Note: Classical Thomists on Aquinas’s “sacra doctrina”

The interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas’s use of the term sacra doctrina has a rich and varied history.1 Of particular note is the attention that the Thomistic commentators devote to the nature of sacra doctrina expounded in STh I, q. 1.2 Significant figures of the Thomist tradition have participated in and have helped to shape our understanding of sacra doctrina secundum mentem divi Thomae.

For two reasons, we will employ Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s commentary on the Summa Theologiae as something akin to a skeleton from which we will advert to the significant themes found in the classical studies of STh I, q. 1: (1) Garrigou-Lagrange is one of the final Thomistic “commentators” in the classical sense of the term whose writings often represent something of a “reader’s digest” of Thomistic interpretations, and (2) Garrigou-Lagrange studied in detail Aquinas’s STh I, q. 1 as well as the classical commentaries on STh I, q. 1.3

Garrigou-Lagrange begins his commentary on the Prima pars of the Summa Theologiae at the work’s beginning: the general prologue (STh-P).4 Garrigou-Lagrange notes that the Summa Theologiae is a work written in a way “suitable for beginners,” but he also accentuates the fact that the “Summa of St. Thomas was not meant to be merely an elementary work.” And he cites Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534) in support of this claim: “for, as Cajetan remarks, all theological problems are here [i.e., in the Summa Theologiae] appropriately and clearly treated.”5 With regard to the overall structure of the Summa Theologiae, Garrigou-Lagrange explains that Aquinas’s magnum opus represents a work that is strictly theological in subject, object, and intention:

The order observed in this work is didactic and strictly theological. St. Thomas adopts a far better method than that of the Master of the Sentences or of Alexander of Hales in the arrangement of the questions, and this not only as to generalities but also as to particulars. In the Summa of the Angelic Doctor all questions are considered as they refer to God, who is the proper object of theology, rather than as they refer to man and his liberty. This point of view may be called therefore theocentric but not anthropocentric.6

We note with interest several details in Garrigou-Lagrange’s commentary on STh-P. (1) Although Aquinas uses the term “sacra doctrina” in STh-P, Garrigou-Lagrange does not use this term in his commentary on STh-P. (2) Conversely, although Aquinas does not use the term “theologia” in STh-P, Garrigou-Lagrange does use this term in his commentary on STh-P.7 This disparity of terms also applies to Cajetan’s brief commentary on STh-P.8 In the lengthy meditatio of Domingo Bañez (1528–1604) on STh-P, however, numerous references to doctrina and to sacra doctrina appear in addition to more frequent references to theologia and to the work of the theologus.9 Francis Sylvius (1581–1649) starts his commentary on STh-P with explicit mention of sacra doctrina in reference to the title of the Summa Theologiae.10 Moreover, (3) Garrigou-Lagrange highlights in the theocentric structure of the Summa Theologiae a break from the structural precedent set in Peter Lombard’s Sentences and in the writing of Alexander of Hales.11 This “strictly theological” order of the Summa Theologiae reflects its strictly “didactic” (i.e., ordo disciplinae) design and execution.

Although Garrigou-Lagrange does not frame his remarks on STh-P around sacra doctrina, he does home in on the nature of the sacra doctrina in his commentary on STh I, q. 1. Garrigou-Lagrange provides the following outline of the question at the beginning of his remarks on STh I, q. 1:

This question contains ten articles. It treats (1) of the necessity of sacred doctrine, asking whether it is necessary; (2) of the nature of this sacred doctrine in three articles: whether it is a science; whether it is one science; whether it is speculative or practical; (3) of its excellence compared with the other sciences, in articles five and six; (4) of its subject or proper object; (5) of its method: whether it is a matter of argument, the intrinsic and extrinsic sources being discussed in a general way in this article; there is also an article on the use of metaphor, and the last article concerns the use which theology makes of Holy Scripture.12

He argues that this order of progression (from specific points 1–5) amounts to a movement from a “nominal to the real and scientific definition” of sacra doctrina.13 The progression that Garrigou-Lagrange identifies in STh I, q. 1 passes from a consideration of the necessity of sacra doctrina (a. 1), to its nature (aa. 2–4), to its excellence (aa. 5–6), to its proper subject or object (a. 7), and finally to its method (a. 8). Garrigou-Lagrange believes that this division of articles not only accurately reflects the progression of STh I, q. 1, but he also defends Aquinas’s use of this order over possible alternatives.14

Garrigou-Lagrange begins his commentary on STh I, q. 1 proper with an outline of the question’s structure. He then summarizes the various positions among the Thomistic interpreters that purport to capture the exact meaning of Aquinas’s sacra doctrina: “Concerning the nominal definition, or the meaning of the words ‘sacred doctrine,’ there is a dispute as to what the holy Doctor [Aquinas] implies by them. Does he mean faith? or theology? Or does he mean sacred doctrine in general according as it abstracts from faith and theology?”15

Cajetan on Sacra Doctrina: Revealed Cognition Transcending Faith and Theology

The latter view corresponds to what Cajetan argues in his commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1.16 A recent study of Cajetan’s understanding of the sacra doctrina describes it thus:

In his commentary [on STh I, q. 1]… Cajetan affirms that sacred doctrine, as presented in article 1 (ST, I, q. 1), can be understood neither exclusively as faith, distinct from theology, nor as theology, distinct from faith; rather sacred doctrine is to be understood as a genus of knowledge revealed by God and necessary for man’s salvation. The extension of the term ‘sacra doctrina’ in article 1 is wide and includes everything made known by God revealing himself, abstracting from the specific aspects of faith and science.17

Cajetan believes that this conception of sacra doctrina—as a revealed knowledge “abstracted” from both faith and theological science—enables the interpreter of Aquinas to avoid two kinds of undesirable implication latent in the alternative interpretations. (1) Cajetan argues that if one were to posit that sacra doctrina means faith, then two incongruities would follow.18 (1-A) First, a sacra doctrina-as-faith reading of STh I, q. 1 would imply that Aquinas materially treats the same question twice in the Summa Theologiae (i.e., both in STh I, q. 1, a. 1 and in STh II-II, q. 2, a. 3 where Aquinas asks whether believing in something supernatural is necessary for salvation).19 STh I, q. 1, a. 1 asking about the necessity of the sacra doctrina (which is faith) would amount to STh II-II, q. 2, a. 3 asking about the necessity of faith (which is the sacra doctrina). Thus, Cajetan’s first argument against the sacra doctrina-as-faith possibility highlights Aquinas’s promise in STh-P: the Summa Theologiae will not foster the “multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments” nor “frequent repetition.”20

(1-B) Cajetan’s second critique of the sacra doctrina-as-faith interpretation deals with the unity of STh I, q. 1, a. 1 in relation to the question’s subsequent articles. Even though a sacra doctrina-as-faith reading might not compromise the intelligibility of the first article, Cajetan observes that such a meaning would not fit with the argumentation of the subsequent articles in the same question. Otherwise expressed, sacra doctrina would have to undergo a change in meaning as the question advanced from the first article to subsequent articles. And this change would render the meaning of sacra doctrina equivocal throughout the question.21 Thus, Cajetan’s second argument against the sacra doctrina-as-faith possibility presupposes the integrity and consistency of STh I, q. 1 throughout its ten articles.

(2) On the other hand, if one were to interpret sacra doctrina as meaning theology (and not faith) in STh I, q. 1, Cajetan argues that another problem emerges. If one were to posit a sacra doctrina-as-theology interpretation, then “it would follow that faith without theology would not suffice for human salvation—which is false.” He explains the reason for this falsity thus: In STh I, q. 1, a. 1, Aquinas argues (A) that sacra doctrina is necessary for salvation, and (B) that it is through the “cognition of faith” (per fidei cognitionem) that man is able to direct his intentions and actions to the supernatural end.22 Therefore, to interpret sacra doctrina as meaning theology rather than faith clearly contradicts Aquinas’s own words and his overall argument in STh I, q. 1, a. 1.

