A Basic Introduction to “Ecclesiastical Faith”

Topical Overview

In turn of the 20th-century scholastic treatises De locis theologicis, De fontibus revelationis, or even the apologetic¹ treatises De ecclesia, it was standard for one to discuss the various censures that can be promulgated by ecclesiastical authority regarding various teachings and, in the positive register, the binding force of certain truths. If one surveys the literature, a plethora of categorizations can be found, containing various levels of assent to truths of faith: De fide divina, De fide divina et catholica, De fide divina et catholica definita, de fide ecclesiastica, sententia fidei proxima, sententia certa, sententia communis, sententia probabilis, sententia recte sonans, sententia congruum pietati… These levels of assent are accompanied by censures befalling those who deny such truths. To survey the texts of that era is to travel through many different forests: similar trees, but with some variation in species, growth histories, and placement.

This entire literature involves far too many ramifications to try to deal with in one little informal essay.² But, I want to discuss an important topic related to the issues of dogmatic development, issues still in need of resolving to this day. In the 1920s and 1930s, there was an at-the-time well known debate between Dominican Fathers Reginald Schultes, O.P. (professor at the Angelicum) and Fr. Francisco Marín-Sola (then-professor at Fribourg) concerning the definability of theological conclusions. This debate has been variously covered in English³ from different perspectives (and with varying degrees of fairness), by Jan Walgrave,⁴ Fr. Guy Mansini,⁵ Dr. Andrew Mezsaros,⁶ Dr. Joshua Brotherton,⁷ Reinhard Huetter,⁸ Michael Seewald,⁹ and Martin Miller;¹⁰ however, its implications are not always fully appreciated in the contemporary Catholic conversations regarding the important topic of theological development (concerning which, obviously, this brief essay will barely scratch).

The two theologians agreed upon much regarding how to understand the continued development of dogma. And Schultes himself noted as much in his writings.¹¹ Schultes was a professor of the history of dogmas (and also the apologetic / fundamental-theological course in ecclesiology), and especially in his Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum, he shows himself very desirous that historical methodology be introduced more and more into contemporary scholastic practice. He had himself written a detailed German work on the notion of fides implicita,¹² as well as a treatise De ecclesia, in which the question of the Church’s role in proposing objects of belief is quite important.¹³ (This is due to the fact that De ecclesia treatises were, at that time, often placed directly after the Tractatus de revelatione, concerning the extrinsic rational credibility of the mysteries of faith.)

For his part, in addition to work on the question of predestination¹⁴ and other topics in article-form, Fr. Marín-Sola was the author of a long series of articles concerning the nature of dogmatic development, texts eventually gathered into a single volume L’évolution homogène du dogme catholique.¹⁵ The work is wide-ranging, at once historical and speculative, and its manifold details are more than can be handled in an article such as this. The work was, however, received by many (arguably most) Thomists as being the definitive presentation of a Thomistic understanding of the nature of dogmatic development. (I feel the need to note, however, that survey totals don’t prove the truth of a position.)

However, an important point (with many implications) separated Schultes and Marín-Sola: can proper theological conclusions be defined as matters De fide, precisely as something that is revealed? The term “proper” has a very specific meaning: conclusions that only belong to discursive theology and to it alone. These would be “objectively illative” conclusions, that is, ones that involve the drawing of a new truth, not formally expressed in the premises, nor merely explicated in the conclusion.¹⁶ Sometimes, one would describe such conclusions as being arrived at as being drawn “from a premise of faith” and a “premise drawn from reason.” Some examples: the sacraments cause grace by way of perfective efficient instrumental causality; there is only one esse in Christ; sanctifying grace involves the infusion of supernatural moral virtues; etc. Such truths, many writers would say (especially during the period of later scholasticism), involve new truths “outside” the deposit of faith. And, again, they are called “proper” precisely because they belong properly to scientific-sapiential theology, as something that it alone can draw, in light of faith (but also derivative in relation to it). Obviously, such scientific-sapiential theology has other offices, other tasks, elucidating the revealed truths themselves, and not drawing new conclusions. And such offices, given that they do not involve the drawing of new truths, are said to lead to conclusions that are “improper”, insofar as they can belong either to theology or to faith.¹⁷ They are quite important in the process of the logical¹⁸ explication of faith, by which scientific-sapiential theology can aid the Church in her own task of proposing the truths of faith.

