas are those propositions or doctrines of faith that a given religious community expressly demands must be admitted by its members or at least by its ministers. The history of dogmas is the history of ecclesiastical doctrines among Christians.⁷⁰

Adolf Harnack defines dogma as being the scientific formulation and expression of Christian doctrines. Hence: “Dogmas are the product of theology and the work of (Greek) genius upon the foundation of the Gospels.”⁷¹ Therefore, the history of dogmas has the office of showing the origins of dogmas in the Church, their later development in the Eastern and Western Church, and finally their ultimate form in the Catholic Church, in Protestantism, and among critical or enlightened thinkers. Krueger defines the history of dogmas as being the history of the forms in which a religious idea has undergone development. According to him, the aim of this discipline is to learn how to avoid confusing form with reality, dogmas with the Gospel.⁷²

Stange rejects the condition of the reception of a given doctrine by the Church as vulgar, dogmas themselves being the doctrinal concepts of a given Churches.⁷³ According to Kolde, dogmas represent those things that the church recognizes in its life and piety as representing the highest reflective consciousness of its faith (Niederschlag ihres Glaubensbewusstsleins), which it is accustomed to both defend and, finally, formulate.⁷⁴

Dorner defines dogma as being the product of a given attempt to formulate the faith, so that in this way the community distinguishes itself from the heterodox.⁷⁵ Scheel identifies dogmas with Christian confessions.⁷⁶ Bonwetsch declares that dogmas are a given Church’s proper and normative affirmation of the nature and reason for its communion with God.⁷⁷

Auguste Sabatier distinguishes two things in religion, namely its body and its soul. The “soul” of religion, its principal element, is one’s immediate and personal relationship to God. The “body” of religion is found in ritual worship forms and, especially, in dogma. However, dogmas are only particular representative expressions of the soul. Such expressions at first took on a poetic form, full of images; however, poetry gradually yielded to philosophy, and images to ideas. Now, in this process of substitution, the original unity was dissolved and doctrinal difference arose. Ecclesiastical authority is instituted to protect against this danger by proposing a given binding formulation of faith (i.e., a creed). And the same also happened in the Christian religion itself: Christ spoke in figures; during the Apostolic era, these figures were reduced to a philosophical form; and, finally, a creed was imposed against Gnosticism. However, dogmas and creeds, as formulas determined by the conceptions belonging to a particular period and mentality, are soon opposed by newly arising ideas. Therefore, a dogma or creed had to be sacrificed and was de facto changed. However, an intrinsic element does remain, namely the very soul or relation to God, at least radically (“le fond”). Thus, the systems of Origen, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas gave way to new concepts of religion.⁷⁸

IV. Therefore, according to Protestants, dogmas are not the interpretation and explication of revealed truths but, instead, at most are a given approximate expression of the Gospel, namely according to the way in which a certain Church has interpreted and represented the teaching of the Gospel to itself, either according to subjective experience or in accord with the conditions of science in a given era. Nay, according to them, dogmas add something extraneous to the Gospel: either a purely external formulation resulting from the development of religious life and denoting the religious impulse [tendentiam] in a particular era (Seeberg); or the symbolic expression of religious experience (Sabatier); or a binding conception for a particular church (Loofs); or the scientific way that a given period understood the evangelical doctrine and represented it to itself (Harnack). Consequently, from such a perspective: dogmas do not belong to faith but, instead, to the history of religion or Christianity; they must change in accord with better experience or knowledge; and, moreover, certain dogmas, namely Catholic ones, must, without qualification, be done away with, as corrupting the Gospel.⁷⁹ Finally, according to the Protestant conception, the history of dogmas is the history of a given school or human discipline, nay, of perpetual error.

V. The Protestant notion of dogma does indeed materially retain the constitutive elements of the Catholic notion thereof (with the exception of infallible proposition by the Church), though in a completely different formal sense. According to the Protestants, dogmas:

are not properly speaking, objective doctrines but, instead, a subjective expression of faith in the form of a doctrine (a doctrinal or intellectual element);
as such are not a revealed truth but, instead, transformations of revelation (revealed element);
are not proposed by divine authority but, instead, by human authority and, therefore, fallibly and, ultimately, in a purely juridical manner (juridical element);
properly speaking, do not determine the faith of the community but, instead, is determined by the faith of the community (social element);
are not themselves the directive and vital principle of religious life but, rather, arises from religious life and experience (religious element);
are not immutable but, instead, must be continuously perfected according to the state of science, namely, as the fruit of the combination of the Gospel and science (scientific element).

Clearly, such a conception of dogma is valid only for Protestant (or other heterodox) doctrines; however, it is wrong to transfer it to Catholic dogmas. Similarly, it is thus clear that Catholics and Protestants hold formally different notions of the history of dogmas, which a priori already explains the diversity of the particular histories of dogma that they propose. Similarly, the diversity found among the history of dogmas in particular Protestant historians (Harnack, Seeberg, Pfleiderer, Loofs, Bonwetsch, etc.) is explained by the different theological systems that each author follows.

II. Errors of Modernists concerning the Nature, Development, and History of Dogmas

VI. Presuppositions.—The doctrine of the modernists⁸⁰ concerning the nature of dogma is founded on their presupposed philosophical agnosticism, philosophy of vital immanence, their systemized fideism, and the Protestant doctrine concerning the transfiguration and disfiguration of revelation or religious sentiment. In particular, the concept of dogma can only be understood in light of their presupposed theory of knowledge.

For first of all, the modernists, without adhering to any particular school of idealism or subjectivism, hold a form of agnosticism,⁸¹ namely that we cannot know the reality of things but, instead, can solely know phenomenal appearances of them; thus, according to them, whatever transcends the order of phenomena (e.g., God in particular) is not the object of science (i.e., knowledge properly so-called).⁸² From this perspective, Modernism leaves behind the foundation of the entire Catholic conception of dogma, namely the notion of objective doctrine or knowledge, either concerning God or His works. Consequently, from this perspective all the other parts of the Catholic conception of dogma take on a different meaning (e.g., revelation, the proposition of dogmas, and the truth thereof). In reality, the Catholic and modernist conceptions of dogma share nothing in common. Therefore, the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists rightly places the dogma concerning the knowability of God in the first place. The consequences of this agnosticism first appears in their teaching concerning the origin and nature of religion.

