The “Problem” of Sacra Doctrina

Written By Fr. Cajetan Cuddy, O.P.

An observation sets up the first article of Aquinas’s Summa theologiae (ST) I, q. 1: “It seems that it is not necessary to have another doctrina besides the philosophical disciplines [philosophicas disciplinas].”1 Two objections frame Aquinas’s introduction to sacra doctrina in ST I, q. 1, a. 1. Both objections argue that sacra doctrina is not necessary. The first objects on account of the limits of human reason.2 The second objects on account of the nature of what is knowable.3

We observe the elegance of these two objections considered singly and cumulatively. They both concern the nature of true knowledge. Because (1) speculative truth is the correspondence of the mind to being, and (2) the mind knows reality through human cognition, any doctrina or disciplina that purports to effect true knowledge must operate within the dynamics of being and reason (ST I, q. 16, a. 1). Thus, the “problem” that sacra doctrina encounters is this: how does sacra doctrina justify its status as a legitimate (i.e., a “necessary”) discipline under both of these aspects (i.e., being and reason). This problem is more formidable than it may initially seem.

The first objection argues that a human ought not to seek knowledge that is beyond human reason. Indeed, it would seem that such a search would be futile because of the mechanics of human cognition. Given the rational nature of the human agent, a “supra-rational discipline” appears paradoxical at best and impossible at worst. And because the “philosophical disciplines” (philosophicas disciplinas) formally comprise the various kinds of rational knowledge—“those things which fall under reason are passed on [traduntur] sufficiently in the philosophical disciplines”—it is difficult to see how “another teaching besides [praeter] the philosophical disciplines” would even be possible (much less necessary).

The second objection shifts from the subject of human knowledge (i.e., rationality and its exercise) to the object of human knowledge (i.e., being). A doctrina of truth is necessarily a doctrina about being—because being informs truthful knowledge. And the philosophical disciplines already address every being (omnibus entibus)—including God.4 Moreover, a “certain part” (quaedam pars) of the philosophical disciplines even extends formally to the being of God. Philosophy includes “theology” or “divine science” (theologia, sive scientia divina).5 “Therefore, it was not necessary [non fuit igitur necessarium] to have another doctrina [aliam doctrinam haberi] besides the philosophical disciplines.”6 Philosophy already accounts for divine being. Therefore, no further doctrina about divine being seems necessary.

These objections lay the foundation for Aquinas’s exposition of sacra doctrina in ST I, q. 1. Aquinas must show how sacra doctrina exceeds the established limits of knowledge and of being (which these two objections outline). The philosophical disciplines comprise the knowing subject (reason) and the known object (being) in all legitimate disciplinae. The correspondence of the mind to reality represents the truth that the various disciplines communicate. And because a correspondence to reality occurs through the use of reason, it appears that all of the disciplinae are philosophical disciplines. Furthermore, because God exists, he falls within the purview of being. Reason can attain certain truths about God because the object of knowledge (i.e., being) includes the being of God. Philosophical disciplines account for reason’s truthful knowledge of being. God is a being. Therefore, the philosophical disciplines also include reason’s truthful knowledge of God. Moreover, the truth about the being of God is something for which the philosophical disciplines specifically account. God’s place in the philosophical disciplines is not vague. Such disciplines extend to God under the titles of “theology” (theologia) or of “divine science” (scientia divina). “Therefore, it was not necessary to have another doctrina beyond the philosophical disciplines.”

We note that these two trenchant objections frame the discussion in terms of disciplinary necessity. Thus, sacra doctrina’s problem lies in its questionable claim that it is a real and a separate discipline. This problem arises from the reference both objections make to sacra doctrina’s putative place praeter philosophicas disciplinas.7 Sacra doctrina claims to have a legitimate disciplinary place outside the bounds of the philosophical disciplines. And it is this claim that the objectors find incredible. How could a sacra doctrina lie praeter philosophicas disciplinas? Does sacra doctrina extend to a different kind of object not considered by the philosophical disciplines—something other than or beyond being? Moreover, how does the human agent arrive at knowledge about this different kind of object—by means of something beyond or other than reason? Both of these possibilities pose grave disciplinary challenges within the dynamics of being and knowledge.

We also note the change in verb-tense found in ST I, q. 1, arg. 2. The opening sentence of ST I, q. 1, arg. 1 says: “It seems that it is not necessary [videtur quod non sit necessarium] to have another doctrina besides the philosophical disciplines.” In contrast, the concluding sentence of ST I, q. 1, arg. 2 says: “Therefore, it was not necessary [non fuit igitur necessarium] to have another doctrina beyond the philosophical disciplines.” The use of the perfect indicative active “fuit” relates to the objector’s reference to the precedent set by Aristotle’s Metaphysica.8 The Stagirite did not believe that a sacra doctrina—as a distinct discipline beyond the “theology” of “metaphysics”—was necessary. The burden of proof, thus, falls on the proponents of sacra doctrina to show how the classical philosophical tradition inadequately accounted for all valid disciplinae.

Consequently, Aquinas must show (1) how sacra doctrina—as a distinct and a necessary discipline—lies within the spectrum of truth and being, and (2) how the philosophicae disciplinae do not already and adequately account for truth and being as the sacra doctrina purports to account. The precedent of the philosophical tradition, it would seem, does not support the addition of this sacra doctrina.9 We can summarize the problem of sacra doctrina that Aquinas must resolve in this way: for what does sacra doctrina account that the philosophical discipline of metaphysics does not already account?

The challenge that Aquinas faces, then, is to demonstrate the existence of another doctrina. Such a doctrina would necessarily fall outside of the disciplinary boundaries of the preexisting philosophical disciplines. This represents a formidable task. It is difficult to envision how, exactly, one could justify a legitimate doctrina that necessarily stands praeter philosophicas disciplinas. It would seem that Aquinas does not have many independent resources to marshal in defense of sacra doctrina. The philosophical disciplines, ostensibly, can adequately account for a theological doctrina through their comprehensive grasp of reason and of being. On the one hand, if sacra doctrina is not something that reason can reach, then it would be difficult to understand how the doctrina is truly a doctrina. Doctrina imparts a knowledge that is intelligible. And intelligibility, evidently, is something predicated in relation to ratio. On the other hand, if sacra doctrina’s object falls outside of the bounds of being, then it would be difficult to explain how sacra doctrina is a legitimate doctrina. Doctrina, evidently, pertains to the truth about reality. Defenders of sacra doctrina, certainly, would not want to attempt the justification of a fictive science. Therefore, both from the side of reason and from the side of reality, sacra doctrina appears unnecessary. This is a formidable problem.

In light of this formidable problematic, this essay argues that Aquinas resolves sacra doctrina’s disciplinary problem, in the Summa theologiae, by framing this doctrina’s existence around the moral requirements of the human person. Because Aquinas believes that God is the ultimate end of the human person, human persons require sacra doctrina so that they are able to order their “intentions and actions” to God. Thus, we examine Aquinas’s arguments for the “moral necessity” of sacra doctrina beyond the purely natural, philosophical disciplines. Moreover, we also examine how sacra doctrina’s moral necessity accounts for this doctrine’s status as a scientia—and, preeminently, as a uniquely transcendent “speculative-practical science” that enjoys disciplinary preeminence among the other philosophical sciences. In sum, this essay proposes that sacra doctrina’s moral origination is essential to Aquinas’s presentation of sacra doctrina—as a unique and valid science—in relation to the philosophical disciplines.

Sacra Doctrina’s Disciplinary Necessity

Aquinas’s justification of sacra doctrina’s necessity in ST I, q. 1, a. 1 begins with a claim about divine revelation. The sed contra cites 2 Timothy 3:16: “All Scripture, divinely inspired [divinitus inspirata], is useful to teach, to argue, to correct, to instruct in righteousness.”10 Scripture’s divinitus inspirata nature places it outside of the philosophical disciplines. “Divinely inspired Scripture, however, does not belong to the philosophical disciplines [philosophicas disciplinas], which are discovered according to human reason [quae sunt secundum rationem humanam inventae].” The final sentence concludes that “it is useful besides the philosophical disciplines” to have “another science”—one which is divinely inspired.” We note that the sed contra concludes to an aliam scientia rather than to an aliam doctrinam. We also remember that “the sed contra… usually, but not always, can be taken to represent the author’s own position.”11 This particular sed contra is certainly consonant with Aquinas’s views regarding sacra doctrina’s scientific necessity (as ST I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 and ST I, q. 1, a. 2 attest). Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that Aquinas does not make explicit reference to scientia in the respondeo of ST I, q. 1, a. 1.