But, what of these “proper” conclusions—can they be defined? Schultes (and many others) would say “no.” Marín-Sola would say “yes”. For Schultes, the matter seems clear: if the inference is scientific and objectively inferential (or “illative”), it involves a new truth in the conclusion. Even if one and the same reality is known, a new truth is drawn. Marín-Sola, by contrast, deployed a distinction between “metaphysical” reasoning and “physical” reasoning (along side an account of various kinds of distinction). According to his account, he believed that one could say that as long as a truth was deduced “metaphysically” from other truths, that truth would involve no new “objective” (in a sens that is different from the classical Thomist sense of objective) affirmation, so long as the two truths in question were affirmed of something that was one in reality. This would at least suffice for a non-development in truth. Thus, for example, the deduction of one divine attribute from another, or one “metaphysical” property¹⁹ of human nature, In other words, in the cases of “metaphysical” reasoning (which, would supposedly be, in the end, scientific reasoning in the Aristotelian sense),²⁰ whatever conclusion one draw from per se connections would involve one and the same assertion, one and the same truth, only known in a different more explicit manner. (This is, at least, how he was understood by Schultes and Garrigou-Lagrange. I believe that a detailed study needs to be undertaken of Marín-Sola’s work to carefully explain his theory and, especially, to explain his questionable distinction between “metaphysical” and “physical” reasoning, as well as his exact understanding of the distinction between res and object—see the selection from Labourdette below.)

The point: for Marín-Sola, proper theological (“metaphysical”) conclusions would not really be new truths. They would be one and the same reality and truth known in a new and more explicit way. Therefore, they could be defined as truths De fide.

For Schultes—who here uses a term of trade drawn from later scholasticism coming from the 16th century—truths that were “proper” theological conclusions could be defined definitively only by way of a derivative sort of faith, “Ecclesiastical faith.” Such faith would be an assent to truths that lay outside of the revealed deposit, formally speaking, although they are contained within the virtuality or “illuminative power” of such truths. Most importantly, such “ecclesiastical faith” would be given to those truths that are definitively taught by the magisterium, though they lay outside of the revealed deposit of truths.

Such language likely calls to mind the idea of “secondary objects of the magisterium,” and rightly so. In point of fact, the 1998 commentary accompanying Ad Tuendam Fidem uses language that is clearly drawn from the earlier scholastic language of ecclesiastical faith, mediated through Lumen gentium. However, here, “fides ecclesiastica” is referred to as “sententia definitive tenenda” or “de fide tenenda,” a truth to be held by the faithful as something definitively taught. It is contrasted to that which is “de fide credenda”, believed de fide:

With regard to the nature of the assent owed to the truths set forth by the Church as divinely revealed (those of the first paragraph) or to be held definitively (those of the second paragraph), it is important to emphasize that there is no difference with respect to the full and irrevocable character of the assent which is owed to these teachings. The difference concerns the supernatural virtue of faith: in the case of truths of the first paragraph, the assent is based directly on faith in the authority of the Word of God (doctrines de fide credenda); in the case of the truths of the second paragraph, the assent is based on faith in the Holy Spirit's assistance to the Magisterium and on the Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Magisterium (doctrines de fide tenenda).²¹

As I will briefly catalog below, the language of being “based on faith in the Holy Spirit’s assistance to the Magisterium and on the Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Magisterium” is precisely the language involved in most of the presentations of ecclesiastical faith by scholastic authors.²² Note, therefore, the important difference of the motive of assent: directly on the authority of the Word of God (de fide credenda); mediately upon faith in the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit (de fide tenenda). The unresolved question that still remains with us, however, is: does this diversity of motives involve some sort of intermediary supernatural habitus, ecclesiastical faith, subordinate to the theological virtue of faith?

One must not immediately rule out the possibility of such “derivative supernatural habitus,” for there are many of them, especially according to the Thomists, each specified by a different intrinsically supernatural formal object, considered from the perspective of the ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum (or formal object quo): the theological virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the infused moral virtues will all of their annexes, and discursive theology itself. Each and every one of these habitus has the Deity as its ratio formalis obiecti ut res (or formal object quod); but precisely as an object, ut obiectum, it is unique. If this were not the case, one could not have separate habitus.²³

To return, however, to sententia definitive tenenda, they are described in the commentary thus:

The object taught by this formula includes all those teachings belonging to the dogmatic or moral area, which are necessary for faithfully keeping and expounding the deposit of faith, even if they have not been proposed by the Magisterium of the Church as formally revealed.