Consequently, Cajetan wishes to attribute a more inclusive meaning to the sacra doctrina that (1) would abstract from both faith and theology, but (2) would also be able to include both faith and theology.23 In this way, sacra doctrina applies to both faith and theology without either faith or theology exhausting or comprehending (exclusively) the meaning of sacra doctrina. The human person requires “cognition revealed by God” (cognitio a Deo revelata) for salvation—and this “broad knowledge” includes formally (formaliter) and virtually (virtualiter) the dynamics of both faith and scientific theology.24

In contrast, Garrigou-Lagrange argues that Francis Sylvius and John of St. Thomas (in disagreement with Cajetan) understand sacra doctrina in STh I, q. 1 as “theology in the strict sense.”25 Garrigou-Lagrange adverts with deference to Cajetan’s insights about the first question of the Summa Theologiae. Nonetheless, Garrigou-Lagrange’s positions more closely resemble that of Sylvius and John of St. Thomas.26 Because Garrigou-Lagrange does not go into the specific arguments that Sylvius and John of St. Thomas provide, we will examine both of their writings on the meaning of the sacra doctrina in relation to STh I, q. 1.

Domingo Bañez on Sacra Doctrina: The Theological Practice of Doctrina Revelata

Before turning to Sylvius and to John of St. Thomas, however, we will briefly consider the commentary on STh I, q. 1 of their predecessor, Domingo Bañez.27 Bañez represents something of a transitional figure between Cajetan and Sylvius’s understanding of sacra doctrina. Unlike Cajetan, Bañez “does not show the slightest interest in discussing the logical sequence of the first question” of the Summa Theologiae.28 Bañez does not read STh I, q. 1 in close reference to Aquinas’s appropriation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. “Rather, he [Bañez] is interested in defending the conclusions of each article against the heresies of the Reformers.”29 Moreover, Weisheipl observes: “It would seem that for him [Bañez] the entire first question (with the exception of part of article one) is about scholastic theology.”30

Throughout Bañez’s commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1, he prefers to speak about “theology” (theologia) and about “revealed teaching” (doctrina revelata) rather than about sacra doctrina.31 In the various “conclusions” (conclusiones) that Bañez provides throughout his commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1, he speaks of doctrina revelata rather than about sacra doctrina.32 Specifically, Bañez also devotes attention to the office and to the work of the theologian (theologus).33 His analysis of sacra doctrina is bound up in his analysis (1) of the office of the theologian, and (2) of the theologian’s work (i.e., theology) in relation to doctrina revelata.34

Thus, it appears that Bañez loosely assumes Cajetan’s understanding of the nature of sacra doctrina, but chooses to consider it concretely in its theological instantiation (both as a scientific habitus and as proper to the theologian). Bañez devotes most of his commentatorial efforts to extolling the necessity and the value of “scholastic theology” (Scholastica Theologia). Nonetheless, it does not appear that Bañez would admit to a fundamental disagreement with Cajetan on the nature of the sacra doctrina—broadly considered. Throughout his commentary on STh I, q. 1, Bañez refers to Cajetan’s commentary with respect and deference even where Bañez nuances matters differently. Bañez simply prefers to consider the reception and the necessity of sacra doctrina according to its scholastic-theological modality.35 Moreover, he does not admit to a real distinction between the theologia of the Church Fathers and the theologia of the Scholastic doctors.36

Francis Sylvius on Sacra Doctrina: A Theological Habitus

James A. Weisheipl observes that Francis Sylvius is “one of the first influential commentators to interpret and defend sacra doctrina as the habit of scholastic theology derived from principles of faith.”37 As noted above, Bañez does not appear to object to Cajetan’s notion of sacra doctrina broadly considered. Rather, Bañez prefers to investigate the sacra doctrina in its theologia-expression and as practiced by theologi. Like Bañez, Sylvius considers the sacra doctrina as theologia. Unlike Bañez, however, Sylvius explicitly rejects Cajetan’s view that the sacra doctrina is something broader and more inclusive than theologia. In this way, Sylvius sides materially with Bañez and breaks formally with Cajetan’s understanding of the sacra doctrina.

Sylvius investigates into the nature of sacra doctrina in the “first question” (“Quaeritur I”) of his commentary on the Prima pars of the Summa Theologiae.38 He begins with an acknowledgement of Cajetan’s view materially, but he does not explicitly cite Cajetan in this part of his commentary.39 Sylvius merely proposes one of the interpretations of sacra doctrina that Cajetan rejected: in the first question of the Summa Theologiae, sacra doctrina means theologia.40 Sylvius offers four reasons for his position.41 (1) His first reason takes into account what Aquinas actually does in STh I, q. 1. Sylvius notes that in the prologue to STh I, q. 1 (P-I-Q1), Aquinas says that the doctrina he will consider is sacra doctrina—“what it is [qualis sit], and those things to which it extends [ad quae se extendat].”42 He then points out that Aquinas does not explain sacra doctrina abstractly or in general in STh I, q. 1. Rather, STh I, q. 1 investigates theologia. Therefore, Aquinas does not present sacra doctrina as something abstracted from faith and theology, but rather as theology itself.43 In other words, Sylvius does not recognize any textual evidence in the first question of the Summa Theologiae that would support Cajetan’s view about the meaning of sacra doctrina. Aquinas does not speak of any “abstracted” meaning of sacra doctrina. Rather, what readers encounter in STh I, q. 1 is theology—in its robust scholastic form.44 Sylvius sees a detailed consideration of theologia in STh I, q. 1. Therefore, the sacra doctrina means theologia.

(2) Sylvius’s second reason starts with the conclusion of STh I, q. 1, a. 1 (i.e., “it is necessary to have sacra doctrina through revelation” beyond the “philosophical disciplines”). He looks at how this conclusion serves as the foundation for the development of Aquinas’s conception of sacra doctrina throughout the question’s subsequent articles.45 Sylvius argues that neither faith nor sacra doctrina (considered abstractly or in general) qualify as a scientia. Consequently, to argue that sacra doctrina is something abstracted from theology is problematic in light of STh I, q. 1, a. 2 where Aquinas concludes that sacra doctrina is a scientia.46 Moreover, if sacra doctrina is interpreted as something other than theology in STh I, q. 1, a. 1, then the series of following articles loses its coherence.47 If sacra doctrina is not theology, then the subsequent articles proving and exploring sacra doctrina’s unified scientific status would not follow from the preceding article. The types of questions that Aquinas’s raises in STh I, q. 1, aa. 2–8, particularly, are scientific questions. And because STh I, q. 1, a. 1 leads to STh I, q. 1, aa. 2–8, Sylvius believes that we ought to interpret the first article in light of the clearly scientific subsequent articles. Sacra doctrina as theology (i.e., a science) easily maps onto the analysis of STh I, q. 1, aa. 2–8. Sacra doctrina as something abstracted from theology does not. Therefore, sacra doctrina and theology are one and the same.

(3) Sylvius’s third argument for the equivalency of sacra doctrina and theology invokes the parallel between STh I, q. 1, a. 2 and Aquinas’s Expositio super Boetium de Trinitate.48 STh I, q. 1, a. 2 argues that sacra doctrina “proceeds from revealed principles,” and STh I, q. 1, aa. 7–8 argues that sacra doctrina receives as its principles the articles of the faith.49 In the Expositio super Boetium de Trinitate q. 2, a. 2, Aquinas observes that the conclusion of some things from other things already known belongs to the ratio of a science. And this discursive movement is applicable even to divine things (i.e., we can reason from divine things known). Therefore, “there is able to be a science of divine things.”50 The human person is able to reason from divine principles (that the human person holds in faith) to specific conclusions.51 This argument appears to be the weakest of the arguments that Sylvius puts forward. Although the themes discussed in the Expositio super Boetium de Trinitate certainly mirror themes found in STh I, q. 1, a. 2, Aquinas does not make explicit reference to theologia in either of these passages. Sylvius’s argument, then, appears to run thus: because the sacra doctrina is scientific, and theologia is scientific, therefore the sacra doctrina is theologia—with STh I, q. 1, a. 2 and Aquinas’s Expositio super Boetium de Trinitate q. 2, a. 2 providing essentially identical accounts of how a divine science works.

(4) Sylvius’s fourth reason follows a pattern similar to his third. In this case, he points to the beginning of Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences in which Aquinas advances the commanding priority of sacra doctrina that he advances in STh I, q. 1.52 In both the Commentary on the Sentences and in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas argues that sacra doctrina as a divine science can command (imperare) all other sciences. Sylvius concludes that this only applies to theology, properly speaking.

