A Note on Topicality (by Ambroise Gardeil, O.P.)
Brief Translator’s Note
Here, I am presenting a translation of Ambroise Gardeil, “La topicité,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 5 (1911): 750–757. To understand Gardeil’s way of proceeding here, the reader should recall that the Topics of Aristotle are organized around the “loci” of what would come to be called “the predicables,” namely genus, species, property, and accident. Hence, Gardeil focus upon those loci as the most general and common-sensical sorts of subject matters for considering the topicality of arguments. Given the great deal of work that needs to be done among Scholastics on this topic, I refer the reader to my brief opening remarks in the previous article related to “the probable.”1
A full PDF of the complete Gardeil text (all three parts) is available by clicking here.Gardeil’s Article
In an earlier article (available here), I mentioned Topicality as a property of probable propositions, by reason of their matter, ratione materiae. There, I mentioned that I would take up this question elsewhere. I am repaying that promise in this article. It naturally has two parts:
1˚ What is Topicality?
2˚ Topicality, property of the Probable.
1˚ What is Topicality?
In ordinary language—which is the obligatory starting point for any philosophical analysis of any subject—the topicality of an argument is synonymous with its actual adaptation to the requirements of a question or objection. In a discussion, a topical answer is one that, to the eyes and minds of those considering the matter, provides an exact solution to the question and, if I may put it this way, “hits the mark.”
Like any common notion, this one certainly reveals an existing reality, an objective modality of certain arguments. But it does not explain the uniqueness of the expression, topicality, a denomination that is untranslatable into French or English, one whose origin is, quite clearly, the Greek word τόπος , meaning, place.
How can the idea of “place,” i.e. the determinate position of a thing in space, be used to characterize arguments appropriate to the requirements of certain questions, objections, and interrogations? How can it be transposed into logic?
If we look at things from the outside and on the surface, we can form a first idea. A material place[, or as we will prefer, locus,] is a specific location where we can be sure to encounter a determinate object, thanks to the positional relationships between different bodies. A logical locus will similarly be, so to speak, the position of the organized content of human reason where we are sure that we will encounter certain arguments in response to certain classes of questions, so that, when this or that question arises, the dialectician has only to resort to his locus, in order, so to speak, to launch the argument that is encountered there and to enable it to fall, at just the right moment, upon the question raised.—This explanation goes some way towards explaining the impression of spontaneous, shared adherence that manifests itself in response to a topical argument. This is only natural, for the argument had already been recognized and carefully adapted beforehand to the question at hand.
If we follow the logic of this perspective, we might be tempted to think that the best loci for arguments are the fully formed sciences (les sciences faites), that their proofs have a first claim to the appellation topics. Indeed, they alone develop that orderly and definitive systematization of necessary proofs that enables one, on the one hand, to encounter them upon completely stable ground, and, on the other, to adequately resolve questions that might arise about this position. Scientific theorems, however, are not numbered among loci; they are not topical. Why not?
This is because, if we may say so, they are more suited to the science to which they belong than to serve as a focal point for arguments. Each scientific conclusion, resulting from its own unique demonstration, forms a logical element in an individual sense, though one that is also integral to the whole in which it is itself contained. To grasp its value, you need to know the whole of the science in question; you need to be a specialist. Specialists, however, are the exception, not the rule . Scientific theorems, therefore, will never have that universally accessible meaning which, in a discussion, makes everyone immediately and unanimously say: that’s it; what a topical answer; here is a kind of je ne sais quoi clean-cut answer that obviously confounds the objector or dismisses the questioner. No doubt, they have something better since they have in hand the fundamental and decisive reason for what they say: It is proven!—But to how few! And after how much thought and toil? And henceforth, the questioner has the upper hand (et dès lors, l’interrogateur a beau jeu). In scientific matters, an apodictic proof is worth infinitely more than all probable arguments; but on the middle terrain of dialectical research and human discussion, it does not have the same effect. And it is on this terrain of common adherence that topicality has currency.2
And this why we need to return to the heretofore superficial notion of locus so that we might deepen its meaning. We must look for the common root upon which are grafted both the quality that makes place a center of appropriate arguments and that which that gives those arguments their immediate, irresistible, common efficacy.