Aquinas’s respondeo justifies the necessity of sacra doctrina. He establishes sacra doctrina’s necessity in relation to the requirements of human salvation (humanam salutem).12 “It was necessary for human salvation that there be [esse] a certain teaching [doctrinam quandam] according to divine revelation besides the philosophical disciplines which are discovered [investigantur] by human reason.”13 In other words, the salvific need of the human person necessitates the existence of sacra doctrina even praeter philosophicas disciplinas. We thus observe that Aquinas begins his response within the literary bounds that the two objections established (i.e., in relation to philosophicas disciplinas and to ratio). The critical element lacking in the objections, however, is the necessity not only of human reason in relation to being, but the necessity of human beings ad salutem. In sum, Aquinas appropriates the literary frame of the two objections, but he places their literary frame within a properly supernatural context: human salvation. This supernatural context explains sacra doctrina’s necessity and the inadequacy of the philosophical disciplines.14

Aquinas then proceeds, by way of explication, to offer two reasons for sacra doctrina’s necessity that take account of (1) the concerns of the philosophical disciplines, and (2) the supernatural context in which the human person actually exists. First, “the human person [homo] is ordained by God as to a certain end [ad quendam finem] which exceeds the comprehension of reason”—as Isaiah 66:4 expresses (“the eye has not seen,” etc.). Aquinas articulates God’s position of finality in relation to the human person and to the limits of human reason. God’s finality in this context is one that “exceeds the comprehension of reason” (comprehensionem rationis excedit). Therefore, the human person’s supernatural ordination to God does not fall within the bounds of rational discovery. God’s finality is supra-rational, and thus it falls outside the comprehensive range of the philosophical disciplines considered from the side of the human agent’s native cognition.

Nonetheless, although God’s finality is supra-rational vis-à-vis the limitations of human nature, movement to salvific union with God (“as to a certain end”) must comport with the real dynamics of human nature. The human person can only advance to real union with the supernatural end as a human person. In other words, the real union of real human persons to the real end must comprise the reality of the human person and the reality of God both (ST I-II, q. 1, a. 8). And human persons are, by nature, rational creatures. Therefore, “the end must be foreknown by humans [praecognitum hominibus], who ought to order their intentions and actions to the end [intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in finem].” “Hence, it was necessary for human salvation [necessarium fuit homini ad salutem] that certain things [ei nota fierent qaedam] which exceed human reason be made known to him through divine revelation” (ST I, q. 1, a. 1).

The “Moral Necessity” of Sacra Doctrina

Aquinas’s reference to “intentions and actions” (intentiones et actiones) in this context immediately elicits his readers’ interest. In ST I-II, q. 1, a. 4, Aquinas explains the dynamics of action and intention with regard to the supreme importance of finality.15 Without a fundamental orientation to a preestablished end, neither intention nor human action is possible (much less intelligible). This point, of course, resonates deeply with Aquinas’s analysis in ST I, q. 1, a. 1 about the necessity of sacra doctrina. Moreover, in ST I-II, q. 12, a. 1 Aquinas explains that intention (intentio) is an “act of the will” (actus voluntatis): “Intention—as the name itself sounds [sonat]—signifies tending to something [in aliquid tendere]. Both the action of the mover [actio moventis] and the motion of the moved [motus mobilis] tend to something.” “The movement of the moved tends to something from the action of the mover.” Additionally, “intention first and principally pertains to that which moves to an end.” And because the “will moves all other powers of the soul to an end [omnes alias vires animae ad finem]… it is clear that intention is properly an act of the will.”

The nature of the will as the rational appetite (rationalis appetitus), evidently, is one of the key principles for Aquinas’s analysis of human action and of the moral life.16 The will’s intentional orientation to an end serves the specification of morality. “The end is last in execution; but it is first in the intention of reason according to which moral actions receive their species [accipiuntur moralium actuum species].”17 The connection between intention and moral action is both comprehensive and profound. Indeed, Aquinas explains that “the intensity of the interior or of the exterior act is able to be referred to intention as object.”18 Human action per se depends upon intentionality. Both interior and exterior human acts proceed in reference to an intended end.19

Consequently, we arrive at an important conclusion: Aquinas’s explicit reference in ST I, q. 1, a. 1 to “intentions and actions” (intentiones et actiones) vis-à-vis God as the “end” places his discussion about the necessity of sacra doctrina squarely in the domain of morality. Brian Thomas Mullady offers the following summary of “moral science” in Aquinas’s thought: “Moral science determines two things in St. Thomas. One is the role of the will as agent cause. The other is the relation of all the acts possible to man as disordered or ordered with respect to reason as final cause… Those acts are placed in the genus of morals by St. Thomas which are capable of control by the will as agent cause.”20 Thus, “morals for St. Thomas is always the study of the interior perfection of the human agent in his act with his powers related to the last end. Operari sequitur esse.”21

Because ST I, q. 1, a. 1’s defense of sacra doctrina’s necessity (even praeter philosophicas disciplinas) arises from the absolute importance of God’s finality, the argument in defense of sacra doctrina represents an argument from moral necessity. Sacra doctrina is necessary praeter philosophicas disciplinas because of the moral requirements of the human person. For an “end must be foreknown by humans [praecognitum hominibus], who must order their intentions and actions to the end [intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in finem].” The divinitus inspirata formality of the sacra doctrina must exist at the beginning of the rational creature’s journey to union with God, the final end. Without divine revelation, the creature would not be able to ordain either its intentions or its actions to God (as supernatural end). And without such ordination, human salvation is not possible. Therefore, the sacra doctrina is necessary—morally necessary. This is Aquinas’s first justification for the disciplinary necessity of sacra doctrina.

Aquinas’s second justification for sacra doctrina adverts to those things which human reason can investigate even without a divinitus inspirata teaching. “Even with regard to those things which are able to be discovered [investigari possunt] about God by human reason [ratione humana], it was necessary for a human to be instructed by divine revelation [revelatione divina].” Without sacra doctrina, only a few persons would actually discover the “truth about God” that is objectively accessible to humans through reason—and this discovery would only occur among a few, after much time (per longum tempus), and with an “admixture of errors” (cum admixtione errorum). This prospect represents a grave problem for the human agent. The “whole of human salvation” (tota hominis salus) depends on “cognition of the truth, which is in God” (veritatis cognitione, quae in Deo est). “Therefore, in order that salvation for humans would arrive fittingly and certainly [convenientius et certius], it was necessary that they be instructed [instruantur] about divine things through divine revelation [de divinis per divinam revelationem].”22 Aquinas then concludes: “Therefore, it was necessary—beyond the philosophical disciplines which are discovered through reason—to have a sacra doctrina through revelation.”23
We note that this second justification for sacra doctrina’s necessity also terminates in divine finality. Specifically, God as the end of the human person. Aquinas’s articulation of sacra doctrina’s necessity proceeds from the moral entelechy of the human person. Human persons require a sacra doctrina in order to arrive at salvation. Therefore, sacra doctrina is necessary even praeter philosophicas disciplinas.

Aquinas continues to clarify sacra doctrina’s legitimacy in his responses to the article’s two objections. As we saw above, the first objection frames its reservation about sacra doctrina around the nature of human reason. The second objection frames its reservation around the being known through human reason. Consequently, in ST I, q. 1, ad 1, Aquinas explains: “Although those things which are higher than the cognition of a human [altiora hominis cognitione] are not to be inquired about by a human through reason, nevertheless, those things revealed by God [a Deo revelata] are to be received through faith.” It is at this point in his analysis that Aquinas introduces the theological virtue of faith. Sacra doctrina comprises matters revealed by God and received in faith. Therefore, it suffers none of the rational limitations outlined in the first objection. The formality of God’s divine revelation firmly establishes sacra doctrina outside the boundaries of the philosophicas disciplinas.24

ST I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2 offers the second objection some essential clarifications about the nature of being as a known object. “The diverse knowable ratio [diversa ratio cognoscibilis] introduce the diversity of the sciences [diversitatem scientiarum].” He continues to illustrate his point by referencing the difference between (1) the ratio by which an astronomer (astrologus) determines that the earth is round, and (2) the ratio by which a natural philosopher (naturalis) determines that the earth is round. Both scientists can arrive at the same conclusion (i.e., the earth is round). Moreover, both kinds of knowers, through scientific demonstration, arrive at this same conclusion with regard to the same material object (i.e., the world). The difference between them, however, lies in the different formalities through which they reason to their shared conclusion.25

The astronomer’s science proceeds through the “mathematical middle term” (per medium mathematicum) of “abstracted matter” (materia abstractum), while the physicist through the middle term of the “considered matter” itself (materiam consideratum). Consequently, Aquinas observes that there is no reason why one and the same things (de eisdem rebus) cannot receive legitimate consideration in the philosophical disciplines according to the light of natural reason (lumine naturalis rationis) and in the sacra doctrina according to the light of divine revelation (lumine divinae revelationis).26 Therefore, specifically distinct sciences are not differentiated according to the specific realities they consider (e.g., the world, God), but rather according to the respective “lights” (lumines) that inform their considerations. “Hence, the ‘theology’ which pertains to sacra doctrina differs in kind [secundum genus] from the ‘theology’ which a part of philosophy establishes.” The “theology” of sacra doctrina and the “theology” of philosophy (i.e., metaphysics) are not just different in degree but in kind (secundum genus). The former science considers God in the light of faith. While the latter science considers God in the light of reason.