VII. According to the Modernists, religion is not founded upon objective knowledge of God but, instead, on a certain subjective need or demand felt by the soul.⁸³ This kind of demand is again founded upon a kind of religious sentiment that stretches beyond and above finite and determinate phenomena into higher ones. Therefore, religion does not arise from the knowledge of God himself but, instead, from a spontaneous desire for the divine and for personal union with God, and the life and root of all true religion consists in this. Therefore, all religions are subjective, immanent, and vital.⁸⁴

VIII. Next, the Modernists posit the religious sentiment or the demand for the divine as the origin and root of faith, namely inasmuch as from the experience of the believer, “it is reasonable and certain for the believer that the reality of the divine exists in itself and does not depend entirely on the believer.” Their systematized fideism consists in this.⁸⁵ Therefore, according to the Modernists, faith is not assent to revealed truths but, instead, the result of a demand for the divine that influences our religious sentiment and unites man in some way with God, such that God Himself remains wholly unknown.

According to the Modernists, the religious sentiment is at first hidden below our consciousness, as they say, in the subconscious, where even its roots remain hidden and not in an understood form. However, it passes into consciousness by what is lived or vitally grasped by experience (Erlebnis). Such subjective and vital experience, which can indeed be aroused by external sources, though it cannot be given directly, supplies not only our objective knowledge of God but also revelation. For revelation is nothing other than the manifestation of the divine in a religious experience or a kind of religious experience in the human mind.⁸⁶ Therefore, modernists replace divine revelations in the Christian sense with subjective experiences that are the product of religious sentiment. Finally, this explains the existence of different religions, among which, according to the modernists, the religion of Christ holds the highest place.

IX. However, inasmuch as such religious experience passes into consciousness, the divine being itself (which in itself is completely unknowable) is captured in a phenomenal form and is thus disfigured or transfigured. Similarly, all religious facts are disfigured or transfigured inasmuch as something is attributed to them which is not really in them. Thus, divinity is attributed to Christ without Him in reality having anything that is not properly human. The Encyclical Pascendi explains this as follows:

For the Unknowable they talk of does not present itself to faith as something solitary and isolated; but rather in close conjunction with some phenomenon, which, though it belongs to the realm of science and history yet to some extent oversteps their bounds. Such a phenomenon may be an act of nature containing within itself something mysterious; or it may be a man, whose character, actions and words cannot, apparently, be reconciled with the ordinary laws of history. Then faith, attracted by the Unknowable which is united with the phenomenon, possesses itself of the whole phenomenon, and, as it were, permeates it with its own life. From this two things follow. The first is a sort of transfiguration of the phenomenon, by its elevation above its own true conditions, by which it becomes more adapted to that form of the divine which faith will infuse into it. The second is a kind of disfigurement, which springs from the fact that faith, which has made the phenomenon independent of the circumstances of place and time, attributes to it qualities which it has not; and this is true particularly of the phenomena of the past, and the older they are, the truer it is…

We will take an illustration from the Person of Christ. In the person of Christ, they say, science and history encounter nothing that is not human. Therefore, in virtue of the first canon deduced from agnosticism, whatever there is in His history suggestive of the divine, must be rejected. Then, according to the second canon, the historical Person of Christ was transfigured by faith; therefore everything that raises it above historical conditions must be removed. Lately, the third canon, which lays down that the person of Christ has been disfigured by faith, requires that everything should be excluded, deeds and words and all else that is not in keeping with His character, circumstances and education, and with the place and time in which He lived.⁸⁷

X. The nature and origin of dogma.—Therefore, through experience had through man’s religious sentiment, God becomes manifest in the soul. But a religious man must think through his faith. Thus, by reflecting upon itself, reason renders and expresses in a given intellectual way what religious sentiment experiences: first, in a simple and common sense [vulgari sententia]; but, then, by thoroughly elaborating the thought, it does so in more distinct expressions [sententiis] and more polished formulas. If these secondary expressions or formulas have been sanctioned by the supreme magisterium of the Church, they constitute dogmas.⁸⁸ Therefore, dogma “is born of the species of impulse or necessity by virtue of which the believer is constrained to elaborate his religious thought so as to render it clearer for himself and others.”⁸⁹ Finally, such an elaboration of formulas takes place under the guidance of religious sentiment or of the heart, and according to the conditions and state of men and their particular eras and, therefore, as they say, vitally.⁹⁰

As regards the nature and condition of dogmas, the following flows from this:

Dogmas are nothing but inadequate knowledge of the objects of faith. Thus, they are called symbols or likenesses (symbolism). “The object of religious sentiment… possesses an infinite variety of aspects of which now one, now another, may present itself. In like manner, he who believes may pass through different phases.” Finally, dogmas are mere instruments or vehicles for expressing religious sentiment.⁹¹
Dogmas are necessarily and essentially changeable, and indeed must be changed. For formulas must be vital: “It is necessary that the primitive formula be accepted and sanctioned by the heart; and similarly the subsequent work from which spring the secondary formulas must proceed under the guidance of the heart.” Therefore, formulas must be adapted to religious sentiment and experience. And if this adaptation ceases for any reason, the dogmas lose their intelligibility [rationem] and must be changed.⁹²
Dogmas in no way contain absolute truth and therefore are not, properly speaking, to be believed. Rather, “The dogmas of faith are to be held only according to their practical sense; that is to say, as preceptive norms of conduct and not as norms of believing.”⁹³
Loisy’s entire doctrine concerning the nature of dogma is embraced in well-known works: “The dogmas the Church presents as revealed are not truths fallen from heaven, but a certain interpretation of religious facts that the human mind has acquired by laborious effort.”⁹⁴