Sylvius is also aware of objections to his position. Although Sylvius does not explicitly cite Cajetan’s commentary on STh I, q. 1, he has evidently read Cajetan’s commentary. Sylvius turns his attention to one of the main reasons why Cajetan concludes that the sacra doctrina is not identical with theologia: if sacra doctrina is theologia, and if sacra doctrina is required (i.e., necessary) for salvation, then it would follow that persons would need to be theologians in order to be saved. This, clearly, is false. Simple and unlearned people can, certainly, arrive at God as their supernatural and salvific end. Sylvius responds that theologia not only comprises the knowledge of theological conclusions (notiam conclusionum Theologicae), but also the knowledge of the principles of theological doctrine—which are, of course, the articles of faith (notitiam articulorum Fidei). Admittedly, “non-theologians” (in the professional sense of the term) may not have a cognitive grasp of all of the theological conclusions latent in the articles of faith. Nonetheless, all believers—through the light of faith—possess the “first part of theology” (prima pars Theologiae): the articles of faith which are the first principles of theologia.53 In other words, every saved person possesses the principles of theology even if they have not worked out all of the implications these principles contain. Even the simple living in the light of faith are, secundum quid, “theologians.” Their knowledge of the first principles of theological science renders them “participants” in theologia. Moreover, most people come to knowledge of the faith through the doctrinal instruction of someone who is, at least, somewhat proficient in theological science.54 Sylvius concludes that even the parents and godparents who teach their children the mysteries of the faith participate in theologia really and truly (even if the parents and godparents are not theologi “absolutely” speaking [absolute]).55

John of St. Thomas on Sacra Doctrina: Scientific and Pre-Scientific Revealed Knowledge

Weisheipl observes that Cajetan, Bañez, and Sylvius all sought (albeit in different ways) to interpret sacra doctrina such that its meaning would remain unified throughout the articles of STh I, q. 1. “The first commentator,” however, who seemed “to deny the univocity of the term sacra doctrina in the first question [of the Summa Theologiae] is John of St. Thomas.”56 Gerald F. Van Ackeren, S.J., summarizes his position thus:

For him [John of St. Thomas] the term [sacra doctrina] has two senses. Its first meaning is any sort of knowledge, even probable knowledge, derived by reasoning from revealed truths. Its second meaning is certain knowledge deduced scientifically from formally revealed truths; in this sense he considers it [sacra doctrina] the same as theology.57

In his prologue to Question 1 of the Cursus Theologicus, John of St. Thomas introduces his readers to that which follows.58 He explains that he will investigate at greater length the precise meaning of sacra doctrina in the second disputation of his first question (titled: De scientia theologiae). Before he enters into the disputations, however, he directs the attention of his readers to a passage in Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics where doctrina and disciplina are linked to the “probative cognition of anything, whether scientifically or probably” (cognitionem probativam alicujus, sive scientifice, sive probabiliter).59 John of St. Thomas argues that Aquinas’s use of word doctrina in STh I, q. 1 reflects this broad meaning found in Aquinas’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (eodem modo sumit D. Thomas in praesenti doctrinam). Thus, doctrina does not mean “the cognition itself of faith which only provides the principles of this science.” Rather, doctrina refers to a cognition that is “probative” and that “deduces conclusions.” “And this,” John of St. Thomas concludes, “is called theology.”60

With regard to Aquinas’s de facto use of the word doctrina rather than theologia in STh I, q. 1, John of St. Thomas explains that Aquinas uses doctrina in the first article in a “general” sense (in genere). Subsequently, Aquinas considers whether this doctrina qualifies as a scientia or not (and, if it does so qualify, whether it is a speculative or a practical scientia). Aquinas, thus, deliberately chose to begin his analysis in STh I, q. 1, a. 1 with sacra doctrina rather than with theologia or scientia. John of St. Thomas explains that Aquinas would have been begging the question if he had begun with scientia (i.e., theologia) in STh I, q. 1, a. 1; because theology’s scientific status and qualities remain undemonstrated until he proceeds to STh I, q. 1, a. 2 and following.61

The preceding analysis is most interesting in the light of what we have considered above. Like Cajetan (and unlike Bañez), John of St. Thomas is overtly interested in the logical development of STh I, q. 1. And like Bañez (in practice) and Sylvius (in theory and in practice), John of St. Thomas wishes to maintain that the majority of the articles in STh I, q. 1 are about theologia—even in those places where the phrase sacra doctrina appears. While Cajetan proposes a meaning of sacra doctrina that is abstracted from faith and theology in order to unify—in a single line of argumentation—all of the articles in STh I, q. 1; John of St. Thomas suggests that a such a proposed unity would render Aquinas’s overall argument in STh I, q. 1 invalid. At the very least, John of St. Thomas believes that the first article bears a strong distinction from the others. If STh I, q. 1, a. 1 did not enjoy some real distinction from article 2 (and following), then Aquinas would fallaciously assume in STh I, q. 1, a. 1 what he has not yet proven until STh I, q. 1, a. 2. In sum, we find Cajetan and John of St. Thomas taking different positions for the same reason: the Posterior Analytics’ requirements concerning “logical sequence.”62 (We also note that Bañez is not concerned in his commentary on STh I, q. 1, with the methodological matters that preoccupy Cajetan and John of St. Thomas. This is not a critique of Bañez’s analysis. It is just a recognition of a difference in emphasis.)

Consequently, John of St. Thomas explains, “in the whole of this question [STh I, q. 1], St. Thomas treats two principal things: First, what this doctrina or scientia is. Second, those things to which it extends.”63 With regard to the first, John of St. Thomas identifies five elements that are primary: sacra doctrina’s (1) utility or necessity, (2) its certitude, (3) its speculative-practical nature, (4) its specific difference, and (5) its mode of proceeding.64 Second, Aquinas explores the subject of the doctrina (i.e., God) with regard to theological conclusions, the object of theology, and theological principles—all of which relate to and stand in order to God. Scripture also falls within this second aspect because the Bible contains the principles of theological science.65

John of St. Thomas begins his second disputation—“On the Science of Theology” (De scientia theologiae)—with explicit interest in the meaning Aquinas attributes to sacra doctrina in STh I, q. 1, a. 1.66 The remainder of the disputation, however, gives an overview of the dynamics of theologia rather than of sacra doctrina.67 The rational nature of theology receives emphasis throughout this article. John of St. Thomas thus accents the distinction between “natural theology, which is metaphysics” (est autem differentia inter theologiam naturalem, quae est metaphysica) and “Christian theology” (theologiam christianam).68 Natural theology proceeds in relation to God “through the mode of conclusion and not through the mode of principle” while Christian theology assumes God and “divine things” (de Deo et veritatibus divinis) as the principles from which theological ratiocination proceeds.69

Consequently, Aquinas employs the term “sacra doctrina” in STh I, q. 1, a. 1 because “doctrina” enjoys a vast broadness of meaning. As we saw above, John of St. Thomas explains that doctrina refers to the “probative cognition of anything, whether scientifically or probably.” Thus, in STh I, q. 1, a. 2 (and following), Aquinas unpacks the scientific structures of theologia that lie virtually (yet really) in the general cognition of STh I, q. 1, a. 1’s necessary doctrina. John of St. Thomas explains that the ratio of the word doctrina comprises elements requisite for probative knowledge (i.e., scientia). “Hence it is clear that by the name sacra doctrina is understood the probative cognition from revelated things.” The revelation which the believer receives through faith is called “sacred cognition” (cognitio sacra). And this sacred, revealed cognition leads to conclusions demonstrated from this sacred knowledge. Thus, John of St. Thomas understands the sacra doctrina as revealed cognition that leads to probable or scientific proof.