We note that Aquinas’s response to the second objection not only serves to vindicate sacra doctrina’s disciplinary existence, but it even offers a precision with regard to the philosophical disciplines themselves. Even within the philosophical disciplines, different scientiae often consider the same things (i.e., material objects). This convergence does not contradict the disciplinary legitimacy of the different sciences. Rather, it shows that distinct sciences are not differentiated with regard to their material object (e.g., being) but with regard to their formal object (e.g., being as movable [ens mobile] or being insofar as it is being [ens in quantum ens]). ST I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, therefore, reveals that Aquinas does not hold the philosophical disciplines in contempt. Rather, even as a theologian, he appreciates their validity and even wishes to expound upon their exact nature.27

Aquinas demonstrates (1) the inadequacy of the philosophical disciplines, and (2) the necessity of a sacra doctrina that is praeter philosophicas disciplinas. The philosophical disciplines—even metaphysics and its “part,” “theology”—do not exhaust the dynamics of being and rationality. It is correct to say that the human agent can know certain truths about God. And this (natural) “theological” knowledge does terminate in the real being of God. Human reason does have access to truth about the being of God. But this access does not comprehend all aspects under which God can be considered (nor is it immune from an “admixture of errors”). God’s identity as the end of the human agent—an end who “exceeds the comprehension of reason” (qui comprehensionem rationis excedit)—introduces a new theological formality into the disciplinary dynamics that the objections do not take into account.

The theological context of the human person’s ordination to God—as to an end that exceeds the capacities of human rationality—unveils the inadequacy of the philosophical disciplines. Before human persons can direct their intentions and actions (intentiones et actiones) to God, their supernatural end; they require some knowledge of God as their supernatural end. Moreover, “divinely revealed knowledge” (divinitus revelata) can only come from God. Were the human person not ordained to God as to a supra-rational end, the sacra doctrina would not be necessary. But the theological fact is that the human person is so ordered. Without divine revelation, human persons would not be able to ordain either their intentions or their actions to God as to their supernatural end. And without such ordination, human salvation is not possible. But, Aquinas believes, a supernatural salvation is possible. God has revealed himself as the supernatural end to which humans ought to direct their intentiones et actiones. Therefore, the sacra doctrina is necessary—morally necessary.

Sacra Doctrina as Science

Aquinas proceeds in ST I, q. 1, a. 2 to consider the scientific nature of sacra doctrina. This aspect naturally follows Aquinas’s justification of sacra doctrina’s existence according to moral necessity. Taken in and of itself, ST I, q. 1, a. 1 could appear to have proven too much. Given the fact that sacra doctrina is divinitus revelata—because its object is a supernatural end that exceeds human reason—another question emerges: does sacra doctrina qualify as real and certain knowledge? In ST I, q. 1, a. 1, Aquinas labored to demonstrate how sacra doctrina exceeds the reach of human reason and of the philosophical disciplines. Sacra doctrina’s necessity lies in the fact that it is beyond human discovery and natural attainment. Consequently, one might inquire as to whether it is too far beyond human discovery to qualify as a legitimate doctrina with proper intelligibility, coherence, and certitude. Thus, after resolving the disciplinary problem of sacra doctrina (resolved through its moral necessity), Aquinas turns his attention to the scientific problem of sacra doctrina. What kind of knowledge is this sacra doctrina?

In a fashion similar to the question’s first article, ST I, q. 1, a. 2 comprises two objections. The first objection argues against sacra doctrina’s scientific status. “It seems that sacra doctrina is not a scientia,” because “every scientia proceeds from principles known per se.” Evidently, the principles from which sacra doctrina proceeds are not per se notae. In fact, Aquinas’s arguments for the necessity of sacra doctrina—praeter philosophicas disciplinas—emphasize that sacra doctrina comprises aspects of reality that are not known per se. The sacra doctrina—including its first principles—must be divinitus revelata. Specifically, the objection observes that “sacra doctrina proceeds from articles of faith [articulis fidei] which are not known per se, since they are not conceded by everyone [non ab omnibus concedantur].” Therefore, the objection concludes: “sacra doctrina is not scientia.”

The first objection, thus, addresses the starting point of all legitimate scientiae: first principles. The second objection, however, examines the type of things sacra doctrina can consider and does include: singular things. The inclusion of singulars appears problematic, because “scientia is not of singulars. But sacra doctrina treats singulars—for example, about the deeds [de gestis] of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and similar things. Therefore, sacra doctrina is not a scientia.”28

In sum, the objections call into question the particular kind of knowledge that sacra doctrina is. Both on account of its divinitus revelata nature and on account of its extension to singulars, the sacra doctrina does not appear to have the disciplinary solidity characteristic of scientia.29 Thus, Aquinas’s articulation of the nature of the sacra doctrina will begin in the framework that these two objections establish.


Sacra Doctrina and the “Scientia Dei et Beatorum”

The sed contra of ST I, q. 1, a. 2 cites Augustine in support of sacra doctrina’s scientific nature: “To this scientia is bestowed [tribuitur] that only by which the healthiest faith [fides saluberrima] is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened.” In light of this revered patristic source and figure, Aquinas says: “This pertains to no scientia except sacra doctrina. Therefore, sacra doctrina is scientia.”

Aquinas clarifies the scientific nature of sacra doctrina in the article’s respondeo. He indicates that there are two kinds of sciences (duplex est scientiarum genus). The first proceeds from principles known by the natural light of the human intellect. He offers arithmetic and geometry as examples of this first kind of scientia. The other type of scientia, however, proceeds from principles known by the light of a superior science (ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae). He offers optics (perspectiva) and music as examples of this second kind of scientia—because optics “proceeds from principles made known [notificatis] through geometry,” and music “from principles known through arithmetic.” Aquinas then argues that the sacra doctrina is a scientia according to this second kind of science: “because [sacra doctrina] proceeds from principles known by the light of a superior science—which, namely, is of God and of the blessed [quae scilicet est Dei et beatorum].” Aquinas then draws an analogy between music and sacra doctrina: “as music believes [credit] principles handed to it [tradita] by arithmetic, so sacra doctrina believes [credit] principles revealed by God [principia revelata a Deo].”30

Aquinas’s reference to the “superior science” “of God and of the blessed” (quae scilicet est Dei et beatorum) attracts particular interest: Aquinas says that this “superior science” belongs not only to God but also to the blessed. This point is often noted only en passant in studies of Aquinas’s conception of sacra doctrina.31 In fact, Charles De Koninck is among the few that pause (and he only briefly) to consider the importance of this superioris scientiae which belongs to God and to the blessed both.32 De Koninck frames the question thus:

Why, strictly speaking, is it not enough to say that theology is subalternated to the science of God? Why is it necessary to add “and the blessed” (Ia, q. l, a. 2, c.)? Indeed, the science of the blessed consists in the vision of God as he is in himself. Also, theology is born subalternated to this knowledge of God as he is. There is therefore no need to mention the science of the blessed.33

De Koninck proceeds to answer this question in a single concise paragraph:

Science can be said either of the known, or of knowledge itself. Now, the science by which God knows himself, the uncreated science, is incommunicable; while the vital operation by which the blessed see God is a created activity, just as the light of glory is a finite light. Also, although the blessed see God as he is in himself, they do not see him absolutely the way God sees himself—that is, “ita perfecte sicut visibilis est.” Now, a science that is subalternated because of its principles, depends on the truth as it is known in the subalternating science. This is why it is impossible for theology to be properly and immediately subordinated to the science of God alone.34

The clarification that De Koninck provides addresses the knowledge itself of God and of the blessed. He reminds his readers that there is a real distinction between the knowledge that God has of himself and the knowledge that the blessed have of God. Human creatures are composites of potency and act—and this composite nature affects even the discrete potency of human intellection. The presence of composition renders human cognition essentially different from God’s cognition. Because (1) God’s knowledge is one with his essence, and (2) his essence is identical with his existence, (3) God’s knowledge of himself, itself, is God himself. Therefore, God’s proper self-knowledge is incommunicable—he is actus purus, and only actus purus itself can know actus purus according to the infinite (potency-less) formality of actus purus.35