Such doctrines can be defined solemnly by the Roman Pontiff when he speaks “ex cathedra” or by the College of Bishops gathered in council, or they can be taught infallibly by the ordinary and universal Magisterium of the Church as a “sententia definitive tenenda.” Every believer, therefore, is required to give firm and definitive assent to these truths, based on faith in the Holy Spirit’s assistance to the Church's Magisterium, and on the Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Magisterium in these matters. Whoever denies these truths would be in a position of rejecting a truth of Catholic doctrine and would therefore no longer be in full communion with the Catholic Church (emphasis added).²⁴

In other words, again, such truths are somehow mediate in their foundation: they are based not upon the immediate supernatural veracity of active divine revelation (“the First Truth revealing”) but, rather, upon the supernatural assistance given to the Church to continue to propose truths, even truths that are solely necessarily connected to De fide truths, without however being themselves formally revealed.

Technically, speaking, as the next paragraph (no. 7) states, such truths could have a historical relationship to some data (what used to be referred to as “dogmatic facts”) or a logical necessity. As regards the latter, such truths “[express] a stage in the maturation of understanding of revelation which the Church is called to undertake.” They are definitive, even if not formally revealed, “insofar as they add to the data of faith elements that are not revealed or which are not yet expressly recognized as such.” The document even allows that perhaps “at a certain point in dogmatic development, the understanding of the realities and the words of the deposit of faith can progress in the life of the Church, and the Magisterium may proclaim some of these doctrines as also dogmas of divine and catholic faith” (emphasis added). I emphasize the words “may” and “some” because not all such truths are what we could call “on the way to being de fide,” as though de fide tenenda were a kind of epistemological toll-booth along the path that inexorably leads to de fide credenda. In other words, some definitive statements—held for a unique motive, namely the divine assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Church—will forever remain “only tenenda.” Once upon a time, modern scholastics would say: they are only “de fide ecclesiastica.”

My interest in this article, however, is not to settle all affairs regarding ecclesiastical faith. It was much contested in the early-20th century. It dates from certain controversies during the era of Jansenism. Many, often following the studies of Marín-Sola, found it to be utterly dubious (e.g., Gardeil, Fenton, Ramírez, Doronzo, Garrigou-Lagrange, and a host of others).²⁵ However, in addition to non-Thomists (or “semi-Thomists”) such as Vacant, Scheeben, Billot, Ott, Tanqueray, Cartechini, and many others, even some able Thomists such as Schultes and De Groot would also hold to it. And even Michel Labourdette would hold that the notion did represent a solution to a real problem that theology faced after the time of Thomas, though Labourdette would liken it ultimately to a kind of supernatural religious assent (though I would need to read more to see if he specifies the habitus that would elicit such assent).

In the remainder of this article, I will merely provide some references for further consideration regarding this matter, which deserves careful and measured study.

A Brief Florilegium Concerning Ecclesiastical Faith

Relatively akin to the language of the 1998 commentary, one might consider the remarks of Adolf Tanquerey in his Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae, in the section concerning the secondary object of infallibility. He defines this as comprising “all things (facts and doctrines) that in themselves are not revealed, but are so connected to revealed truths that infallible exposition of them is necessary for the full and integral guarding, and correct explication, of the deposit of faith.” And it is distinct “from the primary object of infallibility, which is truth directly revealed, and believed, on account of the authority of God (de fide divina), whereas the secondary object is not revealed and is held only on account of the authority of the Church (de fide ecclesiastica).”²⁶

Sixtus Cartechini, S.J.’s De valore notarum theologicarum dedicates a six-page “chapter” to the topic. Though brief, it provides a very orderly summary of how to think about a number of examples of ecclesiastical faith as an assent involved in objectively new truths, definitively held. I believe that Fr. Dylan Schraeder is preparing a translation of this volume, so I will allow his work to be given due recognition when it (hopefully) comes to print.²⁷

Slightly less clear, in my opinion, is what one finds in Ludwig Ott. The reader will also note that he makes distinctions between fides divina, fides catholica, de fide definita, and fides ecclesiastica:

The highest degree of certainty appertains to the immediately revealed truths. The belief due to them Is based on the authority of God revealing (fides divina), and if the Church, through its teaching, vouches for the fact that a truth is contained in revelation, one’s certainty is then also based on the authority of the Infallible Teaching Authority of the Church (fides catholica). If Truths are defined by a solemn judgment of faith (definitio) of the pope, or of a general council, they are “de fide definita”.

