Implicit Faith - A Primer

Introduction

I’ve been thinking for some time about the language of both “virtuality” and implicitness in the various texts in the scholastic tradition. I don’t have time right now for a complete textual study, but I know for a fact that I’ve run across the “floating” character of these terms not only in Thomas, but also in later writers like John of St. Thomas and Billuart. This first came to my attention because of disagreements that I had with certain people regarding the nature of dogmatic development. I took for granted a set of distinctions that I quickly realized I did not share with others. At the time, however, I was not sensitive that I myself had begun to use the terms with a certain kind of specificity that is not always found in texts in the tradition.

For now, I merely desire to try to lay out for my own thought where I stand. In the background of what I’m writing here are the various texts related to the development of revelation and development of dogma, not only in St. Thomas Aquinas, but in later thinkers like John of St. Thomas, Francisco Marín-Sola, Reginald Schultes, and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.

“Virtually”… “Implicitly”… There is an entire theory of scientia hidden in the way that one uses these terms. As is known, later Thomists felt the need to further explicate certain things regarding the nature of theological conclusions, a point not always articulated clearly and distinctly in the works of St. Thomas. There were various pressures that led to these discussions, which can be found from the 14th century onward. These texts contain a lot of content that is quite interesting about the material logic of science in its own right.

But, in any case, the language of the later Thomist school, following upon John of St. Thomas, took up a distinction that at least in part owes a debt to Jesuit thinkers, most (in)famously in this case Francisco Suárez. Properly scientific conclusions in theological discourse will come to be said to be “virtually revealed.”  Some 20th and 21st century thinkers viewed this as a Suarezian perversion of the notion of theology. However, the term itself, in fact, is only a technical elaboration concerning a fact that was recognized quite clearly at the time of St. Thomas: some conclusions, precisely as conclusions, are new “objectively” (as objects of cognition). In other words, scientific reasoning involves passing from the known to the unknown, and, therefore, involves, above all, a kind of objectively new content in the conclusions of scientific-inferential knowledge. In short: such conclusions state new truths (even if these truths happen to deal with the same reality)

Most often, one would come to speak of these conclusions as being derived through syllogistic reasoning–making use of a premise taken from supernatural knowledge and a premise taken from “reason.” Such conclusions would bring to bear something from human knowledge that, in an important way, states a truth not contained in the deposit of supernatural revelation. Two standard examples of such conclusions: there are infused moral virtues; Christ has only one act of existence.  (The case of two premises “of faith” is interesting.  But I must set it aside.  See, for example, what is said by Garrigou in La synthèse thomiste—translated into English under the title Reality. I need, however, to dig further into his sources.)

Rightly, at the turn of the 20th century, Thomists developed a discussion concerning other non-scientific conclusions in theological discourse. Wrongly however, a kind of narrative grew, saying that the main scholastics at least implicitly held that theology picks up where faith leaves off. (This was not unmerited in some cases, but the impugners of “conclusion theology” were too whole-cloth in their condemnations.) However, as I’ve shown elsewhere, this is a distortion of the scholastic position in some very important Thomistic figures. And even beyond what I have already written, I have also found some very explicit remarks made by Reginald Schultes, where he very clearly states that these kinds of conclusions, which are not “objectively” in the deposit, are in fact, not even the most important ones in theology.  (This statement by itself requires a complete revisiting of the accusations against “conclusion theology.”) Nonetheless, they are called properly theological conclusions precisely because they belong to theology and, in nowise, to divine faith per se; they are “proper” to theological ratiocination. But this does not mean that there are not other truths as well involved in theological reasoning. (In fact, to report his own assertions again:: such “proper” conclusions are not even the most important ones in theology.) I will leave these matters, however, to my other articles related to this topic.

What remains important for us is that, unless one wishes to depart from the way that “science” is understood in later Thomist material logic (thus fashioning a new logic, though out of scraps taken from here and there), one must recognize that “science,” precisely as “science” is marked by a kind of discursive conquest of new knowledge, ultimately explained, however, in view of principles and causes that are first known, at first to us, but in the ultimate synthesis of a science in a given period of time, in light of that subject’s principles and causes which are “first” in an absolute sense. (I have in mind here what Garrigou-Lagrange says very importantly, in his article on the twofold via inventionis and via iudicii.)

But without getting into all those issues, we just need to hold onto this fact: in so far as they are specifically scientific, conclusions state new truths which are not formally contained within the premises of the syllogism in question. They are only virtually there. They are “within the power” of those premises, but reasoning must draw the truth out.