Of course, however, the blessed see God as he is himself—in his essence (“simpliciter concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant”). Nonetheless, their proper act of seeing the divine essence is proportioned according to the modality of their created being. Consequently, their act of seeing the infinite essence of God is, itself, a created act. “The known [cognitum] is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence, the knowledge [cognitio] of every knower is according to the mode of [the knower’s] nature [suae naturae].” Subsequently, “the created intellect is only able to see God essentially [per essentiam] to the degree that God—through his grace—unites himself to the created intellect as intelligible by it.” The contingent nature of human intellection establishes the real distinction between the “way” (as De Koninck says) God sees his essence and the way the rational creatures see the divine essence (i.e., by means of the lumen divinae gloriae).36

This real distinction between the knowledge of God and the knowledge of the blessed carries over into the domain of the sacra doctrina. De Koninck explains: “Now, a science that is subalternated because of its principles [i.e., the sacra doctrina], depends on the truth as it is known in the subalternating science [i.e., the scientia Dei et beatorum]. This is why it is impossible for theology to be properly and immediately subordinated to the science of God alone.”37 Although De Koninck appropriates the language of subalternation—language which is absent from ST I, q. 1, a. 2—his fundamental point still stands. Sacra doctrina is a scientia that proceeds from principles “known by the light of a superior science.”38 And this superior science necessarily comprises both (1) the uncreated act of knowing proper to God, and (2) the created act of knowing that pertains to the blessed. Without the inclusion of this created act of beatific knowing (the scientia beatorum), the sacra doctrina would be impossible. The sacra doctrina is a scientia that is proportioned to the cognitive limits of the human person. Consequently, the contingent modality of the scientia beatorum serves an essential mediating function in the constitution of the sacra doctrina. Our transitory knowledge of the sacra doctrina and its first principles “depends on the truth as it is known” in the scientia beatorum.39 The way the blessed know the divine scientia in heaven intrinsically links the sacra doctrina to the scientia Dei and to the wayfarers’ knowledge of God.

The inclusion of the blessed in Aquinas’s presentation of sacra doctrina’s scientific nature also points to the imago Dei. In ST III, q. 9, a. 2, Aquinas observes: “That which is in potency is reduced to act through that which is in act.” Consequently, “a human person is in potency to the science of the blessed [scientiam beatorum], which consists in the vision of God and is ordained to it as to an end. For the rational creature is capable [capax] of this blessed knowledge [illius beatae cognitionis] insofar as it is ad imaginem Dei.” Aquinas then proceeds to apply the imago Dei dynamics of blessed knowledge to the scientia Christi: “Humans are brought [reducuntur] to this end of beatitude [finem beatitudinis] through the humanity of Christ.” “Therefore, it was necessary that this blessed knowledge consisting in the vision of God should most excellently [excellentissime] come to be in the humanity of Christ, because a cause must always be more powerful [potiorem] than the caused.”

Thus, in ST III, q. 9, a. 2, we can identify themes present in ST I, q. 1, aa. 1–2. The vision of God is presented as the “end” of the human person. A human person stands in “potency” to this “science of the blessed” (scientia beatorum) insofar as the human person is created in the image of God (ad imaginem Dei). The reality of the imago Dei in human nature represents the theological “capacity” (capax) that undergirds the blessed’s scientia. In ST I, q. 1, a. 1, Aquinas explains that sacra doctrina is necessary because the human person is ordained to God as to an end which exceeds the natural limitations of human nature. In ST I, q. 1, a. 2, Aquinas explains that sacra doctrina is a true scientia. Sacra doctrina “proceeds from principles known by the light of a superior science”—namely, the “science of God and of the blessed” (scientia Dei et beatorum). And in ST III, q. 9, a. 2, Aquinas explains that human nature enjoys a potential capacity for this “blessed knowledge” (capax illius beatae cognitionis) insofar as the human creature is made in the image of God (ad imaginem Dei). Therefore, the reality of the sacra doctrina—both in its final achievement by the blessed (scientia beatorum) and in its scientific reception by wayfarers—enters into the imago Dei nature of the human person.

The imago Dei—the formality under which Aquinas characterizes the Secunda pars—underlies Aquinas’s teaching on sacra doctrina.40 We also do not fail to note the Christological context in which ST III, q. 9, a. 2 appears. Christ’s humanity as the instrumental means through which the human person advances ad Deum plays an essential role in the actualization of the human person’s theological (i.e., imago Dei) potency.

In sum, Aquinas argues for sacra doctrina’s moral necessity in ST I, q. 1, a. 1. And he articulates the sacra doctrina’s scientific nature in relation to the foundation of human morality (i.e., the imago Dei) in ST I, q. 1, a. 2. Moral principles and moral dynamics thus play key roles in Aquinas’s exposition of sacra doctrina’s necessity and nature.41 Moreover, Aquinas notes that the particularity characteristic of human contingency and moral dynamics does not contradict the scientific unity of sacra doctrina.42 Although the intentional movement of creatures ad Deum plays an essential role in sacra doctrina’s purpose, sacra doctrina remains unified in its properly theological formality. “Sacra doctrina does not determine about God and about creatures in equal ways [ex aequo].” Rather, sacra doctrina concerns God principally (principaliter) and creatures “insofar as they are referred to God as to a principle or an end.”43

Sacra Doctrina as a Speculative-Practical Science

In ST I, q. 1, a. 4, Aquinas continues his scientific consideration of sacra doctrina. In this article, he considers whether sacra doctrina is a practical science (scientia practica).44 The sed contra’s negative answer—sacra doctrina “is not a practical science but more a speculative [science]”—may appear to contradict our suggestion above that moral dynamics underly Aquinas’s understanding of sacra doctrina.45 Further reflection, however, suggests a contrary conclusion. The question pursued in ST I, q. 1, a. 4 serves as a helpful resource for interpreting the types of questions and of answers that preceded it (in ST I, q. 1, aa. 1–3).

All of ST I, q. 1’s commentators advert to its careful division, order, and coherence.46 As James A. Weisheipl observes: “Every good introduction to a new book should, in scholastic procedure, declare three things: (1) the an sit of the subject, (2) the nature, or quod quid est, of that subject, and (3) the method, or modality of that subject.”47 In this Posterior Analytic-inspired categorization, then, Aquinas is pursuing greater precision about the quod quid est of sacra doctrina’s subject. And his pursuit follows a careful method of procedure.

An inquiry into sacra doctrina’s possible nature as a practical science raises several significant observations. First, ST I, q. 1. a. 4 asks whether it is a practical science rather than whether it is a speculative science. Of course, Aquinas’s respondeo answers that sacra doctrina is a “more speculative than practical” (magis tamen est speculativa quam practica) because it treats divine realities (rebus divinis) more than human actions (actibus humanis).48 Nonetheless, it is worth asking: why did Aquinas not ask whether it was a speculative science? Why did he choose, instead, to ask whether it was a practical science?

This question brings us to our second observation: The very fact that Aquinas asks whether sacra doctrina is a practical science in ST I, q. 1, a. 4, indicates that ST I, q. 1, aa. 1–3 would seem to suggest that it is a practical science. The very fact that Aquinas asks whether sacra doctrina is a practical science would seem to suggest that the questions and the answers found in ST I, q. 1, aa. 1–3 could give readers the impression that sacra doctrina is a practical science. An emphasis on the moral dynamics present in ST I, q. 1, aa. 1–3 would naturally lead readers to inquire about sacra doctrina’s practical scientific nature. Hence, Aquinas naturally asks if sacra doctrina is a practical science.

Again, Aquinas explains in the respondeo that sacra doctrina is “more speculative than practical” (magis tamen est speculativa quam practica) because it treats divine realities (rebus divinis) more than human actions (actibus humanis). Nonetheless, he emphasizes the fact that sacra doctrina does treat human actions “insofar as through them the human person [homo] is ordained to perfect knowledge of God [perfectam Dei cognitionem], in which consists eternal beatitude.” We recall that this knowledge of God is the very reason upon which Aquinas builds his argument in defense of sacra doctrina’s necessity in ST I, q. 1, a. 1. The unifying principle of the sacra doctrina is its supernatural formal object.49 Sacra doctrina considers all things in light of one “formal ratio” (propter rationem formalem): the divine light (divino lumine congnoscibilia). Sacra doctrina is, thus, essentially different from the “philosophical sciences” (scientiis philosophicis) which are always either speculative or practical. Uniquely and in contrast, sacra doctrina includes within itself both the speculative and the practical—“as God knows both himself and those things he makes by the same scientia.” And this formal-eminent unity of speculative and practical formalities in the divine science also explains why sacra doctrina is more speculative than practical. The sacra doctrina proceeds from—and reflects—God’s own scientia. The divine scientia is chiefly a scientia about God himself. Nonetheless, divine scientia and sacra doctrina both extend to matters contingent and practical. Therefore, sacra doctrina is (1) both speculative and practical, but (2) it is more speculative than practical, and (3) it is practical in relation to the principle of all scientia: the “perfect knowledge of God, in which consists eternal beatitude.”50

Aquinas explains in ST I, q. 1, a. 5 that sacra doctrina’s unique speculative-practical nature “transcends” (transcendit) all other speculative and practical sciences.51 Sacra doctrina enjoys an excelling dignity over all other speculative sciences both “on account of its certitude, and on account of the dignity of its matter.” Other speculative sciences derive their certitude from the fallible “natural light of human reason” (ex naturali lumine rationis humanae). Sacra doctrina derives its certitude from the infallible “light of divine scientia” (ex lumine divinae scientiae). Furthermore, on account of the dignity of matter, the sacra doctrina excels all other speculative sciences because sacra doctrina is principally (principaliter) about those things which transcend human reason, while the other speculative sciences consider those things that fall within the grasp of human reason.