John of St. Thomas illumines the nuances between (and the relations among) sacra doctrina, faith, and theologia. Sacra doctrina is a revealed cognition of a “probative” nature (cognitio probativa).70 Faith is the non-probative reception of those things formally and immediately revealed.71 Faith is the “cognition of divine realities”—immediately revealed yet retaining obscurity.72 Theology, thus, refers not only to a probative cognition in the general sense of sacra doctrina. It also refers to the process of logically rigorous, scientific reasoning to conclusions from God and those things he reveals.73 It is a deductively mediate, “scientific cognition” (cognitio scientifica).74

We note with particular interest, that John of St. Thomas frames his understanding of the sacra doctrina around sacra doctrina’s broad, abstracted relation to the (probable or scientific) proof drawn from the articles of faith.75 Sacra doctrina comprises the articles of the faith. One receives sacra doctrina through faith. This abstracted conception of the sacra doctrina bears resemblance to Cajetan’s earlier conception of the sacra doctrina as notionally broader than—though comprising—faith and theology. A difference between Cajetan and John of St. Thomas lies in the latter’s seeming emphasis upon the scientific formality latent in sacra doctrina (already in STh I, q. 1, a. 1) and subsequently unpacked in STh I, q. 1, a. 2. John of St. Thomas highlights sacra doctrina as scientia from the very beginning.76 Cajetan prefers to allow the latent scientific nature of sacra doctrina to remain latent in his commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1. Consequently, contrary to what some have said about Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, it would appear that the positions of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas are not in essential tension (even if their respective emphases are different).77 John of St. Thomas simply says that in its common usage, we speak of sacra doctrina with regard to scientific certainty—and this resembles theologia.78 This sentiment and conclusion would not appear to run contrary to the fundamentals of Cajetan’s analysis.79

Garrigou-Lagrange on Sacra Doctrina: Sacra Theologia

As noted above, Garrigou-Lagrange’s understanding of sacra doctrina receives inspiration from John of St. Thomas and Sylvius.80 He argues that sacra doctrina as “theology in the strict sense… seems be the more true answer” to the question: what is sacra doctrina? Garrigou-Lagrange does note, however, that STh I, q. 1, a. 1 “is concerned more [than subsequent articles] with sacred doctrine in general.”81 Indeed, he characterizes STh I, q. 1, a. 1 thus: “It is not as yet scientific theology but sacred doctrine according as it abstracts from faith and theology that is the subject matter of the body of the first article.”82

Regardless, “immediately from the second article it [i.e., STh I, q. 1] is strictly a discussion of sacred science as distinguished from faith. Gradually St. Thomas passes from the confused to the distinct notion of this science.”83 Thus, Garrigou-Lagrange begins his commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 2 proper by remarking: “From this title [a. 2: ‘Utrum Sacra Doctrina sit Scientia’] we see that it is now not merely a question of sacred doctrine in general according as it abstracts from faith and theology, but it is a question of theology as a science.”84 Consequently, he explains the scientific nature of the sacra doctrina: “Sacred doctrine, that is sacred theology, is a science, but it is a science that is subordinated to a higher science possessed by God.”85 In other words, “sacred theology proceeds from principles transmitted by God through revelation. Therefore sacred theology is a science subordinated to the science of God and the blessed.”86

With regard to the distinct habitus of sacra doctrina as sacred theology, Garrigou-Lagrange explains that “in the theologian as wayfarer, theology is substantially a true science (and is neither opinion nor faith), because its conclusions are reducible to evident principles.” Nonetheless, sacred theology is “a science that is imperfect, not in itself but because it is in the initial stage of its development.” Sacred theology is thus scientifically perfect considered objectively, but it remains habitually imperfect subjectively. “Hence, the theology of the wayfarer is a true science, but it is imperfect as to its status.”87 Only the sacred theology of the beati in heaven is perfect as to its status.

In sum, Garrigou-Lagrange does not investigate the nominal definition of sacra doctrina at great length in his commentary on STh I, q. 1. His remarks on the meaning of sacra doctrina, however, fall in line with those of Cajetan, Bañez, Sylvius, and John of St. Thomas. Like Cajetan, he acknowledges a broad meaning of sacra doctrina in STh I, q. 1, a. 1. And like Bañez, Sylvius, and John of St. Thomas, he devotes most of his attention to the scientific extension of the sacra doctrina. Garrigou-Lagrange emphasizes the identification of sacra doctrina and sacred theology throughout his commentary on STh I, q. 1. In this way, his commentary attempts to place the essential insights of Cajetan and of John of St. Thomas in dialogue with the concerns about theological method that preoccupied the theologians of the early-twentieth century.88

The analysis of the Thomists on the nature of sacra doctrina is still important today for numerous reasons. Supremely, of course, because sacra doctrina is necessary for human salvation (STh I, q. 1. a, 1). Sacra doctrina is also of paramount importance for Christian theologians precisely as theologians. Effective work in theology—both academically and, more importantly, spiritually—presupposes that theologians understand the form and method of their sacred discipline—a discipline rooted in the disciplina of sacra doctrina.


  1. For more on the history of the Thomist commentators, see Frederick J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School (Dubuque, IA: The Priory Press, 1964); James A. Weisheipl, O.P., “The Revival of Thomism as a Christian Philosophy,” in New Themes in Christian Philosophy, ed. Ralph M. McInerny (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 164–213; Gerald A. McCool, From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989); Isabel Iribarren, “‘Responsio secundum Thomam’ and the Search for an Early Thomistic School,” Vivarium 39, no. 2 (2001): 255–96; Romanus Cessario, O.P., A Short History of Thomism (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003); Géry Prouvost, Thomas d’Aquin et les thomismes (Paris: Cerf, 2007); Romanus Cessario, O.P., and Cajetan Cuddy, O.P., Thomas and the Thomists: The Achievement of Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2017). For an overview of negative reactions to the Thomistic school, see Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P., “Qu’est-ce que l’antithomisme?,” Revue thomiste 108, no. 1 (2008): 9–38.↩︎

  2. With regard to our in-text citations of Aquinas’s writings (e.g., the Summa Theologiae, the Summa contra Gentiles, De Veritate), we have chosen to abbreviate the title of the work (e.g., “STh”) when we invoke a particular passage within the work (e.g., “STh I, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1”). When we refer to the work as a literary whole, however, we employ the title (e.g., “Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae explains the necessity of sacra doctrina in STh I, q. 1, a. 1”).↩︎

  3. Emmanuel Doronzo (1903–76) also wrote an extensive treatment of the “existence,” “essence,” and “division” of sacred theology (Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I., Theologia Dogmatica: Vol. 1 – Introductio in Universam Theologiam, De Revelatione, De Locis Theologicis, De Deo Uno [Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 1966], 4–92). Although Doronzo’s study of theology also adverts to secondary and commentatorial literature on STh I, q. 1, we have chosen to employ Garrigou-Lagrange in this section rather than Doronzo because the latter’s project is more synthetic rather than strictly expositional and interpretive.↩︎

  4. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., The One God: A Commentary on the First Part of St. Thomas’ Theological Summa, trans. Dom. Bede Rose, O.S.B. (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Co., 1943), 38.↩︎

  5. Ibid. Although Garrigou-Lagrange does not include the full citation from Cajetan, it appears in Cajetan’s commentary on Aquinas’s prologus of Summa Theologiae: “Novitiis namque opus hoc convenire dicitur, non ratione facilitatis, aut superficialis aut epilogalis aut introductorii tractatus; sed ratione sectarum superfluitatum, omissae repititionis, et pulcherrimi ordinis ab ipso inventi; ut enim in processu apparet, omnes theologales difficultates, et ex propriis, hic distincte tractantur” (Cajetan, commentary on the prologue to the Summa theologiae). Emphasis added.

    In his prefatory meditatio on this same passage from Aquinas, the sixteenth-century commentator Domingo Bañez acknowledges Cajetan’s precedent as a commentator on Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. Moreover, Bañez echoes what Cajetan says about Aquinas’s engagement with “all theological problems”: “Quae methodus in Scholasticis quaestionibus servanda sit, videlicet, ut inutilia argumenta, eorumque sophistica multiplicatio omnino vitetur: deinde ut verae disciplinae ordo servetur, ut omnis Theologica difficultas proprio loco examinetur et definiatur: et tandem breviter ac delicude, (quae res difficillima est) universa prosequatur, quantum possibile fuerit pro ipsius materiae, de qua agitur, dignitate” (“Fratris Dominici Bañes in D. Thomae Proemium – Meditatio” in Domingo Bañez, Scholastica Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae S. Thomae AquinatisDe Deo Uno [Valencia: Biblioteca de Tomistas Españoles, 1934], 2–7 at 2). Emphasis added.↩︎

  6. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, 38.↩︎

  7. Garrigou-Lagrange, however, does refer to “Christian doctrine” (doctrinae christianae) in his commentary: “Since Holy Scripture includes the order of charity or of the subjection of all affections to God’s love, a logical order must also be pursued in the body of Christian doctrine” (ibid., 38).↩︎

  8. Cajetan speaks of “theologales difficultates” (appears one time) and “theologia” (appears one time) in his commentary on STh-P.↩︎