“Since the character and lot of dogmatic formulas is so precarious, there is no room for surprise that Modernists regard them so lightly and in such open disrespect. And so they audaciously charge the Church both with taking the wrong road from inability to distinguish the religious and moral sense of formulas from their surface meaning, and with clinging tenaciously and vainly to meaningless formulas whilst religion is allowed to go to ruin.”⁹⁵

XI. Development of dogmas.—From these presuppositions, it is easy to understand the Modernists doctrine concerning the necessity and nature [ratione] of the development of dogmas. Indeed, “first of all they lay down the general principle that in a living religion everything is subject to change, and must change.”⁹⁶ Therefore, dogma is bound by the laws of evolutionary development [evolutionis]. The subject of such development is religious sentiment; the norm and measure, and at the same time the driving force for development is human reason with its needs and conditions. In addition to these subjective causes, they also posit the influence of the Church. Indeed:

it is to be noted that Evolution is due no doubt to those stimulants styled needs, but, if left to their action alone, it would run a great risk of bursting the bounds of tradition, and thus, turned aside from its primitive vital principle, would lead to ruin instead of progress. Hence, studying more closely the ideas of the Modernists, evolution is described as resulting from the conflict of two forces, one of them tending towards progress, the other towards conservation. The conserving force in the Church is tradition, and tradition is represented by religious authority, and this both by right and in fact; for by right it is in the very nature of authority to protect tradition, and, in fact, for authority, raised as it is above the contingencies of life, feels hardly, or not at all, the spurs of progress. The progressive force, on the contrary, which responds to the inner needs lies in the individual consciences and ferments there - especially in such of them as are in most intimate contact with life.⁹⁷

In light of these points, it is clear what the object and nature of the history of the dogmas will be. Its object will be the successive development of the religious sentiment on the one hand, and of symbolic representations on the other. The causes to be considered be man’s vital necessity or impulse, the work of theologians or even laymen preparing material for further development, and the ecclesiastical magisterium approving or hindering this development. The history of dogmas will be a part of the history of mans’ religious life, or rather, the history of human consciousness, surely the foul error of humanity [certe foedi erroris humanitatis]! Nevertheless, the Modernists boasted that they had discovered the right formula between rigid dogmatism and excessive criticism!

XII. As we already noted in the doctrinal exposition above, the modernist conception of dogma is completely different from the Catholic one. Hence Modernism is condemned in the Encyclical Pascendi as “the synthesis of all heresies” and as leading to atheism and “the annihilation of all religion. The first step in this direction was taken by Protestantism; the second is made by Modernism; the next will plunge headlong into atheism.”⁹⁸ Its particular errors are marked out in the Decree Lamentabili. In the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists, the concept of dogma (the first part and the final proposition), their teachings concerning the evolutionary development [evolutione] of dogma,⁹⁹ and the method to be used in the history of dogmas are all condemned.¹⁰⁰

XIII. Many have written both about and against Modernism. As for our needs in this book, in addition to the literature that we cite below, at the end of the fourth article, it suffices merely to indicate some of the principal authors:

Baur, Benedikt. Klarheit und Wahrheit: eine Erklärung des Antimodernisteneides. Fribourg: Herder, 1911.

Bernardi, Valentino. Esame de’ fondamenti del modernismo. Treviso: Tipografia cooperativa trevigiana, 1909.

Bessmer, Julius. Philosophie und Theologie des Modernismus: eine Erklärung des Lehrgehaltes der Enzyklika Pascendi, des Dekretes Lamentabili und des Eides wider den Modernismus. Fribourg: Herder, 1912 (facile opus principale).

Billot, Louis. De immutabilitate traditionis contra modernam hæresïm evolutionismi, 2^nd edition. Rome: Pontificia Instituti Pii IX, 1907.

Donat, Josef. Freiheit der Wissenschaft: Ein Gang durch das moderne Geistesleben, 2^nd edition. Innsbruck: Druck und Verlag: 1912.

Dehò, Ettore. La condanna del modernismo: Appunti polemici. Rome: Desclée, 1908.

Fontaine, Julien. La théologie Du Nouveau Testament et l’évolution des dogmes. Paris: P. Lethielleux, [1906-1907]

———.Les infiltrations Kantiennes et protestantes et le clergé français, 3^rd edition. Paris: P. Lethiellieux, 1907. —

Gardeil, Ambroise. Le donné révélé et la théologie. 2^nd edition. Paris: [Librairie Victor Lecoffre J. Gabalda & C^ie], 1910.

Garrigou-Lagrange, Réginald. Le sens commun, la philosophie de l'étre et les formules dogmatiques. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1909.

———. Dieu: Son existence et sa nature: solution thomiste des antinomies agnostiques, 3^rd edition. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1919 (opus principale- quoad refutationem agnosticismi).

Gisler, Anton. Der Modernismus, [4^th edition. Einsiedeln: Benzinger, 1913] (Best historical account).

Grabmann, Martin. Der Modernismus. Eichstätt: Seitz, 1911.

Heiner, Franz Xavier. Der neue Syllabus Pius X: oder Dekret des Hl. Offiziums "Lamentabili" vom 3. Juli 1907, 2^nd edition. Mainz: Kircheim & Co., 1908.

———. The same in Italian: La dottrina dei modernisti confutata, 2^nd edition. Rome: Desclèe, 1914. trad. Straniero.

Leclère, Albert. Pragmatisme, modernisme, protestantisme. Paris: Librairie Bloud, 1909.

Lemius, Jean-Baptiste. Catéchisme sur le modernisme. Paris: Librairie Saint Paul, 1911.

Lépicier, Alexis-Henri-Marie. De stabilitate et progressu dogmatis, 2^nd edition. Rome: Desclée et Socii, 1910.

Lepin, Marius. Les Théories de M. Loisy: Exposé et critique. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1910.

Manser, Gallus Maria. Die Lehre des von Papst Pius X verurteilten Modernismus und der moderne philosophische Phänomenalismus. Fribourg: Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1911.

Maumus, Élisée Vincent. Les modernistes, 2^nd edition. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1909.