Sacra doctrina also enjoys an excelling dignity over all other practical sciences. In order to explain sacra doctrina’s practical superiority, Aquinas again returns to his consideration of the end. The most dignified (dignior) among the practical sciences is the practical science that orders to the higher end (ad ultiorem finem). The end of the sacra doctrina, however, is “eternal beatitude” (beatitudo aeterna), to which, even, “as to an ultimate end [ultimum finem] are ordered all other ends of practical scientia.” Therefore, in all respects—speculatively and practically—sacra doctrina is the superior scientia.52

In continuity with Aquinas’s consideration sacra doctrina’s scientific superiority, he then proceeds in ST I, q. 1, a. 6 to address its sapiential nature.53 His conclusion is unequivocal: “This [sacra] doctrina is supremely wisdom [maxime sapientia est] among all human wisdoms, not only in any one kind but simply [non quidem in aliquo genere tantum, sed simpliciter].” Aquinas explains that it belongs to the wiseman to order and to judge (sapientis sit ordinare et iudicare).54 Inferior things are judged through a higher cause. Thus, in the context of housebuilding (in genere aedificii), the builder (artifex) is called “wise and the architect” (sapiens et architector) in relation to the inferior laborers who work with wood and stone. The architect orders the laborers and their labor. Additionally, in the context of human life, a person is called wise insofar as the person orders human actions to a due end (inquantum ordinat humanos actus ad debitum finem).

God is the highest cause and the final end of all things, however. Thus, “wisdom is said to be knowledge of divine things” (sapientia dicitur esse divinorum cognitio), and the person who considers God—the highest cause of all things (altissimam causam totius universi)—is most of all called “wise” (maxime sapiens dicitur). Aquinas explains that sacra doctrina is most supremely wisdom because (1) not only does it consider God as the “highest cause”—which is something that is knowable through his creatures (per creaturas)—but also because (2) sacra doctrina considers God according to his intimate self-knowledge (quantum ad id quod notum est sibi soli de seipso). God communicates his sublime self-knowledge through revelation. Therefore, sacra doctrina’s sapiential superiority resides in its procession from the highest knowledge of the highest cause (i.e., God and his self-knowledge).

In ST I, q. 1, a. 7, Aquinas asks whether God is the subject (subiectum) of this science.55 In this article, Aquinas summarizes his preceding analysis and wards off false conclusions that may tempt his readers away from sacra doctrina’s true subject. There has remained a perennial temptation among theologians to confuse the things that sacra doctrina considers (ea quae in ista scientia tractantur) with the ratio according to which sacra doctrina considers things (rationem secundum quam considerantur).56 This confusion over the distinction between material objects and formal objects has led some theologians to propose that the subject of sacra doctrina is “things and signs” (res et signa), “works of reparation” (opera reparationis), or “the whole Christ” (totum Christum).57 Aquinas clearly expresses his own view about the subject of sacra doctrina: “God is the subject of this science” (Deus est subiectum huius scientiae). Indeed, he argues that his view is necessarily correct.

Aquinas reminds his readers that science’s “subject is related to a science as an object is related to a potency or to a habitus.” Properly speaking, an object is assigned to a potency or to a habitus “under whose ratio all things are referred to a potency or a habitus” (sub cuius ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam vel habitum). In order to illustrate his point, he explains that a human (homo) or a stone (lapis) are referred to the potency of sight “insofar as both are colored” (inquantum sunt colorata). Hence “colored” is the proper object of sight. And sight can thus extend both to a human and to a stone because both a human and a stone are “colored” realities.58

“All things are studied [pertractantur] in sacra doctrina under the ratio of God [sub ratione Dei]—either because they are God himself, or because they have an order to God [habent ordinem ad Deum] as to a principle or end.” Therefore, God is the subject of sacra doctrina. If sacra doctrina studies God himself, then God is both the material and the formal object of study. If sacra doctrina studies things other than God, then God remains the formal object because sacra doctrina studies these other things only in reference to God. Aquinas highlights the central importance of the articles of faith (articuli fidei) in this regard. The articles of faith are the principles of the science of sacra doctrina, and a whole science is contained virtually (virtute) in its principles.59 Because the articles of faith are all de Deo, the entire science of sacra doctrina is likewise de Deo. Aquinas ends his respondeo with the point we considered above: a science’s formal ratio—according to which a science studies material objects—specifies a science’s subject. The formal object of a science is the principle of its essential unity.60

Conclusion

In the first question of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas argues that God is also the end to which sacra doctrina tends. Unsurprisingly, thus, Aquinas frames the originating necessity of sacra doctrina in light of the intentiones et actiones requirements of the human person. In other words, the sacra doctrina is necessary because of the human creature’s moral nature. Creatures made ad imaginem Dei require a sacra doctrina from God in order to arrive at God. The disciplinary orientation of the sacra doctrina is that of human salvation.

We suggest, then, that Aquinas presents sacra doctrina in ST I, q. 1 as a morally necessary doctrine. This does not imply that every divinely revealed truth is specifically moral in essence. Many of the most sublime truths comprised by the sacra doctrina are decidedly not moral per se (e.g., The Trinity, the act of creation, the Incarnation, et al.). What we suggest, rather, is that there is a fundamentally moral formality that informs the very act of divine revelation. In other words, every truth that God reveals is a truth revealed for human advancement to God. And human creatures are only able to receive sacra doctrina because of their rational imago Dei nature. Sacra doctrina is a sublime wisdom and a transcendent science that, uniquely, comprises both speculative and practical formalities. Within the context of the rational creature’s movement ad Deum, this makes sense: creatures require speculative knowledge of their supernatural end before they can order their intentions and their actions to this supernatural end. Everything that God reveals about himself is given for human salvation.

Aquinas’s presentation of sacra doctrina in ST I, q. 1, suggests the following: sacra doctrina is God’s divinely revealed teaching given to human creatures so that they can order their intentions and actions to him—as moral creatures. In this way, sacra doctrina—in the mind of Aquinas—is a necessary discipline praeter philosophicas disciplinas.

  1. “Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam haberi” (ST I, q. 1, arg. 1). All Latin quotations from Aquinas’s Summa theologiae (ST) are drawn from the Piana edition (Ottawa: Commissio Piana, 1953). Unless otherwise noted, all English translations are my own.↩︎

  2. “1. Ad ea enim quae supra rationem sunt, homo non debet conari, secundum illud Eccli. III: ‘Altiora te ne quaesieris’. Sed ea quae rationi subduntur, sufficienter traduntur in philosophicis disciplinis. Superfluum igitur videtur, praeter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi” (ST I, q. 1, arg. 1).↩︎

  3. “2. Praeterea. Doctrina non potest esse nisi de ente; nihil enim scitur nisi verum, quod cum ente convertitur. Sed de omnibus entibus tractatur in philosophicis disciplinis, et etiam de Deo; unde quaedam pars philosophiae dicitur theologia, sive scientia divina, ut patet per Philosophum in VI Metaphys. Non fuit igitur necessarium praeter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi” (ST I, q. 1, arg. 2).↩︎

  4. As Thomas Gilby notes, the Leonine and Piana editions of the Summa Theologiae present the Latin of ST I, q. 1, arg. 1 in the form we have utilized above: “Sed de omnibus entibus tractatur in philosophicis disciplinis, et etiam de Deo, unde quaedam pars philosophiae dicitur theologia, sive scientia divina, ut patet per philosophum in VI Metaphys.” The edition of the Summa Theologiae printed in “the French translation of the Summa published by the Revue des Jeunes (Paris, 1925)” (ms. 15347 Bibliothèque Nationale) includes the Latin text in the following form: “Sed de omnibus partibus entis tractatur in philosophicis disciplinis, et etiam de Deo” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae – Volume 1: Christian Theology [Ia. 1], ed. and trans. Thomas Gilby [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964], xvii, 4). (We will refer to this text as “Aquinas-Gilby, Summa Theologiae, vol. 1” in citations that appear in the following pages.) Although a nuance in meaning, perhaps, follows upon these textual variants, we have employed the Latin of the Leonine and Piana editions because the objection’s fundamental point appears to hold true regardless of whether the Latin is “de omnibus entibus” or “de omnibus partibus entis.” The “parts” of being would still fall within a disciplinary consideration of “being.” We do acknowledge a crisp literary parallel between “quaedam pars philosophiae” and “de omnibus partibus entis” if the Latin of ms. 15347 Bibliothèque Nationale more accurately reflects the exact litterae of Aquinas. In light of what Aquinas later explains (in ST I, q. 1, a. 3) about the unity of a scientia vis-à-vis the ratio of a science’s formal object, however, any differences in nuance between “de omnibus entibus” or “de omnibus partibus entis” would not appear to diminish either the weight of this objection nor to alter the shape of Aquinas’s response.↩︎