  9. Bañez, “Meditatio,” 2–7. These commentaries of Cajetan, Bañez, and Garrigou-Lagrange are unique insofar as many other commentaries of renown and influence did not comment explicitly or discretely on STh-P. For example, the seventeenth-century Cursus Theologicus of the Carmelite Salmanticenses begins with an “Oratio Exhortatoria” in praise of the person and work of Aquinas (“Pro Doctoris Angelici Doctrinae Commendatione, ad ejusque amorem, et venerationem, oratio exhortatoria,” in Cursus Theologicus, vol. 1 [Paris: Palme, 1870], pp. v–xx). The focus in the prefatory sections of this Cursus, rather, is on the “doctrina Divi Thomae.” For example, in the “Ad lectorem” of the Cursus Theologicus, we read: “En, studiose Lector, post cursum Artium a Religiosissimo nostro Collegio Complutensi Patrum Discalceatorum B. Mariae de Monte Carmeli diligentissime elaboratum, doctrina Divi Thomae, undequaque refertum, et non nisi Angelicum Doctorem passim eructantem, cursum alterum, nempe Theologicum, juxta miram ejusdem Sanctissimi Praeceptoris doctrinam tibi offerimus” (ibid., xxi). Emphasis added. In their commentaries on the Summa Theologiae, Jean-Baptiste Gonet (1616–1681) and Charles-René Billuart (1685–1757) also do not comment on STh-P and refer more consistently to sacra theologia rather than to sacra doctrina. We do note, however, that Billuart titles the “Dissertatio Prooemialis” of his Cursus Theologiae: “De sacra doctrina seu theologia” (Summa Sancti Thomae hodiernis academiarum moribus accommodata sive Cursus Theologiae juxta mentem Divi Thomae insertis pro re nata digressionibus in historiam ecclesiasticam, vol. 1 [Paris: Lecoffre, 1895], 1). This title signals the fundamental equivalency between sacra doctrina and theology that Billuart presupposes in his Cursus Theologiae.↩︎

  10. “Sancto Doctori propositum fuit in eo Opere [sic], quod Summa Theologica meritissime vocatur, ea quae ad Sacram Doctrinam pertinent breviter ac dilucide prosequi secundum quod patitur, & prout congruit ad eruditionem incipientium, quemadmodum ipsemet intentionem aperit in Prologo toti Summae praefixo…. [O]mnia, quae in Sacra Doctrina pertractantur, considerantur sub ratione Dei” (Commentarii in Totam Primam Partem S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici et Communis, vol. 1 [Venice: Balleoniana, 1726], 1). Emphasis added, but capitalizations and the use of small capitalization reflect the original text. For more on the Sylvius’s significance for and influence among the Thomistic commentators of the seventeenth century, see Joseph C. Fenton, “The Opusculum “De Motione Primi Motoris” by Francis Sylvius,” The New Scholasticism 13, no. 3 (1939): 216–232.↩︎

  11. Recent studies of the history of Lombard’s Sentences include the books of Philipp W. Rosemann: Peter Lombard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s Sentences (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). See also Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1994). For a recent account of the influence the Sentences exercised on the thought and writing of Alexander of Hales, see Hubert Philipp Weber, “The Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum by Alexander of Hales,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 79–108. Weber’s essay is particularly helpful for its opening section which provides a history of scholarship on Alexander’s writings (and those attributed to him). See also Cullen, “Alexander of Hales,” 104–9. Cullen’s essay suggests that the link Garrigou-Lagrange presupposes in this passage between Peter Lombard’s Sentences and Alexander of Hales is justified: “[Alexander] steered scholasticism in a more systematic direction with his momentous decision to use the Sentences of Peter Lombard as the basic textbook for treating the whole of theology” (ibid., 104).↩︎

  12. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, 39.↩︎

  13. “From the beginning of this question he [Aquinas] supposes the nominal definition of sacred doctrina, in which the object of this latter is expressed at least in a confused manner. After this, gradually and methodically, he makes the transition from the nominal to the real and scientific definition, which is completed in the seventh article, in which he speaks explicitly of the proper subject of this science” (ibid.).↩︎

  14. “As to the arrangement of these articles, the objection might be raised that St. Thomas ought to have treated of the subject or object of sacred doctrine before he discussed its nature and excellence, because the nature of a science depends upon its object. In answer to this it must be said that from the very beginning of this question he [Aquinas] supposes the nominal definition of sacred doctrine, in which the object of this latter is expressed at least in a confused manner. After this, gradually and methodically, he makes the transition from the nominal to the real and scientific definition, which is completed in the seventh article, in which he speaks explicitly of the proper subject of this science” (ibid.).↩︎

  15. Ibid.↩︎

  16. “Dicendum est quod sacra doctrina neque sumitur pro fide, ut distinguitur contra theologiam; neque pro theologia, ut distinguitur contra fidem: sed sumitur pro cognitione a Deo revelata, sive formaliter sive virtualiter, ut habet rationem disciplinae et doctrinae, abstrahendo a ratione crediti et sciti” (Cajetan’s commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1, no. vi).↩︎

  17. Hieromonk Gregory Hrynkiw, Cajetan on Sacred Doctrine (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2020), 24–25.↩︎

  18. “Circa hanc conclusionem dubium statim occurrit, quid intelligatur hic nomine sacrae doctrinae seu disciplinae. Aut enim intelligitur fides, aut theologia. Si fides, sequuntur duo inconvenientia” (commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1, no. v). Emphasis original.↩︎

  19. “Primum est, quod idem bis quaereretur: nam in iia iiae, qu. ii, art. 3, quaeretur an credere aliquid supernaturale sit necessarium ad salute” (ibid.).↩︎

  20. “Consideravimus namque huius doctrinae novitios, in his quae a diversis conscripta sunt, plurimum impediri, partim quidem propter multiplicationem inutilium quaestionum, articulorum et argumentorum; partim etiam quia ea quae sunt necessaria talibus ad sciendum, non traduntur secundum ordinem disciplinae, sed secundum quod requirebat librorum expositio, vel secundum quod se praebebat occasio disputandi; partim quidem quia eorundem frequens repetitio et fastidium et confusionem generabat in animis auditorum” (STh-P). Emphasis added.↩︎

  21. “Secundum est, quod aequivoce sumitur sacra doctrina in hoc et in sequentibus articulis: nam constat quod in eis non sumitur pro fide” (commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1, no. v).↩︎

  22. “Si theologia, sequeretur quod fides absque theologia non sufficeret ad salutem hominis: quod est falsum. Sequela patet: quia in littera dicitur quod illa doctrina est necessaria ad salute humanam. Falsitas vero consequentis et ex se patet, et ex ratione in littera assignata convincitur: quia scilicet homo potest intentiones et actiones suas per fidei cognitionem in finem supernaturalem dirigere” (commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1, no. v). Aquinas explicitly references the role of faith in the sacra doctrina in STh I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet ea quae sunt altiora hominis cognitione, non sint ab homine per rationem inquirenda, sunt tamen, a Deo revelata, suscipienda per fidem. Unde et ibidem subditur, plurima supra sensum hominum ostensa sunt tibi. Et in huiusmodi sacra doctrina consistit.” Emphasis added.↩︎

  23. Jean-Baptiste Gonet expresses words of appreciation for Cajetan’s interpretation of the sacra doctrina: “Huic dubitationi et difficultati respondet doctissimus ille Cardinalis [Cajetantus], quem sequuntur plures ex nostris Thomistis, sacram doctrinam non accipi a D. Thoma in primo articulo hujus quaestionis, nec pro fide pracise sumpta, nec pro Theologia praecise, sed pro sacra doctrina ut sic, prout praescindit a fide et a Theologia, et est aliquid commune et superius ad utramque… Haec Responsio et doctrina valde probabilism est” (“Disputatio Prooemilais de Natura et Qualitatibus Theologiae,” in Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae contra Novos ejus Impugnatores, vol. 1 [Paris: Vivès, 1875], a. 10, no. XCI, p. 73). Likewise, Billuart acknowledges that Cajetan’s anlaysis of STh I, q. 1 is a “probable” position (haec sententia probabilis) (“De Sacra Doctrina,” a. 2, p. 4).↩︎

  24. “Cognitio enim qua egemus ad salutem, prout a Deo docente in homine suscipitur, doctrina est et disciplina, iuxta illud Ioan. vi: Omnis qui au divit a Patre et didicit, venit ad me. Et de hac dicitur in conclusione hac, quod est necessaria ad salutem. Et quoniam cognitio huiusmodi, ut disciplina est revelata, abstrahit a ratione credendi et sciendi; et a ratione revelati formaliter, idest in seipso, et virtualiter, idest in suis principiis: ideo hoc in loco, ubi de doctrina revelata praeter physicas disciplinas quaeritur, ad nullum horum licet determinate descendere” (commentary on STh I, q. 1, a. 1, no. vi). James A. Weisheipl summarizes Cajetan’s position thus: “Cajetan therefore concludes that in article one, ‘sacred doctrine’ is not to be taken to mean ‘faith’ as opposed to theology, nor ‘theology’ as distinguished from faith, but rather knowledge (cognitio) revealed by God, either formally or virtually, abstracting from its aspect of being believed or scientifically known (a ratione crediti et sciti)” (James A. Weisheipl, O.P., “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I, q. 1,” The Thomist 38, no. 1 [1974]: 49–80 at 56). “In other words, for Cajetan, sacra doctrina in article one is a generic term abstracted from its specific applications as ‘faith’ and as ‘theology’; subsequent articles use the term as contracted to one of its species, namely ‘theology’” (ibid., 57).↩︎