So far, this analysis is rather standard.  Further discussion was needed, however, precisely to explain the development of dogma.  In Baroque scholasticism, the logical tool that was devised for analyzing cases of potential development was a notion of “subjective illation / inference,” by means of a syllogism deemed “explicative.” I hope to take this up in much more detail later on when thinking through some issues in logic. For now, I’m going to just provide a standard example. (I have, however, found some uneven examples in Garrigou. I feel the need to take a look into this more deeply before I present it publicly in detail.) Example:

• Man is mortal

• But a rational animal is a man

• Therefore, a rational animal is a mortal

What is most important here to note is that the minor premise only contains the definition of the predicate in the subject.  This is not merely a question of some nominal change of terms.  A definition is an explicitation of a more vaguely known term.  (On this issue, see Garrigou in various texts.  Also Woodbury, Schutles, and the Salmanticenses; perhaps also Timothée Richard’s Philosophie du raisonnement.)  It is a real activity of our intellect, at the heart of much of our life of knowledge.  So when we look at the syllogism, we notice that the conclusion really is just the major premise with a more explicit subject. This is at least the standard example given for such explicative syllogistic reasoning – notice how important it is to pay attention to the matter of the syllogism in order to understand exactly what is going on. This is a trivial example, but again, after some research, I hope to be able to lay out this much more fully.  (Ultimately, the understanding of such matters involves engagement with matters related to the second book of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and his Topics, as well as their later legitimate developments.) 

These kinds of syllogisms are important in our attempt to articulate the objective content of faith and explain it to ourselves. But we just need to note here is the fact that such reasoning is objectively explicative, not objectively illative / inferential.  (It is, though, subjectively inferential, unlike the case of an expository syllogism.)

Thus, we have our framework: some conclusions are objective explications, others are objective illations. Thomas and other Thomists (all the way into the 20th century) tend to slur these together, using the term “virtually”, though with qualifications. Sometimes (e.g. Billuart) one will say that some propositions are said to be “virtually inclusively” in the deposit of faith and those others, which are properly theological, are only “virtually connectively” in the deposit.  

For my part, I do not know how to parse the history of this vocabulary yet.  I prefer reserving “implicit” and “explicit” precisely for the cases of explication and “virtual” for conclusions, which are new.  (This is partly related to the way that “virtual” is used in other contexts, for example, the way that some realities are “in” God only virtually – e.g., material forms.)

In the background of all of this, therefore, is a further question concerning whether or not such “virtually revealed” (in the stricter sense that I prefer) conclusions can be defined De fide. This is not my concern today, though as things stand, I believe that Schultes remains the better party in this debate. I’m open to discussion and debate.  (I hope some day to discuss this with Fr. Guy Mansini, who although he seems to follow Marín-Sola in his recent volume on dogmatic development, nonetheless makes important qualifications in footnotes, almost directly echoing the central principle operative in Schultes’ concerns against Marín-Sola.)

Rather, I wish to clear the air, in view of the points made above (though without dealing with all the many details) concerning the use of the term “implicit faith.” The expression can be used to refer to several kinds of “implicitation”. Below, I will outline these various senses:

Explicitation in relation to various believers alive at this time: How much must be believed now in order to be saved?

This was a standard question asked in scholastic moral theology. It technically involved an entire dogmatic view concerning how much must be believed by “regular believers” in contrast to those who are deemed “maiores in ecclesia.” Ultimately, such “maiores” would include those in the hierarchy, teachers, and also, those whose educational status and abilities (and state of life) required them to know more for the sake of deepening their faith and protecting it against impieties.  Usually, the first category was most emphasized, sometimes too exclusively.  

Therefore, one would debate: if one believes in the Trinity and the Redemptive Incarnation, to what extent are the other truths of faith implicitly assented to because of one’s faith in the Church as a teaching authority.  Protestant polemics would come to deride this kind of implicit faith, terming it “fides carbonaria,” the faith of (uneducated) coal miners.  But, the Church is not so haughty as those Protestants who were so dismissive.

Interestingly, however, the very notion itself is precisely what Catholic theology must avail itself of in order to justify “good faith” Protestants and (on some points) Orthodox believers.  There must be someway in which invincible ignorance allows for a judgment at least akin to the “minores in ecclesia” – believing the essential truths of revelation, while implicitly believing the others through a kind of muted faith in the Church. (To a degree, such cases likely involve some aspects of the sense of implicitation involved in the third and fourth bolded divisions below.)  Technically, I would subdivide the Protestant and Orthodox cases, due to the latter’s semi-living, semi-dead magisterium.  (On this topic, one can profitably consult Journet for an orthodox Thomist reflection.)  