Mercier, Désiré-Joseph. Le Modernisme. Sa position vis-à-vis de la science [2nd edition]. Paris: Librairie Bloud, 1909.

Pesch, Christian. Theologische Zeitfragen 4: Folge, Glaube, Dogmen und geschichtliche Tatsachen: eine Untersuchung über den Modernismus. Fribourg: Herder, 1908.

Marx, Jakob. Der Eid wider den Modernismus und die Geschichtsforschung. Trier: Die Paulinus-Druckerei, 1911.

Mausbach, Joseph. Der Eid wider den Modernismus und die theologische Wissenschaft. Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1911.

Michelitsch, Anton. Der neue Syllabus: samt anderen Dokumenten gegen den Modernismus, 2nd edition. [Graz: Styria?, 1908?]

Rosa, Enrico. Il giuramento contro gli errori del modernismo, 2^nd edition. Rome: La Civiltà Cattolica, 1911.

Schultes, Reginald. Was beschwören wir im Modernisteneid?: theologische Erklärung des Antimodernisteneids. Mainz: Kirchheim & Co., 1911.

———. “Nachträge zur Erklärung des Anti modernisteneides" in Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht, vol. 92 (16^th volume of 3^rd series). Mainz: Verlag von Kirchheim & Co.,1912, 459-472.

Seitz, Anton. Modernistische Grundprobleme in den dogmengeschichtlichen Untersuchungen. Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1912.

Weber, Simon. Theologie als freie Wissenschaft und die wahren Feinde wissensaftlicher Freiheit ein Wort zum Streit um den Antimodernisteneid. Fribourg: Herder, 1912.

Weiss, Albert Maria. Die religiöse Gefahr. Fribourg: Herder, 1904.

———. Lebens- und Gewissensfragen der Gegenwart, Fribourg: Herder, 1911.

III. Gunther’s Erroneous Position

XIV. Finally, the error of Anton Günther (1783–1863) must be discussed, at least briefly, inasmuch as he still in some way lives on in his effects. On the basis of his theory of knowledge, Günther deduced the conclusion that all dogmas are to be demonstrated by means of an ideal investigation, which he opposed to logical deduction, as something necessarily standing in need of demonstration [tanquam necessaria esse demonstranda].¹⁰¹ He held that revelation is necessary only on account of original sin and declared that it is only modally supernatural. However, he taught that a distinction must be drawn between the historical facts recorded in Sacred Scripture and the understanding of them. He held that such understanding is had in virtue of the operation of the intellect and that it constitutes the “doctrinal tradition” and “the Church’s consciousness” in a given era. Thereafter, doctrinal understanding would receive continuous growth with the help of philosophical science. Thus, it was more imperfect in the Apostles than in the Fathers, in whom, however, it was by no means perfect—nay, it was quite deficient because it lacked a true philosophy. In the end, however, the true (Guntherian) philosophy was discovered, and the doctrine of faith thus found the path for reaching the greatest understanding of the whole revealed doctrine and reached the conclusion of the “doctrinal tradition,” so that (as Guenther himself said) it could not proceed further. In such scientific progress and dogmatic elaboration one looks to the Church’s magisterium to define, among the various ways of understanding things, the one that is most adapted to that given era. In this definition, the Church, assisted by the Holy Spirit, is indeed infallible; however, this is not the most perfect way of understanding dogmas. Nay, with the progress in human understanding in other sciences, general philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of nature, the earlier definition by the Church will appear imperfect, requiring another, more perfect one. For the definitions that have been declared by the Church in different ages, says Günther, must be recognized as containing a given truth, though not the truth and true understanding of the dogma, without qualification. Thus, the Council of Ephesus’s definition concerning the personal unity of Christ contains a given truth, namely that Christ was a man united to God the Word from the beginning of his existence; however, it does not (and could not) contain the greatest intelligence of this dogma, for the fifth century lacked the philosophical knowledge that would be had in the nineteenth century... For the same reason, Guther called the Council of Trent “a kind of interim, and nobody knows whether or not it its definitions will be need to be replaced.” Generally speaking, according to Günther, dogmatic definitions only have temporary force and value, until the progress of science requires a new definition.

XV. Criticism and condemnation of this teaching.— Günther's fundamental error is found in the identification of being with the Idea (Sein = Denken; Being = Thought) that is found in Schelling’s philosophy.¹⁰² Moreover, it is clear that the dogmas that are held in the Catholic Church cannot be deduced from natural ideas. Furthermore, Sacred Scripture contains not only facts but also doctrines, indeed the same ones that were later defined in dogmas.¹⁰³ Next, the Güntherian teaching destroys all the truth and certainty of the faith, which does not vary with the progress of science but, instead, is only thereby known more fully. Certainly, the Guentherian concept of dogma is different from the historical and Catholic concept of dogma. Finally, Gunther’s particular doctrine is completely foreign to the Christian religion.¹⁰⁴

Hence Gunther’s teaching was deservedly condemned by the Church, first by Pius IX,¹⁰⁵ then by the [First] Vatican Council¹⁰⁶ and, finally, in the Oath Against the Modernists, which establishes: “And this I hold not in order that dogmas might be tailored according to what seems better and more suited to the culture of each age but, rather, so that the absolute and immutable truth preached by the Apostles from the beginning might never be understood to be different, nor ever be understood in any other way.”