  5. For consideration of the extension of the philosophical science of metaphysics according to the limits of its own disciplinary nature, see Thomas C. O’Brien, Metaphysics and the Existence of God, ed. Cajetan Cuddy (Tacoma, WA: Cluny Media, 2017).↩︎

  6. “Non fuit igitur necessarium, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam haberi” (ST I, q. 1, arg. 2 [Leonine and Piana editions]). Ms. 15347 Bibliothèque Nationale prints the Latin thus: “Non fuit igitur necessarium, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam fieri sive haberi” (Aquinas-Gilby, Summa Theologiae, vol. 1, 6).↩︎

  7. ST I, q. 1, arg. 1: “Superfluum igitur videtur, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam haberi.” ST I, q. 1, arg. 2: “Non fuit igitur necessarium, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam haberi.”↩︎

  8. The citation is to Aristotle’s Metaphysica VI, 1, 1026a19: “There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, natural science, and theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort” (Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984], 2: 1620). We note with interest Jonathan Barnes’ observation about the close association of “theology” with the discipline known as “metaphysics” in Aristotle’s thought: “The word ‘metaphysics’ is not Aristotelian, and Aristotle’s Metaphysics was given its title by a later editor. But there is a subject, vaguely and variously called ‘wisdom,’ or ‘philosophy,’ or ‘primary philosophy,’ or ‘theology,’ which Aristotle describes and practices in his Metaphysics; and the subject deals with many matters which we might now characterize as metaphysical” (“Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 66–108 at 66). For more on Aquinas’s engagement with Aristotle’s Metaphysica (and, specifically, Aquinas’s commentary on the Metaphysics), see James C. Doig, Aquinas on the Metaphysics: A Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972); Suzanne Mansion, “L’intelligibilité métaphysique d’après le Proemium du Commentaire de Saint Thomas à la Métaphysique d’Aristote,” Rivisita di filosofia neo-scholastica 70 (1978): 49–62; Leo Elders, “St. Thomas Aquina’s [sic] Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,” Divus Thomas 86 (1983): 307–26; John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” in: Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 240–71; Gabriele Galluzzo, “Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics,” in A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzo, ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 209–54.↩︎

  9. The use of the perfect indicative active “fuit” in the final sentence of ST I, q. 1, arg. 2 (non fuit igitur necessarium) warrants consideration vis-à-vis the textual variance that exist between the Leonine and Piana editions of the Summa Theologiae and the edition drawn from ms. 15347 Bibliothèque Nationale. As we saw in a note above, ms. 15347 Bibliothèque Nationale indicates this Latin verbiage: “Non fuit igitur necessarium, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam fieri sive haberi” (Aquinas-Gilby, Summa Theologiae, vol. 1, 6). The passive infinitive “fieri” in this context seems to be consistent with the perfect tense of “fuit.” Aristotle’s established discipline of “metaphysics” did not suffer (and, seemingly, still does not suffer) from any limitations that would necessitate the “formulation” or the “having” of sacra doctrina as a distinct discipline. “Fieri” makes sense within ST I, q. 1, arg. 2’s discussion of a possible discipline praeter philosophicas.↩︎

  10. “Sed contra est quod dicitur II ad Tim. III: ‘Omnis scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum, ad arguendum, ad corripiendum, ad erudiendum ad iustitiam’. Scriptura autem divinitus inspirata non pertinet ad philosophicas disciplinas, quae sunt secundum rationem humanam inventae. Utile igitur est praeter philosophicas disciplinas esse aliam scientiam divinitus inspiratam” (ST I, q. 1, a. 1, s.c.).↩︎

  11. Aquinas-Gilby, Summa Theologiae, vol. 1, 6 fn. e.↩︎

  12. Gilby suggests that salus—which we translate here as “salvation”—should be taken to mean: “well-being: salus, health, welfare, salvation—the last should not be confined to its negative connotation, of being saved from something. We are not born sound and happy, but may become so by later acquirement or endowment. For the habitus of health, like beauty, a balance and harmony of parts, involving proportion to a principle and adaptation to an end” (Aquinas-Gilby, Summa Theologiae, vol. 1, 7 fn. h). Although we recognize the legitimacy of Gilby’s point, it does seem that the supernatural (and divinely salvific) meaning of salus is germane to this article because of the fact that Aquinas highlights the supernatural character of the sacra doctrina in the respondeo.↩︎

  13. The Latin text of the respondeo, in its entirety, is as follows: “Respondeo. Dicendum quod necessarium fuit ad humanam salutem esse doctrinam quandam secundum revelationem divinam praeter philosophicas disciplinas, quae ratione humana investigantur. Primo quidem quia homo ordinatur ad Deum sicut ad quendam finem qui comprehensionem rationis excedit, secundum illud Isaiae LXIV: ‘Oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praeparasti diligentibus te’. Finem autem oportet esse praecognitum hominibus, qui suas intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in finem. Unde necessarium fuit homini ad salutem quod ei nota fierent quaedam per revelationem divinam, quae rationem humanam excedunt. Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratione humana investigari possunt, necessarium fuit hominem instrui revelatione divina. Quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum homini proveniret; a cuius tamen veritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo est. Ut igitur salus hominibus et convenientius et certius proveniat, necessarium fuit quod de divinis per divinam revelationem instruantur. Necessarium igitur fuit praeter philosophicas disciplinas, quae per rationem investigantur, sacram doctrinam per revelationem haberi” (ST I, q. 1, a. 1).↩︎

  14. For more on the relationship between philosophy and sacra doctrina, see Abelardo Lobato, “Filosofía y ‘Sacra Doctrina’ en la escuela dominicana del S. XIII,” Angelicum 71 (1994): 3-42.↩︎

  15. “Sic ergo ex neutra parte possibile est in infinitum procedere, quia si non esset ultimus finis, nihil appeteretur, nec aliqua actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret intentio agentis; si autem non esset primum in his quae sunt ad finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur consilium, sed in infinitum procederet” (ST I-II, q. 1, a. 4). Emphasis added.↩︎

  16. For example: “Cum autem actus humani proprie dicantur qui sunt voluntarii, eo quod voluntas est rationalis appetitus, qui est proprius hominis; oportet considerare de actibus inquantum sunt voluntarii” (ST I-II, q. 6, prol.). Emphasis added. See also David Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 29, no. 4 (1991): 559–84; Lawrence Dewan, “The Real Distinction between Intellect and Will,” in Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays in Thomistic Ethics (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 125–50.↩︎

  17. “Finis est postremum in executione; sed est primum in intentione rationis, secundum quam accipiuntur moralium actuum species” (ST I-II, q. 18, a. 7, ad 2).↩︎

  18. “Intensio actus interioris vel exterioris potest referri ad intentionem ut obiectum; puta cum aliquis intendit intense velle, vel aliquid intense operari” (ST I-II, q. 19, a. 8).↩︎

  19. For various accounts of the relationship between human action (interior and exterior) and intention, see David Gallagher, “Aquinas on Moral Action: Interior and Exterior Acts,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 64 (1990): 118–29; Joseph Pilsner, The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 73–102; Duarte Sousa-Lara, “Aquinas on Interior and Exterior Acts: Clarifying a Key Aspect of His Action Theory,” Josephinum Journal of Theology 15, no. 2 (2008): 277–316; Steven J. Jensen, Good and Evil Actions: A Journey Through Saint Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 44–131; Steven A. Long, The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act, 2nd ed. (Naples, FL: Ave Maria Press, 2015), 13–16.↩︎

  20. Brian Thomas Mullady, The Meaning of the Term “Moral” in St. Thomas Aquinas (Vatican City: Pontificia Accademia di S. Tommaso e di Religione Cattolica, 1986), 131.↩︎

  21. Ibid., 133.↩︎

  22. Although we have employed the Latin as found in the Leonine and the Piana editions of the Summa Theologiae, we recognize that ms. 15347 Bibliothèque Nationale uses “communius et securius” rather than “convenientius et certius.” We acknowledge a definite nuance in meaning between these two variants, but Aquinas’s fundamental argument appears unaffected.↩︎

  23. Ibid.↩︎

  24. Aquinas summarizes the formality of faith in ST II-II, q. 1.↩︎

  25. Aquinas develops this point in the following articles (e.g., ST I, q. 1, a. 3) where he discusses the unity and diversity among the sciences in relation to their respective “formal objects” (rationem formale obiecti).↩︎