When we peruse the Topics written by the ancient logicians, we see that for them, loci are propositions that are both general in content and generally accepted. Far from relating, like scientific theorems, to a restricted domain of being and relying on reasons that are proper to each thing, dialectical loci aim at common aspects of realities, aspects that, by their very generality, are incessantly offered to the perception and control of all men. Because of the constant use made of these aspects—and the propositions or simple reasonings in which they are formulated— along with the kind of primary grasp they exert on the intellect’s spontaneous activity, they are the sorts of things that garner mass assent. They are pre-philosophical and pre-scientific common-sense truths, identical in substance to the first truths of philosophy and science. This is what even a cursory reading of a treatise devoted to the Topics immediately suggests.
This indication will enable us to explain in a single stroke both the source-character of given arguments and that of the instant success that is characteristic of topical arguments.
And first of all, something that is general is naturally open to a host of determinations, which find therein their point of departure and continued support. Several questions, provided they have a certain affinity, sometimes can receive shared illumination in light of a single general axiom. This is not the definitive light, scientific evidence. Nonetheless, by taking this proposition as a major premise, subsuming to it appropriate and commonly accepted minor premises, we can construct arguments, which without being perfectly decisive, will circumscribe the question and provide an approximate solution. Now, let us be clear: these arguments will have a common center, namely the axiom that serves as their starting point and is, as it were, the source of their common probative value, the locus of these proofs. Thus, the generality of a proposition can make it the locus for other propositions, a very special locus of truth, a logical locus and not a material, quantitative locus.
Moreover, there’s nothing that receives the common approval of mankind like such generalities. Under the name of “common sense truths,” they constitute the intellectual heritage of humanity. And thus, it follows that simple arguments based on such propositions will meet with immediate, easy, and universal approval. These arguments will therefore be topical in the usual sense of the word.
But, as we just observed, they are already so, in the first sense, in the etymological sense, since every general major premise is a veritable locus of arguments. This is the justification for the twofold aspect of Topicality we have been considering, based on a single principle: the generality of propositions.
But although the generality of propositions may explain topicality, it nonetheless does not give the ultimate reason for it. That reason is as follows.
The first notion we form of things is that they are realities, that they are “of being.” Primum quod cadit in apprehensione intellectus est ens. Being is what first falls into the intellect’s apprehension. From the perspective of metaphysical reflection being is a very profound notion, for there is nothing more important than to have noticed that everything is “of being,” nothing but “of being,” down to its very depths. However, from the perspective of logic, it is the most superficial of notions, I mean, the one that first offers itself to our investigations. However, despite its generality, being has its own very precise determination, its own properties, its own laws—in other words, complex principles that explicate its notion and its intrinsic affiliations.
This quasi-essential nature, these properties, and these laws only remotely touch on the essences, properties, and laws of special, individualized beings, yet nonetheless, they profoundly are concerned with them, since every being, because it is “of being,” must realize these basic lineaments. Here, then, concretized in an example accessible to all, is the idea of these generalities, simultaneously able to circumscribe a question from afar and above and cause immediate and common agreement to a solution.
However, being is not the only notion accessible to common sense. The broad outlines of being—genus, properties, accidents—along with the laws that render them explicit are also the object of common knowledge. Languages are constituted by these relationships, and thus bear witness to their active and normal influence on the human outlook.
All these principles based on being are characterized by a twofold generality: logical generality as regards the principles proper to each specific form of knowledge; and subjective generality by virtue of the universal assent they meet with. And this dual property is what is encompassed by the term “common sense truths.” Common sense truths are at once principles common to a large number of truths, and commonly accepted principles.
Thus, we can see how much it is not in conformity to reality to set these two qualities in opposition and to say, with Rémi Hourcade: “These principles (dialectical principles) are common, not, however, as derived from a banal and vulgar cause of assent, namely common opinion, but because they immediately are concerned with the remote and common matter of all sciences, even the most specific—namely, genus, definition or species, property, and accident—and are susceptible to being applied to any of them.”3
Our justification of Topicality rests on the very fundamental lineaments of Aristotelian noetics, on the first theorems concerning the knowledge of being. The two sides of topicality are explained a radice, from the root, once we understand everything contained in this little phrase: primum quod cadit in intellectu est ens.
To inventory the loci, all we will need to do is catalog the general statements, according to their subject matter and degree of generality, group them together, and organize them in relation to the questions. Thanks to the solidarities thus established between questions and answers, the dialectician will have an entire keyboard at his disposal. Once a question has been posed, all he needs to do is press the corresponding key, to set off a principle for resolving the matter, as is, i.e. in a non-scientific manner, though one that is nonetheless doubly valid: 1˚ in itself, because everything is “of being” to its core; 2˚ as regards common assent, because being is at home in every mind—in a word, it is a principle for a topical solution to questions that are raised.