Nevertheless, this kind of error still persists, at least in some form, namely in the opinion held by those who at least judge that the interpretation of the dogmas in force in the Church (though not the dogmas themselves) are the fruit and expression of the knowledge of a given era, especially of the Middle Ages, and consequently judge that it stands in need of correction by a loftier interpretation.¹⁰⁷

In the Latin of this volume, we use the terms evolutio, progressus, profectus, and explicatio dogmatum without distinction, though the force and ratio, as well as the truth and utility, of each of these terms will be determined later on in our study (see a. 5, prop. 5 and a. 16 below). [Tr. note: As discussed in my general translator’s introduction, my practice has been to translate evolutio as development, most often progressus and profectus both as progress, and explicatio as explication.]↩︎
See [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme,” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 2^nd ed., vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), [see] no. 1. And in general, survey the beginnings of books devoted to the history of dogmas. Also, see [Henri] Pinard [De La Boullaye], “Dogme” in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique: contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines, [5th ed.], ed. Adhémar D’Alès, (Paris: G. Beauchesne, [1924-1931]), [see] 1.↩︎
Cicero, Academicae quaestiones, 2.9.↩︎
See Letter to Diognetus 5:3 (A human dogma); The Martyrdom of Justin (Raschen, Florilegium 3.98): “Since I follow the correct dogma (Christian doctrine).”↩︎
See St. Epiphanius, Panarion (Adversus haereses) 76.1–2 (the dogma of Apollinaris).↩︎
Origen, Contra Celsum, 2.4; De principiis, 1.7.1.↩︎
See St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechetical lectures, 4.2 (PG 33, 455). Some (for example, Joseph Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne, vol. 1, [5^th ed.], (Paris: [Gabaldat], [1922]), see p. 2) hold that in the writings of the fourth century Greeks the term “dogma” only signifies theoretical truths. He cites Gregory of Nyssa’s 24^th letter. Nonetheless, Gregory of Nyssa as well as Cyril of Jerusalem teach only that the moral life and true faith make a Christian perfect: “(Christ) divides the Chrisitan way of life [πολιτίαν] in two, namely into its moral part and exactness in dogmas” (Letter 24, PG 46, 1089).↩︎
St. Thomas rarely uses the term dogma, and when he does, it is generally on the occasion of some citation. Thus, in ST II-II, q. 11, a. 1: “Heresy is a species of infidelity, belonging to those who profess the Christian faith but corrupt its dogmas.” In ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2, he contrasts the “pestilential and deadly dogmas” of the heretics (St. Augustine, De civitate dei, 18.51to the “dogmas of faith.” There is also the well-known passage in the sequence “Lauda Sion”: “The dogma is given to Christians, that the bread becomes flesh.” There also are ST II-II, 1. 86, a. 2 (divine dogma) and In I Thessalonians, ch. 2, lect 2 (ecclesiastical dogma). However, St. Thomas uses the term dogma for philosophical doctrines (cf. Schutz’s entry “Dogma” in Thomas-Lexikon. Sammlung, Übersetzung und Erklärung der in sämtlichen Werken des hl. Thomas von Aquin vorkommenden Kunstausdrücke und wissenschaftlichen Aussprüche, 2^nd edition [Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1895] or for any position that someone holds. See In Iohannem, ch. 4, lect. 7, no. 1: “He who is weakened by evil pleasures and dogmas.” See ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2; q. 39, a. 2, sed contra).↩︎
In the modern Latin usage, dogma commonly refers to a particular truth of faith. However, vernacular languages, especially French, it also signifies a complex of the truths of faith (le dogme, professeur du dogme). Similarly, the term dogma is used to indicate in particular the theoretical doctrines of faith; thus theology is divided into dogmatic and moral theology.↩︎
Lateran IV, however, condemned “the utterly perverse dogma of the impious Almeric” (Denzinger, no. 807)↩︎
See Loofs, Realencyclopaedie, 3^rd ed., vol. 3, 734ff.↩︎
See Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3^rd ed. (Freiburg: Mohr, [1894-1897]), 1.14.↩︎
Thus, for example, Harnack in fact properly and intentionally hands on the history of Catholic dogmas. And others more or less do the same as well.↩︎
See Denzinger, no. 3011 [1792].↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3017 [1797]). Also see idem., ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3020 [1800]).↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Pastor Aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3073 [1839]).↩︎
See ibid. (Denzinger no. 3073–4 [1839]).↩︎
Medieval scholastics discuss the nature of dogma in their commentaries on Sent. III, d. 24 and 25. St. Thomas also treats of it in ST II-II, q. 1; and his commentators take it up in the same place. Later theologians mainly discuss it in the treatise on faith. Thus, see Salmanticenses, De fide, disp. 3; Suarez, De fide, disp. 3; Lugo, De fide, disp. 3; Billuart, De fide, disp. 3. The same is also true for more recent authors who have written about the theological or infused virtues, such as Mazzella, Schiffini, and Billot. Moreover, more recent theologians also set forth the teaching concerning dogma: either in their prolegomena to dogmatic theology or in the treatise on the magisterium of the Church. Likewise, it can be found in the writings of pertaining to apologetics, either in the [apologetic] treatise on the Church (for example, [Johannes Vincentius] De Groot, Summa apologetica de ecclesia Catholicae: ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis, 3^rd ed. (Regensburg: Institutum Librarium Pridem G. J. Manz, 1906), q. 10, a. 6) or on revelation (for example, Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation, trans. Matthew K. Minerd [Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2022], vol. 1, 317–346). Also see the following encyclopedia entries: [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme,” In Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 2^nd ed., vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), nos. 2 and 8; “Dogma” in [Heinrich Joseph Wetzer and Benedict Welte, Wetzer und Welte's Kirchenlexicon, oder, Encyklopädie der katholischen Theologie und ihrer Hülfswissenschaften, 2^nd ed., vol. 5, eds. Joseph Hergenröther, Franz Kaulen, and Hermann Joseph Kamp, (Fribourg: Herder and Co., 1882-1903)] ; “Dogma” in Lexikon für theologie und Kirche, [2^nd ed.], ed. Michael Buchberger [(Freiburg: Herder, 1938), vol. 5?]. Other works to be consulted will be cited in chapter 3.↩︎
The word “doctrina” is derived from “docere,” to teach. Doctrine, actively taken, is its action which makes something known; doctrine, passively taken, is this doctrine considered from the perspective of the learner; understood intransitively or objectively, it is the very truth that is the object of teaching or learning.↩︎