  25. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, 39.↩︎

  26. Sacra doctrina “meaning theology in the strict sense… seems to be the true answer, although, of course, the first article is concerned more with sacred doctrine in general. But immediately from the second article it is strictly a discussion of sacred science as distinguished from faith. Gradually St. Thomas passes from the confused to the distinct notion of science” (ibid.).↩︎

  27. As noted above, Domingo Bañez lived from 1528–1604 and Francis Sylvius from 1581–1649. John of St. Thomas lived from 1589–1644.↩︎

  28. Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina,” 57.↩︎

  29. Ibid., 57–58.↩︎

  30. Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina,” 58.↩︎

  31. Theologia, quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinet, differt secundum genus ab alia Theologia, quae pars Philosophiae positur, scilicet Metaphysica. Ratio hujus est. Quia Metaphysica agit de ipso Deo secundum quod naturali lumine cognoscibilis est; Theologia vero nostra considerat Deum secundum quod lumine divinae revelationis cognoscitur…. Adverte, doctrinam revelatam dici, quae humano ingenio non est adinventa, sed sola divina revelatione tradita” (Bañez, In Primam Partem, I, q. 1, a. 1, p. 9). Emphasis added.↩︎

  32. Ibid., 11–13.↩︎

  33. “Antequam ad graviroes disputationes accedamus, quaedam praesertim pro novitiis Theologis sunt animadvertenda…. Theologiam juxta proprietatem vocis idem esse, atque sermonem de Deo vel divinarum rerum rationem peritiam. Unde Theologus est rerum divinarum peritus: ejusque officium est de Deo speculari et loqui; et de caeteris rebus quatenus a Deo sunt et ad illum tendunt” (ibid., 9).↩︎

  34. “Unde, jam Theologus, qui hujus doctrinae sacrae disciplinam profiteri parat, consideret semetipsum in alium mundum invisibilem transferendum esse et quasi alteri Paulo ab oculis naturales squamas auferendas, ut videat regnum Dei” (ibid.).↩︎

  35. “Nota quod quanvis Cajetanus articulo praecedenti dixerit, quod nomine sacrae doctrinae non intellexerit D. Thomas fidem determinate, vel determinate Theologiam, sed indifferenter acceperit pro doctrina revelata immediate, qualis est fides; vel mediate, qualis est Theologia; nihilominus jam in hoc articulo sacra doctrina verificatur non de fide, sed de doctrina, quae inclinat ad assensum conclusionum, quae ex principiis fidei deducuntur. Habet enim se fides respectu hujus doctrinae, sicut habitus primorum principiorum ad scientias naturales” (Bañez, In Primam Partem, I, q. 1, a. 2, pp. 18–19).↩︎

  36. “Scholastica Theologia prout in Ecclesia Dei a tempore Magistri Sententiarum usque in praesentem diem addiscitur et tenetur, necessaria est ea necessitate…. Quoniam scholastica Theologia non differt a Theologia sanctorum Patrum, quantum ad substantiam, sed solum differt quantum ad modum compendiosum et ad disciplinae artem magis redactum, ut jam Theologus quasi in numerato habere possit omnia rerum capita et argumenta, quibus Catholica doctrina et explicari et ab haereticis defendi possit…. Ecclesia Christi praesto sint doctores, qui subtiliter et erudite ac breviter respondeant haereticorum argutiis, eosque fortiter revincant” (Bañez, In Primam Partem, I, q. 1, a. 1, p. 14).↩︎

  37. Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina,” 58.↩︎

  38. Sylvius structures his commentary on the questions and articles of the Summa Theologiae around additional questions that he proposes (e.g., “Quaeritur I: Quid B. Thomas hic intelligat per Doctrinam Sacram”). Therefore, in our citations of Sylvius’s commentary, we have included his “Quaeritur” number in addition to corresponding page numbers.↩︎

  39. “Videtur quod [B. Thomas] non intelligat Theologiam, sed doctrinam revelatam in communi, abstrahendo a Fide & Theologia: quia docet, Sacram Doctrinam de qua disputat esse ad salutem necessariam: Theologia vero non est ad salutem necessaria” (Sylvius, Commentarii in Totam Primam Partem, question 1, a. 1, “Quaeritur I,” p. 2).↩︎

  40. “Per Sacram Doctrinam B. Thomam hic intellexisse Theologiam, hoc est eam doctrinam de Deo rebusque divinis, quae articulis Fidei tamquam principiis innititur, & ex eis conclusions deducit” (ibid.). We note that Sylvius’s reference to principles and to conclusions deduced from the principles places his position within the strictly Aristotelian conception of scientia (and, subsequently, the sacra doctrina as a scientia in STh I, q. 1, a. 2).↩︎

  41. Van Ackeren notes that all four of Sylvius’s “arguments are really concerned only with the meaning of sacred doctrine in the first article of the Summa. They suppose, however, that the term is used in the same sense throughout the first question” (Sacra Doctrina, 26).↩︎

  42. “Et ut intentio nostra sub aliquibus certis limitibus comprehendatur, necessarium est primo investigare de ipsa sacra doctrina, qualis sit, et ad quae se extendat. Circa quae quaerenda sunt decem. Primo, de necessitate huius doctrinae. Secundo, utrum sit scientia. Tertio, utrum sit una vel plures. Quarto, utrum sit speculativa vel practica. Quinto, de comparatione eius ad alias scientias. Sexto, utrum sit sapientia. Septimo, quid sit subiectum eius. Octavo, utrum sit argumentativa. Nono, utrum uti debeat metaphoricis vel symbolicis locutionibus. Decimo, utrum Scriptura sacra huius doctrinae sit secundum plures sensus exponenda” (P-I-Q1).↩︎

  43. i. Quia de ea doctrina hic loquitur, de qua hujus q. proœm. dixit necessarium esse, primo investigare de ipsa Sacra Doctrina qualis sit & ad quae se extendat: non investigat autem hac i. q. de Sac. Doctr. abstractim & in genere qualis sit & ad quae se extendat, sed de Theologia; ergo non loquitur de Doctrina Sacra abstractim a Fide & Theologia, sed de Theologia” (Sylvius, Commentarii in Totam Primam Partem, question 1, a. 1, “Quaeritur I,” p. 2).↩︎

  44. In this way, Sylvius’s interpretation of STh I, q. 1 anticipates the interpretation that T. C. O’Brien would later advance in his 1977 essay: “‘Sacra Doctrina’ Revisited: The Context of Medieval Education,” The Thomist 41, no. 4 (1977): 475–509. We do note at this point, however, that Sylvius’s argument proceeds from a strictly textual and speculative starting point that does not include the historical analysis that O’Brien marshals in defense of their shared position.↩︎

  45. “Dum hoc art. i concludit, prater Philosophicas disciplinas necessariam esse Sacram Doctrinam per revelationem haberi; loquitur de ea Sacra Doctrina, quam art. 2. revolvit esse scientiam, eamque unam art. 3. & omnibus aliis scientiis digniorem art. 5. & argumentativam art. 8. Manifestum est autem, quod in istis art. loquatur de Theologia; ergo & in hoc i, art” (ibid.).↩︎

  46. “Neque Fides neque Sacra Doctrina abstractim & in genere considerate est secundum se scientia…. Nam Theologia est scientia” (ibid., pp. 2–3).↩︎

  47. “Si autem in art. i per Sacram Doctrinam non intelligeretur Theologia, sed doctrina revelata in genere sive abstractim sumpta; series articulorum nequaquam cohaereret: de doctrina enim revelata sic abstracte sumpta dici nequit, quod sit scientia, eaque una; argumentativa &c. cum secundum se neque fit scientia neque argumentativa: sed sub se comprehendat duo; quorum unum est scientia, & quidem argumentativa; alterum vero nec scientia est, nec argumentativa” (ibid., p. 3).↩︎