Explicitation as unfolding of the truths of the faith over time, with new revelation of truths: Development of Revelation

Historically, this is how the earlier scholastics discussed the notion of the development of revealed truth.  The normal way to ask this question would be something along the lines of, “Was the faith had by the patriarchs (or Moses, etc.), the same as that which is today?”  In order to answer yes, but to recognize the difference of explicitness introduced by the difference of time in salvation history.  The logic applies to both post-lapsarian states in salvation history’s unfolding of revelation, both the state of “the law of nature” (for it can be applied to Abraham, Noah, or even perhaps Melchizedek) and to the state of the Mosaic law.  (I suspect that there is disagreement among different thinkers about this, however.)

Interestingly, in De revelatione, Garrigou-Lagrange emphasizes the fact that St. Thomas does not say that later truths are virtually contained in earlier truths but, instead, are only implicitly contained.  I’m not sure what to make of his reading of later clarity concerning these notions back into Aquinas.  He proposes something that I suspect must be drawn from later sources, even where he does not cite anyone other than a passing reference to Billuart.

He proposes a model that probably needs to have some updates.  But, basically, what he argues is that within the two first Credibilia (God’s existence and His Providence) all the other truths are actually and implicitly contained somewhat like how modalities of being (e.g., transcendentals, the various categories, etc.) are contained in being implicitly but not virtually.  (Although based somewhat in Aquinas, I’m wondering if he follows Bañez here.  From what I recall from Schultes, Bañez plays an important role in the later school’s discussion of how the all the revealed truths are contained in the first two Credibilia.) The examples that he uses are: truth, goodness, life, intelligence, freedom, etc.  It would seem that he has in mind the way that each of these notions are tied up with being as either ways of being or acts ultimately specified by being, truth, goodness in some way.  Therefore, he says such expectation involves new notions that are not extrinsic.  (Here, I must embarrassingly note that I and the editors of my translation did not catch the missing “not” here in the translation of the text, which I will need to fix by way of errata.)

The point, though is: new truths are manifested, not merely the same truths in new ways.

(Note, the reference to the transcendentals raises interesting questions about the kind of distinction involved here as well.  The transcendentals are distinct only by way of minor virtual distinction.  Marín-Sola will, in part, use the various senses of distinction as part of his explanation of dogmatic development, though in a way that is not isomorphic with that of Schultes, Garrigou, et al.)

Explicitation as unfolding of the truths of the faith over time, without new revelation of truths: Dogmatic Development

This is where the introductory discussion above comes into play.  Obviously, the process itself is going to involve other factors than merely syllogizing.  The concern of the scholastic philosophers was not to forget this fact but, rather, to explain the logical structure of such development.  Thus, in this case, explicitation involves passing, not from the generic to the specific, but rather, from the vague / confused to the distinct.   Garrigou-Lagrange presents this using the process of defining, sometimes discursively expressed in explicative syllogisms.  This involves greater distinction concerning the same notion.  

I would note something very important here, which I have never explicitly found in him or others along the same lines.  However, I do think it is implied in the position, even if they would not draw the conclusion themselves.  Ultimately, there can be many definitions for one in the same reality.  Of course, a specific difference is always the best, but clearly the process of development is a witness to the way that we use different sorts of causal and proper definitions, over the course of history.  We must always recognize the limitations of our given state of definition.  But it is possible for multiple definitions to exist, though the one that is to be accepted as the clearest and best is that which the Church has most recently promulgated, of course understood in the context of prior definitions, though now more explicitly stated.  Very often, though, differences between the Orthodox and Catholics precisely hinge on a kind of difference of “dogmatic mind,” where one in the same reality is assented to under the form of different definitions.  (Thus, one speaks about only holding the Orthodox to the formulations of the first millennium.  Ratzinger said this earlier in his career, although he eventually qualified the point.)

This difference of “dogmatic mind” is very important for navigating ecumenical matters.  What it indicates is that, in one and the same era, there can exist different degrees of dogmatic development throughout Christian groups.  (Obviously, this is no simple matter, and what is most crucial as a living bond with the living magisterium.  Thus, it is possible for someone to hold an earlier formulation either in a closed fashion [thus falling into a denial of later development in Catholicism] or in an implicitly open fashion.) This also has implications for the issues related to Protestants and Orthodox discussed above. 

(I would note, however, that there may be need for further precision here.  See the beginning of Maquart’s manual, where he discusses the pairing obscure (implicit) – clear and confused / vague – distinct.)