Catholic truths or Church doctrines, on which the infallible teaching authority of the church has finally decided, or to be accepted with a faith, which is based on the sole authority of the Church (fides ecclesiastica). These truths are as infallibly certain as dogmas proper.²⁸

Santiago Ramirez, relying upon the doubts of Marín-Sola concerning fides ecclesiastica (although approaching the question of the definability of theological conclusions in a sui generis way), states that “ecclesiastical faith does not differ from divino-catholica faith, but rather is an act of faith (elicited by the very virtue of divine faith) by which we believe truths that are infallibly and definitively proposed by the Church.”²⁹ (A relevant point, also: he holds that religious assent is an act of infused supernatural docility commanded by the theological virtue of faith.)

Although Journet takes up the question in the first volume of L’église du verbe incarné,³⁰ his most mature treatment is found in his La message révélé: sa transmission, son développement, ses dépendances. He generally takes the position of Marin-Sola on these matters, while noting the disagreement regarding the question of definability, as well as concerning how to handle the issue of definitive non-revealed teachings.³¹

Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I., is basically opposed to the notion of fides ecclesiastica, though he does allow that it might well be the sort of topic still treated in theological manuals, given the unresolved issues surrounding it:

Thus, it follows that ecclesiastical faith, as distinct from divine faith, fails to have any proper and formal object, and therefore is nothing at all, since it could not, otherwise, be a kind of human faith, given that it is based on an infallible definition (which is not appropriate for human faith). Therefore, there is no middle [kind of ecclesiastical faith] between human faith and divine faith, although its defenders try to conceive of some such middle faith under various ambiguous names, which clearly reveal their unacknowledged difficulty: they call it divino-human faith (Pègues), quasi-divine (Granadus), a middle between divine and human (Becanus, Antoine), neither purely human nor purely divine (Vacant, De Groot).

Moreover, the term, concept, and teaching concerning this so-called ecclesiastical faith are all quite recent in the scholastic tradition. The term itself, as expressing this very concept, first appeared around the middle of the 17th century, on the occasion of the controversy with the Jansenists regarding the definitions of dogmatic facts. The concept and doctrine were first ambiguously suggested by Luis de Molina († 1600; In ST I q. 1, a. 2) in regard to a certain kind of “theological assent.” It was more clearly proposed by J. Granada († 1632; In ST I, q. 1, disp. 3), in regard to “an utterly certain kind of human faith, almost pertaining to divine faith, and barely different from it,” and by Martin Becanus († 1624; De fide, c. 9, q. 8, § 8), as regards “a faith that is neither purely divine nor purely human, but rather a middle kind, such that I believe in the articles of faith because of the authority of the Church.” This was subsequently embraced by some 18th-century authors, such as Antoine, Tournely, and the Würzburg Jesuits (Kilber), and especially by more recent theologians. There, it seemed to settle peacefully into place until, at last, defenders of the contrary opinion arose, who, based on reason as well as on the older scholastic tradition, attempted to show its fundamental fragility…³²

The distinctions of faith into unqualified faith (fides simpliciter), divine faith, Catholic divine faith, and ecclesiastical faith should be expunged from classifications and use regarding theological notes. Such distinctions are neither necessary nor universally accepted. Why, then, should we needlessly multiply entities? It is well established that theological faith, which is the principle of theology, cannot exist without the Church proposing it, since the object of faith is the Word of God as proposed by the Church. Hence, it suffices to say “de fide” (adding, for emphasis and determination, that it is defined by the ordinary or extraordinary Magisterium, and by this or that Pope or Council) as the primary and principal note, with the corresponding censure being “heretical.” As for so-called ecclesiastical faith, it is generally more useful to eliminate it from notes and censures, at least because it is not commonly admitted and is quite confusing; but, those who wish to admit it could note it in a footnote on the page, where they could formulate their own note or censure.³³

Michel Labourdette generally holds that in the question related to dogmatic development, the concerns voiced by Reginald Schultes seem to be correct. In fact, Although this is not our immediate concern here, I think it's very important to note that Labourdette explicitly says that the error that Marin-Sola falls into here is the confusion of res and obiectum: “Yes, it is the same thing, but it is not the same truth. Here, We have a grave confusion between res and obiectum…”³⁴ Because he maintains the position close to Schultes-Garrigou regarding the non-de-fide status of objectively illative theological conclusions, he finds it necessary to have a separate kind of definitive assent, one that would seem to be the apex of religious assent, not differing in kind though differing in certitude:

It is hardly astonishing that St. Thomas did not speak of such a notion. It involves questions that he himself did not pose, because the very data themselves had not yet fully matured. It is a certain fact that doctrinal interventions by the pontifical magisterium became much more numerous after the time of the Council of Trent, before which they were generally less frequent. For example, as regards to the canonization of Saints, St. Thomas Did not hold that it was completely certain that the church would be infallible in such matters (pie credendum est…). However, I do not believe that the idea of a kind of ecclesiastical, faith could not be assimilated into his synthesis, No less than the general notion of religious assent (assensus religiosus).

However, the objection still remains that the motive for such ecclesiastical faith (the authority of the church) would ultimately reduce to that of theological faith, Since it is through theological faith that we believe in the church instituted by Christ, and in her powers. However, in my opinion, this seems to involve a confusion analogous to the one found in Cajetan, when he wished to reduce the motive of theological faith itself from “veritas prima revelans” to “Deitas,” on account of which the Veritas Prima is infallible. Faith itself is not what brings about this “reduction”; rather, it is something demonstrated thereafter by theological reflection. The motive for ecclesiastical faith is that an account of which it adheres immediately to a given statement, and this is the authority of the Church. It is something supernatural, though supernatural in the order of created realities. We believe through theological faith that the church is founded by Christ, and given authority by Him; But we believe this, precisely by a different motive, for it is revealed.

Therefore, I believe that, as the [divine] assistance [given to the Church] extends further than strict infallibility, that it has so to speak lesser modes, infallibility itself extends further than solely the declaration of the revealed deposit and that it requires an appropriate assent, one that is essentially distinct from theological faith on account of its motive, and distinct as well—not essentially, but by its degree—from lesser assents, on account of its irrevocability and its absolute certitude. This is what we call ecclesiastical faith.³⁵

And he makes a similar remark in a footnote to an article written in 1950 after the promulgation of Humani generis:

We cannot here discuss all of the precise points that such a subject requires, and we are here content to use an overall general formulation that lacks certain nuances. For our part (and in agreement with a number of theologians) we believe that infallibility extends further than the mere declaration concerning what is contained in revelation and that the Church can infallibly teach truths that are connected to the revealed given and can infallibly condemn those errors that compromise it. Thus, such infallibility requires an assent that is no longer, precisely speaking, that of divine faith but, rather, that of ecclesiastical faith. As regards [other] teachings that are not guaranteed by infallibility, properly speaking, in such cases the assent owed by the faithful will obviously be proportioned to the proper character of this teaching and its authority.³⁶

And although various texts in Schultes could be cited, allow a brief selection from his Introductio:

The third fruit [of later Scholastic development] was the doctrine concerning ecclesiastical faith. For those things that are contained in revelation only as in their principle or cause, like conclusions concerning truths that are only virtually revealed, or that are in some other way connected with revealed truths, such as dogmatic facts, the approval of religious orders, and the canonization of saints cannot indeed be the object of theological faith, although they are the (secondary) object of the infallibility of the Church and the Roman Pontiff.³⁷ Hence, definitive judgments by the Church concerning such things must be held on account of the Church’s infallible authority.

Thus, assent to such declarations by the Church is called ecclesiastical faith: faith inasmuch as the infallibility of the Church is established by divine revelation; ecclesiastical faith inasmuch as the immediate reason for such assent is the Church’s infallible authority.³⁸

There are many other sources that could be considered, both pro and con. In addition to Doronzo, see the brief but detailed footnote to no. 899 in Michaele Nicolau and Ioachim Salaerri, Sacra theologiae summa, vol. 1 (Madrid: BAC, 1952).³⁹

Summary

Merely by way of brief summary, therefore, the topic of fides ecclesiastica is important today for the following reasons:

• It has implications for what one thinks concerning the nature of scientific deductions and the truth content thereof, both in the natural and supernatural orders.

• By implication, it requires one to be very careful in articulating the nature of the formal object of discursive supernatural theology.

• It provides a richer history (long antedating Lumen gentium) concerning what contemporary theologians refer to as sententia de fide tenenda.