  48. “Doctrinam Sacram vocat B. Thomas eam, quae procedit ex principiis revelatis, art. 2. & quae pro suis principiis habet articulos Fidei, art. 7. & 8. conformiter iis, quae scribit Opusc. 70. q. 2. art. 2, argui sola Theologia procedit ex principiis a Deo revelatis, habetque articulos Fidei pro suis principiis; ergo per Sacram Doctrinam intelligit Theologiam” (ibid.). Sylvius cites “Opusc. 70, q. 2 art. 2.” According to the Editio Piana numbering, this corresponds to Aquinas’s commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius (see Raymund A. Verardo, O.P., “Editoris Introductio Generalis in Omnia D. Thomae Opuscula,” in Opuscula Theologica: Volumen I. De Re Dogmatica et Morali, by Thomas Aquinas [Torino: Marietti, 1954], v–xvi at xv).↩︎

  49. “Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum” (STh I, q. 1, a. 2). “Unde sequitur quod Deus vere sit subiectum huius scientiae. Quod etiam manifestum fit ex principiis huius scientiae, quae sunt articuli fidei, quae est de Deo, idem autem est subiectum principiorum et totius scientiae, cum tota scientia virtute contineatur in principiis” (STh I, q. 1, a. 7). “Sicut aliae scientiae non argumentantur ad sua principia probanda, sed ex principiis argumentantur ad ostendendum alia in ipsis scientiis; ita haec doctrina non argumentatur ad sua principia probanda, quae sunt articuli fidei” (STh I, q. 1, a. 8).↩︎

  50. “Dicendum quod cum ratio scientiae consistat in hoc quod ex aliquibus notis alia necessario concludantur, hoc autem de divinis contingat, constat quod de divinis potest esse scientia” (Expositio super Boetium de Trinitate, q. 2, a. 2).↩︎

  51. “Et sicut Deus ex hoc, quod cognoscit se, cognoscit alia modo suo, id est simplici intuitu, non discurrendo, ita nos ex his, quae per fidem capimus primae veritati adhaerendo, venimus in cognitionem aliorum secundum modum nostrum discurrendo de principiis ad conclusiones, ut sic ipsa, quae fide tenemus, sint nobis quasi principia in hac scientia et alia sint quasi conclusiones. Ex quo patet quod haec scientia est altior illa scientia divina, quam philosophi tradiderunt, cum ex altioribus procedat principiis” (ibid.).↩︎

  52. “Init. I Sent. ubi eundem articulum proposuit quem hic proponit; resolvit, oportere esse aliquam doctrinam, quae ex Fidei principiis procedat, eamque dicit imperare omnibus aliis scientiis, & uti his quae in aliis traduntur: hac autem nulli convenient nisi Theologiae” (Sylvius, Commentarii in Totam Primam Partem, q. 1, a. 1, “Quaeritur I,” p. 2).↩︎

  53. “Quia Theologia non solum est notitia conclusionum Theologicarum, sed etiam complectitur notitiam articulorum Fidei, qui sunt principia doctrinae Theologicae; horum autem articulorum notitia non habetur nisi per Fidem: & propterea dum finis supernaturalis innotescit per Fidem; non innotescit abseque Theologia, sed per cognitionem principiorum Theologicorum, quae cognitio est prima pars Theologiae” (ibid.).↩︎

  54. “Quia ut Deus, quatenus est finis supernaturalis, & alii articuli Fidei hominibus innotescant, necesse est, aliquam doctrinam sive instructionem exterius adhiberi; nam juxta Apostolum ad Rom. 10. Fides est ex auditu: non possunt autem doceri mysteria Fidei, ne quidem ruditer & imperfecte, nisi per eos, qui vel doctrinam Theologicam callent, vel saltem aliquid de ea participant. Quapropter quod in argumento dicebatur, multos consequi salutem sine adjumento Theologiae; negandum est: quamvis enim multi eam consequantur, qui absolute non sunt Theologi, non tamen consequuntur sine adjumento Theologiae eorum qui ipsos instruunt, neque sine lumen Fidei, quod ad Theologiam pertinet tamquam notificans ejus principia” (ibid.).↩︎

  55. “Si dicas: Hinc sequi, parentes & patrinos, qui suos filios aliquando sic instruunt de articulis fidei, ut illi filii nullos audient vel Doctores vel Praedicatores; esse Theologos. Resp. Non sequi quod sint absolute Theologi, sed bene quod aliquid de vera Theologia participent” (ibid.). Weisheipl summarizes Sylvius’s position: “Although the whole perfection of ‘theology’ is not necessary for salvation, some part of it is necessary. This part of theology, namely, the principles revealed by God (faith), is necessary for salvation; therefore ‘theology’ is necessary for salvation. It is not necessary for mankind to know revealed truth as principles of theology but only to know them in themselves” (Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina,” 58). Emphasis original.↩︎

  56. Ibid., 59. Weisheipl here echoes Van Ackeren’s assessment: “John of St. Thomas (1589–1644) is the first of the great commentators on the Summa to deny the univocity of the term sacra doctrina in the first question” (Gerald F. Van Ackeren, S.J., Sacra Doctrina: The Subject of the First Question of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, with an introduction by Yves M. J. Congar, O.P. [Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1952], 29). For a recent English translation of John of St. Thomas on sacra doctrina, see John of St. Thomas [Poinsot] on Sacred Science: Cursus Theologicus I, Question 1, Disputation, trans. John P. Doyle, ed. Victor M. Salas (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2023).↩︎

  57. Van Ackeren, Sacra Doctrina, 29.↩︎

  58. “Quid nomine sacrae doctrinae intelligat D. Thomas, dicemus in disputatione secunda prooemiali. Sufficit in praesenti advertere, quod nomine doctrinae et disciplinae intelligit Aristoteles (I Post. c. 1; lect. 1, apud D. Thomam) cognitionem probativam alicujus sive scientifice, sive probabiliter. Et eodem modo sumit D. Thomas in praesenti doctrinam, non pro ipsa cognitione fidei quae solum praebet principia huic scientiae, sed de cognitione probativa et quae deducit aliquas conclusions: et haec vocatur theologia. Sed utitur nomine doctrinae in genere, quia de hac doctrina inquiret postea an sit scientia vel non, speculativa vel practica, etc.: et ideo non debuit uti nomine scientiae, quia sic praesupponeret id quod debebat inquirere” (John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, ed. Benedictine Monks of Solesmes, vol. 1 [Paris: Desclée, 1931], prol. to q. 1, p. 305). Emphasis original. We also note that neither Weisheipl nor Van Ackeren cite this prologue in their considerations of John of St. Thomas’s understanding of sacra doctrina. We find this prologue helpful because it provides, in a concise form, an overview of the presuppositions, approach, and method that John of St. Thomas deploys in his two Cursus Theologicus disputes that bear on STh I, q. 1.↩︎

  59. Aquinas’s exact words are as follows: “Non autem accipitur hic doctrina et disciplina secundum quod se habent ad acquisitionem scientiae tantum, sed ad acquisitionem cognitionis cuiuscumque. Quod patet, quia manifestat hanc propositionem etiam in disputativis et rhetoricis disputationibus, per quas non acquiritur scientia. Propter quod etiam non dicit ex praeexistenti scientia vel intellectu, sed universaliter cognitione. Addit autem intellectiva ad excludendum acceptionem cognitionis sensitivae vel imaginativae. Nam procedere ex uno in aliud rationis est solum” (In Post. Anal., c. 1, lect. 1). Emphasis added.↩︎

  60. “Et eodem modo sumit D. Thomas in praesenti doctrinam, non pro ipsa cognitione fidei quae solum praebet principia huic scientiae, sed de cognitione probativa et quae deducit aliquas conclusions: et haec vocatur theologia” (Cursus Theologicus, prol. to q. 1, p. 305).↩︎

  61. “Sed utitur nomine doctrinae in genere, quia de hac doctrina inquiret postea an sit scientia vel non, speculativa vel practica, etc.: et ideo non debuit uti nomine scientiae, quia sic praesupponeret id quod debebat inquirere” (ibid.). See also, ibid., q. 1, disp. 2, a. 1, no. 5.↩︎

  62. We invoke here, again, Weisheipl’s phrase (see Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina,” 57).↩︎

  63. “In toto textu hujus quaestionis tractat D. Thomas duo principalia. Primo, qualis sit ista doctrina seu scientia. Secundo, ad quae se extendat” (ibid.).↩︎