  26. See Marie-Rosaire Gagnebet, “Un essai sur le problème théologique,” Revue Thomiste 45 (1939): 108–145.↩︎

  27. His theological appreciation for philosophy reappears overtly in ST I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2. For more on Aquinas’s use of philosophy in his theology, see J. L. A. West, “The Functioning of Philosophy in Aquinas,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 45, no. 3 (2007): 383–94.↩︎

  28. “2. Praeterea, scientia non est singularium. Sed sacra doctrina tractat de singularibus, puta de gestis Abrahae, Isaac et Iacob, et similibus. Ergo sacra doctrina non est scientia” (ST I, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 2).↩︎

  29. For more on the nature of scientia, see J. Athanasius Weisheipl, Aristotelian Methodology: A Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, ed. John R. Catan (River Forest, IL: Pontifical Institute of Philosophy–Dominican House of Studies, 1958); William A. Wallace, The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology: A Study of Methodology in St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: The Thomist Press, 1962), 15–70; M.-D. Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, 3rd ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1969), 69–92; Thomas Gilby, “Appendix 6: Theology as Science,” in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae – Volume 1: Christian Theology (Ia. 1), ed. and trans. Thomas Gilby (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 67–87; James A. Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I, q. 1,” The Thomist 38 (1974): 49–80; John I. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11–128; William E. Carroll, “Thomas Aquinas on Science, Sacra Doctrina, and Creation,” in Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic Religions, vol. 1, ed. Jitse van der Meer and Scott Mandelbrote (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 219–48; Guy Mansini, “Are the Principles of Sacra Doctrina Per Se Nota?,” The Thomist 74, no. 3 (2010): 407–35; Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo, “La sacra doctrina como ciencia imperfecta quoad nos en Tomás de Aquino: Nuevas reflexiones a partir de algunas ediciones críticas recientes,” Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 52 (2017): 67–87.↩︎

  30. This latter point, of course, lies at the root of the controversy surrounding whether or not the sacra doctrina is a “subalternated” science. For more on this controversy and on subalternation in general, see Bernard Mullahy, “Subalternation and Mathematical Physics,” Laval théologique et philosophique 2, no. 2 (1946): 89–107; M. V. Dougherty, “On the Alleged Subalternate Character of Sacra Doctrina in Aquinas,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 77 (2004): 101–10; M. V. Dougherty, “Aquinas on the Self-Evidence of the Articles of Faith,” The Heythrop Journal 46, no. 2 (2005): 167–180. Mullahy’s article is an extract from his 1946 doctoral dissertation completed at the Université Laval under the direction of Charles De Koninck: Bernard I. Mullahy, “Thomism and Mathematical Physics” (Ph.D. diss., Université Laval, 1946). Although this historic and complex controversy continues to attract interest from philosophers and theologians, we note that Aquinas does not explicitly invoke “subalternation” in ST I, q. 1, a. 2. The literary absence of “subalternation” in this passage is, perhaps, significant given the fact that Aquinas was familiar with both the concept and the term (see: De veritate, q. 14, a. 9, ad 3; Super Sent., lib. 3, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2, ad 3; S.C.G. III, c. 79, n. 3; ST I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3; De malo q. 8, a. 1, ad 13).↩︎

  31. There are exceptions, however. For example, see: Marie-Dominique Philippe, “La lecture de la Somme théologique,” Seminarium 29 (1977): 898–916 at 900.↩︎

  32. “Quaestiunculae: I. Science des bienheureux et subalternation; II. La définibilité de l’Assomption,” Laval théologique et philosophique 3, no. 2 (1947): 303–4. To clarify, these two “quaestiunculae” do not have any author attributed to them. We infer that Charles De Koninck is their author in light of what his son, Thomas De Koninck, says about his father’s role in the Laval théologique et philosophique (Thomas De Koninck, “Charles De Koninck: A Biographical Sketch,” in The Writings of Charles De Koninck, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Ralph McInerny [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008], 69–97 at 83–4).↩︎

  33. “Pourquoi, à parler strictement, ne suffit-il pas de dire que la théologie est subalternée à la science de Dieu? pourquoi faut-il ajouter « et des bienheureux »? (Ia, q. l, a. 2, c.). En effet, la science des bienheureux consiste dans la vision de Dieu tel qu’il est en lui-même. Aussi, la théologie est-elle subalternée à cette connaissance de Dieu tel qu’il est. Il n’est donc pas nécessaire de faire mention de la science des bienheureux” (De Koninck, “Quaestiunculae,” 303). Translations from De Koninck’s French are original.↩︎

  34. “La science peut se dire soit du connu, soit de la connaissance elle-même. Or, la science par laquelle Dieu se connait, la science incréée, est incommunicable; tandis que l’opération vitale par laquelle les bienheureux voient Dieu est une activité créée, de même que la lumière de gloire est une lumière finie. Aussi, quoique les bienheureux voient Dieu tel qu’il est en lui-même, ils ne le voient pas absolument de la manière dont Dieu se voit—c’est-à-dire « ita perfecte sicut visibilis est ». Or, une science qui est subalternée en raison de ses principes, dépend de la vérité́ telle qu’elle est connue dans la science subalternante. C’est pourquoi il est impossible que la théologie soit proprement et immédiatement subalternée à la seule science de Dieu” (ibid.).↩︎

  35. See ST I, q. 14, a. 4.↩︎

  36. “Dicendum ergo quod ad videndum Dei essentiam requiritur aliqua similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, scilicet lumen divinae gloriae confortans intellectum ad videndum Deum; de quo dicitur in Psalmo: ‘In lumine tuo videbimus lumen’. Non autem per aliquam similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest, quae ipsam divinam essentiam repraesentet ut in se est” (ST I, q. 12, a. 2).↩︎

  37. De Koninck, “Quaestiunculae,” 303.↩︎

  38. ST I, q. 1, a. 2.↩︎

  39. De Koninck, “Quaestiunculae,” 303.↩︎

  40. See the prologue to the Secunda pars of the ST↩︎

  41. We also note Aquinas’s explicit reference to “moral sciences” in his response to the second objection: “Ad secundum. Dicendum quod singularia traduntur in sacra doctrina, non quia de eis principaliter tractetur; sed introducuntur tum in exemplum vitae, sicut in scientiis moralibus, tum etiam ad declarandum auctoritatem virorum per quos ad nos revelatio divina processit, super quam fundatur sacra scriptura seu doctrina” (ST I, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2).↩︎

  42. This point resonates with what Aquinas says later about God as the subject of the sacra doctrina: “Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus vere sit subiectum huius scientiae. – Quod etiam manifestum fit ex principiis huius scientiae, quae sunt articuli fidei, quae est de Deo; idem autem est subiectum principiorum et totius scientiae, cum tota scientia virtute contineatur in principiis. Quidam vero, attendentes ad ea quae in ista scientia tractantur et non ad rationem secundum quam considerantur, assignaverunt aliter subiectum huius scientiae: vel res et signa, vel opera reparationis, vel totum Christum, idest caput et membra. De omnibus enim istis tractatur in ista scientia, sed secundum ordinem ad Deum” (ST I, q. 1, a. 7).↩︎

  43. “Ad primum ergo. Dicendum quod sacra doctrina non determinat de Deo et de creaturis ex aequo, sed de Deo principaliter, et de creaturis secundum quod referuntur ad Deum, ut ad principium vel finem. Unde unitas scientiae non impeditur” (ST I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1).↩︎

  44. “Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacra doctrina sit scientia practica” (ST I, q. 1, a. 4, arg. 1).↩︎

  45. “Sed contra. Omnis scientia practica est de rebus operabilibus ab homine, ut moralis de actibus hominum, et aedificativa de aedificiis. Sacra autem doctrina est principaliter de Deo, cuius magis homines sunt opera. Non ergo est scientia practica, sed magis speculativa” (ST I, q. 1, a. 4, sc.).↩︎