See ST I, q. 16, a. 1; De veritate, q. 1, a. 1 and 2.↩︎
See ST I, q. 16, a. 2; q. 85, a. 5; De veritate q. 1., a. 3.↩︎
See ST I, q. 16, a. 8, ad 3: “A proposition has truth inasmuch as it signifies the truth of the intellect.”↩︎
See Thomas Pègues, “Qu’est-ce qu’un dogme?” Revue Thomiste 12 (1905): 438–454; [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 2^nd ed., vol. 4, pt. 2, ed. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann, (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924); [Henri] Pinard [De La Boullaye], “Dogme” in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique: contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines, [5th ed.], ed. Adhémar D’Alès, (Paris: G. Beauchesne, [1924-1931]), no. 6 (“valeur de vérité”).↩︎
See ST I, q. 16, a. 8; De veritate, q. 1, a. 1.↩︎
See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 2: “Known realities are known in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now, the manner of knowledge proper to the human intellect is to know the truth by combining and dividing [subjects and predicates]. Therefore, the human intellect knows those things which are simple in themselves in accord with a kind of complexity… Therefore, the object of faith can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, from the perspective of the very reality believed, the object of faith is something incomplex, namely the very reality concerning which one has faith; on the other hand, from the perspective of the believer, this object of faith is something complex, in the form of a statement” (namely in a judgment or proposition).↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, no. 7ff.↩︎
On the notion of revelation, see Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation, vol. 1, 275–316; Ambroise Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie, 2^nd ed. (Paris: [Librairie Victor Lecoffre J. Gabalda & Cie], 1910), 41–76.↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4.↩︎
As is evident from the very term revelation, dogmas must have been truly and properly revealed. Therefore, it does not suffice that some doctrine be revealed only improperly or in an analogous sense, as we will discuss below regarding virtual revelation (theological conclusions properly so-called, dogmatic facts, the canonization of saints), etc.↩︎
See Melchior Cano, De locis theologicis, bk. 12, ch. 3, concl. 3; Salmanticenses, Cursus theologicus, Tractatus de fide, disp. 1, no. 115; Benedict XIV [Prospero Lorenzo Lambertini], De servorum Dei beatificatione, bk. 2, ch. 32, no. 11; Jean Vincent Bainvel, De magisterio vivo et traditione (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1905), 129.↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 3 (Denzinger, no. 3011[1792]).↩︎
See Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, nos. 23 and 27.↩︎
Garrigou-Lagrange, De revelatione, vol. 1, 139 (parenthetical remarks added by Schultes).↩︎
Council of Trent, Session 4, Decree on the Vulgate Edition of the Bible and on the Manner of Interpreting Sacred Scripture (Denzinger, no. 1507[786]).↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 2 (Denzinger, no. 3007[1788]).↩︎
See Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, [vol. 1, 4^th ed. (Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr, 1905)], 528ff.↩︎
See Council of Trent, Decree on Justification, ch. 9 (Denzinger, no. 1533[802]).↩︎
See Adolf von Harnack, Das Wesen des Christentums: sechzehn Vorlesungen vor Studierenden aller Facultäten, [2^nd ed. (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1901)], lect. 7, no. 5.↩︎
ST II-II, q. 1, a. 1.↩︎
For like reason, any dogmas whatsoever can be called practical truths inasmuch as they have an order to action. See the excellent remark by Pinard in “Dogme” in Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique: contenant les preuves de la vérité de la religion et les réponses aux objections tirées des sciences humaines, [5th ed.], ed. Adhémar D’Alès, (Paris: G. Beauchesne, [1924-1931]), no. 7 (col. 1160): “Christianity is a school of science only so as to be a school of virtue.” Similarly, as St. Thomas says in ST I, q. 1, a. 1: “In order that man might more fittingly and certainly experience salvation it was necessary that they be instructed about divine realities through divine revelation.” Cf. ST II-II, q. 2, a. 3.↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3070[1836]).↩︎
See Melchior Cano, De locis theologicis, bk. 12, ch. 13, ad 1; Juan de Lugo, De fide, disp. 1, sect. 13, §1, no. 27; Matthias Scheeben, Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics, trans. Michael J. Miller (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2019), vol. 1.2, 9ff.↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, nos. 3073–74[1839]).↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, nos. 3074[1839]).↩︎
Therefore, it is supposed that a defined doctrine is a revealed doctrine concerning faith or morals. Hence, Harnack wrongly thinks that it is in the Popes’ power to define any doctrine as dogma, or that the Pope is the master of dogmas, with private authority like the head of a household [tanquam rei domesticae].↩︎
Thus, the canons found in the decrees of the Council of Trent do indeed contain dogmatic definitions; the chapters of the texts, however, generally contain only doctrine. Even more so, the proceedings of earlier [veterum] Councils for the most part only report more or less approved doctrines.↩︎
See the Council of Florence, Decree for the Greeks (Denzinger, no. 1307 [694]); [First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4. See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 10, along with his commentators, who on the occasion of this article’s text in general provide development concerning the doctrine of infallibility. Also see more recent authors concerning the issue.↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3074[1839]).↩︎
[First] Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3070[1836]).↩︎
See the excellent remarks concerning this in Christian Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, vol. 1, [4^th ed.] ([Freiburg: Herder and Co.], 1915), p. 362: “These two classes of things (namely per se revealed truths and those that are revealed as ordered to others, such as most of the historical events related in Sacred Scripture) involve no distinction in terms of credibility by which it is first of all clear that they were revealed by God. However, the situation is different as regards the preservation and handing on of these revealed truths. For divine providence indeed sees that those things that are necessary for salvation are preserved intact, but not that even those things that per se have little connection [per se minime perinent] would be handed on without error.” Cf. Anton Straub, De Ecclesia Christi, (Oeniponte [Innsbruck], Typis et sumptibus Feliciani Rauch, 1912), bk. 2, nos. 879–882.—The Fathers [SS. Patres] are infallible witnesses only regarding matters of faith and morals.↩︎