• A careful adjudication of the ambiguities involved in this topic aid in understanding the formal object of faith and of religious assent. This is very important. Habits are specified by formal objects. The categorization of statements is not merely a question of “what doctrinal-dogmatic” bucket they go into. It is a question, most profoundly, about the formal character of these objects precisely as objects.

• It would help to clarify what is at stake in a number of topics regarding dogmatic development, noting indeed the unique formal character of developments that have two very different paths.

• Perhaps, too, it would force theologians to be much clearer about their analysis of theological notes and censures. This alone would provide marked service to public clarity regarding what authors believe is at stake in various arguments / debates.

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1. In opposition to the properly placed De ecclesia treatises—in the context of De verbo incarnato. (Cf. remarks in Gardeil, Journet, and importantly Billot—credit must be given where it is due, though I hasten to remind readers that Billot should not be considered, by any strict measure, a “Thomist” —among others.)↩︎

2. In order to adequately treat of the topic, it presupposes an entire theology of: the formal character of faith, the role of the Church in the proposing of the object of faith; the jurisdictional and teaching authority of the Church, along with the nature of the assistance of the Spirit in such teaching; the nature of theological science; the relationship between theological science and dogmatic truth; the nature of dogmatic and doctrinal development (both “logically” and “affectively” considered); etc.↩︎

3. It has a much broader treatment, especially in its immediate wake, in French and, less so, German.↩︎

4. See Jan Hendrik, Unfolding Revelation: The Nature of Doctrinal Development (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972). The overall outlook of Hendrik is not, obviously, that of the present essay. Nonetheless, the work remains a text to be referenced in the English literature.↩︎

5. See his most recent ​​Guy Mansini, The Development of Dogma: A Systematic Account (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2024); “The Development of the Development of Doctrine in the Twentieth Century,” Angelicum 93, no. 4 (2016): 785–822; “The Historicity of Dogma and Common Sense: Ambroise Gardeil, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Yves Congar, and the Modern Magisterium.” Nova et Vetera (English) 18 (Fall 2020): 111–138. It should be noted that, in his most recent work, it seems that Fr. Mansini has changed somewhat his estimation of the outlook of Garrigou-Lagrange on these topics.↩︎

6. See Andrew Meszaros, “Some Neo-Scholastic Receptions of Newman on Doctrinal Development,” Gregorianum 97, no. 1 (2016): 123–150; “John Henry Newman and the Thomistic Tradition: Convergences in Contribution to Development Theory,” Nova et Vetera (English) 19, no. 2 (2021): 423–468; “Dei Filius IV: On the Development of Dogma,” Nova et Vetera (English) 20, no. 3 (2022): 909–938.↩︎

7. Joshua Brotherton, “Development(s) in the Theology of Revelation: From Francisco Marin-Sola to Joseph Ratzinger,” New Blackfriars 97, no. 1072 (2016): 661–676.↩︎

8. Reinhard Hütter, John Henry Newman on Truth and Its Counterfeits: A Guide for Our Times (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2023).↩︎

9. See Michael Seewald, Theories of Doctrinal Development in the Catholic Church, trans. David West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023). Seewald’s perspective is also quite different from my own.↩︎

10. See Martin John Miller, The Concept of Dogma in Vatican II, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Navarra (Pamplona: 2000).↩︎

11. See Reginald-Marie Schultes, Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum (Paris: Lethielleux, 1922); “Circa dogmatum homogeneam evolutionem” Divus Thomas 28 (1925): 83–99, 768–778; “Éclaircissements sur l’évolution du dogme,” Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 14, no. 3 (1925): 286–302; also see idem., Fides implicita: Geschichte der Lehre von der fides implicita und explicita in der katholischen Theologie, 2 vols. (Regensburg: Pustet, 1920).↩︎

12. See Reginald Schultes, Fides implicita: Geschichte der Lehre von der fides implicita und explicita in der katholischen Theologie, 2 vols. (Regensburg: Pustet, 1920).↩︎

13. See Reginald Schultes, De ecclesia catholica praelectiones apologeticae (Paris: Lethielleux, 1931). For the present questions, see p. 304–332, 605–742 (esp. 617–618).↩︎

14. For more information in English, see Michael Torre, Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call: Francisco Marín-Sola on Sufficient Grace (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013); Taylor Patrick O’Neill, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin: A Thomistic Analysis (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019).↩︎