  46. For example, see J.-Fr. Bonnefoy, La nature de la théologie selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Extrait des Ephem. Theol. Lov. 1937–1938) (Paris, 1939), 5–7; Gerald F. Van Ackeren, Sacra Doctrina: The Subject of the First Question of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, with an introduction by Yves M. J. Congar (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1952), 78–117; Victor White, Holy Teaching: The Idea of Theology according to St. Thomas Aquinas, The Aquinas Society of London, Aquinas Paper No. 33 (London: Blackfriars, 1958); H.-D. Gardeil, “Appendice 1. Notes explicatives,” in Thomas d’Aquin, Somme théologique: La théologie–Ia, Prologue et Question 1, trans. H.-D. Gardeil (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1968), 61–73; Thomas Gilby, “Appendix 5: Sacra Doctrina,” in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae – Volume 1: Christian Theology (Ia. 1), ed. and trans. Thomas Gilby (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 58–66; James A. Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I, q. 1,” The Thomist 38, no. 1 (1974): 49–80; T. C. O’Brien, “‘Sacra Doctrina’ Revisited: The Context of Medieval Education,” The Thomist 41, no. 4 (1977): 475–509; Albert Patfoort, “Sacra Doctrina, Théologie, et Unité de la Ia Pars,” Angelicum 62, no. 2 (1985): 306–19; Henry Donneaud, “Insaisissable sacra doctrina? À propos d’une réédition récente,” Revue Thomiste 98 (1998): 179–224; Jean-Pierre Torrell,“Le savoir théologique chez saint Thomas,” in Recherches thomasiennes: Études revues et augmentées (Paris: J. Vrin, 2000), 121–57; Bruce D. Marshall, “Quod Scit Una Uetula: Aquinas on the Nature of Theology,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 1–35; Fáinche Ryan, Formation in Holiness: Thomas Aquinas on Sacra doctrina (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 107–41.↩︎

  47. Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina,” 64. This is the procedure according to which Weisheipl divides and interprets ST I, q. 1 (ibid., 65).↩︎

  48. The Latin text of the respondeo, in its entirety, is as follows: “Respondeo. Dicendum quod sacra doctrina, ut dictum est, una existens se extendit ad ea quae pertinent ad diversas scientias philosophicas, propter rationem formalem quam in diversis attendit, scilicet prout sunt divino lumine cognoscibilia. Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramque, sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit, et ea quae facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam practica, quia principalius agit de rebus divinis quam de actibus humanis; de quibus agit secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua aeterna beatitudo consistit” (ST I, q. 1, a. 4).↩︎

  49. See also ST I, q. 1, a. 7.↩︎

  50. For more on the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge, see Henri Pichette, “Considération sur quelques principes fondamentaux de la doctrine du spéculatif et du pratique,” Laval théologique et philosophique 1, no. 1 (1945): 52–70; S. Edmund Dolan F.S.C., “Resolution and Composition in Speculative and Practical Discourse,” Laval théologique et philosophique 6 (1950): 9–62.↩︎

  51. The Latin text of the respondeo, in its entirety, is as follows: “Respondeo. Dicendum quod cum ista scientia quantum ad aliquid sit speculativa, et quantum ad aliquid sit practica, omnes alias transcendit tam speculativas quam practicas. Speculativarum enim scientiarum una altera dignior dicitur tum propter certitudinem, tum propter dignitatem materiae. Et quantum ad utrumque haec scientia alias speculativas scientias excedit. Secundum certitudinem quidem, quia aliae scientiae certitudinem habent ex naturali lumine rationis humanae, quae potest errare; haec autem certitudinem habet ex lumine divinae scientiae, quae decipi non potest. Secundum dignitatem vero materiae, quia ista scientia est principaliter de his quae sua altitudine rationem transcendent; aliae vero scientiae considerant ea tantum quae rationi subduntur. Practicarum vero scientiarum illa dignior est, quae ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur, sicut civilis militari, nam bonum exercitus ad bonum civitatis ordinatur. Finis autem huius doctrinae inquantum est practica, est beatitudo aeterna, ad quam sicut ad ultimum finem ordinantur omnes alii fines scientiarum practicarum. Unde manifestum est, secundum omnem modum eam digniorem esse aliis” (ST I, q. 1, a. 5).↩︎

  52. For more on Aquinas’s understanding of beatific finality in relation to sacra doctrina, broadly considered, see Roger Guindon, Béatitude et théologie morale chez saint Thomas d’Aquin: Origines – Interprétation (Ottawa: Editions de l’Université d’Ottawa, 1956), especially 251–55.↩︎

  53. The Latin text of the respondeo, in its entirety, is as follows: “Respondeo. Dicendum quod haec doctrina maxime sapientia est inter omnes sapientias humanas, non quidem in aliquo genere tantum, sed simpliciter. Cum enim sapientis sit ordinare et iudicare, iudicium autem per altiorem causam de inferioribus habeatur; ille sapiens dicitur in unoquoque genere, qui considerat causam altissimam illius generis. Ut in genere aedificii, artifex qui disponit formam domus, dicitur sapiens; et architector respectu inferiorum artificum, qui dolant ligna vel parant lapides; unde dicitur I Cor. III: ‘Ut sapiens architector fundamentum posui’. Et rursus in genere totius humanae vitae prudens sapiens dicitur, inquantum ordinat humanos actus ad debitum finem; unde dicitur Prov. X: ‘Sapientia est viro prudentia’. Ille igitur qui considerat simpliciter altissimam causam totius universi, quae Deus est, maxime sapiens dicitur: unde et sapientia dicitur esse divinorum cognitio, ut patet per Augustinum, XII de Trin. Sacra autem doctrina propriissime determinat de Deo secundum quod est altissima causa; quia non solum quantum ad illud quod est per creaturas cognoscibile, quod philosophi cognoverunt, ut dicitur Rom. I: ‘Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis’; sed etiam quantum ad id quod notum est sibi soli de seipso, et aliis per revelationem communicatum. Unde sacra doctrina maxime dicitur sapientia” (ST I, q. 1, a. 6).↩︎

  54. For more on Aquinas’s understanding of philosophical and theological wisdom, see Kieran Conley, A Theology of Wisdom: A Study in St. Thomas (Dubuque, IA: The Priory Press, 1963); Mark D. Jordan, Ordering Wisdom: The Hierarchy of Philosophical Discourses in Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986); Mark F. Johnson, “The Sapiential Character of Sacra Doctrina in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas: The Appropriation of Aristotle’s Intellectual Virtue of Wisdom” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1990); Francisco P. Muñiz, The Work of Theology, trans. John P. Reid (Washington, DC: Thomist, 1958); Matthew K. Minerd, “Wisdom Be Attentive: The Noetic Structure of Sapiential Knowledge,” Nova et Vetera 18, no. 4 (2020): 1103–1146.↩︎

  55. “Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit subiectum huius scientiae” (ST I, q. 1, a. 7, arg. 1).↩︎

  56. “Respondeo. Dicendum quod Deus est subiectum huius scientiae. Sic enim se habet subiectum ad scientiam, sicut obiectum ad potentiam vel habitum. Proprie autem illud assignatur obiectum alicuius potentiae vel habitus, sub cuius ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam vel habitum, sicut homo et lapis referuntur ad visum inquantum sunt colorata, unde coloratum est proprium obiectum visus. Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus vere sit subiectum huius scientiae. – Quod etiam manifestum fit ex principiis huius scientiae, quae sunt articuli fidei, quae est de Deo; idem autem est subiectum principiorum et totius scientiae, cum tota scientia virtute contineatur in principiis. Quidam vero, attendentes ad ea quae in ista scientia tractantur et non ad rationem secundum quam considerantur, assignaverunt aliter subiectum huius scientiae: vel res et signa, vel opera reparationis, vel totum Christum, idest caput et membra. De omnibus enim istis tractatur in ista scientia, sed secundum ordinem ad Deum” (ST I, q. 1, a. 7).↩︎

  57. As we saw above, ST I, q. 1, a. 3 contains Aquinas’s explanation of the difference between material and formal objects. For a consideration of other proposed subjects of sacra doctrina in relation to Aquinas’s own, see Henry Donneaud, Théologie et intelligence de la foi au XIIIème siècle (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2006).↩︎

  58. Note the parallel between this analogy and what Aquinas explains in ST I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.↩︎

  59. For Aquinas’s examination of the articles of faith in the Summa theologiae, see ST II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–10.↩︎

  60. “Sacred theology thus differs from metaphysics in that it takes divine things, as they subsist in themselves and not merely as they are principles of being, for its adequate subject of consideration. Therefore its proper concern is neither ens commune [metaphysics] nor ens mobile [physics], but rather ens divinum, and this insofar as it is knowable through divine revelation. Furthermore, since all divine being is said to be such with reference to the prime analogate, which is God or subsistent divinity, it follows that the principal subject of sacred theology is God Himself. All else comes under the science insofar as it is viewed in one way or another ‘sub ratione Dei,’ i.e., as having an order to God either as principle or as end. Such a subject then corresponds to the principle which makes sacred theology possible as a science. It is only because reason is illumined by faith, which itself is of God, that sacred theology can have such an extensive scope: all of being, created and uncreated, comes under its consideration” (Wallace, Role of Demonstration, 38).↩︎

Fr. Cajetan Cuddy, O.P.

Fr. Cuddy teaches dogmatic and moral theology at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, D.C. He serves as the general editor of the Thomist Tradition Series, and he is co-author of Thomas and the Thomists: The Achievement of St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters (Fortress Press, 2017). Fr. Cuddy has written for numerous publications on the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Thomist Tradition. 

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