The best exposition of this teaching is found in [Johannes Vincentius] De Groot, Summa apologetica de ecclesia Catholicae: ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis, 3^rd ed. (Regensburg: Institutum Librarium Pridem G. J. Manz, 1906), q. 9.↩︎
Therefore, the greatest of errors is committed by those Catholic theologians who, although retaining the terms of definitions nonetheless suppose in their own though some different meaning than that which the Church has held. Thus, the Eusebians attempted to interpret the consubstantiality of the Son in a different way than the Nicene Fathers. And more recent theologians err by, for example, interpreting the hypostatic union no longer in an ontological sense—as the Church has always understood and still understands it—but, rather, in accord with idealistic or psychologistic philosophy. And, ultimately, this is especially true of the Modernists.↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 and canon 4.3 (Denzinger nos, 3020 and 3043 [1800 and 1818]). [Trans. note: Fr. Schultes has no. 1808 for the second reference. However, the relevant canon is as related in the citation above.]↩︎
Thus, the third council of Antioch is said to have repudiated that Christ is ὁμοούσιοσ to the Father, although the term was understood in a different sense than how it was used at the Council of Nicaea. Thus, see Joseph Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne, [2^nd ed.], ([Paris: Lecoffre & Gabalda, 1912]), vol. 2, 432.↩︎
Protestants commonly understand “Catholic” faith as though it were faith not on account of the authority of God who reveals but rather solely on account of the human (juridical) authority of the Church. Therefore, they call the Catholic faith the implicit faith that is included in “I believe what the Catholic Church believes or teaches,” by virtue of which every true Catholic is ready to embrace whatever the Church, through an arbitrary judgment, proposes as dogmas. In this way they reduce Catholic and implicit faith to a kind of juridical and blind obedience ([so-called] fides carbonaria, a coal-miner’s faith). Such can be found in Albrecht Ritschl, G. Hoffman, [Ludwig] Ihmels, R[einhold] Seberg, Harnack, and others, all of whom were preceded in this by Luther and Calvin. See Reginald Schultes, Fides implicita: geschichte der lehre der fides implicita und explicita in der katholischen theologie, vol. 1 (Pustet: Regensburg, 1920).↩︎
The other divisions of dogmas are not to be explained here, or are explained in their proper place.↩︎
See Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, 3.4, 16.5 and 36; Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, 1.10.1;↩︎
See the historical exposition in the first volume of our work Fides implicita cited above.↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 3 (Denzinger, no. 3011 [1792]).↩︎
See the citation in Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, [vol. 1, 4^th ed.? (Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr, 1905), 4.↩︎
See ibid., 10.↩︎
See ibid., Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, vol. 3, 3^rd ed. (Freiburg: Mohr, [1894-1897]), 684.↩︎
See ibid., 19.↩︎
See Pinard, “Dogme,” in Dictionnaire apologétique, no. 4 (“Existence du dogme”).↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3017 [1797]). Also see idem., ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3020 [1800]).↩︎
See [Edmund] Dublanchy, “Dogme” in Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique vol. 4, pt. 2, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Anè, 1924), cols. 1127–1130.↩︎
A similar error can be found in what the [pseudo-]Synod of Pistoia said concerning the obscuring of the truths in the Church, a position condemned by the Constitution “Auctorem fidei” in the following words: ‘The proposition that asserts “that in these latter times there has been spread a general obscuring of the more important truths pertaining to religion, which are the basis of faith and of the moral teachings of Jesus Christ”, [is] heretical.’ (Denzinger, no. 2601[1501]).↩︎
See Atzberger, [L.] “Dogmengeschichte” in Kirchliches Handlexikon: ein Nachschlagebuch über das Gesamtgebiet der Theologie und ihrer Hilfswissenschaften. [Edited by Michael Buchberger] Munich: Allgemeine Verlags-Gesellschaft, 1907, vol. 1, col. 1143.↩︎
See Reinhold Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 2^nd ed., vol. 1, (Leipzig: Deihert, [1908-1913]), p. 4–7.↩︎
Friedrich Loofs, Leitfaden Zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, 4^th ed., (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1906), p. 9.↩︎
See Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, [4^th ed. (Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr, 1905)], p. [1 and 18?]. “In its conception and development, dogma is a work of the Greek spirit on the foundation of the Gospel... That is, the conceptual means used by those trying to make the Gospel understandable in the ancient times merged with the content of the same and elevated to the status of being dogmas.” Therefore, dogmas are not, indeed, the product of Greek philosophy but, instead, the product of the combination of the Gospel with Greek philosophy (see ibid., 22). Or you have another definition, on ibid., 3: “Dogmas are the Christian doctrines of faith conceptually formulated and marked out for scientific apologetic treatment.” Therefore, Harnack simply identifies dogmas with the scientific formulation of faith, this formulation being a product of ancient times and redolent of its conditions and culture, and as a result, obsolete today.↩︎
See l.c., 8: “Church dogmas are doctrines [Lehrsätze] with the claim of absolute validity, in which the Church has thought to express the essential truths of the Christian faith.” Thus, the history of Dogmas is the history of the forms in which a religious idea has developed (p. 23).↩︎
See Carl Stange, Das Dogma und seine Beurteilung in der neuren Dogmengeschichte, (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1898) p. 24, 62.↩︎
See Theodor Kolde, “Dogma und Dogmengeschichte” in Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift, vol. 19, (Munich: [Wilhelm Engelhardt], 1908) p. 507.↩︎
See August Dorner, Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte: Entwickelungsgeschichte der christlichen Lehrbildungen, (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1899), p. 12.↩︎
See Otto Scheel, “Stillstand und Neubildungen in der protestantischen Dogmengeschichtsschreibung” in Theologische Rundschau, [vol.] 14, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1911), p. 107. The last four authors are here set forth on the basis of the exposition that can be found in Felix Haase, Begriff und Aufgabe der Dogmengeschichte, (Breslau: Goerlich & Coch, 1911).↩︎