2° Is Topicality a property of the probable?
1. At first glance, the attempt to connect the topicality of dialectical loci to probability seems to involve a particular difficulty.
Principles founded on being and what is immediately connected there to [ses appurtenances] are immediate, analytical, necessary principles. Now, that which is analytic and necessary is something that is even more than the probable.
To resolve this difficulty, we need only recall what we said about the admission of necessary propositions into the Ancients’ lists of probable propositions.4 Although necessary in themselves, such propositions can be entitled to be called contingent, either because we subjectively have only a confused, vague, unanalyzed knowledge of them, what Albert the Great calls opinion of necessity, or because they are only accessible with the help of more or less plausible (vraisemblables) objective signs, giving the quia est without revealing the propter quid.
Now, this is precisely the case for the common loci belonging to dialectics. The most rigorous principles are admitted only on the basis of common knowledge and common sense. Hence, the difficulty raised above is not really a difficulty at all. This is why the Topics are full of propositions per se notae, viewed, however, from the angle of probability.
2. But the Topics involves propositions that do not have this necessity. Such are, for example, propositions of fact, but which have sufficient evidence for themselves. For these propositions, topicality is only extrinsic and incomplete: extrinsic, because it derives solely from human approbation, and incomplete because it has only one of the two elements of a locus, namely its capacity to provoke adherence by virtue of the authorized testimony that approves it. It does not have the characteristic of serving as a center and point of attachment, a locus, for a certain number of arguments. Such are the commonplaces of history, which are of worth only through the unanimous approbation of historians. They are not loci in the full sense of the word.
This is why we said that topicality is a property of the probable ratione materiae, i.e. on account of the character of the propositions that by rights and more ordinarily are enumerated in the [T]opics, namely universal immediate propositions, concerning being and what is immediately connected there to, property, species, genus, accident—matter that is remote from distinct and specific knowledge.
Only these propositions combine the two facets of topicality: to serve as a rallying point for a number of arguments, by virtue of their generality; to win common assent, by virtue of the common approval they give rise to.
But, note well that the ability to initiate several arguments is not accidental to the probable. To say ratione materiae is not the same as to say per accidens, for matter, though extrinsic to form, is connected to the essence: it is the due subject to this or that form, whereas accidents arise from extrinsic and adventitious causes.
Knowledge of being and of the generalities of being belongs by rights to the human mind. Objectum intellectus est ens. For this right to be effective, it is not necessary that knowledge be distinct and analyzed. Much to the contrary, such knowledge is the privilege of the few. The masses can only know these universal principles in a kind of state of indistinctness, which is sufficient for them—in other words, through opinions. And thus, the due matter of probable knowledge is naturally constituted by generalities about being and what is immediately connected there to. There is nothing adventitious in this attribution.
Therefore, it is not without a profound logical reason that Aristotle gathered together in a single treatise the consideration of probability and that of topicality, understood in the sense of the generality of propositions. And we can see the common root from which his entire treatise springs: being is that which is most general, most proper for serving as a common locus for all compartments of knowledge. And, being is, at the same time, that which is most generally known and accepted by the common man.
Fr. A. Gardeil, O. P.
Le Saulchoir, Kain.
I would like to thank Mr. Mitchell Kengor for his help preparing this text.↩︎
As a side note, let us observe that this is a frequent cause of illusion among those who, needing to address popular audiences, imagine that the closer they get to the fundamental reasons for things, the more they will be able to demonstrate and the more the audience will be convinced of their arguments. Doubtlessly, one should never approach a subject without having delved deeply into it. The possession of the heart of the matter provides an incomparable and inimitable boldness and vigor. Nonetheless, one must furthermore transform the power of these analytical or abstract scientific evidences into images and give them a tangible relief that strikes the listeners. The loftiest reasons become accessible to most listeners is in the form of axioms or common sense reasoning, immediately accepted by the multitude. In this way they acquire a topical value.↩︎
Rémi Hourcade, “De Melchior Cano au P. Gardeil,” Bulletin de Littérature ecclésiastique (May 1910): 240.↩︎
Translator’s note: See the first article on probable certitude for more information regarding this point.↩︎