  64. Et ad primum, qualitas istius doctrinae consideratur ex quinque praecipuis condicionibus ad eam requisitis. Primas est utilitas, seu necessitas hujus doctrinae; quod pertinet ad quaestionem an est. Secunda est certitudo, qua discernitur ista doctrina ab opinione et cognitione incerta, et constituitur in ratione scientiae; pertinetque quasi ad genus remotum. Tertia pertinet ad genus magis propinquum: an videlicet sit practica, vel speculativa. Quarta pertinet ad differentiam specificam: an sit una specie, et an sit sapientia. Quinta pertinet ad modum procedendi: an sit argumentativa. De primis quatuor condicionibus agit D. Thomas sex prioribus articulis, de quina auten in articulo octavo” (ibid., 305–6). Emphasis original.↩︎

  65. Quantum ad secundum, considerat subjectum istius doctrinae, quod est Deus, tam quoad ea quae se habent ut conclusions, et se habent ut objectum theologiae, quam quoad ea quae se habent ut principia, et continentur ut credita in sacra Scriptura. Et de subjecto circa quod theologia versatur, agit articulo septimo, ostendens quod est Deus, et quidquid ad Deum dicit ordinem. De principiis vero, scilicet de contentis in sacra Scriptura, et de ejus sensibus ac metaphoris, ut inde nobis constare possit quidnam liquido de fide et litteraliter sit contentum in Scriptura, agit articulo nono et decimo” (ibid., 306).↩︎

  66. “Primum quod se offert investigandum circa scientiam theologiae, est id quod pertinet ad ejus necessitate: de qua agit Div. Thomas in hac quaestione (art. 1) sub nomine sacrae doctrinae” (ibid., q. 1, disp. 2, a. 1, no. 1, p. 347). John of St. Thomas’s first disputation was about the “certitude of the principles of theology” (De certitudine principiorum theologiae) (ibid., pp. 307–46).↩︎

  67. Immediately after noting that STh I, q. 1, a. 1 inquires into the word sacra doctrina in the first sentence, John of St. Thomas begins the second sentence thus: “Cum autem theologia sit cognitio quae rationcinatur de Deo, oportet concurrere ad ipsam, aliquam cognitionem per modum principiorum” (ibid., q. 1, disp. 2, a. 1, no. 1).↩︎

  68. “In omni scientia et in omni cognitione probative requiruntur principia, ex quibus per consequentiam infertur conclusio. Est autem differentia inter theologiam naturalem, quae est metaphysica, et theologiam christianam, quod in theologia naturali cognoscitur de Deo, se habet per modum conclusionis et non per modum principii: sed effectus Dei, et creaturae, se habent per modum principii; eo quod non possumus naturali scientia ad Deum assurgere nisi ex creaturis, juxta quod dicit Apostolus (Rom. i, 20) quod invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. At vero theologia christiana ita agit de Deo et veritatibus divinis, quod pro principiis assumit non creaturas, sed ipsum Deum et veritates divinas, ex quibus ratiocinando procedit” (ibid.). Emphasis original.↩︎

  69. For more on the distinction between God’s placement in the science of metaphysics and God’s placement in the science of sacred theology, see Thomas C. O’Brien, O.P., Metaphysics and the Existence of God, ed. Cajetan Cuddy, O.P. (Tacoma, WA: Cluny Media, 2017). O’Brien discusses John of St. Thomas on this topic in his first chapter, “Remote Background: Anterior to Nineteenth Century,” 5–34.↩︎

  70. “Cognitio probativa, quae nomine doctrinae appellatur” (John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, q. 1, disp. 2, a. 1, no. 3).↩︎

  71. “Nomen autem fidei proprie non intelligitur cognitio probativa, quae nomine doctrinae appellatur; quae enim fide tenentur, non probantur, sed revelantur a Deo, et testimonio ejus atque auctoritate tenentur… et ita fides respicit ea quae formaliter et immediate revelata sunt” (ibid).↩︎

  72. “Fides dicit cognitionem circa res divinas, ut immediate revelatas obscure” (ibid., no. 4).↩︎

  73. “Nomine vero theologiae intelligimus, non solum doctrinam probativam in communi, sed proprie et in rigore scientiam ratiocinatam de Deo, ex his quae revelata sunt. Et ita respicit ea quae sunt virtualiter et mediate revelata, id est, ex formaliter revelatis deducta” (ibid., no. 3).↩︎

  74. “Theologia autem est cognitio scientifica, seu certa, procedens ex formaliter revelatis, et inferens ea quae mediate et virtualiter revelata dicuntur, tamquam deducta, et connexa cum revelatis formaliter” (ibid., no. 4).↩︎

  75. “Ex his colligitur, quomodo inter se comparentur fides, theologia, et sacra doctrina.—Nomine enim doctrinae (ut dicitur i Poster. c. 1; et explicatur ibi a D. Thoma, lect. 1) intelligitur quaecumque cognitio probative: quae in docente nominator doctrina, in addiscente vero disciplina. Unde ad rationem doctrinae requiritur id quoad ad probativam cognitionem: scilicet aliquid per modum principii inferentis seu probantis, et aliquid per modum conclusionis illatae et probatae. Unde patet, quod nomine sacrae doctrinae intelligitur cognitio probative ex revelatis: haec [revelatio] enim dicitur cognitio sacra; et ita quae per cognitionem revelatam probantur, nomine sacrae doctrinae intelliguntur, sive probatio fiat probabiliter, sive scientifice; ab hoc enim abstrahit” (John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, q. 1, disp. 2, a. 1, no. 2). Emphasis added.↩︎

  76. “Quod vero nomine doctrinae intellexerit cognitionem pertinentem ad theologiam, constat: tum quia eam doctrinam quam dicit necessariam, appellat scientiam in argumento Sed contra ubi dicit ‘et aliam scientiam esse divinitus inspiratam’, et (in solutione ad 2, ibi) ‘de eisdem rebus aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine divinae revelationis’; tum quia alias diminutus fuissete D. Thomas in quaestione in qua agit de theologia, et non de fide, nec de aliquo abstrahente a fide et theologia, praetermittere necessitate theologiae, et agree de necessitate fidei de qua acturus est suo loco (id est, II-II q. 2, a. 3)” (ibid., no. 5).↩︎

  77. Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, 39; Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina,” 59; Van Ackeren, Sacra Doctrina, 29–33.↩︎

  78. “Sacra doctrina dicit quamcumque cognitonem probativam ex revelatis a Deo, etiam probabiliter, quamvis communi usu loquentium sumatur pro doctrina certo et scientifice: et sic est idem quod theologia” (Cursus Theologicus, q. 1, disp. 2, a. 1, no. 4).↩︎

  79. Similarly, as noted above, Gonet expresses appreciation for Cajetan’s interpretation of the sacra doctrina. Gonet also acknowledges the validity of nuances present in John of St. Thomas’s argumentation (Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, a. 10, no. LCII, p. 73). Likewise, Billuart largely assumes the theologia emphasis of John of St. Thomas in his examination of STh I, q. 1, a. 1 (“De Sacra Doctrina,” a. 2, pp. 4–5).↩︎

  80. Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, 39.↩︎

  81. Ibid.↩︎

  82. He continues: “There is also a reference to faith inasmuch as faith and not theology is necessary for salvation. Theology as a science is not indeed necessary for any of the faithful, but for the Church collectively, at least according to the ordinary law, since the teaching Church must also make use of human means in the discharge of her office, having recourse to reason in defending what is of faith against the objections of the adversaries” (ibid., 42).↩︎

  83. Ibid., 39.↩︎

  84. Ibid., 43.↩︎

  85. Ibid.↩︎

  86. Ibid., 44.↩︎

  87. Ibid., 45.↩︎

  88. For more on the concerns that preoccupied Garrigou-Lagrange, see Richard A. Peddicord, O.P., “Another Look at the Theological Enterprise of Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.,” Angelicum 82, no. 4 (2005): 835–48; Nichols, Reason with Piety, 33–47.↩︎

Fr. Cajetan Cuddy, O.P.

Fr. Cuddy teaches dogmatic and moral theology at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, D.C. He serves as the general editor of the Thomist Tradition Series, and he is co-author of Thomas and the Thomists: The Achievement of St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters (Fortress Press, 2017). Fr. Cuddy has written for numerous publications on the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Thomist Tradition. 

Previous
Previous

A Prolegomenon Concerning the Objectivity of Second Intentions, Part 2

Next
Next

Reason as Rule of Human Action (A Draft Presentation Concerning the Relevance of a Debate involving Fr. Leonard Lehu, O.P.)