See Gottlieb Nathanael Bonwetsch, Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte, 2^nd ed. (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1919), p. 1.↩︎
See Auguste Sabatier, Esquisse d’une philosophie de la religion, [9^th ed.], (Paris: Fischbacher, [1901-1920]), bk. 3, ch. 1 and 2; Marcolinus M. Tuyaerts, L'évolution du dogme: étude théologique, (Louvain: Imprimerie Nova et Vetera, 1919), 15ff.↩︎
In fact, the history of Protestant dogmas is the genuine offspring of the polemical theology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.↩︎
Its main exponents are Alfred Loisy, The Gospel and the Church, trans. [Christopher Home] (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988); idem., Autour d’un petit livre, 2^nd ed., (Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, Éditeurs, 1903); George Tyrell, especially in his book, Through Scylla and Charybdis, or, The Old Theology and the New (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1907). For the authoritative exposition of Modernism, see Pius X’s 1907 Encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis. For the condemnations of modernism, see the decree Lamentabili (Denzinger nos. 3401–65 [2001–65]) and the Oath Against the Errors of the Modernists (Denzinger, nos. 3536–3550 [2145–47]).↩︎
Modernists follow, in particular, Herbert Spencer, William James (from whom the term subconscious is derived) and Henry Bergson, the author of the philosophical pragmatism. See Paul Simon, Der Pragmatismus in der modernen französischen Philosophie, [2nd ed.], (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1920).↩︎
See Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, no. 6.↩︎
The argument for this assertion is supposedly sought from the history of religion, though in reality it is drawn from the doctrine of agnosticism. The Catholic teaching concerning the existence and the knowability of God is defended and explained in Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature, 2 vols., trans. Bede Rose (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder, 1949).↩︎
See Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, nos. 7, 10.↩︎
See Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, nos. 7, 14. See Jules Lebreton, “L’Encyclique et la théologie moderniste” in Etudes vol. 113, n. 22 (Paris: Victor Retaux, 1907): 497. Also, in book form, idem. Bibliothèque apologétique. L'encyclique et la théologie moderniste, (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne & Cie. 1908).↩︎
See Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, nos. 8, 10.↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, no. 9.↩︎
See Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, no. 11.↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi, no. 21.↩︎
See Pius X, Pascendi, no. 13.↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi, no. 12–13.↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi, no. 13.↩︎
Pius X, Lamentabile, prop. 26 (Denzinger, no. 3426[2026]). Édouard Le Roy, who in particular holds this teaching in particular [in 1922], strives to color it with a form of pragmatism.↩︎
Pius X, Lamentabile, prop. 22 (Denzinger, no. 3422[2022]). Below, in the chapter concerning “dogmatic formulation”, we will render a judgement concerning the explanation that Loisy proposes in L’Évangile et l’Église.↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi, no. 13.↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi, no. 26.↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi, no. 27.↩︎
Pius X, Pascendi, no. 39.↩︎
See a. 5, prop. IIc below.↩︎
See a. 18 below.↩︎
In this, Günther follows the teaching of Georg Hermes (1775-1831). The latter, guided by this intention, seeking to better defend the Catholic doctrine, determined that one must begin from a perspective of positive doubt and from there proceed to the demonstration of revealed doctrines by ways of intrinsic reasons. Thus, human reason is declared to be the norm and motive of faith. The Hermesian teaching was condemned by Gregory XVI in 1835 (see Denzinger nos. 2738–2740[1618-21]) and by the [First] Vatican Council, in Dei filius’s chapters on faith and on faith and reason.↩︎
See Kuepper, in Heinrich Joseph Wetzer and Benedict Welte, [Wetzer und Welte's Kirchenlexicon, oder, Encyklopädie der katholischen Theologie und ihrer Hülfswissenschaften], 2^nd ed., vol. 5, [eds. Joseph Hergenröther, Franz Kaulen, and Hermann Joseph Kamp, (Fribourg: Herder and Co., 1882-1903)], 1331.↩︎
See Christiano Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, vol. 1, [4^th Edition.] ([Freiburg: Herder and Co.], 1915), p. 359.↩︎
The best refutation of Gunther can be found in Joseph Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, vol. 2 (Münster: Theissing, 1867-1874); Constantin von Schäzler, Die Bedeutung der Dogmengeschichte vom katholischen Standpunkt aus erörtert, ed. Thomas Esser. (Regensburg: Manz, 1884).↩︎
See Pius IX, Brief “Eximiam tuam” to the Archbishop of Cologne (June 15, 1857) (Denzinger, no. 2829 [1656]); Syllabus errorum, no. 9 (Denzinger, no. 2909 [1709]).↩︎
See [First] Vatican Council, Dei filius, ch. 4 (Denzinger, no. 3020) and the canons related to faith and reason (Denzinger, nos. 3041–44[1816–1819]). [Tr. note: Fr. Schultes here includes also the opening to concluding section the constitution.]↩︎
See the doctrine of the schismatic Greek Church as presented Aurelius Palmieri, Theologia dogmatica orthodoxa (ecclesiae graeco-russicae) ad lumen catholicae doctrinae examinata et discussa, vol. 1 (Florence: Libreria editrice fiorentina, 1911), p. 11-89. The four conditions assigned: dogmas are 1˚ theoretical truths, 2˚ revealed truths, 3˚ truths formally proposed by the Church as pertaining to the deposit of revealed faith, and 4˚ truths to which all the faithful are bound to assent, (p.11ff). This definition of dogma, as well as the doctrine concerning dogmatic progress (cf. p. 31ff) (setting aside certain explanations) agrees with Catholic doctrine. Only, as Palmieri notes well, after the time of the schism, both de facto and from the very rights of the Orthodox Churches, authority for proposing dogmas is lacking (p. 63ff).↩︎

Réginald SchultesDogmatic DevelopmentDogmaModernismHistory of Dogmas

Dr. Matthew Minerd

A Ruthenian Catholic, husband, and father, I am a professor of philosophy and moral theology at Ss. Cyril and Methodius Byzantine Catholic Seminary in Pittsburgh, PA. My academic work has appeared in the journals Nova et Vetera, The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, Saint Anselm Journal, Lex Naturalis, Downside Review, The Review of Metaphysics, and Maritain Studies, as well in volumes published by the American Maritain Association through the Catholic University of America Press. I have served as author, translator, and/or editor for volumes published by The Catholic University of America Press, Emmaus Academic, Cluny Media, and Ascension Press.

https://www.matthewminerd.com