15. In English, see Francisco Marín-Sola, The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma, trans. Antonio T. Piñon (Manila: Santo Tomas University Press, 1988). Regarding the differences with Schultes in particular, see p. 771–805; for his treatment (“refutation”) of ecclesiastical faith, see p. 439–539. One should note that, as regards his interpretation of John of St. Thomas, the editors of the Solesmes edition of John of St. Thomas’s Cursus theologicus felt that Marín-Sola’s interpretation of the Portuguese scholastic was questionable enough to merit an open statement of opposition to his proposed reading. See Ioannis a Sancto Thoma, Cursus Theologici, vol. 1, ed. Monks of Solesmes (Paris / Tournai: Typis Societatis S. Joannis Evangelistae / Desclée et Socii, 1931), p. 361n1.↩︎

16. Because of the importance of this arcane expression, I here reproduce a footnote from my translations in the Philosophizing in Faith volume published by Cluny Press in 2019. Properly speaking, a syllogism is objectively illative, inferring a given truth (i.e., the conclusion) from two premises. As regards the distinction between an explicative and an illative syllogism, see the remarks of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange’s student, Fr. Austin Woodbury, S.M., in Austin Woodbury, Logic (St. Vincent College, Latrobe, PA: The John N. Deely and Anthony Russell Collection), pp. 239–41 (nn. 299–300):
    
    “In every syllogism properly so-called, from one truth is inferred another truth. Therefore, whenever by a syllogism there is not inferred a new truth, this is a syllogism improperly so-called. The syllogism improperly so-called is twofold, to wit: the expository syllogism and the explicative syllogism... From the expository syllogism must be distinguished the explicative syllogism; whereof, this is an example: ‘Man is mortal. But a rational animal is a man. Therefore, a rational animal is mortal.’”

    “Here, [the middle term] is universal, and therefore there is a true illation. Nevertheless, it is not a syllogism properly so-called, because it does not infer in the conclusion another truth, i.e. a judgment other than in the premises. For here, the conclusion expresses the same truth but explicates it by other concepts. For these two propositions, ‘man is mortal,’ and, ‘rational animal is mortal,’ express the same truth, but the latter expresses it by more distinct concepts than the former. Wherefore, to this is rightly given the name of explicative syllogism.”
    
    “In the explicative syllogism, the conclusion is identical as regards itself (quoad se) with the major but not as regards us (non quoad nos); and therefore, there is a formal illation, but not an objective illation. Observe that the major [premise] and the conclusion of an explicative syllogism are in the same mode of saying ‘per se’; otherwise, there would be had, not an explicative syllogism but a syllogism properly so-called. In the example given above, both these propositions are in the second mode of saying ‘per se.’ But the case is otherwise with this syllogism: ‘A rational animal is capable of science. But man is a rational animal. Therefore, man is capable of science.’ Here, the major [premise] is in the fourth mode of saying ‘per se’; otherwise, the syllogism would be employed to no purpose. But the conclusion is in the second manner of saying ‘per se.’ Wherefore this is a syllogism properly so-called.”↩︎

17. Schultes, in his Introductio, will insist on this point very strongly, even at one point remarking that such conclusions are not even the most important of those to be drawn in theology. This echoes things that can be found in Garrigou-Lagrange, too. It is a good example evidencing the fact that the accusation that scholastic theology was mere “conclusion theology” is quite distortive. I discuss some of these matters in Matthew K. Minerd, “Wisdom be Attentive: The Noetic Structure of Sapiential Knowledge,” Nova et Vetera. 18, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 1103–1146.↩︎

18. One might also think of the “affective” development of the sensus fidelium that accompanies the Ecclesia docens as another important aspect of development. (cf. Journet, though one thinks also of Newman and even Marín-Sola, or from a different perspective, remarks in De Lubac and others. See the various studies cited above, as well as their bibliographies.)↩︎

19. I do not have space here to discuss the distinction between a physical property (property as accident) and metaphysical property ( something that is only conceptually distinct from the essence, like risibility or being-a-cultural-being for the case of man, or the essence itself as foundation for a physical property). I would need to dig for my references from Goudin (and others) to present this in full.↩︎

20. “Physical” reasoning would be based upon contingent laws which could, by the divine absolute power, be different. There are other issues discussed in the opening chapters of Marín-Sola’s work. I am only presenting a very general outline. We still await a complete and detailed revisiting of the entire debate between him and Schultes, which I believe remains an incomplete theological (and philosophical-logical) debate.↩︎

21. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Doctrinal Commentary on concluding formula of ‘Professio fidei,’” no. 8 (https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/doctrinal-commentary-on-concluding-formula-of-professio-fidei-2038).↩︎

22. This similarity was not lost on Francis A. Sullivan in “Some Observations on the New Formula for the Profession of Faith,” Gregorianum 70, no. 3 (1989): 549–558 (here, 554). However, as regards the status of “secondary objects” of infallibility, one should consult the relationes of Gasser and Kleutgen Mansi directly. The present essay presumes the basic solidity of the presentation and commentary found in Vincent Gasser, The Gift of Infallibility, ed. and trans. James T. O'Connor (San Francisco: Ignatius Prss, 2008).↩︎

23. On the universality of the specification of acts and habitus by formal objects, see Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace, trans. Dominican Sisters of Corpus Christi Monastery (St. Louis: Herder, 1952), 467–80.↩︎

24. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Doctrinal Commentary on concluding formula of ‘Professio fidei,’” no. 6.↩︎

25. For the presentation in Marín-Sola, see Homogeneous Evolution, 439–539. For Fenton, see Joseph C. Fenton, “The Question of Ecclesiastical Faith,” American Ecclesiastical Review (April, 1953): 287–301; also, derivative upon Marín-Sola, but also informative, see Leonard Thomas Fallon, Ecclesiastical Faith and the Principles of St. Thomas Concerning the Unity of Faith, Lectorate of Sacred Theology Thesis (Washington, DC: Dominican House of Studies, 1949).↩︎

26. Adolf Tanquerey, Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae, 26th ed. vol. 1 (Paris: Desclée et Socii, 1949), no. 918 (p. 618).↩︎

27. See Sixtus Cartechini, De valore notarum theologicarum et de criteriis ad eas dignoscendas (Sainte Croix du Mont, France: Tradibooks, 2010), 25–32, 84–86. Original published in 1951 in Rome by Typis Pontificiae Universitatis Gregocianae.↩︎

28. Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, trans. Patrick Lynch, ed. James Canon Bastible (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder, 1960), 9.↩︎

29. Jacobus M. Ramirez, De Fide Divina, In II-II Summae Theologiae Divi Thomae Expositio (qq. I–VII), Opera Omnia 10 (Salamanca: Editorial San Esteban, 1994), 424-430, here 427, followed by arguments for his position.↩︎

30. See Charles Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, vol. 1 (The Apostolic Hierarchy) (London / New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 166–167, 351–353, and 345–346.↩︎

31. See Charles Journet, La message révélé: sa transmission, son développement, ses dépendances (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 64–65, 83–84,102–109.↩︎

32. Emmanuel Doronzo, Theologia dogmatica, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1966), no. 473.↩︎

33. Ibid., no. 487↩︎

34. Michel Labourdette, La Foi, “Grand cours” de théologie morale, vol. 8 (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2015), 136. This is the heart of Garrigou-Lagrange’s concern as well. See Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, “Theology and the Life of Faith,” in Philosophizing in Faith (Providence, RI: Cluny Media, 2019), 439–443; the same essay can be found in The Thomistic Response to the Nouvelle Théologie: Concerning the Truth of Dogma and the Nature of Theology, ed. and trans. Jon Kirwan and Matthew Minerd (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2023), 284–286. Also, see Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, De virtutibus theologicis (Turin: Berruti, 1948), 83–95.↩︎

35. Labourdette, La foi, 132–133.↩︎

36. Michel Labourdette, “Les enseignements de l’Encyclique Humani Generis,” Revue Thomiste 50 (1950): 39n1.↩︎

37. Whether or not this is correct is not the concern of this essay.↩︎

38. Schultes, Introductio, 130–131. Also see the sections from De ecclesia cited above.↩︎

39. Just to name some well known names. On the “pro” side: The Würzburg Jesuits, Vacant, Scheeben, Pesch, Billot, Bainvel, Tanqueray, Van Noort, De Groot, Lennnerz, Franzelin, Palmieri, Mendive, Schultes, and many others. On the “con” side: Schiffini, Mazzella, Tuyaerts, Marín-Sola, Gardeil, Beraza, Stolz, Journet, Martinéz. Also, I would add, Garrigou-Lagrange, at least in brief remarks, registered in De virtutibus theologicis, 141.↩︎