Implicitation in cases where the noetic content of faith is objectively deficient but one has not opposed grace’s operation in the first act of freedom (thus, implication by way of a implicit desire for baptism)

The finding of the new world basically pushed this point quite strongly, although already we can find in the Latin Middle Ages some of the pieces necessary for discussing this question (e.g., the “first act of freedom” in relation to grace, and also the question of someone who is “reared in the wilderness”).  There is some fluctuation in the way that this is discussed, for example, in the 19th century.  Bl. Pius IX, in Quanto Conficiamur Moerore, speaks of “those who are struggling with invincible ignorance about our most holy religion. Sincerely observing the natural law and its precepts inscribed by God on all hearts and ready to obey God, they live honest lives and are able to attain eternal life by the efficacious virtue of divine light and grace.”  However, some of these words need further distinction, because really such persons are living “by the efficacious virtue of divine light and grace” and therefore not merely according to the natural law.  They have the theological (and infused moral) virtues and even the gifts of the Holy Spirit.  (I tend to note, with Garrigou-Lagrange, however, that the exercise of the gifts is very precarious in such a case. Nonetheless, he does not deny their existence and warmly engages with Maritain, Massignon, and others on this topic.)  

In any case, Bl. Pius IX’s words can sound as though God will give supernatural recompense after a life of natural rectitude. But in fact, it is a question of implicit supernatural faith, had by means of very weak noetic instruments.  Therefore, this is a sort of utter radicalization of the case of “minores in ecclesia.” Here, the data of common sense is in some way illuminated in order to propose supernatural truths, though most precariously.

Such implicit faith was discussed by Scholastics, and also conservatives like Hugon, Garrigou, and even, to a degree, Fenton (even if he is very conservative on the point, arguably more than even his teacher, Garrigou).  I think it is given excellent analysis by Maritain, Journet, and Jean-Hervé Nicolas.  (I am thinking here of the case analyzed in the article on the Immanent dialectic of the first free act, by Maritain.  As Nicolas points out, this is different from a pre-volitional, natively positive inclination that would be a kind of anonymous Christianity on the model of Karl Rahner’s theory.)

Final remarks

Thus, to summarize these final points we have the following senses of implicitation and explicitation, though now ordered from greatest implicitness to least implicitness.  I am formally dividing the kind of implicitness precisely as regards the ratio of implicitness / explicitness.  However, as we have seen, different parties can subjectively experience different kinds of implicitation.  (I am not exhaustive about such “overlaps,” but I’m trying to point out what sticks out to me right now.). Thus:

1. Implicitation in those who have only an implicit desire for baptism, without sufficient external proposition and natural objective content

2. Implicitation by way of non-extrinsic, but new, truths (development of revelation)

3. Implicitation by way of definitional passing from vague to more distinct knowledge (development of dogma) 

4. Implicitation with a given moment of dogmatic development (between “maiores” and “minores”)

I sense that something important is different between 3 and 4, due to the way that 3 involves the exercise of the Church proposing the truth in question.  Thus, 4 would also fall to the domain of those truths that are explicitations in theological discourse.  However, they are subject to De fide definition precisely because they are not merely virtually revealed but, instead, are explications of what is implicit.  (Thus, one must very carefully distinguish between theological conclusions in general and properly theological conclusions.  Or, as I have proposed elsewhere, those conclusions that are properly sapiential and those that are properly scientific.) What does not fall into 4, however, are merely virtually revealed (or in the Billuartian language mentioned above, though not made my own, “virtually connexively”) conclusions.  These kinds of conclusions can actually be certain, because scientific knowledge really involves certitude and is not mere opinion (even if scientific knowledge greatly uses opinion in its dialectical investigations).  They are therefore subject to definitive definition by the Church, though that does not mean that they belong to the deposit of faith.  This distinction, nowadays as being between “credendum” and “tenendum,” parallels the earlier division between what is De fide divina and what is De fide ecclesiastica. This latter topic, however, is a matter for another day!  It is, nonetheless, a very important topic. The distinction (even if awkwardly and problematically drawn) is the mark of theological progress in fieri.

(Thus, to be clearer, though I will take this up later: we have remained here solely within that domain of truths that are formally in the revealed deposit, namely dogmas.  As for the case of definitive doctrines, which depend upon 3 but are not in the deposit, there is the open question regarding the formal motive of such assent.  Moreover, such doctrines—which some scholastics held to be matters of “ecclesiastical faith”—are themselves subject to variations within the kind of “maiores” vs. “minores” explications considered in 4.)